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Abstrac 
This thesis is a study of a political movement which 
has had a profound influence on the development of modern 
Iraqi politics. The study has attempted to investig ate 
the historical and ideological origins of Jama'at al-Ahali 
and its political philosophy, to assess its role in Iraqi 
opposition politics and its contribution to the national 
movement as a whole. This has involved a general survey 
of political and socio-economic developments in late 
nineteenth and twentieth century Iraq, as well as a more 
detailed discussion of events in the 1930s and 1940s. 
Various aspects of the ideology of the group, and its 
reactions to the deficiencies of the prevailing political 
system have been related to the particular circumstances 
of the period. 
The thesis has been divided into three parts. Part I 
deals with the general background of Iraqi history until 
the beginning of the period of research, and the formation 
and ideological origins of Jamalat al-Ahali. Part II 
deals more specifically with events in the 1930s and 
1940s, while Part III deals with the role of Jamalat al-Ahali 
between 1932 and 1946. Thus ChapterII describes the political 
and socio-economic development of Iraq from the end of 
the nineteenth century until 1946, while ChapterM deals 
with the formation and nature of political parties in 
general, with special emphasis on the opposition bloc 
and the position and function of Jama'at al'-Aha'li within 
i. 
it. Chapter iVwhich ends the first part, is divided into 
ii 
four sections. The first describes the activities of 
the founders of the group, while still at school and 
university in Baghdad and Beirut; the second discusses 
the main ideological influences on the group; the third 
outlines its formal foundation and the publication of 
al-Ahali newspaper in January 1932, and the final section 
analyses the group's ideology, al-Sha'biya. 
Part 11 consists of Chapters V, VI and VII which 
set the scene for the 1930s and 1940s with special 
reference to various major events of the period. These 
events affected either the political system as a whole, 
or involved Jamalat al-Ahali to a greater or lesser extent. 
Finally, Part III, which is divided into four 
chronological Chapters (VIII - XI) followed by a 
Conclusion, traces the different stages in the development 
and activities of the group over the whole period. 
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1 
Chapter I 
Introduction 
This thesis is a study of a political movement which 
has had a profound influence on the development of modern 
Iraqi politics. Jama'at al-Ahali 
1 
attracted the support and 
membership of many leading Iraqi intellectuals from its 
beginnings in the early 1930s until the overthrow of the 
monarchy in 1958. Although its members only held government 
office for a fairly brief period between 1936 and 1937, 
the group and its newspapers helped to awaken the political 
consciousness of several generations of Iraqis and acted 
as a focal point of opposition to the political system under 
the monarchy. 
Jamalat al-Ahali was not, strictly speaking, a political 
party, but a loose grouping of like-minded individuals who 
believed in a form of social democracy which they called 
,2 al-Sha'biya, or 'popularism Their views were disseminated 
in the pages of their various publications, which maintained 
a broadly consistent ideological position and high literary 
and journalistic standards over more than three decades. 
al-Ahali's main period of influence, which forms the central 
concern of this study, began with the last year of the 
British mandate, and continued through Iraq's early years 
In this context, Jama'at means group, association or 
faction. 
2. 
a- l'-S'ha'biya has been translated as 'popularism' rather 
than populism' in order to distinguish it from the term 
used in the United States in the nineteenth century. For 
a more detailed discussion, see Chapter iv, section 4. 
(0 
2 
as a nominally independent state. The system of indirect rule 
which the British authorities had introduced in 1920, whereby 
Iraqi ministers held executive positions, but were backed 
up by British advisers whose advice had to be taken on all 
essential matters, gave way to a new system which, although 
providing an outward appearance of national sovereignty, 
concealed important structural continuities from the previous 
period. In these circumstances, the emptiness and corruption 
of the political system, which effectively excluded the 
bulk of the population from participation in the political 
process, became increasingly apparent. 
The period prior to 1932 had seen the emergence of 
a number of political factions, mainly centred around 
prominent individuals, and based on alliances of mutual 
interest rather than political principle. The emergence of 
Jama'at al-Ahali as a political association with an ideology 
and definite objectives, was thus an almost entirely new 
departure. As well as demanding genuine national 
independence for the country, Jamalat al-Ahali also stressed 
the need for wide-ranging economic and social reforms, aimed 
especially at raising the living standards of the poorer 
sections of the community. 
Given the political and socio-economic structure of 
Iraq in the 1930s and 1940s, and the special nature of 
her relationship with Britain, it is not surprising that 
the members of Jama'at al-Ahali were largely frustrated 
in their efforts to build a new society. However, in spite 
3 
of this apparent failure, the influence of the group's 
ideology and activities on its contemporaries was immense. 
In the first place, they were articulating ideas which 
gradually became widely supported throughout society, but 
which had not previously been expressed in a consistent or 
coherent fashion. Through the group's newspapers, ideas of 
social democracy, the provision of universal health, 
education and welfare services, agrarian reform, and state 
control of key sectors of the economy became part of the 
common currency of popular political discussion. The demand 
for such reforms came to form the core of opposition to the 
monarchy, and was carried over into the republican period. 
Although previous studies of Iraqi history have 
acknowledged the evident importance of Jamalat al-Ahali, no 
single work has concentrated on the group's history, 
development and general significance for its time. Of the 
3 
older works in English, Khadduri and Longrigg , who had no 
access to original documents, have given brief descriptions 
of its formation and activities. Two recent theses by Tarbush 
and Pool 
4 
are more analytical and more thoroughly researched, 
but their emphasis is rather different; Tarbush has 
concentrated on the relationship between Jamalat al-Ahali 
and the army, particularly in the context of the coup of 1936, 
3. 
Khadduri, M., Independent irag, 1932-1958, A Study in Iraq 
Politics, 2nd edn, London 1960- Longrigg, 5.11. Iraq 1900 
to 1950, London 1953. 
4. Tarbush, M., The Role of the Military in Politics: a case 
StudZ of Iraq between 1936 and 1941, unpublished D.. 
* 
Phil. 
Thesis, oxford University 1978; Pool, D., The Politics o-f 
Patronage: Elite and Social Structure in Iraq ., 1921-1958# 
unpublished Ph. D. ThesisPrinceton University, 1972. 
4 
while Pool is especially concerned with the workings of 
patronage within the political system. Batatu devotes several 
pages to a discussion of the group, but, again, his interests 
are focussed on a larger canvas, although this has made his 
5 
work an indispensable source of reference and support 
Various detailed studies in Arabic on parts of the period 
and aspects of the activities of Jama'at al-Ahali have also 
appeared, with particular emphasis on the person of Kamil 
6 
al-Chadirchi . Finally, two works on al-Ahali 
between 1932 
5. Batatu, H., The Old Social Classes and Revolutionary 
Movements of Iraq: A Study of Iraq's Old Landed and 
Commercial classes and of its Communists, Ba'thists, 
and Free officers, Princeton 1978. 
Although published in the United States in 1978, this 
study did not become available in England until mid-1979. 
At that stage the great bulk of the present work had 
already been written and in almost every case Batatu's 
findings confirm the conclusions previously reached. 
The frequent references which have been made to it 
throughout this study illustrate its fundamental importance 
to modern Iraqi historiography. 
6. See al-'Akkad, S., "Tatawwur al-Yasar fi al-'Iraq" (The 
development of the Left in Iraq), al-Katib Vii, March 
1972, (Cairo), pp. 96-106; Anis, M., "Jama'at al-Ahali wa 
nash'at al-Yasar al-'Iraqi" (jamalat al-Ahali and the 
growth of the Iraqi Left), al-Hilal LXXIII, January 1965 
(Cairo), pp. 46-55; al-Mallah-, W-.., --"-'Shai' 'an Jaridat al- 
Ahali" (Stories about al-Ahali newspaper), al-Thaqafa, II, 
Vol. 10, No. vember 1972 (Baghdad), pp. 9-37. 
Ibid., Tarikh 
- 
al-Haraka al-Dimuqratiya fi al-'Iraq fi Nisf 
Qarn (History of tH-e Democratic movement in Iraq'over halt 
a century), (Baghdad), 1975. 
al-'Umari, K., "Dhikrayat 'an Kamil al-chadirchi" (Memories 
of Kamil al-Chadirchi), al-Hilal LXXVI, April 1968 (Cairo), 
pp. 26-49. 
Ibid., "Kamil al-Chadirchi fi al-Thalathiniyat" (Kamil 
iil-Chadirchi in the Thirties), Dirasat 'Arabiya, VI, 
Febr 
, 
uary 1970, (Beirut), pp. 52-68. 
Ibid., "Jaridat al-Ahali min 1932 ila 1937" (al-Ahali 
newspaper from 1932 to 1937), al-'Aqlam, VI, November 
1969 (Baghdad), pp. 5-19. 
5 
and 1937 by Khalil and al-Wakil appeared in 1973 and 1978, 
but these are both generally narrative accounts of the 
group's development between those years7. 
This study has attempted to investigate the historical 
and ideological origins of Jamalat al-Ahali and its political 
philosophy, to assess its role in Iraqi opposition politics 
and its contribution to the national movement as a whole. 
This has involved a general survey of political and socio- 
economic developments in late nineteenth and twentieth 
century Iraq, as well as a more detailed discussion of 
events in the 1930s and 1940s. Various aspects of the 
ideology of the group, and its reactions to the deficiencies 
of the prevailing political system have been related to 
the particular circumstances of the period. 
The research has involved an exhaustive examination of 
all available sources in Arabic and English relating both 
to Iraqi history in the period and to the foundation, 
ideology and activities of the group itself. Three main 
classes of primary source materials have been used: archives, 
contemporary newspapers and other publications and interviews 
with the founders and some of their contemporaries. 
7. Khalil, M., al-Ahali wa al-Haraka al-Wataniya fi al -Iraq 1932-1937 ! al-Ahali and the National Movement in Iraq, 
1932-1937) unpublished M. A. Thesis, Cairo University, 1973. 
aj-Wakil, F., Jama'at al-Ahali fi al-'Iraq 1932-1937 
(jamalat al-Ahdli in Iraq), u; ipM1`shed M. A. Thesis, 
Baghdaa Univers-iff"y, 1978. See also the informative thesis 
by 'A. al-Daraji, Ja'far Abu al-Timman wa dawruhu fi 
al-Haraka al-Wataniyya fi al-*Iraq, 1908-1945 (Ja'far Abu 
al-Timman and his role in the Iraqi national movement 1908-1945), M. A., Baghdad University 1976, and published 
Baghdad 1978. 
6 
The archives consist of British Foreign Office and Air 
Ministry papers on Iraq for the period in the Public Record 
Office, London; correspondence between the American 
Legation in Baghdad and the State Department in the United 
States National Archives, Washington D. C. which have not 
previously been used by researchers, and various papers in 
the Iraq National Archives, the General Security Office and 
8 
the General Security Library in Baghdad . There, %as no single 
complete run of al-Ahali and Sawt al-Ahali newspapers for 
the period 1932 to 1946, but it has been possible, with 
considerable effort, to compile one on microfilm from a 
9 
number of different sources . The group's other publications 
have been made available through the generosity of the 
founders. Finally, since all the leading members of the 
group, with the exception of Kamil al-Chadirchi, are still 
alive, it has been possible to interview them at length in 
Baghdad and London at various times between 1975 and 1979. 
Other political personalities, notably Naji Shawkat, Mahdi 
Kubba, Sj8diq Shanshal, Mahmud Subhi al-Daftari and 
Muhammad Fakhri al-Jamil also kindly consented to be 
interviewed. 
The thesis has been divided into three parts. Part I 
deals with the general background of Iraqi history until 
the beginning of the period of research, ' and the formation 
and ideological origins of Jama'at al-Ahali. Part II deals 
8. See the Note on Sources, p. 411. 
9" 
Ibid. 
7 
more specifically with events in the 1930s and 1940s, while 
Part III deals with the role of Jamalat al-Ahali between 
1932 and 1946. Thus, Chapter II describes the political and 
socio economic development of Iraq from the end of the 
nineteenth century until 1946, while Chapter III deals with 
the formation and nature of political parties in general, 
with special emphasis on the opposition bloc and the 
ppsition and function of Jama'at al-Ahali within it. 
Chapter IV, which ends the first part, is divided into 
four sections. The first describes the activities of the 
founders of the group while still at school and university 
in Baghdad and Beirut; the second discusses the main 
ideological influences on the group; the third outlines 
its formal foundation and the publication of al-Ahali 
newspaper in January 1932, and the final section analyses 
the group's ideology, al-Shalbiya. 
part II, which consists of Chapters V- VII, sets 
the scene for the 1930s and 1940s with special reference 
to various major events of the period. These events either 
affected the political system as a whole, or involved 
Jamalat al-Ahali to a greater or lesser extent. Finally, 
Part III, which is divided into four chronological chapters 
(VIII-XI) followed by a conclusion, traces the different 
stages in the development and activities of the group over 
the whole period. 
8 
Chapter II 
The Historical Backgrourýd of Modern Iraq 
In order to set Jama'at al-Ahali in its proper political 
context, it is useful to give a brief review of Iraqi 
history from the mid-nineteenth century until 1946. This 
period has been the subject of a number of scholarly 
monographs 
1 
and therefore does not require detailed treatment 
here. The founding members of Jamalat al-Ahali, and hence 
their most impressionable years coincided with the end of 
four centuries of Ottoman rule and the creation of Iraq as 
a separate entity under British influence at the end of 
the First World War. 
P,, j ", s4-ov! j IS60 - 193Z 
Although the formal occupation of Iraq only began 
with the landing of Indian Expeditionary Force 'D' in 
Basra in 1914, British Commercial penetration had long 
dominated political and economic life in the two southern 
wilayets_of Baghdad and Basra. Furthermore, even at the 
height of Ottoman power, the control exercised by 
Constantinople over the Iraqi provinces had been largely 
dependent on the strength of individual governors. In the 
mid-nineteenth century, most of the area of the modern 
state lay outside the effective jurisdiction of the central 
government, but by the end of the century some of the 
e. g. Ireland, P. W., Iraq, a Study in Political Devel*o*R*m'ent 
(London 1937); Sluglett, P., Britain__Iraq 1914-1932-, ()Lon on, 
1976); Cohen, S., British Poli=3-n Mesopotamia_, 1903-1914, 
(London, 1976), - Ba atu, H., (1978). 
9 
effects of the Tanzimat had filtered through to the Iraqi 
provinces, and had begun to weaken the power of the great 
tribal confederations. During the governorate of Midhat 
Pasha between 1869 and 1872, a certain degree of economic 
and administrative reform was introduced, but the increased 
security which resulted ultimately served to facilitate 
the expansion of British economic and political influence, 
particularly after the Anglo-Ottoman Treaty of 1861 and 
the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. Batatu tells us that 
the value of British textiles imported through Basra rose 
from E51,000 in 1868-70 to E1,128,000 in 1897-99 and to 
2 E3,066,000 in 1907-09 
Furthermore, the Gulf and the route to India had 
long been an important strategic concern of Great Britain, 
and this was further accentuated in the early years of 
the twentieth century by the discovery and development of 
oil in southern Persia. Britain's anxiety over German- 
ottoman plans for the Baghdad railway and German penetration 
in general were further accentuated by official knowledge 
of the existence of major oil deposits on either side of 
3 the projected line . Thus, when Turkey entered the War on 
the side of the Central Powers in 1914, British Indian 
troops were immediately despatched from Bombay to Basra to 
protect British interests in Iraq. The Mesopotamia campaign 
began auspiciously for Britain, but in spite of rapid 
advances in the spring of 1915, a revival of Turkish strength 
2. Batatu, 1978, pp. 239-240. 
3. Cohen, 1976, p. 57. See also Kent, M., Oil and Empire; British Policy and Mesopotamian Oil, 1900-1920 CL--o`fi`d on, 1976 ), P-4- 
10 
delayed the, capture of Baghdad until 1917. As British troops 
advanced northwards a civil and political administration 
was set up in the occupied territory. Just after the 
official ending of the War, Mosul town was occupied, 
while much of Lower Iraq had been under direct British 
administrative control for almost four years. 
As well as bringing administrative reform, the 
introduction of the institutions of the Tanzimat at the 
end of the nineteenth century had had an important impact 
on the social and intellectual life of the Iraqi provinces. 
In particular, young Iraqis began to attend civil and 
military educational establishments in Constantinople. 
This development took place at the same time as tne 
emergence of important trends of secular nationalism in 
the Arab countries in general, particularly in Egypt and 
4 
Greater Syria . In the latter years of the reign of 
'Abd al-Hamid 11 (1876-1908), Arab writers put forward 
notions of a federal Ottoman state, in which the various 
provinces would enjoy some degree of autonomy. Arab 
officers of the Ottoman Army were prominently associated 
with the Young Turk revolution in 1908, but their hopes 
for a form of devolution were soon dashed by the new 
rulers' adoption of a policy which emphasised the 
essentially Turkish nature of the Ottoman state. As a result, 
a number of Arab secret societies were formed, whose 
objectives ranged from the simple administration decentralisatic 
4. See HouraniA. H., Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 
1798-1939, (Londori-,, l9'70)#PP. 2bQ-323. 
11 
of the Arab provinces to their outright eecession from the 
Empire. al-'Ahd, a group which favoured secession, was 
dominated by a number of Iraqi officers who were latar to 
play a prominent part in the early years of the independent 
state, notably Nuri al-Sa'id, Ja'far al-'Askari, Yasin al- 
Hashimi, Jamil al-Madfa'i, Naji Shawka: t and 'Ali Jawdat. 
Many of these officers took part in the British-inspired 
Arab Revolt of 1916, and later held office in the short- 
lived Arab Government in Damascus under Amir Faisal between 
October 1918 and July 1920. 
The First World War left Britain in actual occupation 
of most of the territory of Greater Syria and Iraq. The 
Sykes-Picot Agreement had effectively divided the area into 
British and French spheres of influence in spite of 
undertakings to Husain, Sharif of Mecca, that an 'independent' 
Arab state would be created. However, at the end of 1918, 
the situation in the Middle East was still comparatively 
fluid, in the sense that the virtual absence of French 
troops in Greater Syria encouraged the belief that such a 
state might actually come into being, and the Anglo-French 
Declaration of 10 November gave further foundation to such 
hopes. Meanwhile, in Iraq, the extremely rigid form of 
British Indian administration which had been in existence 
for four years in parts of Basra wilayet, was now being 
imposed on the rest of the country. The contrast between 
the Arab state in Damascus, which was being administered 
by Arab officials including a number of senior ex-Ottoman 
officers of Iraqi origin (the Sharifians), and the 
administration in Baghdad, which was carried out entirely 
12 
by British officers and officials, was particularly striking. 
The inflexibility of British rule in Baghdad, and its 
failure in any way to accommodate to Iraqi aspirations 
eventually played an important part in provoking what 
is known as the Revolution of June - October 1920. This 
event is of significance as the first major manifestation 
of a form of Iraqi national identity, and subsequently 
played an important role in the country's political 
mythology as a focus for opposition to the monarchy and 
5 for anti-British sentiments . Partly as a result of the 
Revolution, and partly as a result of other developments 
in British colonial policy, direct rule by British 
officials was abandoned in favour of indirect rule by 
Britain through an ostensibly Iraqi governmeht and civil 
service backed up by a small but powerful corps of 
British advisers. 
This apparent change of heart was in fact the 
culmination of a process that had begun at least since the 
end of the World War. A variety of pressures, but perhaps 
most notably the entry of the United States into the War 
on the Allied side in 1917, had combined to make 
traditional forms of colonialism no longer a practical 
possibility. In the course of the Paris Peace Conference 
the mandate concept was elaborated, under which the British 
and French would govern parts of the former territories 
of the Central Powers by means of a form of trusteeship 
from the League of Nations. Theoretically, at least, the 
See Nadhmi, W. J. O., The Political, Social and Intellectual 
Roots of the Iraqi Independence Movement of 1920 (Durham 
University Ph. D. thesis, 1974), passim. 
13 
mandatory power was to prepare the mandated territory for 
independence at some indefinite point in the future. Thus, 
under the Treaty of San Remo of 1920, France gained Syria 
and Lebanon, and Britain, Iraq and Palestine. , 
The Revolution of 1920 had been embarrassingly expensive 
for the British government in terms of 'British blood and 
treasure', particularly as it took place at a time when 
painful austerity measures had been introduced in Britain 
itself. It was therefore felt necessary to embark on a 
policy of cheap but effective administration in Britain's 
6 
new middle Eastern 'responsibilities' . To this end a 
special sub-department was set up in the Colonial Office to 
coordinate policy and administration. Churchill, the 
Colonial Secretary, organised a conference in Cairo in 
March 1921 where the main principles of a new and far cheaper 
policy was developed. It was decided to set up a national 
government in Iraq, headed by an Arab ruler. Faisal, the 
ex-king of Syria, was the obvious candidate for the post 
7 
In August 1921, Faisal was duly installed as King of 
8 
Iraq, and a government and administration set up . In the 
6. -Incredible waste now proceeding in Mesopotamia can only 
be cured by driving large numbers of troops and followers 
out of the country and off our pay list ... We have to 
carry everybody back sooner or later and keeping them 
waiting eating up our mutton is pure waste. ' 
FO 371/6350/E 4830/100,931 SIS Colonies (W. S. Churchill), 
Cairo, to Prime Minister, London, Tgm of 14 March 1921. 
Quoted Batatu, 1978, p. 325. 
7 'Fgr further details, see Sluglett, 1976, pp. 42-73. 
8-See Ireland, 1937, pp. 326-33. 
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course of the years that followed, Faisal did not prove 
quite the pliant instrument that his British masters had 
expected him to be, although their monopoly of the means 
of coercion ultimately meant that the advice that they 
gave had to be taken. The King and his immediate circle 
(largely composed of the officers who had served under 
his command during the Arab Revolt) were constantly 
involved in a delicate balancing act. They had to satisfy 
the exigencies of British policy while at the same time 
retaining some degree of credibility with what may loosely 
be termed Iraqi national aspirations. 
Batatu has shown in great detail the variety of ways 
in which the British were able both to maintain Faisal's 
government in power and at the same time to limit its 
field of manoeuvre 
9. By bolstering the powers of tribal 
shaikhs and landlords, and limiting the size of the Iraq 
Army by refusing to permit the introduction of conscription 
10 
AP 
it was possible to ensure that the new government could 
not act independently. Hence, Faisal and his circle were 
gradually forced into a tacit alliance with the most 
reactionary elements in the country, and political life 
came more and more to resemble an elaborate game of musical 
chairs, played by individuals whose prime objective was 
their own self-interest. Although a parliamentary system 
was provided under the constitution of 1924, elections 
were always rigged and the democratic process further debased 
9. See Batatu, 1978, pp. 53-61, passim. 
lo. conscription was not introduced until 1934. 
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by appointments based on political consideration rather 
I than on merit. During the mandate period, political 
parties were for the most part simply short term alliances 
between groups of like-minded individuals. To very great 
extent, therefore, political life operated in an entirely 
artificial atmosphere, and occupied itself very little 
with the major concerns of the bulk of the population, 
who were excluded from participation in the political process. 
In spite of all this manipulation of the political 
system, it was not possible to prevent the rise of a small 
but significant number of individuals and groups who came 
to form the nucleus of opposition to the regime. Significantly 
for the future, this opposition contributed in a major 
sense to the politicisation of crucial sections of society, 
particularly students, the intelligentsia, army officers 
and the emerging working class. in 1929 when negotiations 
were in-progress for the Treaty that was to replace the 
existing instrument which governed Anglo-Iraqi relations, 
the members of Jama'at al-Ahali were in their early 
twenties, and had participated in much of the opposition 
political activity of the previous few years. The 1930 
Treaty can be regarded as a watershed in Anglo-Iraqi 
relations, since it provided the mechanism by which Britain 
could continue to exercise a permanent influence in 
strategic and political affairs throughout the period 
of the treaty while at the same time providing Iraq with 
all the trappings of an independent sovereign state. The 
size and number of the demonstrations in Baghdad against 
16 
the 1930 Treaty showed that most politically conscious 
Iraqis certainly understood its true significance 
11 
. 
Members of Jama'at al-Ahali, which was not founded formally 
until 1932, were to take the 1930 Treaty as the focus of 
their opposition to the Iraq Government and the British 
presence. A despatch from the American Legation accurately 
summarised the attitudes of the opposition in 1932: - 
Although Iraq became a member of the League of 
Nations as an Independent and free state, the 
fact cannot be hidden that perhaps the Iraqian 
without exception feels that his country is still 
tied to Great Britain both by written and by 
implied terms of the Anglo-Iraqi treaty, to an 
extent which still leaves it under a sufficiently 
powerful influence of Great Britain which make it 
impossible for Iraq to be considered or to act as 
a fully independent State. I believe that I am 
correct in saying that the views are held by every 
Iraqian without any exception. 12 
11. The American Legation noted: 
"The treaty gives Great Britain a military hegemony over 
Iraq and permits that country to dictate all Iraq's 
foreign relations. That, of course, is the position 
which Great Britain occupies and consequently in 
that respect, Iraq's position will not be any worse 
after 1932 than it is today. However, while the 
treaty gives Great Britain this predominate power 
in the Country it frees her from many obligations 
to Iraq which must be carried out under present 
arrangements; in other words, Great Britain is 
receiving a great deal and giving little or nothing 
in return. If the present treaty is ratified and Iraq 
becomes a member of the League of Nations, the 
membership will mean nothing, as the country will be 
tied, hand and foot, just as it is at present. " 
sloan (Baghdad) to State Department, 1.11.1930. USNA 
890. G. 00/134. 
12. Sloan (Baghdad) to State Department, 17.11.1932. 
USNA 890G. 00/223. 
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1932-1946 
Although the political system set up by Britain in 
Iraq during the mandate survived substantially intact 
until the Revolution of 1958, the period immediately after 
'independence' in 1932 witnessed a series of dramatic 
political upheavals. Here it is important to remember that 
Iraq was an artificial entity, created in 1918, in which 
forces for national integration were still comparatively 
weak. Ethnic and sectarian differences, the cultural and 
economic distance between city and countryside, the 
immense disparities between rich and poor, the unrepresentative 
nature of the political system and the immaturity of 
political forces which might otherwise have played a 
unifying role, all resulted in a series of violent internal 
conflicts which could not be resolved by political means. 
Thus the period in which Jama'at al-Ahali was active as 
a political group was overshadowed by tribal uprisings, 
military coups and ultimately by a further British 
occupation during the Second World War. In these circumstances 
politicians and political groupings of all shades of 
opinion, and even the Palace, were forced into constant 
changes of alliance with the tribes, the military and the 
British in order to try to ensure their political 
13 
survival 
Less than a year after the end of the mandate, two major 
13 'For this period, see also Khadduri, M., Independent Ira . q, 
1932-1958. A Study of Iraqi Politics (2 edn., London, 1960), 
Abd al-Razzaq al-Hasani, Tarikh a! --Wizarat al-2Irqq;, ya 
(History of the Iraqi Cabinets); (Sal-da -1974), Vols. V-IX. 
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events occurred within weeks of each other which were to 
have far-reaching effects on the country's political system. 
In July 1933, the Assyrian incident took place, reaching a 
bloody climax on *the third of August, and on the eighth of 
S;, 2PfeO, t4r. # King Faisal died suddenly and unexpectedly in 
Berne. The significance of the Assyrian affair, which will 
be discussed in detail in Chapter V was that it 
facilitated the emergence of the Army and its commander, 
Bakr Sidqi, as a force to be reckoned with in Iraqi 
politics. The King's death created a vacuum in the political 
arena, which was thus deprived of the cornerstone which 
had hitherto held the whole precarious edifice together. 
Although Faisal had been installed and maintained by the 
British, he had proved a shrewd and capable politician, 
who had exercised a moderating role on the various 
conflicting political and social groupings. His son Ghazi, 
who succeeded him (1933-1939), was a much less impressive 
personality and lacked his father's political flair and 
consummate diplomatic skill. 
Ghazi's general lack of experience and his active 
indifference to affairs of state prompted politicians 
whose ambitions had been partially checked by his father 
to give their own designs a freer rein. Between 1934 and 
1936, a number of factions in Baghdad, including members 
of Jama'at al-Ahali, incited various tribal leaders in 
the Middle Euphrates and elsewhere to rise in revolt in 
order to force the resignation of the governments of 
Jamil al-Madfa'i, 'Ali Jawdat and Yasin al-Hashimi. The 
seriousness of these uprisings forced the government to 
19 
call on the Army to put them down, which further enhanced 
the Army's role as a major political force. 
In 1936, realising that the Army was the sole 
instrument available to bring about any major change 
in the political power structure, Jama'at al-Ahali sided 
with Bakr Sidqi and his circle in a coup d'ýtat which 
toppled the government of Yasin al-Hashimi and installed 
a cabinet dominated by Hikmat Sulaiman and three other 
members of al-Ahali. The alliance bore little fruit as 
far as the implementation of al-Ahali's reform programme 
was concerned, and in fact had as its major consequence 
a result quite alien to the group's intentions, since the 
coup itself set a precedent for further military involvement 
in political life, and resulted in the Army becoming the 
dominant force in Iraqi politics for the next five years. 
A despatch from the British Embassy in 1938, summarising 
the events of the previous year, noted that: 
Many officers in the army continue to give 
themselves to political intrigue. There is 
one group seeking opportunities to support 
Nuri Salid's return to power; another sides 
with the present government; and the third 
is formed of those who hope somehow to 
regain what they lost through the passing 
of Bekr. 14 
Hence the period between 1936 and 1941 saw the rise 
and fall of a series of military-civilian alliances. When 
war broke out in 1939, these alliances were polarised 
into two major camps, the pro-British group headed by 
14. Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs: 
Annual Report for 1937, FO 371/21856/E794. 
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Nuri al-Sa'id and the Regent 'Abd al-Ilah (Ghazi had 
been killed in a car crash in April 1939, and his son 
Faisal was only four years old), and the Pan-Arab 
nationalist faction in the army known as the Golden 
Square, led by Salah al-Din al-Sabbagh, in association 
with Nadi al-Muthanna (notably Yunis al-Sablawi) who 
joined forces with Rashid 'Ali al-Gailani and the influential 
Hajj Amin al-Husaini, Mufti of Jerusalem. The 
group favoured a more or less neutral Position, and when 
they came to power in March 1940 refused to bow to 
British demands to break off diplomatic relations with 
Italy 
15. Under strong pressure from his military 
associates 
16 
, Rashid 'Ali declared that the government's 
relations with Britain would be maintained strictly in 
accordance with the Treaty of 1930, which gave Britain 
the right to use Iraqi territory and air space in the 
event of war but did not require Iraq. to play an active 
role as a belligerent. 
Rashid 'Ali's first cabinet lasted from March 1940 
to January 1941, a period of the war in which the 
situation on all fronts seemed particularly grave for 
Britain and her allies, and a successful outcome for 
British arms was by no means certain. In the Arab world, 
the defeats in North Africa and the existence of the 
pro-Axis Vichy government in Syria encouraged popular 
15. Diplomatic relations with Germany had been broken off in 1939 
16. In 1979, Naji Shawkat and Siddiq Shanshal recalled that 
members of the Golden Square had threatened Rashid 'Ali at 
gun point in May 1941. See also, al-Hasani, 'A., al-Asrar 
al-Khafiyya fi Harakat al-Sannat al-Wahid wa al----Kr-b7a-'in 
al-Taharruriyva TT--h-e--H-'7-den secrets Of the 1941 Liberation InCA 
21 
anti-British sentiments already influenced by the 
situation in Palestine, and the hope that an Axis victory 
17 
might bring substantial political changes in the area 
Although Nuri al-Sa'id served as Rashid 'Ali's foreign 
minister, he was unable to exert any influence on policy, 
and hence resigned in the autumn of 1940. Throughout 
this period, Rashid 'Ali and Naji E; hawkat were in contact 
with the Germans through both the Italian Legation in 
18 
Baghdad and the German Embassy in Ankara . By this time 
the Golden Squar e and its civilian counterparts had gained 
almost overwhelming popular support, and British efforts 
to undermine Rashid 'Ali and force his resignation were 
for the time being frustrated. The Regent, 'Abd al-Ilah, 
feeling that he could no longer influence the course of 
events, and in an attempt to forestall requests from the 
Golden Square for his own abdicationl9, left Baghdad for 
Diwaniya, on 30 January 1941, refusing to return until 
17. This was the view of the Mufti, which influenced the 
Golden Square and Yunis al-Sab'awi and p-.. shed t-ýem to 
take a hard line in face of British demands. Ibid, 
also see al-Sabbagh, Salah al-Din I Fursan al-'Aruba 
fi al-'Iraq (The Arab Knights in Ira--q7, Damascus, 1956. 
18. British Intelligence had succeeded in breaking the 
Italian codes, and successfully intercepted the messages 
to Rome. For Naji Shawkat's contacts with von Papen 
. in Ankara, see Naji Shawkat, Sira wa Dhikrayat, Thamanin 
'Aman 1894-1974(Memoirs of Eighty y rs 
19., 
Tfiaghflaj-, Jý31, pp. 402-410 
it seems that the Golden Square had already asked Amir 
Zaid to return to Baghdad from Ankara, where he was 
head of the Iraqi Legation, in order to replace 'Abd 
al-Ilah. Sde Knabenshue to State Department, 26.1.1941, 
USNA 890G. 00/524. 
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Rashid 'Ali submitted his resignation. The latter, 
fearing that the Regent might try to raise 'loyal' shaikhs 
and the local army commander in revolt against his 
government in Baghdad, obliged by relinquishing his post 
the following day. 
A compromise figure, Taha al-Hashimi, was appointed 
to succeed Rashid 'Ali. As Commander in Chief of the Army, 
a former Chief of General Staff, and brother of the late 
Yasin al-Hashimi, Taha commanded respect among the armed 
forces and was acceptable both to the British and to the 
Regent. However, he soon found himself unable either to 
secure the abrogation of diplomatic relations with Italy 
or any reduction in the power of the Golden Square. In 
February, the Mufti, Yunis al-Sablawi, Rashid 'Ali and 
the Golden Square jointly pledged themselves in secret 
to resist any compromise with Britain, and Taha al-Hashimi 
in his turn was thus obliged to resign a few weeks later. 
At this juncture the Golden Square were sufficiently 
powerful to insist on the reappointment of Rashid 'Ali, 
who was duly installed as Prime Minister on April 12. 
Thus the stage was set for a confrontation between Britain 
and iraq, which, given an appropriate Axis response, which 
was however not forthcoming 
20 
, might well have 
inflicted 
20. Although an Oil Treaty was signed in secret by Rashid 
'Ali and Gabrieli of the Iýalian Legation on 26 April 
1941. This treaty, whose text appears in the American 
records, is reproduced as Appendix A. 
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considerable damage on Britain's strategic position in 
the Middle East. Faced with the return of Rashid 'Ali 
and his colleagues to power, the Regent fled to Basra, 
where he was encouraged by the British authorities to 
try to form a government in exile 
21 
. When it became clear 
that no prominent politician was prepared to lend the 
Regent his support, the British Ambassador, Sir Kinahan 
cornwallis 
22 decided that it was now imperative to crush 
the new government by force, in spite of the logistical 
difficulties which this involved. He insisted that a 
battalion of British troops which had arrived at Basra 
should be allowed to cross Iraq, supposedly en route for 
Palestine 
23. Rashid 'Ali temporised but troops were in 
any case flown to R. A. F. Habbaniya. The Iraq Army had already 
surrounded the base, but when fighting broke out on May 
2, the British gained the upper hand almost immediately. 
Fighting continued sporadically until the end of May, 
but in fact little serious resistance was encountered. 
Rashid 'Ali and his colleagues escaped to Iran, and a truce 
was negotiated between the British and Iraqi forces. Nuri 
and the Regent returned to Iraq, and the country was 
21. See Knabenshue to State Department, 6.4.1941. 
USNA 890G. 00/544. 
22-Cornwallis had been Advisor to the Iraqi Ministry 
of Interior from 1921 to 1935, when he was dismissed 
by Rashid 'Ali. 
23. Until mid-April 1941, the only British troops in Iraq 
were stationed at the R. A. F. bases at Habbaniyya, some 
70 kilometres from Baghdad, and at Shu'aiba, near Basra. 
The nearest reinforcements were in Egypt and 
Transi ordan. 
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subjected to a period of nearly four years of foreign 
military occupation. The Iraq government now cooperated 
fully with the British authorities and threw itself whole- 
24 
heartedly behind the Allied war effort . The Pan-Arab 
nationalists were arrested or forced into exile, their 
organisations disbanded and their supporters purged from 
25 
the armed forces and the administration The Army was 
reduced in size, and in fact subordinated to British 
commanders. 
Between 1941 and 1945, the British were chiefly 
preoccupied with winning the war, and simply required a 
stable and loyal government in Iraq. In these circumstances, 
the choice of Nuri as their chief ally was at first the 
only alternative to direct rule, since he alone could 
maintain and manipulate the political machinery to their 
best advantage. Ultimately, however, his evident 
corruption became an embarrassment, and he was replaced 
by Hamdi al-Pachachi in June 1944, although in fact he 
was to remain the eminence grise of all Iraqi governments 
until his death. Nuri's regime was unable, or more probably 
unwilling, to clamp down on the spate of profiteering, 
speculation and hoarding, especially of essential 
commodities, which caused widespread suffering and 
deprivation, and immense profits for a small number of 
26 
merchant entrepreneurs . The process of alienation of 
24-See al-Kitab al-Abyadh (The White Book on the events 
leadir-ngup to the British Aggression in Iraq, The 
Government Press (Baghdad 1941). 
25. Batatu, 1978, p. 478. 
26-ibid., pp. 224-318. 
a 
25 
the government from the governed became so acute during 
these years that British observers forecast a 'violent 
confrontation between the haves and the have-nots, 
27 
and urged Nuri and the Regent to inject some 'new blood' 
28 
into the government 
In spite of the stagnation of political life at the 
level of government, the years between 1941 and 1946 were 
marked by a major expansion of Political consciousness 
throughout Iraq, both vertically and horizontally. Local 
political and economic factors, coupled with the entry 
of the Soviet Union into the War on the Allied side, the 
more widespread acceptance of ideas of socialism and 
communism, both nationally and internationally, and the 
notion that democracy could only be achieved when the 
fight against fascism had been won, all contributed to 
an increased political awareness which was expressed in 
the growth of ideologically based political parties. 
Because of the new international order, neither the 
government nor the British authorities could afford to 
29 
be seen to be repressing the growth of such organisations 
Jamalat al-Ahalil the Iraqi communist Party, and other 
27-cornwallis to SIS Foreign Affairs, 30.3.1945, 
FO. 371/45302/E2431. 
28. Cornwallis to SIS Foreign Affairs, 8.2.1944, 
FO. 371/40041/Ell43. 
29. To such an extent that Arshad al-Umari, who became Prime 
Minister in June 1946, complained to the British 
Ambassador that the Allies 'were responsible for spreading 
progressive and communist ideas'. Ambassador (Baghdad) 
to SIS Foreign Affairs, 5.7.1946. FO. 371/52459/E6336. 
26. 
left-wing groups had been active in promoting their ideas 
and in reorganising themselves in preparation for their 
eventual legalisation, or, in the case of the Communist 
Party, for their tacit acceptance, by the authorities. 
Hence, in April 1946,. five political parties were legally 
recotnised, three of which were headed by founding members 
of Jama'at al-Ahali. 
2. Economic and Social Background 
The main purpose of the previous section was to 
establish a chronological narrative of events as a 
background to the formation of political ideologies and 
organisations. What follows is an attempt to trace the 
main features of the economic and social history of the 
period, in order to give a broader perspective to 
political developments and to permit a fuller understanding 
of the origins and nature of Jama'at al-Ahali, and the 
climate in which its members operated. 
in the course of the hundred years between 1850 and 
1950 the economy of the three Iraqi provinces underwent 
a gradual transition from virtual subsistence and self- 
sufficiency to almost total integration in the world 
economic system.. This process has been charted in some 
detail by the economist M. S. Hasan, who has shown how 
foreign trade gradually transformed Iraq into a dependent 
30 
economy . The first signs of this process were evident 
in the period after the opening of the Suez Canal, a 
30. Hasan, M. S. # 'The Role of Foreign Trade in the Economic 
Development of Iraq 1864-1964: a Study in the Growth Of 
a Dependent Economy', in Cook, M. A., (ed), Studies in the 
Econ_omic History of the Middle East, (Londo-n-IIMT, 
pp. 346-372. 
27 
development which increased British trade to the Gulf 
31 
and Lower Iraq . Until the discovery of oil, Iraqi 
exports consisted largely of agricultural and animal 
produce, notably cereals and dates. Thus, Hasan tells 
us, exports increased from E147,000 in 1864-71 to 
E2,960,000 in 1912-13, although the increase in agricultural 
production (1.2% per annum) did not keep pace with the 
increase of population (1.90% per annum) nor the increase 
in foreign trade (2. 'rl. per annum) in the period between 
32 
the 1860s and the 1950s . Furthermore, British firms 
such as Andrew Weir and Company, and Lynch Brothers, were 
substantially involved in the export trade. 
i) Demography and Agriculture 
The change in the nature of the economy is reflected 
in the demographic history of the period. In 1867, the 
population was estimated at 1.2 million, of which 35% 
were nomads, and 41%o settled, that is neither nomads nor 
townsmen. By 1905, the nomads had dropped to 170%, and 
33 
by 1930, they formed only 71% of the total population 
By the time of the first accurate census in 1947, the 
31. See above, P. 9. 
32 'Hasan, 1970, pp. 348-9. 
33. Hasan, M. S., al-Tatawwur al-Iqtisadi fi'l-'Iraq 
The Economic Development of iraq), -7S§-a-lrd-a, 1965)opp. 37-58. 
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figures were: 
Percentage of total 
Nomads 250,000 5 
Settled 2,700,000 57 
Urban 1,800,000 38 (34) 
The process of sedentarisation was greatly influenced 
by major changes in the nature of land tenure, which began 
in the late nineteenth century. In their land legislation, 
as in other aspects of the Tanzimat, the Ottoman government 
attempted to deal directly with its subjects instead of 
going through intermediaries. Thus efforts were made to 
register land in the names of individual owners, to 
facilitate tax collection in return for security of title. 
34. Hasans 1965, p. 55. The 1947 census, which was the first 
to be carried out on a scientific basis, gives the 
following division of the active population: 
Percentage 
Agriculture 748,400 57 
Industry 95,933 8 
Commerce and 470,979 35 
services 
In 1944, Sawt al-Ahali, the newspaper of Jamalat al-Ahali, 
described the economic division of Iraqi society as follow's: 
Class (al-tabaqa) Percentage 
Rich (al-ghaniya) 2 
Middle (al-wusta) 8 
Poor (al-faqira) 70-75 
Destitute (al-muldama) 15-20 
Sawt al-Ahali, 13.8.1944. 
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Such arrangements, however, had little or no relevance to 
the actual situation in Iraq, where communal grazing or 
cropping rights were far more common than individual holdings. 
Thus, when boundaries and questions of title became matters 
of greater importance as the demand for Iraqi agricultural 
produce on the world market increased, the casual nature of 
the prevailing tenurial arrangements enabled the more astute 
tribal leaders, along with merchants, notables and officials, 
to secure the registration of tribal lands (dira) under 
their own names. In consequence, the tribesmen became 
economically and legally subservient to their leaders or 
to their new landlords. In the 1920s this tendency was 
further encouraged by the mandatory government's conferring 
judicial and political powers on shaikhs and landlords, in 
an attempt to create a loyal clientele in the countryside 
for the new regime. 
The main results of this process were, first, the 
very great enhancement of shaikhly political and economic 
power, and secondly, the debasement of the status of the 
tribesman/cultivator. After independence in 1932, the Iraq 
Government continued similar policies, which served more 
and more to deprive the peasants of any basic civic rights. 
Most cultivators lived at terrible extremes of poverty: in 
the 1950s, a medical expert described the Iraqi fellah as 
a living pathological specimen', with a life expectancy 
of between 35 and 39 years 
35 
, and a report commissioned by 
the I. B. R. D. noted that: 
35. Gabbay, R., Communism and Agraria'n Reform in Irac 
(London 1978), P. 2-T. - 
L, 
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The standard of living of the people is 
extremely low. Income per capita is 
probably at most ID 30. Almost 900% of the 
population are illiterate, and many are 
subject to debilitating diseases such as 
malaria, hookworm, and bilharzia ... 36 
This situation, and its consequences at the other end of 
the social scale, was vividly described in a despatch from 
the American Legation in Baghdad in 1935: 
The majority of the people of this country 
are still living under conditions of a 
feudal system somewhat similar to that which 
prevailed in Europe during the middle ages. 
For the most part, the people are tribal, 
they give their allegiance first to their 
shaikhs ... and in many respects they are 
governed by tribal laws and customs. Thus, 
the shaikhs are able to wield an influence 
similar to that of the feudal barons of the 
mid-ages. 37 
In 1933 the government had enacted the Law Governing 
the Rightsand Duties Of Cultivators (No. 28). This was 
claimed to be necessary in order to organise agricultural 
production more efficiently, and to prevent the migration 
of cultivators to the cities, but for all practical 
purposes the law 
... had the effect of making the peasants tied to the land and their landlords ... one of its debt clauses stated that when 
a peasant sharecropper was dismissed or 
moved from the land he must pay his 
agricultural debt to the landlord 
immediately pLnd that while the debt was 
unpaid, unless a certificate of release 
was obtained from the landlord, employment 
elsewhere in the economy was prohibited. 
As the peasants were perpetually in debt, 
36. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
The Economic Development of Iraq, (Washington 1952), p. l. 
37. Knabenshue to State Department, 4.4.1935. uSNA 
890G. 00/326. 
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the landlords legally made sure of their 
labour supplies and thereby denied 
flexibility of supply to other interests. 
Peasants were, however, not tied to 
specific land areas; they were moved by 
the landlord when necessary and so 38 developed little interest in the land itself. 
Under the monarchy successive governments enacted. 
and amended various laws in relation to land settlement 
policies and to regulate cultivation 39 , which further 
consolidated the powers of the shaikhs and landowners. 
Batatu explains: 
In their practical effect - and as far as the shaikhly class was concerned - these laws amounted to a legal recognition of 
a process that had been taken place for 
some decades in the tribal countryside: 
the usurpation by the shaikh of the 
communal tribal land, his dispos5es-sicy% of 
weaker neighbours and his encroachment on 
virgin state lands. On the shaikh was now 
conferred an exclusive, private, and free 
title to all these acquisitions. 40 
The tribal shaikhs were not alone in indulging in such 
practices. Politicians and merchants had'begun to use their 
positions and influence to acquire land on a large scale 
in the 1920s 
41 
and subsequently continued to indulge in 
I 
38. Langley, K., The Industrialisation of Iraq, (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1967) , P. 68. 
39. Settlement of Land Rights No. 50 of 1932: the Lazma 
Law Of 1932, and their various amendments. 
40. Batatu, 1978, p-110. Table 5-1 
shows the extent of the concentration of landholding in 1958, before the Revolution. Batatu&1978, p. 54. 
41-Sluglett, 1976, pp. 92,101. 
0 
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dubious land transactions. In 1943, the acute conditions 
which prevailed widely in the countryside prompted the 
British ambassador to criticise: 
Nuri Sa'id's natural reluctance to offend 
powerful agricultural and mercantile vested 
interests. I blamed Nuri for the shameless 
land-grabbing carried on by prominent 
personalities, and the general lack of 
courageous leadership and the wide gulf 
between the government and the people. 42 
The widespread salination caused by over-cultivation, which 
was made possible by the introduction of mechanical pumps 
43 
caused a net decline in yields, and, together with the 
repressive legislation which has been described, produced 
a large scale rural exodus, and the intensification of rural 
underemployment. 
42. FO 371/ Cornwallis to SIS Foreign Affairs, 6.11.1943. 
35013/E7266. 
43. In 1926 the Law for the Encouragement of Cultivators for 
the Use of Pumps was introduced. Article Three is as 
follows: 'All enhancement of land produced resulting 
from the use of pumps in respect of land already under 
cultivation and similarly the whole land produce resulting 
from the use of the said pumps in respect of lands which 
were previously uncultivated shall be exempt from 
government share. ' 
The number of pumps in use rose rapidly during this 
period. In 1921 there were 1438 in 1929,2031, and 
in 1944-45,2757. 
see Sluglett, 1976, p. 258- 
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This ruinous cycle was aggravated further by the fact 
that the shaikhs and landlords, who were largely absentees, 
spent the greater part of the proceeds from the sale of 
agricultural surplus on consumer goods rather than on 
productive investments. They spent very little on the 
maintenance* let alone the improvement, of the fertility 
of the soil, or the irrigation canals. They seem to have 
shown little or no interest in improving productivity, and 
the state of decline into which agriculture fell in these 
years has remained a major obstacle to economic development 
until the present time. 
ii) Industry 
Until the 1930s and 1940s, no major industrial 
enterprises had been developed in Iraq. The economy was 
primarily based on agriculture and apart from small local 
craft manufacture, most industrial and consumer goods were 
imported. Investment remained at a low level until the 
shortages caused by the second World War encouraged something 
of an industrial take-off which was given further impetus 
by the very considerable increase in oil revenues which 
took place in the years after 1951. 
Apart from a shortage of the raw materials necessary 
for industrial development a number of other constraints 
operated to prevent the growth of an industrial sector of 
any magnitude in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
The general caution on the part of owners of capital, who 
preferred to invest in commerce, land, or urban properties 
34 
which gave faster profits and fewer risks, has already 
been alluded to. Secondly, the size of the home market 
was extremely limited, since most of the population was 
too poor to participate to any extent in. the money economy. 
In the third place, local handicrafts or small industries 
could not compete with the products of the European 
industrial revolution. Tariff protection, introduced rather 
half-heartedly in the late 1920s and early 1930s had little 
effect. A further constraint was the lack of both trained 
managerial staff and skilled labour. As far as the work 
force was concerned, many of them were recent migrants 
from the countryside who were generally illiterate and 
undernourished. Hours were long and wages low 
44, 
and during 
the war years a decline in real wages led to severe 
45 46 hardships Labour laws enacted in the 1930s and 1940s 
only covered establishments employing more than 12 workers, 
and even there the application of the laws was not universal. 
44. The average annual income of industrial workers in the 
period 1939-45 ranged between ID 50 and ID 70. Jawad, H., 
Muqaddima fi Kiyan al-'Irag al-Ijtimali (Introduction to 
the Social Structure of Iraq), (Baghdad, 1946), p. 77. 
45. See Batatu, 1978, p. 471, Table 17-2; Popular Uprisings 
in_the Forties and Fifties and the Cost of Living Index 
for Unsk-11-13led Laborers in EýRhdad City. 
46- 
e. g. Law 72 of 1936, amended in 1942, regulating Labour 
and Factories. 
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The three largest employers of labour in the period 
between 1932 and 1946 were the Basra Port Authority, the 
Iraq State Railways, and the Iraq Petroleum Company. A few 
Iraqis held positions of responsibility in the Railways 
and Port managements, but in the oil company Iraqis were 
only employed in unskilled and semi-skilled positions. 
Furthermore, the turnover into the rest of the industrial 
sector was small, since wage rates in these three enterprises 
were generally relatively high and working conditions 
favourable. However, it is significant that the first 
effective labour unions were formed within these enterprises 
in the course of the 1940s, and since all three concerns were 
foreign owned, the labour movement became closely involved 
in the struggle for national independence from its earliest 
days. 
Despite the constraints which have already been 
mentioned, some industries did develop in the late 1930s 
and 1940s, particularly in response to the shortages 
experienced after 1939. These tended to specialise in 
products for Which there was already an established local 
demand, and were built on the fouddations of the older 
industries. Hence modern textiles, cigarettes, soap, cement, 
leather and vegetable oil factories were set up. Many of 
these were given assistance by being awarded government 
contracts, as well as loans from the Agricultural and 
industrial Bank, set up in 1936. 
36 
Oil Rev'e'nue and Oil Production 1934-46 . 
0 
Revenue as 
percentage of 
Year Production(a) Revenue(b) national 
(millions of long tons) (thousands of dina rs) revenue(a) 
1934 1.06 989 19.6 
1935 3.66 598 11.1 
1936 4.02 600 9.9 
1937 4.29 731 10.5 
1938 4.32 1,977 25.2 
1939 4.04 2,014 21.8 
1940 2.65 1,576 16.2 
1941 1.61 1,534 15.1 
1942 3.25 1,576 11.4 
1943 3.78 1,880 10.3 
1944 4.25 2,225 11.7 
1945 4.62 2,316 11.4 
1946 4.60 2.327 9.3 
(47) 
47. (a) Batatu, 1978, pp. 106-7 (Table 6-2). 
(b) Longrigg, S. H., Oil in the Middle East: its 
Discovery and. Development, London 1954, p. 478. 
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The oil industry, Iraq's main source of wealth, 
operated very much on the margin of the economy, since it 
imported most of its own needs from Europe and the u. S. A. 
and its product was not used to stimulate industry within 
the country. The company gained its first concession in 
1925, and oil in commercial quantities was first struck 
in 1927. However, at this stage, world demand for oil was 
relatively limited, and exploitation on a large scale did 
not take place for some years. The concession was arranged 
on a royalty basis, the government receiving a payment 
equivalent to a certain percentage of production. Between 
1 
1929 and 1931, the government's economic position was so 
desperate that the oil company advanced 'dead rents' against 
future royalty payments. This effectively bound the 
government to the company, and prevented them from obtaining 
more favourable terms, a state of affairs which lasted 
until the early 1970s. 
iii) Trade 
Throughout the period between 1850 and 1950, 
foreign trade was the chief determinant of the structure 
of the Iraqi economy. British imports, and British 
controlled exports, dominated Iraqi trade during these 
years: British and other foreign companies used local 
agents, who were generally from religious or ethnic 
minorities. A despatch from the British Embassy in Baghdad 
38 
in 1934 underscores the extent of this penetration: 
The foreign commercial interests in Iraq, 
owing to the existence of the British 
connexion, are predominantly British ... 
The greater part of the country's foreign 
trade is carried in British ships. The foreign 
capital sunk in the country is almost 
exclusively British. Two of the three banks 
are entirely British, including the Eastern 
Bank, which handles all government cash, the 
capital of the third bank, the Ottoman, is 
about one-third British and has a number of 
British directors. All important insurance 
business is in the hands of British firms. 
In another sphere of activity, the Euphrates 
and Tigris Steam Navigation Co. is a long 
established British Co., operating, with but 
one native competitor, river transport on the 
Tigris between Basrah and Baghdad. It owns a 
fleet of 18 steamers and has about E250,000 
invested in Iraq. In every direction, despite 
intense Japanese competition, British 48 
commercial influence remains paramount. 
The companies exported wool, grain and dates and other 
primary products and imported all kinds of consumer goods, 
which accounted for nearly two-thirds of imports between 
1926 and 1945 Thus: 
Modern housing and furniture came very much 
into vogue from the 1930s. In addition, the 
use of luxurious motor cars by the upper 
income groups, and of ordinary motor cars 
by the middle classes, became widespread. 
On the other hand, the consumption by the 
other sections of the urban population of 
cheap textiles, tea and sugar, also increased, 
especially during the 1950s and 1960s. 49 
49. Humphrys (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs 1.2.1934, FO 
406/72 E962/190/93. Quoted Batatu, 1978, p. 268. Only 
one of the 25 'first class' companies affiliated to The 
%B, aghdad Chamber of Commerce in 1938-39 was owned by 
an Iraqi. 
49. Hasan, 1970, p. 362. 
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Very considerable profits could be made from commerce, 
although most of these went out of the country to foreign 
countries. Gradually Iraqi entrepreneurs also became 
attracted to the import-export trade, and began to import 
directly in their own right, increasing their number and 
wealth. Since their prosperity was dependent on the political 
and economic status quo, they curried favour with the 
royal family and leading politicians, thus bolstering an 
already corrupt system. However, their newly acquired 
wealth was generally not, as has already been mentioned, 
used to stimulate the economy in any productive fashion. 
Instead, the oil revenues permitted a 'lop-sided' 
development, thus: 
it is this duality in the Iraqi economy 
or its development into a mono-economy, 
dependent almost entirely on oil production 
and exports, or the economically unbalanced 
relation between the foreign oil sector and 
the domestic economic sector, or finally the 
disequilibrium between Iraq's foreign trade 
and her home trade, which constitutes the 
end-result of the interaction between 
foreign trade and investment and the local 
5g 
of Iraq during the past backward econom 
hundred years. 5 
Education 
It has already been noted that the politicisation of 
certain important sections of society began in the 1920s 
and 1930s, in response to contemporary economic and 
political developments. in this connection the spread of 
education played a vital part. In the Ottoman period, 
50. Ibid., p. 372. See also Issawi, C. p'Egypt since 1800; 
a Study in Lop-sided Development', Journal of Economic 
History, xxi (1), 1961. 
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educational opportunities were very restricted; there were 
only two state secondary schools, in Baghdad and Mosul, 
in 1914, and two military secondary schools (al-'Adadiya aj, _- 
'Askariya . In this respect, the minority communities were 
slightly better off, because of the missionary schools for 
the Christian population and the Alliance Israelite for 
the Jews, all of which-also admitted Muslim children. In 
general primary education for Muslins was largely confined 
to the mulla schools, where children were taught the three 
Rs and elementary Quranic studies, although bome state 
elementary schools had been built by 1914 
51. However, these 
schools were almost entirely concentrated in the cities, 
and since they were run by the Sunni state, they were not 
attended by the Shi'i population. Furthermore, since child 
labour was widespread and often an economic necessity, 
poorer families were often not in a position to educate 
their children. Hashim Jawad estimates that only 1% of 
the population was literate at the end of the First World 
52 
War 
During the mandate, educational facilities were 
gradually expanded, and budget allocations increased from 
about 3% at the beginning of the period to almost 80% at 
the end, and averaged 100% in the years between 1932 and 1946. 
51. Himada, S., a. 1-Nidham al-Igtisadi fill-'Iraq (The 
Economic System of Iraq), (Beirut, 1938), p. 46. 
52. Jawad, 1946, p. 104. 
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The actual numerical increase was impressive: 
Elemen 
, 
tary Intermediate and 
Schools 
. 
Pupils Secondary Schools Pupils 
1920-1 88 8,000 4 110 
1934-5 528 60,324 35 6,058 
1945-6 944 118,487 59 12,173 53. 
In fact, education, in common with health and agriculture, 
was largely run by Iraqis during the mandate period, in 
contrast to the Ministries of Finance, Defence and Interior, 
which were directed by British personnel. Although there 
was a British Adviser at the Ministry of Educatiori throughout 
the 1920s, policy was largely in the hands of the Director- 
General, Satil al-Husri, who had been Faisal's Director 
of Education in Damascus. al-Husri was an energetic 
educationalist, who had the King's constant support in his 
efforts to expand and redirect the system. In particular 
he was responsible for the introduction of nationalist ideas 
into the school syllabus, which deeply influenced a whole 
generation of young people. 
In spite of the expansion of education, and its 
relative independence from foreign control, there were 
constant complaints from all parts of the country that the 
programme was insufficient, particularly in the rural areas; , 
in 1946, for example, illiteracy was still estimated at 
over 90% 
54. However, the major deficiency of the system 
53. Figures taken from Jawad, ý946, pp. 105-106, and al-Marayai; i, A. o 
A Diplomatic History of Modern Iraq (New York 1961), pp. 163-5. 
54. Jawad, 1946, p. 116. 
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lay as much in its orientation, which remained rooted to 
the Ottoman tradition from which it had sprung. 'It was 
heavily dominated by the humanities, and its main purpose 
continued to be the production of clerical and higher civil 
servants; uVile-scientific and technological training did 
not receive high priority. The Monroe report, commissioned 
55 by the government in 1931 , criticised the lack of 
vocational, industrial and agricultural schools, and the 
over-concentration of facilities in the urban areas. This 
report, and others which followed it, were largely ignored 
by the Ministry of Education, which preferred to continue 
with the system with which it was familiar, but which was 
-largely irrelevant to the needs of the country. Only one 
agricultural and two industrial secondary schools were 
founded, and these had produced only 78 and 351 diploma 
56 
students respectively by 1943-44 In a country where 
over 700% of the population worked in agriculture, and 
whose wealth derived from oil, it seems almost inconceivable 
that more attention was not paid to setting up more of 
such institutions to meet the present and future needs of 
the country. One of the results was that Iraq long remained 
dependent on foreign expertise in most of the key sectors 
of the economy, particularly in engineering, science and 
technology. 
55. Paul Monroe was Professor of Education at Columbia 
University, New York. 
56. Jawad, 1946, p. 115. 
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Higher education also expanded significantly during the 
mandate and monarchy periods. In 1920-21,65 students 
attended post-secondary institutions in Iraq. In 1932-33 
there were 115, and by 1945-46 there were 2146, of whom 
284 were women 
57 
. In addition, increasing numbers of students 
were studying at foreign universities and technical 
institutions, mostly in the Arab world, Europe and North 
America, both on government scholarships and at their 
families' own expense. Three of the founders of Jamalat 
al-Ahali had studied abroad; Muhammad Hadid at the American 
university of Beirut and the London School of Economics, 
'Abd al-Fattah Ibrahim at the American University of Beirut 
and Columbia University, and Husain Jamil at the School of 
Law in Damascus. The growth in the student and graduate 
population was a crucial factor throughout the period and 
was a major influence in the development of opposition 
political organisations, notably Jamalat al-Ahali and the 
communist Party. 
Perhaps most important of all was the fact that all 
strata of the population, including the very poor, were 
intensely concerned to provide their children with at least 
the bare minimum of education, and would often make enormous 
sacrifices in order to make this possible. Those who succeeded 
in spite of difficulties and hardships often emerged with 
indelible aspirations for social justice, and also became 
willing recruits for the new opposition parties. 
57. 
al-Marayati, 'A., 1961, p. 170. 
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Chapter III 
The Development of Political Parties, 
a) 
1908 - 1946 
Before discussing the formation of Jamalat al-Ahali 
and the background of its founders, it is useful to consider 
the development of political consciousness over the period 
between 1908 and 1946, concentrating on the political parties 
and organisations fouhded in these years. Until 1908, no 
formal political organisations existed in Iraq, but when 
the Young Turk revolution took place in that year branches 
of the committee of Union and Progress were opened in the 
three major cities. As the new regime in Istanbul revealed 
its essentially anti-Arab colours, various societies were 
formed, notably Jam'iyyat al-Islah (The Reform Association) 
in Basra, under the presidency of Sayyid Talib al-Naqib, 
and al-'Ahd, which had established branches in Mosul, Baghdad 
1 
and Basra before the outbreak of the First World War 
other important political organisations were: Hizb al- 
Hurr al-mu'tadil (The Moderate Liberal Party) established 
in Basra and Baghdad in 1911. Hizb al-Hurriya wa al- 
'Itilaf (The Liberty and Accord Party) was established 
in Baghdad in 1912, and Jam'iyyat al-Nadi al-Watani 
(The National Club Society) whichwas founded in 
Baghdad in 1912. 
For further details see Atiyyah, G., Ira : 1908-1921, 
A Socio-Political Study, (Beirut 197.3 , pp. 53-70. 
a) for the main political alignments, see pA7 
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After the War, and the ending of the Ottoman Empire, 
the focus of political activity naturally changed. By 1918, 
some parts of Iraq had been occupied by British troops for 
four years. During this time, opposition had grown up which 
was eventually to crystallise in the events of 1920. In 
1919, Jam'iyyat Haras al-Istiqlal (The Association for the 
Safeguarding of Independence) was founded, the first of 
its kind to take an overtly anti-British stand, calling 
for the independence of Iraq from foreign rule, and for 
the formation of a constitutional government. Its leaders 
were the shili notables Amin al-Charchafchi, 'Ali Bazirgan, 
Muhammad al-Sadr, and also Jalfar Abu a 1-Timman 
2, 
who was 
later to become a prominent member of Jamalat al-Ahali, and 
one of Iraq's most respected political figures. 
In 1921, when the Iraq state was established under the 
British mandate, it soon became clear that neither the 
politicians nor the population as a whole were going to be 
given any opportunity to participate in constructing the 
new political system. The British High Commissioner and 
the advisers held real authority: hence they immediately: 
began to exploit those internal conditions 
which were unfavourable to democratic 
institutions in order to strengthen their 
own position. Political institutions formed 
at that time did not spring from the social 
forces existing nor did the express the 
true desires of the people. 
y 
The result was a weak political system and an empty facade 
2. 
al-'Akkam, 'A., al-Haraka al-Wataniya A al-'Iraq 1921 - 
1932 (The Iraqi national movement 1921-1932), (al-Najaf, 
1975) , pp. 2 7-29. 
3. Khadduri, M., Political Trends in the Arab World, 
(Baltimore 1972), p. 33o 
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of democratic institutions, which the poet Malruf al- 
Risafi described as: 
This government of our 
's 
and all its pride 
are lies, and all its deeds are pretentious. 
A flag, a constitution, and a national assSmbly 
each one a distortion of the true meaning. 
Shortly before King Faisal's coronation in August 
1921, a number of leading politicians, notably Jalfar Abu 
al-Timman, Yusuf al-Suwaidi, Amin al-Charchafchi, and 
jalfar al-'Askari, met together and decided to form a 
political party which would seek Iraq's independence from 
Britain. At a second meeting, they were told that Faisal 
did not favour the formation of political parties, believing 
them to be against the national interest. His Syrian 
experience had taught him that political parties had a 
divisive effect, and he considered that they had prevented 
him taking a united stand against the French5. Instead, he 
hoped that the Iraqi politicians would support him in order 
to enable him to consolidate his leadership. However, Abu 
al-Timman and al-Charchafchi would not take his advice, 
and formed their own parties, al-Hizb al-Watani al-1Ir! jaj 
(The Iraqi National Party), and Hizb al-Nahdha (The 
Revival Party) respectively 
6. 
Throughout the mandate period, and indeed until 1958, 
one of the main issues in Iraqi politics was the precise 
4. Ma'ruf al-Rasafi, Hukumat al-Intidab (The Mandate 
Government, in Diwan al-Rasafi, (Ca-irro 1949). pp. 453-6. 
S. 
al-Hasani, 'A., (1974), vol-111, p. 208. 
6- For the parties'prc)grammes see Ibid., pp. 216-18. 
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nature of the country's relationship with Britain. 'Even 
before the signature of the first Anglo-Iraqi Treaty in 
1922, and its ratification by the Chamber of Deputies in 
1924, various shades of opinion on the question had 
developed among the politically active which crystallised 
into three loose and by no means permanent sets of 
alliances which continued to function until, and in some 
cases beyond, the end of the mandate. Occasionally, these 
groupings acquired the names and even the constitutions 
of political parties, but they were primarily pragmatic 
coalitions of interested individuals. It was not until the 
appearance of Jama'at al-'Ahali in 1932 that a political 
party or group with a defined ideological platform and 
-programme came 
into existence. 
The first group consisted of those who considered 
that Iraq needed British assistance and tutelage in order 
to be able to develop into an independent. entity at some 
point in the future. Although it is convenient to refer 
to this group as the 'pro-British politicians', such a 
description admittedly overlooks the complexity of the 
situation. Although many of these individuals came to 
benefit substantially from their co-operation with Britain, 
mI any of them clearly set out with the belief that, given 
the reality Of ýthe British presence, such a course of 
action was the best way to achieve independence in the 
long term. Prominent members of this group included 
several Prime Ministers, including 'Abd al-Rahman al-Naqibo 
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Ja'far al-'Askari, 'Abd al-Muhsin al-Sa'dun, Nuri al- 
Sa'id, 'Ali Jawdat, and Jamil al-Madfa li7. 
The second group, which was more or less the direct 
antithesis of the first, can be called the 'Iraqi 
nationalists' or the 'permanent opposition', and consisted 
of those who rejected first the British presence in the 
1920s and early 1930s, and then the whole political 
apparatus of the regime under the monarchy. These 
individuals generally refused to accept government office, 
and although initially relatively few in number, enjoyed 
considerable personal prestige and commanded wide popular 
support. Among other members of this group were Ja'far Abu 
al-Timman, Amin al-Charchafchi, 'Ali Mahmud, and subsequently 
Yunis al-Sab'awi, Mahdi Kubba, Kamil al-Chadirchi, Jamalat 
al-Ahali (after 1932) and the Communist Party (after 1934). 
The third group, the 'token opposition' occupied an 
intermediate position between the other twa, in that it 
alternated between support and rejection of the Treaty and 
the British presence. In opposition, its leaders allied 
with the Iraqi nationalists, and played on popular anti- 
British sentiment, but the group was prepared to accept 
ministerial office in a form of partnership with the pro- 
British politicians. Its most important members were 
7. 
al-Sa'dun committed suicide in 1929. By 1930 this group 
had split into two factions: Hizb al-. 'Ahd formed by 
Nuri and Ja'far, was entirely pro-Bril-Mish, while Jamil 
madfali and 'Ali Jawdat took a more moderate stand. Later in 1934 Jawdat formed the short-lived Hizb al-Wahda al- 
WataniY4 . 
so 
Yasin al-Hashimi, Rashid 'Ali al-Gailani and Hikmat 
Sulaiman, (the leaders of Hizb al-Sha'b (1926) and Hizb 
al-Ikhal al-Watani (1930) ). 
The two parties that have been mentioned already, 
Hizb al-Nahdha ard al-Hizb al-Watani, fall into the second 
or opposition group. In 1922, they co-operated to oppose 
the first Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, and organised popular 
protests and demonstrations. The extent of the opposition 
prompted the High Commissioner, Sir Percy Cox, to assume 
full powers when the King suddenly fell ill with appendicitis. 
He disbanded the two parties, and banned the two opposition 
papers, al-Mufid and al-Rafidan, and 'packed the nationalist 
leaders off to Henjam'8. At the same time, the British 
authorities intimated to Mahmud al-Naqib, the eldest son 
of the first Prime Minister, that he should form a 'pro- 
British' party called al-Hizb al-Hurr al-traql 
9 (The Iraqi 
Liberal Party) which would support his father's cabinet. 
its aim was to fill the political vacuum created by the 
suppression of the nationalist parties and newspapers, 
and most importantly, to assist the government to approve 
the 1922 Treaty. This party was typical of a number of 
political machines created by various governments to play 
carefully orchestrated roles in the political arena. As 
soon as the Treaty was signed in November 1922, and the 
8- Sluglett (1976), p. 78. Henjam is an uninhabited island 
in the Gulf. 
9. al-'Akkam, 1975, P. 460. 
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al-Naqib Cabinet was forced out of office, al-Hizb al-Hurr 
disintegrated, since there was no longer any reason for 
i. ts existence 
10 
Between. 1924 and 1925-three-political parties were formed by 
moslawi Arabs in order to oppose Turkey's claim to the 
Mosul Wilayat, which was the subject of a League of Nations 
Commission of Enquiry. These parties received government 
11 
support, and financial aid from the King . They were 
Hizb al-Istiqlal al-Watani (National independence Party), 
formed in September 1924: Jam'iyyat al-Difal al-Watani 
(The National Defence Association), formed in January 1925, 
and al-Hizb al-Watani (The National Party) formed in May 
1925. The sole purpose of these three organisations was 
the maintenance of Mosul within Iraq, and when this 
objective was achieved in December 1925, the parties 
dissolved. 
After the eventual ratification of the Anglo-Iraqi 
Treaty, which took place in July 1924, and the establishment 
of the Constitution on parliamentary lines, the King and 
his associates, as well as the British authorities, 
seem to have recognised the desirability of creating some 
form of1political life'. Hence 'government' and 'loyal 
opposition' political parties were formed. Thus, when 'Abd 
al-Muhsin al-Sa'clun was appointed Prime Minister in July 1925, 
10. 
al-Hasani, 1974, V01-111, p. 210. 
11- 
al-'Akkam, 1975, P. 466. 
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he founded the Hizb al-Taqaddum (Progress Party) formed 
from suitable members of the Chamber of Deputies. The 
Party became the majority in the Chamber by the simple 
expedient of actually consisting of the majority of 
Deputies, and thus the Prime Minister could claim that 
he had formed his cabinet from the majority party. 
However, even this was not sufficient to secure an easy 
passage for al-Sa'dun, since the King engaged in constant 
backstairs intrIgue against him. He resigned in November 
1926, and was succeeded by a more dependable ally of 
Faisal, Jalfar al-'Askari, with the help of the 'loyal 
opposition', which consisted of the Hizb al-Sha'b, founded 
by Yasin al-Hashimi and Rashid 'Ali in November 1925 12 
supposedly to oppose the Anglo-Iraq Treaty of 1924 and 
the Financial Agreement of 1926. al-'Askari in his turn 
also needed a 'majority' party, and in strict adherence 
to constitutional practice turned to the Hizb al-Taqaddum. 
12. The Chamber of Deputies rejected al-Sa'dun's candidate 
for the office of Speaker of the Chamber (Hikmat 
Sulaiman, later a prominent member of Hizb al-Ikha' 
al-watani and subsequently of Jamalat al-Ahali), and 
instead chose Rashid 'Ali. al-Saldun interpreted this 
as a vote of no confidence and promptly resigned 
exactly as King Faisal had envisaged. 
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For a moment there seemed to be a difficulty, since he 
was not himself a Deputy. However, this was quickly 
overcome when the Party's executive inserted a new clause 
in its statutes allowing Ministers and Senators to become 
members. al-Sa'dun resigned the leadership in al-'Askari's 
favour and was in turn given the Speakership of the 
13 
Chamber 
In fact, al-Sa'dun became Prime Minister on two 
further occasions from January 1928 until January 1929, 
and from September 1929 to his suicide in mid-November 
the same year. The Party functioned sporadically throughout 
these two ministries, but ceased to function after the 
death of its founder. The Hizb al-Sha'b exercised the 
function of loyal opposition until its leader Yasin al- 
0 Hashimi was persuaded to accept a portfolio in al-'Askari's 
government in November 1926. while in office, al-Hashimi 
ignored his Party and actually supervised the passage of 
the Financial Agreement which he had previously denounced, 
while simultaneously laying the foundations of a substantial 
14 
private fortune . As a result, his followers both inside 
and outside the Chamber became disillusioned and the 
Party collapsed. 
In March 1930, Faisal appointed Nuri al-Sa'id Prime 
Minister in order to conclude the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, 
13. See al-Hasani, 1974, V01-III, pp. 210-11. al-'Akkam, 
1975, pp. 464-472. 
14. See al-Qaisi, S., Yasin al-Hashimi wa dawrahu fi al- 
Siyasa al-Iraqjyaý-1922-1936) (Yasin al-Hashimi and FiEs role in Iraqi Politics (1922-36) ), Baghdad, 1976. 
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which would end the Mandate and supposedly lead to 
'lal-Istiýlal al-Tamm" (Complete Independence). The King 
and the British wished to pass the Treaty as fast and as 
smoothly as possible, and in order to do this the opposition 
had to be muzzled. Nuri first dissolved Parliament, 
re-assembling a more favourable one, and then formed 
Hizb al-'Ahd al-Iraqi, (The Iraqi Covenant Party) whose 
name resembled the pre-war secret society of which Nuri 
had been an active member, from a number of hand picked 
deputies in the same manner in which al-Sa'dun had formed 
Hizb al-Taqaddum and published Sada al-'Ahd as the party 
newspaper. After these preparations, Nuri naturally 
succeeded in passing the Treaty in June 1930, against a 
background of fierce popular oppositionl5. 
Meanwhile, Yasin al-Hashimi and Rashid 'Ali al-Gailani 
were once more organising an opposition party, Hizb al-Ikha' 
al-Watani, to press for the revision of the Treaty, and 
16 
the resignation of Nuri al-Salid's government . The 
15. See Chapter IV. Sactli6, ft 1 
16. The elected Executive Committee included Naji al-Suwaidi, 
Rashid 'Ali al-Gailani, Hikmat Sulaiman, Ali Jawdat al- 
'Ayyubi, Muhammad zaki, Yusuf Ghanima, Abd al-Ilah 
Hafidh and Kamil al-Chadirchi; at one time it also 
included Muhammad Ridha- al-Shabibi,, 'Abd al-Wahid al-Hajj 
Sikkar and Muhsin Abu Tabikh. 
al-Akkam, 1975, p. 481, also al-Hasani,, 1974,, Vol. III, 
p. 202. 
0 
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task of opposition was complicated by the fact that Nuri's 
Hizb al-'Ahd al--'Iraqi had 74 out of the 88 seats in the 
Chamber, but al-Hashimi approached Ja'far Abu al-Timman, 
the veteran nationalist leader of the. Hizb al-Watani, 
seeking joint co-operation and a united front. In this, 
al-Hashimi was successful, and the two parties issued 
Wathiqa- al-Ta'akhi (the Charter of Brotherhood) which 
denounced the Treaty and the unrepresentative nature of 
the Parliament which had passed it, and significantly, 
stressed that any future government should make rejection 
or revision of the Treaty a firm condition for holding 
17 
office 
The two parties continued to co-ordinate their 
activities, holding regular meetings and leading joint 
protests and demonstrations. However, Faisal eventually 
succeeded in creating a rift between them, and within 
Hizb al-Ikha', by offering the post of Chief of the Royal 
Diwan to Rashid 'Ali. The leadership of the party (except 
for Kamil al-Chadirchi) could not resist this chance of 
power, and Rashid 'Ali accepted the post in June 1932. 
The final blow came in March 1933, when Rashid 'Ali agreed, 
with the approval of the leadership of Hizb al-Ikhal to 
form a government, without any specific co=itment to 
the revision of the Treaty. This disassociated him entirely 
from the Wathiqa al-Ta'akhi and the whole previous platform 
17. Nida' al-Sha'b, 23-11-1930, Quoted al-'Akkam, 
1975, p. 483. 
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of the Hizb al-Ikha'. Abu al-Timman bitterly criticised 
the decision to form a government, and announced the 
Charter dissolved. In 1933, he announced his retirement 
from politics, although he was persuaded to join Jamalat 
al-Ahali shortly afterwardsl8. 
In the meantime, Hizb al-Ikha' remained active. 
Rashid 'Ali resigned from the Premiership in October 1933, 
and under the ministries of his two successors (Jamil al- 
Madfa'i; November 1933-August 1934, 'Ali Jawdat; August 
1934-February 1935, Jamil, al-Madfa'i; 4-16 March 1935) 
the Party played an opposition role. This time it attempted 
to rally the tribal shaikhs of the Middle Euphrates to 
revolt against the government. In order to rally some 
support for himself, 'Ali Jawdat also formed his own 
v 
political party, Hizb al-Wahda al-Wataniya (The National 
Unity Party). The British Ambassador commented: 
The formation of a new party, the party of 
National Unity was announced. This is intended 
to be the party of Ali Jaudat's Cabinet. Like 
previous similar parties it is, in fact, 
little more than a group of Deputies, and 
has no organisation outside the Chamber. Its 
fate will probably be not unlike that of the 
al-'Ahd al-Iraqi, which was founded by Nuri 
Sa'id when he became Prime Minister in 1930 
and ceased to exist when he resigned the 
premiership in 1932.19 
18. See Chapter .. x. 
19. Ambassador, Baghdad to SIS Foreign Affairs 27.12.34, 
FO 371/17869/E7699. 
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The U. S. Legation reported in a similar vein: 
This is scarcely a political party. it is 
a group composed solely of the supporters 
of the present Cabinet and its aim is 
apparently to continue such support. It 
is hardly expected to survive this session 
of the Chamber of Deputies-. 20 
Naturally, the Party ceased to function when 'Ali Jawdat 
left the Premiership in 1935. 
In March 1935, the various intrigues of Hizb al-Ikha' 
finally succeeded in securing the opportunity of power 
for its leaders. The price to pay this time was the 
formation of a coalition between Yasin al-Hashimi and 
Rashid 'Ali of the Hizb al-Ikhal (without, importantly, 
Hikmat Sulaiman) and their two former arch opponents, 
Nuri al-Salid and Ja'far al-'Askari. Yasin completely 
reversed his vigorous opposition to the 1930 Treaty, and 
in fact ordered the dissolution of political parties, 
including the Hizb al-Ikha 0, on 29 May 193521. al-Hashimi 
remained in office until October 1936, when he was over- 
thrown by a coup engineered by General Bakr Sidqi, with 
the co-operation of Jamalat al-Ahali. Although formed 
in 1931, Jama'at al-Ahali did not appear on the political 
scene until January 1932, when it published its newspaper 
al-Ahali, which i=ediately became the most prominent 
Iraqi daily. members of the group co-operated actively- 
20. Knabenshue to U. S. State Department, 16.12.1934, 
USNA 890G. 00/306. 
21. Knabenshue to U. S. State Department, 23.5.1935. 
USNA 890G. 00/341. 
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in editing it, contributing articles which had a wide 
influence in Baghdad and other urban centres 
22. 
The most 
important members of the group forming the al-Ahali movement 
who actually edited the paper were four well-educated 
young Iraqis who believed that it was necessary to improve 
living standards through social, political and economic 
reform, and to establish complete independence and establish 
a democratic system within the country. They called their 
ideology al-Sha'biya (popularism) which was a combination 
of socialist and liberal ideologies. It called for reform 
in the social, political and economic sectors, and State 
control of industry, agriculture, health and education. 
al-Ahali. 's opposition to the Iraqi political system 
was based on ideological principles, rather than on personal 
differences, and its members did not regard politics merely 
as a ladder to ministerial office. They rejected the 
political system as it existed and demanded total reform 
(though not class struggle or revolution) an end to social 
injustices, and the abolition of exploitation, whether by 
Iraqis or foreigners. 
Through al-Ahali and the books and literature which 
they had published, Jamalat al-Ahali aimed at educating 
public opinion and gathering mass support in order to 
achieve their aims. Jn11S3-4 they formed two societies to 
spread their ideas and to make contact with the young 
22. Khadduri, (1960), p. 72. 
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people who aspired to work with them. The first was 
, Tamliyyat al-Sa'i li Mukafahat al-Ummiya (The Society 
for Eradicating Illiteracy) whose President was Ja'far 
Abu al-Timman, and Nadi_Baghdad (The Baghdad Club), 
which was headed by 'Abd al-Fattah Ibrahim. More importantly, 
jamalat al-Ahali formed a secret society, Jamliyyat al- 
Shalbiya, based on the principles of al-Shalbiya. Its 
executive committee included Ja'far Abu al-Timman, Hikmat 
Sulaiman, Kamil al.: -Chadirchi, Muhammad Hadid, 'Abd al-Fattah 
Ibrahim and 'Abd al-Qadir Isma'il. Through this society, 
Bakr Sidqi was contacted by Hikmat Sulaiman and plotted 
the 1936 coup d'etat in which four members held ministerial 
posts including the Premiership, as will be described in 
Chapter VI. 
Nadi al-Muthanna23 
In the 1920s and 1930s a new form of nationalism 
developed in the Arab countries, which saw the Arab world 
essentially as a single geO-pOlitical entity which had 
been artificially divided by the Western powers after the 
First World War. The prominent educationalist Satil al-Husri, 
23. This section is based on interviews with Mahdi Kubba, 
Siddiq Shanshal and'Abd al-Razzaq al-Hasani in October 
1979. It should be noted that Mahdi Kub a, who was 
vice-chairman, resigned from the Clt _ 
1ý protest against 
the Club's invitation to Nuri al-Sa'id to deliver a 
speech in an attempt to woo the Pan-Arab nationalists 
in the army and the country at large, as the most 
physically powerful political group in Iraq. Batatu's 
assertion that Mahdi Kubba was the vice-chairman of 
the club from 1935 to 1941 (Batatu, 1978, p. 293) is 
incorrect. Hence Kubba was not involved with the May 
1941 uprising. (Interview with Muhammad Mabdi Kubbal 
October 1979). 
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who was Director of Education in Iraq from 1921 to 1929, 
was a vigorous exponent of the theory of Pan-Arabism and, 
as has already been mentioned, influenced a whole generation 
through his nationalist writings, particularly through 
his contribution to the school text-books of the period, 
and his lectures and contacts with the students during 
his long association with the Ministry of Education in 
different capacities from 1921 to 1941. 
The main standardbearers oi this ideology in Iraq 
combined to form Nadi al-Muthanna (The Muthanna Club) in 
1935. Though influenced by Sati' al-Husri, the group was 
deeply impressed by contemporary developments in Italy 
and Germany, and also reacted against the popularity of 
what they saw as the 'Iraqist' ideas of Jamalat al-Ahali. 
The founders of al-Muthanna Club came from two 
main ideological strata. First, there were the more 
traditional Arab nationalists, such as Sa'ib Shawkat 
(Naji's brother), Said Thabit, a6d Dalud al-Sa_'clij who. had 
been former associates of King Faisal. The second group 
consisted of younger and more revolutionary elements such 
as Mahdi Kubba, Muhammad Hasan Salman and Yunis al-Sablawi. 
The latter was the main link between the civilian and 
military Pan-Arab group. al-Muthanna Club were closely 
associated with Yasin al-Hashimi until his death in 1936, 
and in fact were responsible for the death of Bakr Sidqi 
and the overthrow of Hikmat Sulaiman's government in 
August 1937. From 1937 to 1941 they dominated Iraqi politics, 
because of their links with the military and the weakness 
61 
of the other factions. In 1946 some of the former members 
of the Club combined to form the Independence Party (Hizb 
al-Istiqlal) which was headed by Mahdi Kubba. 
The Iraqi Communist Party 
24 
Marxist ideas and the influence of the Bolshevik 
revolution filtered through to Iraq as early as 1920. The 
first Marxist study circle was formed in Baghdad in 1924, 
consisting of a group which revolved around Husain al- 
Rahhal and Mahmud Ahmad al-Sayyid. They published al-Sahifah, 
and the group was known either by the name of their journal 
25 
or al-Ruwwad (The Pioneers) . Communist cells were 
organised in Basra and Nasiriya,. in 1927 and 1928 as a 
result of the activities of Pyotr Vasili, a Russian tailor 
who was also a party functionary26. 
Yusuf Salman Yusuf, known as Fahd, who later became 
the most famous secretary of the Party, was an early 
24. For the Iraqi Communist Party in this period, see 
Batata 1978, pp. 367-656. 
25. See Chapter IV, section M 
26. British Intelligence reported this as well: "It is reported 
that a suspected Soviet agent (Communist functionary) 
Petros Shamoun Vasili, in 1932 opened a tailor's shop 
in Nasiriyah (Vasili arrived earlier, probably in 1926) 
and became the organizer of the Communist cells and 
activities". AIR 23/589/04914.21.2.1933. 
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adherent of Vasili's circle, joining the Nasiriyah and 
Basrah groups in 1927 and 1928. Communist cells were 
formed in Baghdad in 1930 but remained inactive, while 
the Basra, and Nasiriy& Communists were busy recruiting 
more members, working with the peasants, and distributing 
communist leaflets, which resulted in arrests in Nasiriyyah 
in 1933, including Yusuf Salman Yusuf, who was acting as 
a correspondent for al-Ahali 
27 
. An Air ministry despatch 
reported: 
In the course of search conducted in the 
house of a communist in Jerusalem several 
documents, including correspondence for 
the oriental section of the Comintern 
were seized. Among the correspondence 
Yusuf Salman Yusuf was mentioned and his 
address given. 28 
and subsequently: 
In connection with the Inquiry concerning 
the Communist man's house in Nasiriyah, 
Yusuf Salman Yusuf was also arrested and, 
when questioned, admitted he is a communist 
and gave a tirade of the usual typ-e--aro-ut 29 
the "Capitalists" and the "toiling masses 
In March 1934, the Communist Party was founded formally, 
probably by Fahd, 'Asim Flayyih (a graduate Of KUTV), Mahdi 
Hashim, Yusuf Isma'il (the brother of 'Abd al-Qadir Ismalil, 
of Jama'at al Ahali) and Zaki Khairi (still a member of 
the Party's Central Committee). 
27. Interviews with Husain Jamil and 'Abd al-Oadir Ismalil. 
28- Air 23/589/04915, Baghdad 4 March 1933. 
29. 
Ibid. 
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'Asim Flayyih became the secretary of the Party, which 
now began to distribute leaflets and to organise new 
members, but its most significant accomplishment was the 
publication of Kifah al-Sha'b which appeared in July 1935, 
as the "mouthpiece of the workers and peasants" and as a 
publication of the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party. 
Between October and December 1935, three leading 
Communists, 'Asim Flayyih, Zaki Khairi and Mahdi Hashim, 
were arrested, and as a result Kifahal-Shalb ceased 
publication, and the Party's activities came to an end 
until the coup of October 1936. The Communists supported 
the coup, and joined Jam'iyyat al-Islah al-Shalbi, (The 
Popular Reform League), which was in fact a front for 
Jama'at al-Ahali. However, according to Muhammad Hadid, 
Batatu's assertion 
30 
that the Communists worked hand in 
hand with Jama'at al-Ahali is incorrect: there was no formal 
co-ordination, and in fact al-Ahali were at pains to 
disassociate themselves from the Communists. During this 
period, the Communists made their presence felt and their 
activities took place on a wider scale, especially among 
the small working class in Baghdad, Basrah and Kirkuk. 
The widespread strikes in these towns in 1937 seem to have 
prompted Bakr Sidqi to denounce Communism. He began a 
campaign of opposition to the activities of the left in 
general and the Communists in particular, suppressing 
30. Batatu, 1978, p. 439. 
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the Popular Reform League, stripping the Isma'il brothers 
of their citizenship, and persecuting other activists. 
When Bakr Sidqi was assassinated and Hikmat Sulaiman was 
forced to resign, Jamil al-Madfa'i came to power in 
August 1937. He took even harsher measures and enacted 
more severe laws to "combat Communism". 
on 30 January 1938, Fahd returned to Iraq, and a 
new epoch in the history of the Iraqi Communist Party 
began; he became the dominant figure in the Party until 
his execution by Nuri al-Salid's government in February 
1949. He took over the leadership of the Party officially 
on 29 October 1941, as a result of the arrest ofAbdullah 
Maslud. Fahd's devotion to the Party and his accomplishment 
in creating a wide and strongly knit organisation cannot 
31 
be overestimated . During the second World War a variety of 
political, social and economic conditions, both local and 
international, assisted the spread of Communism in Iraq 
and were important factors behind the Party's growth all 
over the country. The fact that Germany attacked the Soviet 
Union in June 1941 and forced it to j6in the Allies, 
helped the Iraqi Comm unists in two ways. First, the security 
forces relaxed their persecution measures against the 
communists and their vigilance on the movement, and instead 
directed their efforts to root out the nationalist elements 
31. Indeed, at one point while he was absent in Moscow 
(November 1942) the overwhelming majority of the members 
deserted him, and he had in effect, on his return, to 
build again from scratch. Batatu, 1978, p. 493. 
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who had supported the uprising of May 1941. Secondly, 
the Soviet Union's defence of its territory in the face 
of German aggression and the international gains for the 
Communist bloc also assisted the Iraqi Communists. Thus 
the Iraqi communist Party supported the Allied war effort, 
and for the time being considered Britain as an ally and 
part of the democratic forces in the war of liberation 
32 
rather than an imperialist enemy 
As the war progressed, Fahd gradually strengthened 
his position within the Party, dominating the first Party 
congress held in 1945. The Congress adopted a constitution 
for the Party (al-Nidham al-Dakhili , and elected a central 
committee and a politbureau. At this stage nembership came 
largely from the minority communities, particularly Kurds, 
Christians. and Jews 
33. 
When Tawfiq al-Suwaidi's 
government came to power in 1946, the communists applied 
for permission to form a legal party under the name of 
Hizb al-Taharrur al-Watani (The National Liberation Party), 
but this was refused. However, another Communist front 
32. See Chapter VI, 1ýart V. The ICP supported Rashid 'Ali's 
government in May 1941, but as a result of the German 
invasion of the Soviet Union changed its whole attitude 
towards the war. In 1943 The Central Committee admitted 
that their support of Rashid 'Ali had beenlýnistake,. 
33 . Gabbay (1978), p. 54, and Batatu (1978), pp. 519-521. 
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organisation 'Usba Mukafaha al-Sahyuniyya (The Anti- 
Zionist League) was permitted to operate. At the end of 
1946, however, the period of liberalisation came to an 
abrupt end with the beginning of the Cold War and the 
government's evident fear of the spread of Communism within 
the country. An extensive campaign was set in motion which 
culminated in the arrest and subsequent execution of the 
three most prominent Party members in 1949. 
The Nature of Iragi Political Parties, 1932-1946 
it will be clear from the discussion that apart from 
Jama'at al-Ahali and the Communist Party, Iraqi political 
parties had little in the way of formal organisational 
structure or coherent ideology. Even Ja'far Abu al-Timman's 
much respected Hizb al-Watani simply advocated national 
independence without any concrete proposals for subsequent 
social or economic reform. Jamalat al-Ahali was the first 
political organisation to advocate reforms within Iraqi 
society, and link the issue of internal social change with 
national independence. It was also original in its rejection 
of the political status quo within the country, seeking to 
replace it with a genuine participatory democracy. Other 
parties were generally simply short-term coalitions of 
interested individuals, and often dissolved once certain 
short-term objectives had been achieved. 
Furthermore, the traditional political parties did not 
seek and certainly did not attract a mass membership. 
Although the two ideological parties had relatively small 
memberships, they attempted to attract as wide as possible 
67 
a following given that they were banned or harassed for 
most of the period of their existence. They attempted to 
represent the widest possible cross-section of the 
population, and with their coming into existence, political 
opposition took on a new and significant function within 
Iraqi politics, revolving around issues rather than around 
personalities. 
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Chapter IV 
The Formation and Ideoloqy_of Jama'at al-Ahali 
1. Stuýd'ent Acýtivities in Beirut and Baghdad 1923-1930 
Jama'at al-Ahali originated among the Iraqi student 
population of the 1920s, and its founders met and worked 
closely together while attending schools and colleges in 
Baghdad and Beirut. The roots of the group go back to the 
early twenties and sprang from two distinct sources. The first 
consisted of 'Abd al-Fattah Ibrahim, Muhammad Hadid, 
'Ali Haidar Sulaiman and their friends who had studied 
together at the American University of Beirut 
1, 
while the 
second consisted of Husain Jamil, 'Abd al-Qadir Isma'il 
and their friends and classmates 'Aziz Sharif, Jamil . 'Abd 
al-Wahhab, Khalil Kanna, Isma'il al-Ghanim, and Hasan al- 
Talibani, all of whom studied at the Baghdad School of Law, 
2 
and, except for Husain Jamil, graduated from it . Furthermore, 
Husain Jamil and 'Abd al-Qadir Isma'il went to secondary 
school together and led the school strike in 1926. 
1. Information on the activities of Iraqi students in 
Beirut is based mainly on numerous interviews with 
'Abd al-Fattah Ibrahim and Muhammad Hadid in Baghdad 
and London in August 1976, June-July 1978, and 
October 1979. 
2. The activities of the Baghdad group were described by 
'Abd al-Oadir Ismalil in Baghdad June-July 1978 and 
in numerous interviews and written answers from Husain 
Jamil in Baghdad and London between 1976 and 1979. 
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When Sati' al-Husri was appointed Director-General of the 
Ministry of Education in the first years of the. Iraq state 
the government adopted a policy of financing secondary 
school graduates to study in Lebanon, Egypt, England and 
the U. S. A. At that time there were few higher education 
institutions in Iraq, and an acute shortage of secondary 
3 
school teachers . Thus, in September 1923, 'Abd al-Fattah 
Ibrahim went to Beirut to study modern history at the 
American University. At the same time, Muhammad Hadid 
arrived in Beirut to continue his secondary school education 
at a school adjoining the University. That same academic 
year, several more Iraqi students also commenced studying 
on government scholarships. Among them were Jamil Tuma, 
Darwish al-Haidari, the nephew of Nasrat al-Farisi, and 
Nuri'Rufalil. They were joined the following year by 'Ali 
Haidar Sulaiman, 'Abdullah Bakr and some two years later 
by Hashim Jawad 
4 
During the academic year 1924-25 there were over 50 
5 Iraqi students at the American University of Beirut . They 
decided to form an Iraqi Student Association along the 
lines of other societies at the University, electing Yusuf 
zainal president and Ibrahim vice-president. Ibrahim says 
3. 
al-Husri, Sati', Mudhakarrati fi al-'Iraq 1921-41, 
(My memoirs in Iraq 1921-1941), (Beirut 1967), p. 35. 
4. 
al-Mallah, 'A., Tarikh al-Haraka al-Dimugratiy'a fi al-'Iraq fi 
Nisf Oarn (History of the Democratic Movement in, Iraq 
over half a century). Baghdad 1975, p. i23. 
S. al-Hilali, 'A., "Lamhat Tarikhiya #an al-Dirasa al- 
'Ilmiya, fi'l-Kharij" (Historical aspects Of Academic 
study abroad 1922-32), Afa 'Arabiya, VO1-IVNo. 1, 
March 1979, p. 20. 
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that the main purpose of the Association was"to discuss 
the socio-political situation in Iraq and other Arab 
countries and to dissuade the students from over-indulgence 
in Beirut's night life". In 1925, the more active among 
the students also formed Tam'iyyat al-Nash' al-Iraqi (Iraqi 
Youth Club) outside the University, since University 
regulations forbade political associations, activities 
and debates on campus. ' Zainal was elected president and 
in this capacity sent a telegram to the Iraqi Government 
protesting against the Oil Agreement signed between 
Iraq and the T. P. C. in 1926. 
At the end of 1926, when Zainal graduated and returned 
to Iraq, Ibrahim became the president of both the Club and 
the Association. The students closely followed political 
developments in Iraq, but tended to remain isolated 
from Lebanese politics., To a certain extent this reflected 
the ideology of 'Abd al-Fattah Ibrahim, Muhammad Hadid 
and 'Ali Haidar Sulaiman, who were more interested in Iraqi 
affairs than in the wider spectrum of Arab nationalist 
politics. During their years in Beirut, the latter three 
became close friends, sharing similar political beliefs 
which ultimately were to find expression in the formation 
of Jama'at al-Ahali. 
However, perhaps more significant than the activities 
of Ibrahim, Hadid and Sulaiman in the students' Association 
and the youth club was the formation of a secret organisation 
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on a cell basis, whose members held regular meetings and 
paid monthly membership dues. The principal cell included 
Yusuf Zainal, Nuri Rufa'il, Darwish al-Haidari and 'Abd al- 
Fattah Ibrahim, who in his turn was responsible for a cell 
6 
which included Hadid, Sulaiman and Jamil Tuma . The 
organisation opposed the Iraq Government and pledged to 
work towards the country's independence by pressing for 
the removal of Britain and British influence from the 
country. It also undertook to work towards improving the 
standard of living of the people of Iraq. Meetings took 
the form of educational sessions in which members discussed 
various political ideologies and conditions in Iraq, naturally 
emphasising the necessity to continue their work when they 
returned home. Ibrahim recollects the group's early 
admiration for Mussolini, whom they considered the liberator 
of his country. Eventually, allegations that some members 
were informing the government of the activities of Ibrahim 
and his group created a split within the students' society, 
and when Ibrahim returned to Iraq in 1928, the students' 
society and the Youth Club closed down. 
g-Fi, dent Activities in-Ba2hdad 1926-1930 
The Baghdad section of Jama'at al-Ahali consisted 
principally of Husain Jamil and 'Abd al-Qadir Ismalil, who 
met: and became close friends in 1924 while still pupils at 
6. After returning to Iraq, Jamil Tuma was described as being 
"interested in Communism and Bolshevism", while 'Ali Haidar 
Sulaiman was described as "dabbling in Communism". 
Air 23/589/04914 11.3-1933. 
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al-Markaziya secondary school. During their school years, 
the two were involved in the student strike of 1926, the 
al-Nusuli affair, the demonstration against the visit of 
Sir Alfred Mond to Baghdad in 1928, and the opposition to 
the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930. At the time of the 
negotiations over the 1926 Anglo-Iraq Treaty and the oil 
concessions with the Turkish Petroleum Company, there were 
widespread public protests and eighteen members of 
7 
parliament boycotted the discussions on the Treaty 
Nevertheless, the Treaty was soon signed and ratified by 
the government since it was clear that there could be no 
8 
serious resistance to British demands . For some time the 
Treaty was the subject of heated discussions in cafes, 
mosques and schools. 
At this time, an English teacher at al-Markaziya 
secondary school told his class, which included Jamil and 
Isma'il that the Iraqi people were stupid for not welcoming 
the Treaty, because the British wanted them to become 
'civilized' and it was their 'ignorance' which prevented 
them from appreciating what Britain was trying to achieve. 
He went on to describe the leaders of the opposition and 
their supporters as 'fools and donkeys'. These insults 
enraged the pupils, especially Isma'il and Jamil, who 
7. M. ahadh . ir al-Majlis al-Niyabi, (Proceedings of the Chamber 
of Deputies), 1926, first session, 12th meeting, p. 10 '- Quoted 
' 
al- 'Umar, F. al-Mu'ahadat al-Iraqiya al-Britaný'ý 
wa Atharuha fi al-Sivasa al-Dakhillya (The Iraqi-British 
Treaties and their effect on internal politics), (Baghdad 
1977), p. 162. 
8- Sluglett, 1976, pp. 130-31. 
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pressed their classmates to submit letters of protest to 
the headmaster and the Ministry of Education. They then 
urged the other pupils to boycott the teacher's classes, 
and eventually went on strike and refused to attend any 
classes at all. Isma'il and Jamil discussed the issue with 
other teachers in the school who responded sympathetically, 
and as a result the headmaster asked the Ministry to remove 
the offending teacher, who was subsequently transferred. 
The success of this incident encouraged Jamil and Isma'il, 
to become more involved in political issues. 
The Nusuli Affair 
In 1924 the government had recruited a number of 
syrian and Lebanese graduates to teach in al-Markaziya 
secondary school in Baghdad, including Anis al-Nusuli, 
9 
who taught history . In 1926, al-Nusuli published a book 
entitled al-Dawla al-Ummawiya fill-Sham, (The Ummayad 
State in Syria) which aroused unfavourable attention because 
of its apparently insulting reference to Shi'i religious 
tradition. Furthermore, the recruitment of other Arabs to 
jobs in Iraq was very unpopular, which added a special 
10 
dimension to criticism of the book . Thus in February 1927, 
al-Husri, 1967, p. 557. 
10. Further indignation was caused 
. by the dedication of the book. 
which read: 'Who deserves the history of the Ummayads more 
than the sons of the U=ayads? Who deserves the history of 
Mu'awiya and al-Walid more than the sons of Mu'awiya and 
al-Walid? So, sons of independent and United Syria, accept 
this simple work". Ibid., pp. 558-9. 
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the Minister of Education, who was a Shi'i and also hostile 
to the Director-General of Education, Sati' al-Husri, 
ordered that al-Nusuli should be sacked and expelled from 
the country, and the sale of his book prohibited. 
The secondary school pupils held a huge protest demonstration 
together with the students at the Teachers Training College, 
led by Jamil, Isma'il and others. They marched through 
the streets of Baghdad complaining at the dismissal of 
al-Nusuli and demanding freedom of thought and research. 
The teachers of both institutions submitted a letter of 
protest to the Prime Minister and the Minister of Education. 
The demonstration elected a delegation of four students, 
including Hi. sain Jamil, and a Shili student, Muhammad 
Hasan Salman, but the Minister of Education refused to meet 
them. The police intervened, and a violent confrontation 
resulted. The students finally dispersed at the request of 
11 
their Popular teacher, Yusuf Zainal . In retaliation, the 
Minister of Education dismissed all the Syrian teachers 
who had supported al-Nusuli, and ordered his British 
adviser to form a committee to investigate the student 
demonstration and the attack on the police. The Committee 
decided to expel four students, including Jamil and Fa'iq 
al-Samarra'i, for leading the demonstration and attacking 
the police. Seven students, including Ismalil, were 
suspended for one month, eleven were suspended for two 
weeks, and six others received a warning letter. Those 
expelled sent a petition (which was published in some of 
For more details see al-Mallah, 1975, p. 81 and 
al-'Akkam, 1975, p. 222. 
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the Baghdad daily papers 
12 ) to the King, the Prime Minister, 
and the Minister of Education, stating that they had been 
unfairly treated and demanding their reinstatement. The 
fate of the students was subsequently discussed in the 
Chamber of Deputies, and a month later they were allowed 
to return to their schools. Jamil attributed this to public 
pressure, but al-Husri maintained that it was because of 
his influence with the King. 
The al-Nusuli affair was a turning point in Iraqi 
student politics. The demonstration, which was one of the 
largest and best organised ever held in Baghdad, and the 
fact that the government gave way under popular pressure, 
showed the new strength of the movement, and encouraged 
wider student participation in national and international 
issues. 
The Demonstration Against Sir Alfred Mond, 1928 
The restlessness of the political climate in 1927 
was evident in the al-Nusuli demonstration, the Kadhimain 
riots, the elections and the resignation of the cabinet. 
This continued into 1928, when a demonstration which turned 
into a riot took place at the funeral of Shaikh Dhari, one 
of the heroes of the 1920 revolution. Dhari had been charged 
with the murder of a British officer, Colonel Leachman, and 
had been in hiding for almost seven years until his arrest 
in 1927. He was condemned to death, but because of his 
ill health and notoriety the sentence had been reduced to 
12' 
al-'Umari, K., Hikayat Siyasýya Min Tarikh al-'Irag 
al-Hadith (Polltilc-al anecdotes-from Modern -Iraqi 
tory), Cairo 1969, p. 162. 
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life imprisonment. At the end of January 1928, it was 
announced that Sir Alfred Mond, who was director and 
chairman of several major British companies, in particular 
Imperial Chemical Industries, would visit Iraq. A leading 
Zionist, he was also the chairman of the Economic Board 
13 
of Palestine . King Faisal had known Mond 
in England, 
and it was rumoured that he had been invited by the King 
to discuss various projects, notably 'the proposal to build an oi: 
14 
pipeline connecting Iraq with the mediterranean 
Some of those who had taken part in the al-Nusuli 
demonstration began meeting at the Nadi al-Tadhamun 
(The Solidarity club)15. When they heard of Mond's proposed 
visit, they were, in Husain Jamil's words "shocked at the 
idea that a Zionist leader would visit Iraq apd would 
extend his political and commercial activities within the 
country". They decided to prevent Mond and his party from 
entering Baghdad by organising a huge demonstration to 
meet them on the outskirts of the capital. Jamil, Isma'il 
and others made contact with students at the College of Law, 
13. Who was Who, 1929-1940 (London 1941). p. 928. 
14. Mushtaq, T. A. wraq Ayyami 1900-1958, (Memoirs 
1900-1958), TBeirut-1968), -p-188., and al-Mallah, 1975, p. 83. 
15. Batatu, 1978, p. 398, says that al-Tadhamin Club 
was founded by Musain al-Rahhal ana Yus-u-F-Zainal, 
and that the former was the moving force behind 
it. The founders of Jama'at al-Ahali do not share 
this view and emphasise that Mnal-was the real 
catalyst. 
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where they were both students, and at the Teachers Training 
College and Secondary School. They also prepared banners 
and slogans for the demonstrationl6. 
On the day that Mond was scheduled to arrive from 
Damascus, the students began to assemble near the Maude 
Bridge as planned, and they were joined by a huge crowd, 
17 
bringing the number present to about 20,000 They marched 
through the eight bank district of Baghdad and stopped 
at the junction of the road from Damascus waiting for 
Mond's party to arrive. The demonstrators checked every 
passing car and shouted anti-Zionist slogans, while the 
police tried unsuccessfully to break up the demonstration. 
Realising the critical nature of the situation the 
. 
authorities : sent the Commissioner of Police with an 
armed contingent to meet Mond and his party, and led 
them safely and secretly to the High Commissioner's 
residence18. Meanwhile, the demonstrators waited until dark 
and when word spread that Mond's route had been changed 
because of the demonstration, the crowd marched back to 
the capital cheering their success in having foiled the 
visit and in hýving beaten off attempts by the police to 
disperse them. Many were injured and arrested, including 
16. Jamil and Ismalil took materials to a calligrapher 
named Jalal whose shop was opposite the Baghdad police headquarters, to inscribe the banners. When they 
picked them up, it is very possible that they were 
noticed by the police. 
17- 
al-Basani, (1974), Vol. 2, p. 150. 
18. Reuters telegram, INA, File No. D/6/3,1927-29, No. 51. 
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Husain al-Rahhal and Zaki Khairi, early adherents of Marxism, 
and 'Abd al-Qadir Isma'il, who became one of the founders 
of Jýama-a-t *al'-Aha li. 
News of the demonstration soon. spread throughout Iraq 
and the Arab world, and was accurately reported by Reuters. 
The demonstration infuriated and embarrassed the British 
High Commissioner. He sent a copy of the Reuters' telegram 
to the King, the Prime Minister, and the Ministers of 
interior and Education, pointing out that the demonstrations 
had damaged Iraq's reputation in Europe and the civilized 
world, emphasising the necessity to prevent any recurrence 
19 in the future . When the King and the Prime Minister met 
the High Commissioner, they complained that they had not 
been informed of what was going on, although the C. I. D. had 
been aware early in the day that the al-Tadhamun Club was 
planning some form of protest 
20. The High Commissioner in 
21 his turn criticised the police's handling of the demonstration 
The authorities reacted swiftly without waiting for 
the High Commissioner's instructions; Nadi al-Tadhamun was 
raided and closed and its founder, Yusuf Zainal, was 
22 banished to al-Fao in the south of Iraq . The headmasters 
and teachers in Baghdad met the Minister of Education, 
Tawfiq al-Suwaidi, who threatened that firearms would be 
used to suppress any further disturbances. The Ministry 
19. Ibid., NO. 52 of 11.2.1928. 
20. Ibid*., No. 49, Bourdillon to Ministry of the Interior 
of 10.2.1928. 
21. Ib-ýd. 
22. 
al-'Akkam, (1975), p. 289 and al-Hasani, (1974), Vol. 2, p. 150. 
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of the Interior issued an order expelling eighteen students 
from their schools (including Jamil, Ismalil, 'Aziz Sharif, 
and Adham Mushtaq), suspending six students for one month 
and three others for one week, and laws were introduced to 
deal with this and future demonstrations. Even the King, 
who felt that the existing laws were "sufficient to deal 
23 
with such incidents" accused the cabinet of over-reacting 
The students petitioned the government with the support of 
the opposition Deputies 
24 
who defended the students and 
accused the government of preventing the expression of 
25 
national sentiment The government reluctantly reinstated 
26 
the students in the next academic year 
All in all, the students felt that they had won the 
day, since they had in fact succeeded in restricting 
Mond's movements in Baghdad, and subsequently forced the 
government to reinstate them in their schools. The 
incident 
gained them widespread support and was an important 
23. INA File No. D/6/3 No. 45 (The King's remarks to the 
Cabinet). These were Laws 13 and 14 of 1928, which were 
introduced to the Cabinet by the Adviser to the Ministry 
of Justice without the previous knowledge or consent 
of the Minister, Hikmat Sulaiman. Sulaiman threatened 
to resign in protest and was only persuaded to remain 
in office by a decision to make the Ministry of interior 
responsible for the implementation of the laws. 
24. 
al-'Alam al-'Arabi, 17.2.1928g quoted al-'Akkam, 1975, p. 297, 
25. The deputies who spoke on behalf of the students were 
Ja'far Abu al-Timman, Yasin al-Hashimi, Rashid 'Ali 
al-Gailani, Mahmud Ramiz and Mahmud Subhi al-Daftari. 
Mahadhir al-Ma3_13-s a'l-Niyabi, 1928, pp. 26-28. 
26. al-Mallah, 1975, p. 86. Jamil left for Damascus right 
away, and was helped by the Syrian nationalists to 
enroll at the Law School, so he did not miss that 
academic year. 
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landmark in the growth of popular opposit. ion to the political 
system in Iraq. It pushed students to the very centre of 
the opposition and was a vital catalyst in the future 
formation of, jama'at al-Ahali. In particular, it strengthened 
Jamil and Isma'il's patriotic beliefs and prepared many 
more students for future involvement in politics. 
T. h. e. Oj sition .t. o the jq' 
-Anglo-Iraqi_Treaty 
of 1930 
On the 30th June 1930, Nuri al-Salid and Sir Francis 
Humphrys signed a Treaty which was to signify the formal 
ending of the mandate. The Treaty was made public on 
18 July 27 Nuri having left for London on 1 July to continue 
financial negotiations. The announcement of the Treaty 
"caused little rejoicing in Baghdad" 
28 
where "the ultra 
nationalist politicians hailed it as a mere continuance 
of slavery" 
29 The cpposition, although fragmented, denounced 
the Treaty, criticised it in the press and the two opposition 
parties, al-Hizb al-Ikha' al-Watani and al-Hizb al-Watani, 
led by Yasin al-Hashimi and Jalfar Abu al-Timman, declared 
the Treaty unacceptable and protested to the King of Iraq 
and the heads of foreign countries. They also sent a 
telegram to the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League 
30 of Nations threatening a boycott of the elections 
Here we shall concentrate mainly on the students' role 
27. The Director of Publishing distributed the text of the 
Treaty to the newspapers and ordered them to publish it with no comment. 
28. Sluglett, 1976, p. 182. 
29. Longrigg, 1958,. p. 183. 
30. For more details of the opposition see al-'Umari, K., 1969, pp. 343-347. 
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in the opposition. In order to ensure the ratification of 
the Treaty in Parliament, new elections were to be held 
between 10 July and 10 November. Along with the other 
opposition leaders, Abu al-Timman decided to boycott the 
31 
elections . During that period Husain Jamil graduated 
from Damascus Law School and returned to Baghdad to find 
the political atmosphere extremely tense. He contacted 
'Abd al-Qadir Isma'il, who was in his last year at the 
Baghdad Law School, and a number of other politically 
active students. They decided to publish a leaflet (bayan 
supporting Abu al-Timman, urging a boycott of the elections 
by asking people not to co-operate with a government 
which was attempting, in the pamphlet's own words, to 
create a "tool in the hands of the Colonial powers in 
order to achieve their aims in a pseudo-legal fashion". 
The bayan praised Abu al-Timman, and urged the people and 
the politicians to support him. It was signed by 'Abd al- 
Qadir Isma'il, Husain Jamil, Yunis al-Sablawi, Fa'iq al- 
Samarra'i, Khalil Kanna, 'Aziz Sharif and Sadiq Habba 
32 
Through its paper, al-Hizb al-Watani called'on the 
people to boycott the elections, and this appeal found a 
33 
positive response in different parts of the country 
Isma'il and his fellow activists applied to the governorate 
31. INA, Pile No. D/6/2, Nos. 25-29, The Treaty of 1930, 
For more details on the role of Ja'far Abu al-Timman 
in Iraqi politics see al-Daraj 1 (1976) . 
32. 
al-: B-ilad, 20.7.1930, Quoted al-Daraji (1976), p. 290. Almost 
all thege persons went on to play a prominent part in 
Iraqi politics ei-her in government or opposition. 
33. Sada al-Istiqlal 15.9.1930, quoted al-Daraji (1976), p. 291. 
of Baghdad for a permit to hold a protest meeting in the 
34 
centre of the Capital . At the same time they printed 
another leaflet (bayan which they distributed and displayed 
on walls all over the city. This bayanattributed the ills 
which existed in Iraq to Britain and her local supporters 
who controlled the government. It asked everyone to stop 
work and to attend the protest meeting which was to be 
followed by a peaceful demonstration. Despite the 
authorities' refusal to grant a permit a large crowd 
converged on the place of the meeting on the afternoon of 
22nd September. The police locked the hall and ordered the 
crowd to disperse, but they refused, marching to the 
headquarters of al-Hizb al-Watani to show their support 
for Abu al-Timman. They then assembled at the Haidarkhana 
mosque, a traditional focus of protest meetings, where they 
were attacked by the police and many arrests were made. 
Later, the police rounded up those who had signed the 
petition, and they were tried by the Baghdad Criminal Court 
in November. 'Abd al-Qadir Ismalil, Yunis al-Sablawi, Llamil 
'Abd al-Wahhab, Khalil Kanna and Fa'iq al-Samarrali were 
given six months imprisonment, Ahmad Qasim. Raji and Salim 
Zalluf, three. Husain Jamil and 'Umar Khulusi were 
acquitted 
35 
, and 'Aziz Sharif went into hiding to avoid arrest. 
34. 
The application for the permit was signed by 'Abd al-Qadir 
Isma'il, Yunis al-Sablawi, Jamil 'Abd al-Wahhab, Paliq al- 
Samarra'it Khalil xanna, 'Umar Xhulusi, Ahmad Oassim Raji and 
Salim Zalluf. al-Hasani (1974), Vol. 3, p. 74. Jamil did not 
sign the application because he had already submitted an 
application to publish a newspaper. Interview with Jamil. 
35. For the complete sentences, see Bayat, S., a'l-Qadha' al- 
iinýdli al-Iraqi (Iraqi Criminal Proceedings) Vol. 1, 
Baghdad, 192r7-, pp. 107-109. Jamil thinks he was acquitted because he did not sign the petition, although he took 
part in the demonstration. 
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On appeal, the sentences were reduced and since the 
defendants had already been held for several weeks, they 
were immediately released. Ja'far Abu al-Timman, Yasin al- 
Hashimi and Naji al-Suwaidi all took part in the campaign 
against the sentences in their newspapers, in parliament 
and by writing petitions to the King . 
A year after leaving prison, 'Abd al-Qadir Isma'il 
graduated from Baghdad Law School. Husain Jamil had already 
graduated from Damascus, and in 1931 they both began to 
look for an office to practice law. Their first involvement 
in political activities after graduation was in the strike 
against the Municipal Tax Law of 1931. Isma'il knew Ja'far 
Abu al-Timman and Muhammad Salih al-Qazzaz, the president 
of Jam'iy5iat A's'hab al -Sana . 'i (The Artisans' Association). 
During the strike he acted as a co-ordinator and advisor 
to the leaders of the strike. He and Jamil worked hard to 
gather popular support for the strike as well as trying to 
involve their own friends, other lawyers and students. 
When the leaders of the strike were arrested and put on 
trial, Husain Jamil was one of the five lawyers who 
volunteered to defend them. 
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2. T. he' Founders'*-. * 'Early Con . ta . ctsi 
It has been mentioned earlier that three of the four 
founders completed their higher education abroad. 'Abd al- 
Qadir Isma'il was the only one to remain in Iraq until his 
graduation from Baghdad Law School in June 1931, a year 
after Husain Jamil had finished his law degree in Damascus. 
Jamil then returned to Baghdad, renewing his contacts with 
and 
his former classmates/especially his friendship with Isma'il. 
Thereafter, the two met regularly to discuss the political 
situation in Iraq and their plans for the future. They 
seemed to have agreed on most major issues and also shared 
the same drive to achieve their ambitions. They decided 
that there was a deeply felt need for a newspaper which 
would be ideological rather than commercial, and since 
no existing newspaper satisfied their political beliefs or 
even approached them, they decided to publish one of their 
own. 
Jamil and Isma'il had already helped to manage and 
edit various journals and periodicals, and had written 
2 
articles and short stories . Since they maintained a 
continuous and almost obsessional interest in Iraqi politicso, 
and they had no interest in government employment, it was 
natural that they should seek to publish a paper which 
1. This section is based mainly on numerous interviews with 
the four founders of Jama'at al-Ahali, 'Abd al-Fattah 
Ibraham, Muhammad Hadid, 'Abd al-Qadir Ismalil and Husain 
Jamil, between 1976 and 1979. 
2- For details of Jamil's and Isma'il's experience, see 
their background. (Appendix B) . 
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would reflect and disseminate their views. They felt it 
to be their duty to revive national feeling, or in Jamil's 
words, "to lead our countrymen along the road to independence, 
democracy, freedom and equality", although this proved 
considerably more difficult than they anticipated. 
In 1931, 'Abd al-Fattah Ibrahim returned from the 
United States, after spending a year at Columbia University 
studying for an M. A.. in International Relations which he 
did not complete. He had finished his B. A. in history at 
the American University of Beirut in 1928, and had devoted 
much of his time to the study of political doctrines and 
ideologies, as well as being involved in various political 
activities. He was, and still is, a serious and meticulous 
person. Ismalil, who was related to him by marriage, 
contacted him to tell him about the newspaper venture he 
was planning with Jamil. Ibrahim reacted favourably, and 
a meeting was arranged. 
Ibrahim found the two other young men, who were three 
years his junior, somewhat simple and unpolished. They 
seemed to think that Iraq was the only country in the 
world, and were obsessed with the British presence to 
the virtual exclusion of everything else. For his part, 
Ibrahim promised to provide the support of his friends 
and former classmates at A. U. B., including Nuri Rufa'il, 
Jamil Tuma, 'Ali Haidar Sulaiman, Ibrahim Baithun and 
'Abdullah Bakr. In particular, Ibrahim was eagerly 
awaiting the return from the London School of Economics 
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of Muhammad Hadid, with whom he had formed closer ties 
in Beirut. Both had similar characters, and shared the 
same political ideas. Ibrahim knew he could work well 
with Hadid, and with him in the group they could form a 
balanced partnership; Ibrahim would be the ideologist, 
Hadid the strategist, Jamil the journalist and Isma'il 
the activist. With such talent, the newspaper began to 
seem a viable possibility. In fact, Hadid returned to 
Baghdad in October 1931 and was immediately approached 
by 'Abd al-Fattah Ibrahim who informed him of the project. 
Hadid agreed and met with the rest of the group to discuss 
various general aspects of the project. Jamil had already 
applied for a permit to publish a newspaper, and the 
government had approved. After several meetings they agreed 
on a set of basic ideological principles, which they 
called al-Sha'biya (Popularism). They decided to call their 
newspaper al-Ahali, and from the time of its newspaper's 
appearance in January 1932, the group became known as 
Jama'at al-Ahaliý 
In July 1931, Husain Jamil was granted a permit by 
the Ministry of the Interior to publish the newspaper. 
He had chosen the name al-Ahali for the newspaper for 
three main reasons. First,, al-Ahali means "the people", 
which implied that the paper took the side of "the people" 
against the existing newspapeiz which generally took the 
side of the government. Secondly, the name contrasted with 
3. 
see Appendix B. 
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the names of other contemporary papers. such as al-watan, 
(homeland, patrie) or al-Bilad (country, territory). 
Finally, it showed the group's admiration for the Egyptian 
Wafd party, which also published an al-Ahali newspaper 
edited by 'Abd al-Qadir Hamza 
4. The four founders held 
regular meetings to establish the principles which their 
newspaper was to follow. They agreed on a statement of 
principle, Minhaj al-Shabila(the programme of Popularism). 
It was agreed that the paper should concentrate on achieving 
true democracy and national independence for Iraq, fostering 
economic and social reform within the country, and supporting 
anti-colonial and national liberation movements in other 
countries. Also the paper would reflect popular sentiments 
and aspirations for a better life. After agreeing on what 
Jamil described as "these major ideological points", the 
group embarked on the practical side of setting up a 
newspaper. First they needed the capital to buy a prest 
and rent premises as they had decided to be completely 
independent. However, they soon found that even by pooling 
their capital they did not have enough to buy a press and 
newsprint, rent premises and hire workers. It was then 
suggested that they should encourage possible sympathisers 
to invest money in the movement in the form of shares, 
and to make the newspaper into a commercial enterprise, on 
the condition that this would not permit any interference 
4. The Egyptian writer and thinker, Salama Musa, who. was 
a powerful influence on members of the group, had also 
published a newspaper called al-Ahali in 1919. 
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in the paper's policy, direction or conduct on the part 
of the other shareholders. Thus, Ibrahim Baithun and 
Khalil Kanna were invited to contribute and later, Darwish 
al-Haidari, Nasrat al-Farisi (who asked that his name should 
not be mentioned), and Maqqi al-Chaibaji5. Finally, they 
brought a broken-down press, and agreed to start publication 
on 1 January 1932. However, on 31 December the press broke 
down and they were forced to postpone publication until 
the next day, the 2nd of January, only one day before the 
expiry of their permit. 
The significance of the newspaper and its influence 
on Iraqi political life can hardly beenx&ýTCO-UA . It 
signalled the emergence of a new political trend, directed 
by a group of young men with new ideas and approaches to 
politics, society and the economy. The appearance of al-Ahali 
was of an importance and significance shared according 
to one writer, by "no other newspaper in the whole of 
the Arab world", for it was not simply an end in itself, 
but the means of spreading progressive ideas in a backward 
6 
society . As well as being"a thorn 
in the side of the 
government" 
7, 
al-Ahali established itself as "the spokesman 
of all revolutionary, patriotic and progressive forces in 
According to al-Chadirchi the shares were divided as 
follows: 28 shares to 'Abd al-Fattah Ibrahim, 20 to 
Husain Jamil, 13.1/2 to 'Abd al-Oadir Isma'il, 10 to 
Ibrahim Baithun, 5 to Khalil Kanna, 3 to Nasrat al- Farisi, 2 to Darwish al-Haidari, and one to Haqqi al- 
Chaipachi. Mudhakkar 
- at 
Kamil al-Chadirchi (The Memoirs 
of Kamil al-chadirchi), (Bei-rut 1970), p. 23.. 6. Kha. l. il,. M. Y.. (1974), 'p. 173. 
7- Knabenshue to State Departmen: t, 16.7.1932, USNA 890 
G. 00/209. 
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in Iraq" 
8 
and became the most prominent daily paper in 
9 
the country . This did not come about because of a 
shortage of other newspapers or as a coincidence, or 
simply because it was an opposition paper, but rather 
because it consistently maintained high standards in 
editorials, reporting and investigation. More important'. 
it reflected popular feelings and demands, and expressed 
widely held aspirations for a better life and a more 
representative government. From its first issue on 2nd 
January 1932, until the end of the period of study in 
1946, al-Ahali and its successor Sawt al-Ahali, went 
through many owners and editors. Although suppressed 
many times and not published for many years, it remained 
highly respected. Generally speaking, it kept to a fairly 
consistent style and content, although it went through 
different phases affecting its course of action and approach, 
which will be discussed in Part III. 
Because of the uniqueness and significance of the 
first issue of al-Ahali, which contained a statement of 
the objectives, it is useful to describe it in some detail. 
Alongside the paper's name appeared the words "a universal 
political daily newspaper, published by a team of young 
people '. 
10. A flaming torch 11 appears next to the 
traditional headline, which read "the good of the people 
10 a. Vit0l, # F., The-Coup dI etat government in Iraq. The Revolutionary_East (moscow 1937) (Translated-into 
Ara-b-ic Ln al-Thaqa'fa al-JadidaoBaghdad June 1971, p. 58). 
9. Khadduri, M. (1960), p. 70. 
10. al-Ahali, 2.1.1932. 
11. TýTesjýql of the flaming torch was used by al_-Ahali and 
a1w laced nqxt to the title on editoria .? age. 6It was copUa 
Yrom, 
al- Usur, an. Eylptian maqazinq eAi e Ismail Mudhir whose writings in uenced the thinking of 
Lmil, 
Isma'ii and Hadid. Interview with Jamil. 
90 
above every other good: our paper is the people's paper, 
it sees their welfare above all other goals". It defined 
the people's welfare as: 
,.. everything which is useful and beneficial 
o the majority of the citizens of this country, 
such as the improvement of the standard of 
living, the achievement of material and 
spiritual security, the establishment of a 
stable and healthy political and economic 
order, the utilisation of the population's 
intellectual talents and its economic and 
other resources for the people's maximum 
benefit. 
In order to create this, the country needs 
individuals who are prepared to work 
unostentatiously and derive their happiness 
and satisfaction from this struggle rather 
than in palaces and wealth. These are the 
young people with firm beliefs and clear 
objectives who are prepared to devote their 
lives to the service of their people in all 
spheres of political, ideological and economic 
activity to achieve the goals for which the 
paper has been published. 
We at this newspaper do not support any exidting 
political party. We follow our own free will and 
support what we believe to be beneficial to the 
majority and the common good. But this in no way 
implies any hatred or resentment towards other 
parties ... we are after the truth wherever it is and we devote this paper to the cause of truth. 
We are publishing this paper because we 
appreciate the importance of journalism and its 
great influence. We recognise that newspapers can 
function as a school for society, developing 
individuals all through their lives, enlightening 
them and showing them the right way as well as 
misleading them. Newspapers can be the means 
either of building up or of ruining a society. 
Hence the people have the right to demand that 
newspaper publishers should be unselfish, and 
believe that their duty is to serve the country, 
having tru and frankness'as the motto of their 
professiontý2 
12. 
a'l-Aha'l'i, 2. January 1932. 
; k- 
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In the same issue, on page 3, the paper further 
clarified its identity and objectives. In seeking to find 
a cure for the present backward condition of society, the 
paper declared its purpose to be the publication of daily 
to 
events and foreign news, /discuss modern thoughts and ideas, 
and to translate and summarise the works of modern 
philosophers and contemporary writers 
13. Until the middle 
of 1937 it had six pages, but between 1942-46, only four. 
Special sections were devoted to various different sectors 
of society, particularly labour, youth, women and literature, 
Another important section, "News from all parts of 
Iraq" concentrated on the needs and complaints of the 
people, particularly in the poverty-stricken country areas. 
It showed the appalling living conditions of the rural poor 
and the injustices inflicted upon them by their shaikhs 
and corrupt government officials. Such information was 
provided by volunteer correspondents from all over Iraq, 
of whom one of the most famous was the reporter from 
Nasiriya, Yusuf Salman Yusuf (Fahad), later the general 
secretary of the Iraqi Communist Party 
14. At least one 
page was devoted to a section called "Latest Telegrams 
and Cables" which carried the latest news from around 
the world, concentrating particularly on the plight of 
oppressed peoples, revolutionary struggles for independence 
by National Liberation movements against repressive 
systems such as the Indian struggle against British rule, 
13. -b * Ibid. 
14. Interview with Husain Jamil and 'Abd al-Oadir Isma'il. 
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and the progress, development and achievements of the Soviet 
Union. 
About half a page was devoted to the Arab countries. 
This brought news of the fight against Zionism and 
colonialism in Syria, Egypt,,, North Africa and Palestine, and 
also reported evidence of democratic progress in Egypt 
and Syria in the context of the development of political 
parties and parliamentary institutions. Another half page 
was devoted to 'Reformist Turkey and Iran', emphasising 
the progress achieved and reforms undertaken by both 
countries. A further section was devoted to various 
economic theories, giving an analysis of world economic 
conditions, generally, and in the context of Iraq's own 
economic conditions and problems. There was also a health 
section which was concerned with public health matters 
and common diseases. 
Although Jama'at al-Ahali worked together on the 
production of the paper, different individuals supervised 
different sections, although their names were not mentioned. 
Isma'il lived in the same building as the newspaper which 
made him in effect the resident manager. He supervised 
overall. day to day control of the technical side of 
productiono besides writing and editing the "Story for 
Today". His brother Yusuf isma'il was editor of the 
telegrams and cables section, while 'Abd al-rattah Ibrahim 
was responsible for the sociological, historical and 
political articles, which concentrated on ideological 
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interpretations of popularism and the translation of 
various articles and books, as well as contributing to 
the editorial. Hadid concentrated on economics and 
finance, in addition to translations, while 'Ali Haidar 
Sulaiman contributed historical and political articles 
and critiques under the pen-name Shamali(ýa Northerner), 
or "The Young Historian". Jamil helped to manage the paper, 
and acted as an editor, also writing on legal and public 
affairs. Kamil al-Chadirchi took over most of these tasks 
when Jamil left in June 1932. 
There was an unofficial editorial committee composed 
of the founders (Ibrahim, Hadid, Isma'il and Jamil) and 
later al-Chadirchi. They suggested appropriate topics 
which the group would analyse and try to clarify, and the 
main editorial would then be assigned to one of them. 
After writing, the piece was normally looked over or 
corrected by one or more of the group. The editorials were 
always clearly and precisely written according to a method 
which never changed. A long and obvious title indicated 
the subject, and then the body of the article stated 
the problems, the analysis and other aspects before 
suggesting a solution. Nothing was superfluous or 
exaggerated in the writing, in contrast to most of the 
writing of the time. In fact, it is not until comparatively 
recently that the use of rhetoric has begun to be omitted 
in some Arabic journals. Another new practice was that of 
omitting the names of contributors, which was already well 
known from the British press, particularly from The T*im'e's*. 
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This was particularly suited to al-Ahali's purposes; if 
the writers were anonymous, the government did not know 
who they were, which protected government employees like 
Ibrahim and Hadid from prosecution. It also encouraged 
aspiring writers to contribute articles to the paper without 
fear or being found out and possibly being persecuted, 
losing their jobs or being transferred to some remote part 
of the country. 
al-Ahali newspaper was thus patriotic, in opposition 
to the government, oriented towards socialism and generally 
progressive and educational in nature. It always remained 
in contact with popular aspirations, yet it was also fairly 
sophisticated, possibly too much so for the majority of 
its readership. However, it always attempted to explain 
political systems and ideologies, and simplify terms in 
order to make for easier and more digestible reading. 
The Story for Today, sometimes part of the literature and 
art page, was another prominent feature. The stories were 
generally fictional but they were an accurate reflection 
of social, economic and political conditions in Iraq, 
showing the suffering of the workers and contrasting this 
with the idle and unproductive lifestyle of the upper 
classes. Also progressive writers such as Abdullah Jaddul, 
Lufti Bakr Sidqi,, Husain al-Rahhal, 'Abd al-Wahhab al-Amin, 
Oasim Hasan, Mustafa 'Ali and Yusuf Matti# 'Abd al-Qadir 
Isma'il also wrote many short stories for the newspaper. In 
addition, it published translations of the works of 
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international writers like Tolstoy, Maupassant, Shaw, 
Goethe, Gorki and Chekhov. From the very first time there 
were studies of the development of various schools of 
political thought and ideology, which explained and analysed 
the characteristics of each one, as well as translations 
of biographies of national leaders such as Gandhi, Nehru, 
Lenin and Stalin. 
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3. The-Principal Influences on the Ideology of Jama'at al-Ahali 
On 8 October 1932, al-Ahali carried an editorial which 
pointed out that the ideology of al-Sha'biya was a combination 
of and selection from a number of different ideologies. The 
article continued: 
It is wrong to follow one single ideology 
or principle, neglecting useful features 
of other ideologies. It is our duty to create 
our own road to follow in dealin? with our own 
political and social conditions. 
In what follows we will look into the ideologies which 
influenced members of al-Ahali and also their debt to a 
number of contemporary political figures. We must also 
consider the effect of the atmosphere in which the founders 
of al-Ahali lived, whether in Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, 
London or New York. In order to understand the various 
influences more clearly we will attempt to divide the spheres 
of influence into three loose categories, local, Arab (mostly 
Egyptian) and international. 
Local Influences 
A progressive socialist circle first began to meet in 
Baghdad in the early 1920s to discuss Marxism and Socialism. 
The group was known as, al-Ruwwad (The Pioneers) 
2 
and their 
founder was Husain al-Rahhal, who had returned to Iraq after 
spending some six years in Europe between 1913 and 1919, 
mainly in Germany where he witnessed the Spartacist rising. 
" 
al-Ahali, 8.10.1932. 
2. Interview with Jamil and Isma'il, also al-Rawi, A. L. j "al-Mukawinat al-'Ula lil-Fikr - al-Ishtiraki fi al-Iraq" (The early formation of socialist thought in Iraq). al- 
Thaqafa al-Jadida, No. 59, March 1974. pp. 182-190. 
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He later visited India, where he probably came into contact 
with Indian Communists 
3. He was a firm believer in Socialism, 
and was well versed in many foreign languages, which enabled 
him to translate articles on Marxism and Socialism for his 
friends and followers. Another outstanding figure in this 
group was Mahmud Ahmad, the cousin of 'Abd al-rattah 
Ibrahim and 'Abd al-Qadir Isma'il, who had visited India 
in 1919, was influenced by the revolutionaries there and 
had absorbed some of the principles of scientific Socialism. 
He also had had contact with leaders of the labour 
movement and had experience of strikes and demonstrations 
4 
Ahmad was one of the foremost orators of the Revolution of 
1920 in Baghdad. Ahmad and al-Rahbal attracted politically 
conscious youngsters such as 'Abdullah Jadda', Mustafa 
'Ali, Muhammed Salim Fattah, 'Auni Bakr Sidqi and 'Abd 
al-Hamid Rif'at 
5, 
who were the nucleus of al-Ruwwad. They 
used to meet daily in an old cafe near Bab al-Sharqi which 
became a centre for young people, who came to listen to 
these grown-up discussions on political and social issues. 
Ibrahim and Jamil attended many of these sessions but Isma'il 
was a regular, especially in the later 1920s 
6. 
3. 
Batatu, (1960), pp. 60-62. 
4. 
al-Rawi (1974), p. 187. See also Batatu 1978, chapter 12. 
Batatu seems to concentrate his attention on Husain al- 
Rahhal, while LTama'at al-Ahali put him on par with 
Mahmud Ahmad. 
S. Interview with Ibrahim and Isma'il; also al-Rawi (1974), 
p. 187. 
6. interviews with Ismalil, Ibrahim and Jamil. 
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The group was interested in reading about the Bolshevik 
Revolution as well as in developments in other countries, 
but they looked to Egypt as the main source of information 
about socialism. The need for books and articles about 
socialism became pressing when al-Ruwwad published the 
country's first socialist newspaper, al-Sahifah (The Journal) 
in 1924, after which they were known as Jama'at al-Sahi*fah 
7 
al-Ruwwad seems to have had contact with the leading 
socialists of the Arab world (especially in Egypt and Lebanon) 
and with the French Communist newspaper 1'Humanite". In his 
article on the beginnings of socialism in Iraq, al-Rawi 
reproduces an interesting letter sent by Mahmud Ahmad to 
comrade Niqula Haddad in Egypt dated 1923, in which the 
writer asked Haddad to supply them with socialist literature 
which they badly needed; "we want to be socialists, educated 
socialists ... and we cannot find books to satisfy our 
aspirations". The letter goes on to say that Ahmad and his 
friends had read Haddad's own book as well as Salama 
Musa's book on socialism, but they remained in need of more 
literature. This had prompted them to contact 1'Humanite 
in France, who sent them some of their literature and 
catalogues, which were of course all in French. Ahmad urged 
Haddad to translate recent books on Marxism, which he 
called 'contemporary socialism', and asked to be sent back 
numbers of the Egyptizýn Socialist Party's newspaper 
al-Ishtiraki. Ahmad started his letter on a cynical note; 
7. 
al-Rawi (1974), p-187; see also Batatu (1978), Chapter 12. 
99 
"we, the people of Iraq, are isolated from the rest of the 
world, we have no contact with the advanced nations except 
8 through Reuter's telegrams, thank GodIIIII . Mahmud Ahmad 
also corresponded with Yusuf Yazbuk, one of the founders of 
the Syrian Communist party and the author of many novels 
dealing with socio-economic conditions and social injustices. 
In a letter to Yazbuk in April 1929, Ahmad implied that the 
group was then still active in spreading socialist ideas 
9 in Iraq 
al-Ruwwad subscribed to various progressive Egyptian 
magazines such as al-Muqtataf, al-Hilal, and al-Mustaqbal, 
and they also read the writings of Salama Musa, Shibli 
Shummayyil, Niqula Haddad, Taha Husain, 'Abd al-Qadar 
al-Mazini, and al-Aqqad's early writings on socialism. 
al-Muc 
. 
Itataf and the writings of Shummayyil and Haddad in 
particular made a significant contribution to the understanding 
and diffusion of socialist ideas in Iraq and in the Arab 
10 
world al-Ruwwad influenced three of the four founders of 
Jama'at al-Ahali, namely, Ibrahim, Jamil and Ismalil, (Hadid 
lived in Mosul), in varying degrees. Ibrahim knew Mahmud 
Ahmad well, since he was his cousin and a frequent visitor 
11 to his house, and admired him a great deal . It is most 
al-Rawi (1974), pp. 187-8. 
9. Khadduri, M. Po . litical 'Trends in the Arab Wor 1d; The Rofe' 
oi Id'eas'and Ideals in Politics (8altTm-; re 1972), pp. 104-5. 
For Yazbuk's and Ahmad"W-s--tyrTe-, see Ibid., p. 103 and 105. 
lo. al-RaWi (1974), p. 184. Also interviews with Ismalil and Jamil. 
11- interview with Ibrahim. 
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probable that al-Ruwwad implanted the seeds of socialism 
in Ibrahim's mind, made him aware of social injustice, 
deepened his resentment of British colonialism, and made 
him receptive to progressive ideas. However, he left 
Baghdad as soon as he finished secondary school at the 
end of 1923, and in fact himself discounts the influence 
of al-Ruwwad on his ideas. Nevertheless, he does not deny 
the impact of Ahmad's personality, and the fact that he 
was one of the most active Iraqi students from the moment 
of his arrival at the American University of Beirut, 
proves that he was well prepared politically. Jamil was 
probably the least influenced of the three as he used to 
attend al-Ruwwad, meetings accompanied by his older brother 
and he only listened to the discussions. Jamil believes thlat 
these meetings made him aware of socialist ideas in general 
and of Marxism and the Bolshevik Revolution in particular. 
They also made him aware of social injustices in Iraq and 
elsewhere and deepened his concern for the plight of the 
poor and the deprived 
12. Of the four, Ismalil was certainly 
influenced the most by al-Ruwwad and he remained attached 
to them in one form or another until he left Iraq in the 
summer of 1937. Their discussions and dialogues interested 
and stimulated him, and the more he listened to their 
discussions on Socialism and Marxism, the more congenial 
he found their ideas. Mahmud Ahmad's and Yazbuk's literary 
style strongly influenced his own in his short stories and 
12. Interview with Jamil. See also, Jamil, H., "Bawakir 
al-Haraku al-Wataniya wa al-Taqadumiya fi al-'Iraq", al-Thaqafa al-jadida, Vol-104, April 1978. 
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reports describing the economic difficulties facing the 
average Iraqi family, and the wretched life of the peasants 
13 in the Iraqi marshes . Ismalil shared their concern for 
the plight of the poor and their exploitation by the rich 
and the British and expressed this in a simple and 
sensitive style14 
Egyptian Influences 
In the 1920s and 1930s, Egypt was the main source of 
literature on political ideas for the Arab reader, either 
written originally in Arabic or translated from European 
languages. It also provided the Arab world with a leading 
example of a national struggle for independence and 
democracy. During the early part of the 20th century, 
educated Iraqis considered Egypt to be a model for their 
own political aspirations and keenly watched developments 
is 
there . As has already been mentioned, Egyptian books, 
magazines and newspapers were regularly read and much sought 
after in Iraq. It is thus not surprising that educated 
Iraqis were well aware-of the trends of thought and heated 
debates taking place among the relatively more numerous 
educated classes in Egypt. From Egypt came two main influences, 
the first that of ideology in general and the second that 
of the Wafd party as a mass independence movement. The 
British occupation of Iraq during the First World War, and 
the mandatory regime which followed had several parallels 
13. 
al-9habab, vol. 3,4, & 5,1929; also al-Ahali 4.7.1934,, - 8.9.1934 describing 15 days in the marshes oi Iraq. 
14. Interview with Isma'il. 
15- Interview with Jamil. 0 
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with the experience of contemporary Egypt, and the Iraqi 
Revolution of 1920 could be compared with the Egyptian 
revolt of 1919. However, the Egyptians had had a longer 
experience of colonial rule thah the Iraqis, and had 
gained a certain amount of experience in organising themselves 
to gain independence. Hence Iraqi nationalists watched 
developments in Egypt to try to benefit from the lessons 
of the Egyptian example. 
After 1918 the Egyptian nationalist movement developed 
into a mass or popular movement on a number of different 
levels. In the first place it attempted to rid Egypt of 
foreign domination and to achieve independence, and although 
it was led by educated middle-class lawyers, merchants and 
students, the Egypt; ian peasantry was present en masse and 
thus it was a truly popular independence movement. Secondly, 
it was a constitutional movement aimed at weakening the 
power of the King and the executive and at strengthening 
the legislative branch. The most powerful element in this 
period of Egyptian history was the Wafd party; indeed, the 
"history of the nationalist movemento at that period, is 
,, 16 in fact, the history of the Wafd party . The figure of 
Salad Zaghlul, leading the Egyptians in defiance of the 
British authorities and in search of Egyptian independence 
had a great impact on the imagination of young Iraqi 
nationalists, and the influence of the Wafd newspapers 
was also considerable outside Egypt. Again the influx of 
16. Ramadhan,, A., Tatawwur al-Haraka al-Wataniya Fi Misr 
The Development of the Nationar- movement _ in Egypt) J1918-1936), 
Cairo 1968, p. 76. 
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Egyptian newspapers, magazines and books, transmitting the 
ideas of western and Arab (mainly Syrian), writers and 
thinkers, the latest in modern ideas, and the debates between 
progressive and conservative elements in Egypt, also had a 
great impact on educated Iraqis. As well as following these 
ideas and developments they also attempted to digest them 
for themselves and to create a similar political climate. 
The two most important and influential Egyptian magazines 
were al-Muqtataf (first published in 1876) and al-Hilal 
(first published in 1892), which were devoted mainly to 
exploring different political concepts. At the turn of 
the century and afterwards they were engaged in heated 
debates over socialism and other modern doctrines17 and 
were widely read by educated Iraqis, many of whom had regular 
subscriptions 
18. 
al-Muqtataf arrived in Baghdad as early as 
19 1876 . The magazines fulfilled two major functions, the 
popularisation of the new ideas of socialism and the promotion 
of secularism. Although both al-Hilal and al-Mucft-ataf 
initially attempted to disparage socialism, the supporters 
of socialism had to explain its principles in the process 
and thus brought it to the attention of their readers. 
Furthermore, 
17. Abu Jaber, Ko The Arab Balth Spcialistparty, 
-HistorV, Ideology and Orqanizationp(Syracuse, N. Y. 1966), p. 1; also 
Hourani, A. (1970) pp. 246-7 and DonaldRe1d, tarly 
Christlan, hriters, "WMES, Vol. 5p! 1974). pp. 179-190. 
18. Interview with Jamil. 
19- Hourani, (1970), p. 247. 
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From the discoveries of science, there could 
be inferred a system of social morality which 
was the secret of social strength; and that 
the basis of this moral system was public 
spirit or patriotism, the love of country and 
fellow countrymen which should transcend all 
other social ties, even those of religion: it 
was largely through the work of these 
periodicals that such ideas later became 
commonplace. 20 
Thus al-MuLtataf'and al-Hilal brought the new ideology which 
had already influenced great numbers of educated people in 
the Arab world to Iraq. Here it is necessary to outline 
briefly the basic ideas of the Arab socialist thinkers, and 
to trace their impact and influence on at least some 
members of al-Ahali who admitted having been greatly influenced 
by them. 
one of the first Arab socialists 
21 
was Shibli Shummayyil 
(1850-1917) a Syrian doctor of medicine, who had moved to 
Egypt. He had become interested in Darwin's theory of 
evolution while still a student at the American University 
of Beirut, and considered himself a social Darwinist. Later 
in life, he focused his attention on scientific socialism 
22 
and in 1908 drew up proposals for an Egyptian socialist party, 
with the notion of ppsitive government action for the public 
good rather than state ownership of the means of production 
as his central concern. His programme asserted that the 
government should control wages, improve public health, manage 
schools and provide employment 
23. Another important figure 
20. Ibid'. 
21. Maqsud, Clovis, Nahwa Ishtirakiya Arabiya (Tow .a. r. d. sA. r. ab 
. 
Socialism) 2nd ej-n., Beirut 1958, p. 57, Quoted Abu Jaber 
(1966), p. 2. 
22. Re id, D. (19 74) , p. 184. 
23. Ibid., p. 185. 
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of the socialist school was Niqula Haddad (1870-1954) 
who was more influential in his pursuit of socialism than 
Shummayyil. Yet he had a strikingly similar background. 
Haddad was a Syrian Christian who studied pharmacy at 
24 A. U. B. and moved to Egypt shortly after 1900 . Haddad 
published and edited various papers and magazines 
(including al-mucltataf between 1948-1950), and wrote 
numerous articles and novels. Haddad's major contribution 
on the subject of socialism is his book al-Ishtirak*iýa 
(Socialism) (Cairo 1920), considered the first book in 
Arabic to appear on the subject (apart from a short pamphlet 
by Salama Musa in 1913) 
25. In his book, Haddad expressed 
his belief in democratic socialism and stated that political 
26 democracy was a prerequisite for economic democracy 
Thus democracy is necessary to achieve socialism; "once they 
have a democratic government, the socialists can launch 
a massive educational campaign to win over the voters and 
come to power legally". Haddad adopted Henry George's 
gradualist method as well as his 'single tax' on property 
as a means of equalising wealth and bringing in sufficient 
revenue to run the economy. He attacked free enterprise as 
inadequate and declared that it was capitalism rather than 
socialism which restricted individual freedom, led to 
24. Ibid., p. 186; also Abu Jaber (1966), P. 3. 
25. Reid (1974), p. 186. 
26. Abu jaber (1966), p. 3. 
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laziness, and bordered on anarchy 
27 
. 
Both n. ummayyil and Haddad were associates of Salama 
Musa, who was born into a distinguished Coptic family in 
1817. He soon became involved with progressive writers and 
helped to edit many periodicals, notably al-Hilal and 
al-Mustaqbýai". He also became involved with al-Muqtataf and 
became a friend and associate of progressive thinkers and 
was influenced by their ideas. In spite of changing direction 
at times, he remained fascinated by the scientific approach 
28 
and loyal in principle to liberal ideas . Musa travelled 
in Europe and meeting socialist groups there confirmed his 
belief in socialism. Between 1908 and 1911 he visited 
France and England and spent three years with the founders 
of l'Humanite and the Fabian Society. He was so impressed 
by the Fabians that he joined the Society himself 
29. In 
1921 when the Egyptian Socialist Party was accused of being 
communist, Musa wrote an article in al-Ahram (31.8.1921) 
denying that he was a Communist and asserting that he was a 
member of the Fabian Society, which he described as a 
moderate socialist society in London, saying that the 
Egyptian Socialist Party has exactly the same ideas 
30 
In 1913, Musa published a pamphlet on socialism, 
al-Ishti (Cairo 1913,1962) which Kbadduri describes as a: 
27. Haddddi Niqulal al-Ishtirakiya, p. 179-197, Quoted by Reid, p. 187. 
28. Reid (1974), p. 188. 
29* Ib., , p. 189, also Abu Jaber, p. 2. 
30- Ramadhan (1968), p. 520i., 
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Mixture of Utopian and Marxism socialism, 
since he combines the principles of the 
abolition of private property with that 
which recognises the variation Qf individual 
incomes. The brand of socialismý' that Musa 
wanted for Egypt seemed to be a combination 32 
of parliamentary democracy and state socialism. 
He also published many articles in al-Hilal in 1920 
describing and praising the Bolshevik revolution, and the 
33 
ideology and system of the Soviet Union . In 1921, he 
joined with other Egyptian intellectuals to form the 
Egyptian Socialist Party, but when the Party's executive 
committee decided to transform it into the Egyptian Commiinist 
Party 
34 
a year later, Musa resigned and wrote articles in 
al-Ahram attacking the move and declaring that he had severed 
35 
all relations with the new party . Musa's social and 
political ideology, his philosophy and his liberal approach, 
and his many books and articles made him one of the most 
influential and respected Arab thinkers of modern times, 
and the impact of his ideas were felt on generations of 
students in the Arab world. Khadduri believes: 
It is Musa who provides the most direct link 
between the Syrian Christian socialist 
pioneers of the early twentieth gqntury and 
the Arab socialist of the 1960s. JO 
As well'as the socialist pioneers, there were other 
writers and thinkers in Egypt who made a great impact on 
their own and succeeding generations in the Arab world, 
31. Musa favoured the use of Ijtima'iyah (Social) as a better 
r. end. itipp of 'Socialism'pReid (1974T, p. 190; quoting Musa, 
Tarbiyat (Education), Salama Musa, p. 124. 
32. 
Khadduri (1972), p. 94. 
33. 
Reid, (1974), p. 189. 
34. 
Ramadhan (1968), p. 534. 
35. Ibid., p. 532; quoting al-Ahram, 4,9,, 19.8.1922. 
36. KMa duri (1972) p. 228. 
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such as Taha Husain, 'Ali 'Abd al-Raziq, MListafa Sadiq 
al-Rafi'i, and Isma'il Mazhar who contributed to the spread 
of free thought and a secular and scientific approach to 
life, societyo religion, politics and culture. Once more, 
al-Muqtataf played a role in promoting these revolutionary 
ideas and sensitive issues by publishing articles by well- 
known people like Salama Musa and the Iraqi poet Jamil 
sidqi al-Zahawi. But it was Ismalil Mazhar who devoted 
himself to the ideas of free thought, scientific approach 
and liberal or abstract ideas, and for that purpose he 
founded a periodical called al-'Usur, (The Ages), which 
first appeared in 1927., al-'Usur found a receptive audience 
inside and outside Egypt, for it dealt with vital contemporary 
topics, and attracted contributions from liberal and 
progressive intellectuals. It won immediate success, and 
those who supported its principles became known as Jamalat 
al-'Usur. Although the periodical proved short-lived 
through lack of financial support and the strong criticism 
it attracted, it left a lasting influence on its readers. 
According to Khadduri "It taught a lesson to liberal thinkers 
to. follow more subtle methods in spreading liberal ideas". 
Mazhar did not confine himself to preaching free thought; 
he advocated a "hybrid economic system which he called 
al-Takaful al-Ijtima_'i or al-ishtiraki, (Social or Socialist 
Equilibrium), which was designed to replace free enterprise 
as well as socialism, since he considered that both had 
failed to build a stable society. Equilibrium meant providing 
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for moderation and individual security with equal opportunities 
to all under a system of guaranteed freedom, which would 
limit the individual's oppression of society as well as 
society's oppression of the individual. These views, 
according to Khadduri "are shared by many Arab thinkers 
who seem to be prepared to tolerate certain restrictions on 
individual liberty in order to achieve equitable distribution 
,, 37 of wealth rather than tolerate disparity 
It is thus possible to appreciate the enormous influence 
exerted on the founders of Jamalat al-Ahali by the influx 
of ideas, literature, or personalities coming from or through 
Egypt. Each of them had, at some time or other, regularly 
or occasionally, read al-Muqtataf and al-Hilal. Jamil was 
perhaps the most regular reader, while in Beirut Hadid also 
followed them with interest. On the other hand, Isma'il 
read them only occasionally and although Ibrahim affirms 
his interest in these and other Arabic periodicals, he 
denies that they had any permanent influence on his way 
of thinking. The founders of al-Ahali certainly acknowledged 
the stimulus of the early Arab socialists, like Shummayyil, 
Haddad, Musa and the others, who encouraged them to explore 
different ideologies further. Again Jamil admits to be 
the most influenced by them, particularly by Mazhar's 
theory of free thought and social equilibrium; Hadid 
acknowledges the strong influence of Salama Musa, and it is 
significant that Hadid became a member of the Fabian Society 
when he was a student at the London School of Economics. 
37. Khadduri (1972), p. 238, p. 259. 
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Thus individually or collectively, the influence of the 
Egyptian struggle for independence, together with Egyptian 
periodicals and books, left a great imprint on the a-f-Ahali 
movement as well as on their ideology, al-Sha'biyal. 
Influences from Outside the Arab World 
Soon after the end of the First World War, political 
ideas and ideologies from other parts of the world began 
to filter through to Iraq, both from foreign literature 
and from Iraqis returning from outside the country. These 
ideas came from three main sources; Marxism from the Soviet 
Union; social democracy from Britain, France and Germany; 
and anti-colonialism from the example of the Indian 
independence movement. Jamalat al-Ahali and the left in 
general were particularly receptive to these various 
ideologies, and progressed from simple notions of 
independence and national self-determination to ideas of 
comprehensive social and economic reform. Since they both 
studied abroad, Hadid and Ibrahim were particularly 
instrumental in the transmission of these new ideas. 
After graduating from A. U. B., Hadid went to London in 
1928 to study Economics at L. S. E., while Ibrahim registered 
for an M. A. in Political Science at Columbia University in 
1930. Although Hadid had been active in the student movement 
in Beirut, he was not committed to any particular political 
ideology before his arrival in London, apart from a general 
critical awareness of his country's backwardness and its 
ill 
dependent semi-colonial status. However, within a few months 
of his arrival he had become deeply influenced by Harold 
Laski, who was his personal tutor as well as one of his 
main lecturers. Laski was a leading member of the Fabian 
society, which had a strong ideological influence on the 
Labour Party in the late 1920s and early 1930s. In fact, 
at the general election of 1929, forty-seven out of 
ninety-nine Fabian candidates were elected, and eight Fabians 
38 had seats in the cabinet . Hadid clearly found the 
atmosphere at L. S. E. highly congenial, and he was an 
39 enthusiastic and active member of the Fabian Society 
As will shortly be described, the influence of Fabianism 
on Jamalat al-Ahali was especially strong, in organisational 
and strategic as well as ideological terms. 
Ibrahim was particularly interested in modern European 
history, and had written a B. A. dissertation on the 
Bolshevik revolution during his final year at A. U. B. in 
1928. At Columbia University he studied with Parker Thomas 
moon, the author of Imperialism and World Politics 
40 
0 
and began an M. A. on Anglo-Iraqi relations. Although he 
did not complete the thesis, the material he-collected 
formed the basis of his 'Ala Tariq al-Hind published as an 
al-Ahali tract. His reading at Columbia gave him deeper 
38. Cole, Margaret, The Story of Fabian Sociall'sm (London 
1961), p. 218. For the Fabians' views-on an olonialism, 
see Martin, Kingsley, Harold Laski (1893-1950) A Biographical 
39. 
Interview with Hadid. 
memo-ir (Londo pp. b4 -100 
90-91. 
40. Moon, P. T., 
_Imperial_ism and 
World Politics, (New York 1922 
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insight into the workings of imperialism, and in general he 
was also profoundly influenced by Marxist thought. Although 
at heart a social democrat, he has always maintained an 
admiration for Marxist analysis and the achievements of the 
Soviet Union. His view of nationalism reveals an obvious 
41 
debt to Stalin's writings on the national question 
However, the most decisive foreign influence on al-ýAhafi 
was undoubtedly the Fabian Society. This 
examination of various aspects of the Soi 
principles, and organisation, and from a 
the two groups' publications and general 
interests. A study of the Fabian Society 
follows: 
is clear from an 
:: iety's activities, 
comparison of 
theoretical 
describes it as 
The Fabian Society is neither a socialist 
party nor pre-eminently a school of socialist 
doctrines, but a group of men and women who 
are endeavouring to spread practical views on 
immediate and pressing social problems, and 
to indicate the way for their embodiment in 
legislative and administrative measures. 
According to these views socialism is not a 
revolutionary movement of the working classes 
for the purpose of establishing some new form 
of society, nor is it an anti-parliamentary 
and an extra-national system of co-operation. 
It is the result of a long series of national 
problems, which have arisen out of the manifold 
economic, social, and spiritual changes that 
were taking place in the last century, and which 
must be dealt with by the nation if it desires 
to raise its efficiency and to continue its upward 
progress. 42 
shaw, who later became a member of the Society,, described 
the founding members of the Fabian Society somewhat 
41. Interview with Ibrahim. 
42. Beer, M. A., History of British Socialism vol. ii, 
(London 1953), pp. 276-277. 
113 
disparagingly in 1884 as "middle-class philanthropists 
who believe themselves to be socialists" 
43 
, while a modern 
author gives a more favourable verdict; they were: 
... scholarly young idealists, who were radicals 
of a ... different sort. The founding Fabians 
were convinced free thinkers, alienated from 
convention ... 
44 
The early Fabians were more concerned with positive action 
as a means of regenerating society than with precise 
theoretical formulations and had a spirit of optimism 
and faith in humanist values like the young founders of 
al-Ahali. The basic principles of the Society centred on 
form of 
the achievement of a/democratic socialism in which the 
state would control the economy and be generally responsible 
for the health and social welfare of the population. Such 
aims were to be realised by strictly gradualist and 
constitutional means. Hence 'democracy would be the political 
45 
agent of socialism' 
There are other similarities between this ideology 
and that of al-Shalbiya. Both the Fabians and, al-Ahali 
rejected the notion of class struggle or violent rdvolution, 
believing that social change could be achieved by raising 
consciousness through programmes of mass education 
46. Hence 
43. Wolfe, W., From R adicalism to Socialism (New Haven, 
1975), p. 164. 
44. ibid. # p. 151a 
45. Cole, 1961, pp. 27-30. 
46. Ibid., pp. 7-9. See also below, Part III. 
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both groups produced a series of publications in the form 
of essays, tracts, and a magazine, the Fabian New Statesman 
with its special supplements, and al-Ahali newspaper with 
its supplements, and the essays collected in Rasa'il al-Ahali 
ila al-Shabab. Both groups restricted membership to selected 
individuals 47, and al-Ahali adopted the Fabian pledge, 
which was an oath or undertaking to serve the Society to 
the member's best ability, to contribute monthly dues, and 
to attend the Society's meetings48. 
India 
Finally, the founders of al-Ahali, Jamil and Isma'il 
in particular, were keenly interested in the progress of 
the Indian independence struggle. They admired Gandhi's 
policy of non-violent resistance, but also applauded 
Nehru's more practical vision and aggressive style. The 
first two photos published on the front page of al-Ahali 
were of the two Indian leaders leading their people in 
defiance of British rule. The first issue of, al-Ahali began 
a serialisation of Gandhi's life which ran for several 
weeks. al-Ahali also used the technique of boycotting foreign 
goods and companies, both in appeals through the newspaper 
and in the action against the Electric Light Company in 1934. 
The following comment on Nehru could equally well apply 
to Ibrahim, Hadid or Jamil from the point of view of 
family background and attitudes as well as of ideology: 
47. Ibid., p. 8. 
48. Ibid., pp. 57-8. 
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Nehru, for all his attachment to Western 
manners and ideas, was an epitome of 
Indian, indeed Asian, nationalism. There 
was no contradiction in his attempt to 
imbibe all that was good in Western thought 
while fighting British Imperialism nor in 
his parallel efforts to combine in himself 
the best values of both Western liberalism 
49 and Marxist ideology. 
49. Malhotra, I., "Nehru", The Guardian, 28.5.1979. 
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4. The Ideology of Jama'at al-Ahali 
This section will discuss the ideas and principles 
developed by the founders of Jamalat al-Ahali in the early 
1930s known collectively as Mabdal al-Shalbiya 
1 (The 
principles or ideology of PopulariSM2). al-Sha'biya was 
not based on a comprehensive or coherent theory, but was 
rather a selection of ideas which formed the basis of a set 
The sources which have been used to define thegroup's 
ideology are: 
i) al-Ahali newspapers (al-Ahali and Sawt al-Ahali 
1932-1946). 
ii) al-Ahali tracts (Essays), entitled Rasalil al-Ahali 
ila al-Shabab (al-Ahali Tracts for Youth) in ý volumes, 
a) 'Ala Tariq 
ý1-Hind (On the Way to India), al-Ahali 
Press, Baghdad, 1932. 
b) al-Shalbiya fi al-Mabadil al-Siyasiya al-Haditha 
. (Popularism in Mod; rn Political Ideologies), 
V01.1, 
' 
al-Ahali Press, Baghdad, 1933. 
C) Mutala'at fi al-Shalbiya (Reflections-on-, ", ` 
Popularism), Baghdad, l9j3. 
iii) Minhaj al-Shalbiva (The Programme or summary of 
Popularism) which was a summary of the ideology. 
Appendix C. 
iv) The recollections of the founders. 
2. See page I above. 
117 
of common principles. The literature published by Jama'at 
al-Ahali on al-Shalbiya tended to describe its views towards 
other ideologies rather ýhan what it was and how it was 
supposed to function. This point also emerged in conversation 
with the founders, since each individual tended to define 
al-Sha'joiya in the way most congenial to his political 
convictions and personal point of view both then and at 
the present time. 
al-Shalbiya was defined as a 'view of social reform 
aimed at ensuring security, prosperity and progress for 
all the people on the basis of equal opportunity for every 
citizen' 
3. A similar definition appeared in the 'Manifesto' 
pamphlet which stated: 
There is no comprehensive definition of 
al-Sha'biya. It is a view of the problems 
which membqrs of society face in their 
different walks of life. These problems are 
divided, according to their nature, into 
political,, economic and social. al-Sha'blya 
attempts to ensure security, prosperity and 
progress for society. 4 
This definition is vague and does not easily distinguish 
al-Sha'biyafrom other ideologies. Ibrahim's definition 
in 1977 was slightly more specific: 
A political and social movement which believed 
in the ability of democracy to improve the 
general conditions of the population, seeking 
to achieve a form of national sovereignty which 
would bring about the political and economic 
independence of Iraq. 5 
Although al-Ahali was a genuinely Iraqi movemento its 
3. Mutala'at Fi al-Sha'biya. (Reflections) (1935), p. l. 
4. minhaj_ al-sha'biya (Summary of Popularism), (1932), p. l. , and 
5. pp 
3-93-395 below. 
Inýerview with Ibrahim. 
Ilb 
ideology was self-confessedly put together from other, mostly 
6 
western, sources . The name al-Sha'biya, was adopted to avoid 
the label of socialism, al-Tshtirakiyya, which would have 
carried a certain stigma in Iraq and the Arab world at the 
time 7. Furthermore, the group, and 'Abd al-Fattah Ibrahim 
in particular, were eager to come up with a new ideology 
which they could claim as their own. They probably thought 
that the name al-Sha'biya would be more acceptable to 
Iraqis, and the word was also identical in meaning to the 
name of their newspaper, al-Ahali. 
One of 'Abd al-Fattah Ibrahim's articles stated: 
We have written about our ideology, and rumours. 
and myths have surrounded us. They attached 
various political names and labels to us; some 
tried to use this to impede our holy struggle ... we are popularists and what we mean by 
popularism is a common concern for the 
interests of the majority of the people, who 
are the pillar of the structure of the State. 
We are popularists, and the standard by 
which we judge everything is the interests 
of the people. Whoever sides with the people, 
we will support, and whoever oppo 9 es the 
people's interests we will fight. 
The principles of al-Sha'biya, were geared toward 
regenerating Iraq and transforming it into an independent 
and democratic state by changing the pattern of its 
political, social and economic life. The following general 
principles and objectives were agreed on by the founders 
of al-Ahali after a series of meetings and discussions in 1931: 
6. 
al-Ahali, 8.10.1932, and al-Shalbiya, vol. I, 1933, p. 2. 
7. Abu Jaber (1966), p. 5. 
Nahnu Sha'biyymn (We are Popularists), al-Ahali, 8.10.1932. 
a. - 
1. The achievement of complete independence, for Iraq. 
2. The achievement of popular sovereignty through 
a democratic and constitutional form of government. 
3. The rejection of the capitalist system of free 
enterprise and the adoption of a system in which 
the economy would be guided and controlled by 
the State. 
4. The reduction of economic disparities between 
social classes. 
5. The establishment of a modern State to achieve 
the above goals. 
9 
Patriotism (al-wataniya) is the underlying theme of 
the whole ideology. al-Ahali's manifesto stated the 
movement's three basic principles (al-mabadil al-asasiya 
which also form the basis of, al-Sha'biya. These are: 
security (al-itmi'nan), prosperity (al-rafah) and progress 
(al-taqaddum . Security was understood in a formal political 
sense. al-Ahali postulated the need for a sovereign democratic 
constitutional state in which the people were to be supreme. 
PrOs2erity was to be achieved by the state taking over the 
direction and planning of the economy, as well as control 
over major industries, agriculture, financial institutions 
and public utilities. Economic disparities were to be 
narrowed by progressive income and inheritance taxes. 
Pro gress would be achieved by the provision of free universal 
interview with Jamil. 
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education for children, an anti-illiteracy campaign for 
adults, free health care, and a comprehensive social 
insurance programme. Particular attention would be paid 
to measures which would achieve the emancipation of women 
in the context of a modern society 
10 
. 
In addition, a further set of less explicit but fairl Y 
consistent tenets emerges from a study of al-Ahali 
literature. Democracy and socialism are particularly 
important: the state must control the economy and the 
organisation of society, while the state in its turn must 
be controlled by democratic forces. However, this is to 
be achieved by essentially gradualist methods, through 
reform, not revolution, and the ideology is eclectic 
rather than doctrinaire. Patriotism is another important 
element, though unlike the Pan-Arabists, al-Ahali did 
not take up any strong ideological position on Arab 
nationalism. It was essentially secular and non-sectarian 
without being anti-religious, and was particularly directed 
towards and attractive to educated young people. 
A further indication of the essentially moderate 
nature of al-Sha'biya was the notion of an ideally harmonious 
equilibrium between the individual's rights and duties 
and the state's authority and functions. Thus the state 
should only interfere in society when such intervention 
was necessary in the public interest. The third al-Ahali 
10. Minhaj al-Sha"biya. 
a. S 
essay stated: 
The duty of the individual citizen is to 
work as hard as he can and to obey the law 
in order to safeguard and maintain the 
democratic process. The rights and duties 
of the citizen make his relationship with 
the government the basis on which his rights 
and duties are balanced to achieve the 
supremacy of the people, which is the essence 
of al-Shab'iya_. ll 
al-ghalbiya affirmed its belief in democracy, and the 
achievement of a genuinely representative parliamentary 
form of government: 
The people elect their representatives from 
their own ranks; each sector of society 
elects its own representatives. The peasants 
elect peasants to represent them, and the 
workers elect workers. This method al-Sha'biya 
considers to be real (haaLicLiL) rgresentation 
and genuine people's democracy. ' 
As for who should lead the democratic system and rule the 
state, al-Shalbiya states OPtimistically that "In order to 
have a truly democratic system, intelligent and honest men 
should lead the government, not professional politicians., 
13. 
al-Sha'biya emphasis on social democracy was the 
core of its principles and objectives. Hadid says: "We 
concentrated on the idea of democracy and the establishment 
of a social democratic system in Iraq; we were not concerned 
14 
with the details of socialism" The founders of Jama'at 
al-Ahali, especially Ibrahim and Hadid, thought that 
"', Mutala'at fi al-Sha'biya Vol. 11 (1935), pp. 1-8. 
12. Ibid., p. 14. 
13. 
al-Sha'biya, vol. 1 (1933), pp. 29-30. 
14. Interview with Hadid. 
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democracy was the solution as well as the cure for all the 
problems in Iraq. Some of them had seen democracy in 
operation in the West, especially in Britain, and were 
struck by the West's progress and prosperity compared to 
their own country's backwardness. They realised that there 
was no lack of ability or intelligence on the Part of 
their own people, since many of them had proved their worth 
in some of the best Western academic institutions. Hence 
they came to believe that the country's backwardness 
resulted from its corrupt and stagnant political system, 
and the subordination of national interests to those of 
a foreign power. Hence if 'true' democracy were to be 
achieved in Iraq, the country would be set on the road to 
progress and prosperity. According to Ibrahim: 
Democracy was to achieve independence as 
well as socialism. It would give the 
opportunity to every Iraqi to improve the 
quality of his life and his material standard 
of living. Peasants and workers would seek 
to improve their conditions, educate their 
children, organize themselves in trade 
unions, and demand higher wages and better 
working conditions. The Iraqi people 
wanted a sovereign state I free from foreign influence and interference. 15 
]However, these beliefs begged two important questions as 
far as political action was concerned. In the first place, 
how could a movement which believed in democracy and gradual 
social change implement its ideology in a society with 
a corrupt autocratic system of government, where vested 
15. Interview with Ibrahim. 
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interests were backed by the military might of a foreign 
power? And secondly, how was this relatively advanced 
ideology to be understood by a backward and illiterate 
society? Jama'at al-Ahali certainly recognised these problems 
although its solutions were probably rather simplistic. 
Broadly speaking, the group felt that education in general 
and political education in particular would make people 
aware of their rights and the social injustices which 
they suffered. it also drew comparisons between life in 
more advanced societies and life in Iraq, to show how 
exploitation and monopoly control ran counter to the 
national interest, which would only be served by genuine 
democracy. In its various publications it also attempted 
to explain other political ideologies and systems, and 
was generally concerned in the process of politicising 
all sections of Iraqi society. 
To this end, a number of different initiatives were 
taken. In January 1932, al-Ahaii newspaper commenced 
publication, and continued to function through, much of the 
period until 1946, and in fact was only finally suppressed 
ý 16 as late as 1962 . It contained weekly supplements which 
fulfilled a similar political and educational role to that 
of the Egyptian reviews al-Muqtataf and al-Hilal which 
16. Sawt al-Ahali . appeared on 14 March 1934. After 75 
r- issues it was suppressed, to reappear on 23 September 
1942. 
I. d 4 
have been mentioned earlier, and, to a certain extent, of 
the Fabian New Statesman. Members of the group, particularly 
Ibrahim, also wrote essays and pamphlets explaining and 
promoting the principles of al-Sha'biya and other political 
ideologies. The first essay, 'Ala Tariq al-Hind dealt wt+, V% 
Western imperialism and the historical background to 
17 
Britain's interests in Iraq . The essays were collected 
in a three-volume series called Rasa'il al-Ahali ila 
al-Shabab, al-Ahali tracts for youth, whose title was a 
clear echo of the Fabian tracts. 
Three further developments took place on a more 
practical level. The Society for Eradicating Illiteracy, 
founded in 1933, called on educated Iraqis to support and 
assist in the foundation of adult literacy centres 
throughout the country. In the same year Nadi Baghdad, 
the Baghdad Club, was opened as a cultural centre for 
meetings, debates, and general educational purposes, but 
was also used, though not overtly, to promote the principles 
of al-Shalbiya. Finally, in late 1933 and 1934, the group 
began to organise a secret society which came to be 
composed of some fifty full members who had all taken a 
pledge to support the principles of al-Sha'biya. The 
society, which included Ja'far Abu al-Timman, Kamil al- 
Chadirchi and Hikrnat Sulaiman as well as the founders of 
al-Ahali, co-operated with Bakr Sidqi, who was also a 
member, in the coup d'4tat of 1936. After the coup, the 
17. Published first in 1932 and again in 1935. 
society was made legal, and called itself Jam'iyyat al- 
Islah ai-'Shýa"bi, The Popular Reform League. Attempts to 
turn the League into a well organised political party 
capable of taking part in elections were foiled, mainly 
by Bakr Sidqi himself, and it was suppressed in the summer 
of 1937. It was not until 1946 that Jama'at al-Ahali 
succeeded in forming three legal but separate political 
parties. 
The Attitudes of al-Sha'biya_towards Other Ideologies 
18 
Although jama'at al-Ahali published two volumes on 
al-Sha'biya, written mainly by 'Abd al-Fattah Ibrahim, 
there was more emphasis on its attitude towards other 
ideologies than on al-Sha'biya itself. In spite of this 
vag'uenesso, it was generally based on the principles of 
social democracy, and largely influenced by the principles 
of the Fabian Society. However, al-Sha'biya attempts to 
distinguish between 'people's democracy' and 'capitalist 
democracy', the latter term being applied to describe the 
political systems of Britain or the United States. Jama'at 
al-Ahali believed that capitalist democracy largely 
benefitted the rich ruling class at the expense of the 
mass of the population. Equally, al-Shalbiva strongly 
condemned both capitalist and fascist exploitation of 
patriotism (al-wataniya), which it considered should be 
directed towards service to one's country and social reform 
in general. Nationalism (qawmiya), it claimed, had been 
18. This section is based on the two volumes of al-Shalbiya 
(1933 and 1935). 
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used throughout history by the capitalist ruling class 
as a device to'spread hatred and division between nations, 
causing the spilling of innocent blood. Thus: 
al-Sha'blya sees the history of nationalism 
as stai ed with blood and filled with 
atrocities. It is one of the methods used 
by the governing elite to exploit the people. 
As far as the Arab world was concerned, the emphasis was 
on co-operation against imperialism rather than any call 
for unity. 
al-Shalbiya distinguished between what it saw as two 
kinds of dictatorship, the first was collective 
dictatorship (al-diktatoriya al-haqiqiya), backed by a 
mass political party with an ideology, as in the Soviet 
Union or Fascist Italy. The second, individual or superficial 
dictatorship (al-diktatoriya al-fardiya or al-suwari ) 
was typified by Turkey, Iran and South American dictatorships 
which depended on the military for their survival. al- 
Sha'bi. ya supported the class dictatorship of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union, but turned from a short-lived 
initial approval of Mussolini to criticism and rejection 
by March 1932 
19. 
al-Sha'biyaapproved of most of the ideology 
of Communism, particularly the notion of state regulation 
of the economy and the abolition of exploitation and monopoly, 
but rejectod the principle of class struggle and the 
dictatorship of the proletariat. It also rejected any 
19- 
al-Ahali, 29.3.1932. 
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revolutionary means of changing the social order, and 
what was seen as the sacrifice of individual liberties 
20 
Again, it considered that Communism did not give sufficient 
21 
emphasis to religion or family structure 
20. Ibrahim's criticism of Communism and nationalism 
occasioned strong reactions from the supporters of these 
ideologies, and created a deep and long-lasting rift , between them and Jama'at al-Ahali. This was also one of 
the principal reasons for the conflict between Ibrahim 
and Kamil al-Chadirchi. See below, ChapterX. 
21. 
Thus al-Sha'biya allows 
to which it is required 
guards the family unit 
to secure the happiness 
of the public. " 
religion to exist "to the extent 
by the people's interests" and 
and structure "in such a way as 
of the individual and the safety 
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PART II 
(Chapters V, VI, VII) 
Introduction 
During the period between 1932 and 1946, in which 
Jama'at al-Ahali was a major force in Iraqi opposition 
politics, a number of key events helped to shape the 
political system as a whole, and generally to determine 
its direction. Some of these have been mentioned briefly 
above, but since their influence was so crucial and 
Jama'at al-Ahali was so profoundly affected by them 
and had an equally profound effect upon them, it is 
important to discuss them in some detail. In chronological 
order, these events were the Assyrian incident of 
May-August 1933, King Faisal's death in September of 
the same year, the tribal uprisings of 1934 to 1937, 
the Bakr Sidqi coup dletat of October 1936, and the 
political and economic developments during world War 
which led to the legalisation of political parties 
in 1946. 
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Chapter V 
significant Events 1932-1936 
1. T he As syrian Incident 
The Assyrians were the descendants of a Christian 
community living mainly in the Hakkiari mountains in 
Eastern Turkey, which had been recognised as a millet 
within the Ottoman Empire in 1845. In 1915 they were 
persuaded by Czarist Russia to rise against the Turks; 
the revolt failed, and as a result they were driven from 
their homes and made their way to Iraq via Persia. The 
Assyrians joined the British forces in Mesopotamia just 
before the signing of the armistice, and were settled 
in a temporary camp at Ba'quba, some thirty miles east 
of Baghdad, under the hope that they would one day be 
able to return to their homeland. In 1920 the Ba'quba 
camp was closed and the Assyrians were moved north to 
1 
the Mosul liwa . many of them took up employment in the 
Levies, a body of about 4,500 Imperial troops who served 
with the R. A. F., both as aerodrome guards and as ground 
support troops, particularly in the various operations 
2 in Kurdistan in the 1920s . In spite of attempts by Britain 
to press Turkey to cede the Hakkiari mountains to Iraq 
For a detailed study of , 
the Assyrian incident, see 
Stafford, R. S., The_Tragedy of the_Assyrians (London 
1935. ).; also Husry, Khaldun S., "The Assyrian Affair", 
IJMES 1974, No. 2 (April, pp. 161-176) and No. 3, (June, 
pp. 344-360). 
2. Sluglett (1976), p. 214; also Batatu (1978), p. 90- 
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in 1926, the territory remained in Turkey and the Assyrians 
were thus unable to return to their homes. 
Throughout the mandate years, the Assyrians, especially 
the Levies, had generally shown little respect for the 
Iraq government, and more particularly, the Iraq Army. The 
British officers of the Levies constantly assured them 
that they were first-class troops and this encouragement 
served to exacerbate tensions. To make matters worse, 
the Assyrians refused to accept Iraqi citizenship or to 
deal directly with the Iraqi authorities, preferring to 
go through the British High Commissioner. On two occasions, 
in Kirkuk in 1924 and Mosul in 1926, the Assyrian Levies 
had been responsible for outbreaks of violence which 
3 
resulted in a large number of deaths and injuries 
The prospect of Britain's departure from Ir4q in 1932 
gave the minorities cause for concern, and in 1931 the 
Assyrians had expressed their desire to leave the country 
4 
Britain was naturally keenly interested in the affairs 
of the minorities and the Assyrians in particular, for 
obvious. political reasons, which made the Iraqis highly 
suspicious of their motives, since the Levies had clearly 
been used during the mandate as a kind of counterpoise to 
3. Husry, K., (1974), p. 166. 
4- Desire of the Assyrians to leave Iraq - letter from the Mar Shim'un to the Permanent Mandate Commission. Reported 
in 15.8.1931, FO 371/15321/E 5871 and in 4.7.1931, 
FO 371/15321/ E 5658. 
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the infant Iraq Army 
5. 
In 1932 the government submitted guarantees for the 
protection of the minorities to the League of Nations, 
pledging to treat them justly as a condition for its 
6 
admission . At the same time, the Assyrians under their 
young leader the Mar Shim'un, also submitted petitibns 
to the League, demanding the establishment of an autonomous 
enclave in Iraq, and claiming that Britain was failing 
to provide adequately for their future after the termination 
of the mandate. 
In April 1932, a secret pact was concluded between 
the Mar Shim'un and some Assyrian Levy officers, which 
confirmed him as their leader, thus assuring him of their 
support in his attempt to gain autonomy from Iraq by means 
of a 'coup de main' if necessary. This was followed on 16 
June by a meeting of the Assyrian leaders, who afterwards 
submitted a petition to the High Commissioner for 
transmission to the League. It demanded that the Assyrian 
community should be recognised as a millet, and that a national 
home should be established for them in the north of Iraq, 
which was to include the Hakkiari mountains. It also 
demanded the recognition of the Mar Shim'un as the spiritual 
and temporal leader of the community, with an annual 
subsidy from the government. The League rejected the 
Batatu (1978), p. 90. 
6- Air 23/5980 , Ref. CICI/BD/13 "Brief History of Iraq"' 
)1914-1941)" of 10 July 1941, p. 4. 
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petition and the Iraq government's efforts to establish a 
working relationship with the mar Shim'un and secure his 
co-operation in maintaining peace in the northern region 
ultimately failed. 
Growing tension in the north prompted the local British 
Administrative Inspector to urge the government to recall 
the Mar Shim'un to Baghdad and to send a military force 
to the area 
7. In May 1933, the Minister of the Interior, 
Hikmat Sulaiman, invited the Mar Shim'un to Baghdad 
8 
and 
on 24 June-an army unit under the command of Brigadier 
Bakr Sidqi was dispatched to the Dohuk-'Amadiya area, 
bands 
where some 200 armed Assyrian/ were massed in defiance of 
.9 government aut ority . 
In Baghdad, the government tried to come to terms 
with the Mar Shim'un; it would not grant him any temporal 
authority, but was ready to recognise him officially as 
spiritual head of his church, which was not sufficient for 
10 
the mar Shim'un With the approval of his advisor, 
C. J. Edmonds, the Minister of Interior, Hikmat Sfalaiman, 
decided to detain him in Baghdad. meanwhile King Faisal 
7. Husry,, R. (1974). pp. 166-171. 
For details of the negotiations between the government 
and the Mar Shim'un, see INA Pile D/11 documents Nos. 
99-108. 
9. Husry, K. (1974), p. 170. 
10. Ibid., p. 173. 
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who was in Europe, counselled patience in dealing with the 
11 
Assyrians . He returned to Baghdad at the end of July 
"acting on strong British advice 
J2 
to find that the 
situation had become completely out of hand; on the 23rd 
July, some 1200 armed Assyrians had crossed the Iraqi 
frontier into French-mandated Syria apparently under the 
impression that the French authorities would welcome them. 
However, they did not meet a particularly enthusiastic 
reception, and began to attempt to filter back to Iraq. 
The Iraq Army uhder Bakr Sidqi moved to the frontier area 
with orders not to allow the Assyrians to recross unless 
13 
they had surrendered their arms Either by accident or 
by design: 
The Syrian (French) authorities, after disarming 
the Assyrians, returned their arms and permitted 
their return to Iraq without notifying Iraq 
government, contrary to frontier agreement. A 
party of Assyrians pretending submission 
attacked Iraqi military post inflicting casualties 
In 1936 Nuri al-Sa'id revealed to the British Ambassador 
that King Faisal was the chief culprit behind the killing 
of the Assyrians and what had been done had been the 
result of his directions. This statement seems to have 
been accepted by the British Embassy and the Foreign 
Office, Minutes by J. G. Ward dated 30.12.1936, and letter 
from C. J. Edmonds to Ogilvie-Forbes dated 24.8.1933; 
See Ambassador to SIS Foreign Affairs, F0371/20015/E8113 
of 15.12.1936. 
12. Minut 
' 
es by G. W. Rendel, dated 25.7.1933, see F0371/ 
16916/E4082 of 20.7.1933. 
13. Air 23/5980, p. 5. 
The Assyrians were given rifles upon being discharged 
from the Levies under their condition of service with 
the R. A. F., ostensibly to defend themselves against 
armed Kurdish tribesmen. 
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the distraction permitting re-entry of the 
remainder. Armed men of Assyrian villages 
rushed to aid their returning brethren, 
leaving villages open to plunder by Kurds, 
who had begun to act. The situation is 
critical and probably will bring about a 
three-cornered conflict between Assyrians, 
Kurds and Iraq Army. 14 
The outcome of the attack on the Iraqi post was 
30 soldiers killed and 40 wounded. The Assyrians in turn 
suffered a number of casualties; some 500 were driven 
back to Syria, and the remainder took to the hills with 
the army in pursuit, assisted by Kurdish and Arab 
tribesmen. The bloodiest incident took place on the llth 
August at the village of Summaiyl where about 315 unarmed 
Assyrian women and children were machine-gunned by a 
company of the army under the command of Isma'il 'Abbawi 
Tuhalla, the murderer of Ja'far al-'Askari in 1936. 
Although Bakr Sidqi was in Mosul at the time of the 
incident, he was almost certainly its instigatorl5. 
Hikmat Sulaiman admitted that he had approved the general 
line of policy which Bakr Sidqi adopted 
16 
, but subsequently 
managed to convince the British of his essentially 
moderating role 
17 
. 
14. knabenshue to State Department, 8-. 8.1933, USNA 
890 G. 00/257. 
15. Longrigg (1953), p. 235. 
16. Khadduri (1960), p. 44. 
17. 
Ambassador to"SIS Foreign Affairs, 15.12.1936, 
FO 371/20015/E813'3 (enclosing letter-of-C. J. Edmonds 
which contains his evaluation''of Hikmaý Sulaiman). 
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The timing and a number of other elements involved 
in the incident add to its significance. It created an 
opportunity for the Rashid 'Ali's al-Ikha, government to 
regain the favour of the opposition and the confidence 
of the public, since they had damaged their credentials 
by abandoning the Ta'akhi charterla under which they had 
agreed not to form a government without demanding 
substantial alterations to the 1930 Treaty. The Prime 
minister Rashid 'Ali al-Gailani and his Minister of 
Interior Hikmat Sulaiman, capitalising on popular 
sentiment, worked in defiance of the King and apparently 
against British advice. They attempted to show that they 
were safeguarding the national interest and that they 
had in no sense sold out to the British. At the same time 
they were not being sufficiently belligerent towards 
Britain to risk dismissal. Rashid 'Ali's government had 
allegedly followed a reasonable attitude toward the 
Assyrians and it claimed that it was the Assyrian leaders 
19 
who were "hot-headed" . Besides, it was the Army, not 
the Police, who had taken the harsh measures. 
The reception and celebrations organised by the 
residents of Mosul and Baghdad to welcome the returning 
army units demonstrated the extent of public support for 
the operation against the Assyrians. The incident was 
18. See above, p. 55. 
19. Air 23/5980, p. 5. 
recalled by those who witnessed or experienced it as one 
2o 
of the few triumphant events of the period 
The two main sources of anti-Assyrian sentiment were 
first, the newspaper campaign against the Mar Shim'un 
and the Levies, spearheaded by al-Ahali newspaper, and 
second, local resentment in northern Iraq on the part 
of both the Army and the local civilian population. 
al'-Xhali'portrayed the Mar Shim'un's intransigence and 
the defiant behaviour of the Assyrians. as a challenge 
to Iraq's newly acquired independence, and an insult to 
21 
the national honour . Furthermore, it alleged that the 
incident provided yet more proof of Britain's continuing 
interference, in Iraq's internal affairs. Local residents 
had long resented the high-handed behaviour of the Levy 
troops, particularly in Mosul and Kirkuk. In general the 
incident was seen both as an act of revenge for past 
insults and as proof that the government was master in 
its own house and was prepared to defy Britain. al-Ahali 
further accused Britain of actively assisting the 
20. Husry's account includes his own childhood memory of 
the incident. 
al*-Ahali, 30.. 7.. 1933, and 1,3,4,6,7 August 1933. 
See also al-Istiqlal and al-Ikhal al-Watani for 
the same 2ates. 
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Assyrians 
22 
and attempted to dissuade 
Prince Ghazi, acting as Regent during 
from the country, publicly supported 
such an extent that 'the nationalists 
force (the) abdication of King Faisal 
23 
Crown Prince' 
such interference. 
his father's absence 
the Army's action, to 
are threatening to 
in favour of (the) 
Thus the Army under Bakr Sidqi not only settled old 
scores and put an end to the superiority of the Levies, 
but it was also now hailed as the saviour of the 'nation' 
and the 'protector of the homeland' 
24 
. Bakr Sidqi was 
25 
acclaimed as a'herol . Even Brigadier-General Headlam, 
22. As a result the British government instructed the 
Acting Ambassador Mr. Ogilvie Forbes to address a 
formal note of protest to the Iraqi government. See 
Foreign Office to Mr. Ogilvie Forbes telegram of 
28.7.1933. F0371/16916/E4082. 
on the King's return Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes protested 
again against the offensive article in al-Ahali of 
July 30th, and presented the paper to the King: 
"King Faisal with a gesture of shame seized the 
offending paper from my hand and threw it under his 
chair. He asked me to convey his sincere apologies 
to His Majesty's government. I said I hoped that 
something would be done to the editor and His Majesty 
promised to take up matter personally with the 
Prime minister". Acting Ambassador to SIS Foreign 
Affairs 3.8.1933. P0371/16916/E4358. 
23- Knabenshue to State Department, 4.9.1933, USNA 890 G. 00/265. 
24. Husry, X. (1974), p. 352. 
25 - Air 23/5980, p. 6. 
Also Longrigg (1953), p. 236. 
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the British Acting Inspector-General of the Army, commended 
Bakr Sidqi's role in dealing with the Assyrians; "The 
government and people of Iraq have good reasons to be 
thankful to Colonel(sic) Bakr Sidqi and his forces for 
,, 26 the success on 4-5 August . Besides gaining popularity 
and notoriety as an able and ruthless officer, Sidqi now 
developed strong ties with Hikmat Sulaiman 
27 
and a 
working relationship with King Ghazi, which was to 
become particularly important in 1936. However, the most 
significant outcome of the Assyrian conflict was the new 
role the Army subsequently assumed in the political system. 
As it grew in. popularity and influence to become the real 
power in the country, the politicians began to compete 
for its favour and to align themselves with its leaders. 
As a further result of the incident, al-Ahali newspaper, 
which had led the campaign against the Assyrians and the 
I British intervention was suppressed for ten days in August, 
probably as a result of direct pressure on the Iraq 
28 
government on the part of the British Foreign Office 
26. Husry, (1974), p. 175. - 
27. Interview with Husain Jamil. 
28. On Sth August Mr. Ogilvie Forbes telegrammed his 
Government "Newspaper in question (al-Ahali) has 
been suspended for ten days. " 
Ogilvie Forbes to SIS Foreign Affairs 9.8.1933, 
FO 371/16916/E4433. 
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This undoubtedly gave the paper great popular prestige, 
but perhaps even more important was the relationships 
which were established between members of the group and 
Hikmat Sulaiman and Bakr Sidqi. Hence, well before the 
coup of 1936, Jama'at al-Ahali had begun to draw closer 
to the political and civilian opposition forces, and 
this association was to be of major significance for 
the future of the group and the country. 
140 
2. The Effect of King Faisal's Death on the Position 
of the R7on_arcýjy and the Political System-' 
When Faisal became King of Iraq he had to cope with 
numerous difficulties which arose partly because he was a 
foreigner and partly because of his anomalous position 
under the mandate. However, after several years he emerged 
as an experienced and prestigious politician and diplomat, 
with a strong instinct for political survival. However, 
his reign was not without difficulties, since 'he had to 
try and meet the demands of the nationalists while 
attempting to maintain a good relationship with his 
British masters. Batatu describes his dilemma and tactics 
as follows: 
Suffering the buffets of the English on the one 
side and the national opposition on the other, 
Faisal could now enlarge the sphere of his 
authority only subtly and gradually. Inasmuch 
as the appearance of power is not completely 
separable from its substance, by clinging to 
the one, he acquired more and more of the 
other, edging the English, whenever opportunity 
offered, out of a degree after degree of their 
influence. Simultaneously, he kept his hands 
on the political pulse of the country and, 
while leaning on the ex-Sherifian officers - 
now the backbone of Iraq's new army - he 
maintained contact with all the existing 
forces and shades of opinion, and placed 
himself publicly above rivalries between 
parties, sects, or tribal combinations. 
Although ýFaisal clearly wanted to transform Iraq into a 
modern country, he was well aware of the immense problems 
which this involved. In 1930 the U. S. Legation reported 
that the King was taking a particularly active part in 
1. Batatu (1978), p. 362. 
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2 
directing the policies of the kingdom , probably as a- 
consequence of Sir Henry Dobbs' departure and the death 
of 'Abd al-Muhsin al-Sa'dun. In the same report, the U. S. 
Minister cited the King's active influence on the 
selection of the members of Nuri al-Said's cabinet: 
One thing seems very evident, and that is 
that the members of the new Cabinet, with 
the possible exception of Abdul Hussain 
al-Chalabi, owe their appointment mainly 
to the fact that they have long been very 
loyal followers of King Faisal. It will be 
noted from a study of their biographies 
that they were all soldiers, with the 
exception of Abdul Hussain al-Chalabi, and 
that they all served under King Faisal in 
the Arab revolt. 3 
Even the British officials who occasionally disagreed with 
his policies, were forced to recognise Faisal's capabilities 
and his grasp of politics. The acting High Commissioner, 
Hubert Young, reported in 1931 that: 
It cannot be denied that he (Faysal) has been 
remarkably successful during the past ten 
years in maintaining connection with all shades 
of political opinion, and while the methods 
adopted have been open to criticism, the 4 
results obtained have certainly justified them. 
2. Sloan to State Department, 1.4.1930. 
USNA 890G. 00/128. 
3. 
I-bid., for further details of Faisal's skill at political 
manipulation see Batatu (1978) and Pool (1972), passim. 
4. 
Young papers, St Antony's College Oxford, quoted in Pool 
(1972), p. 188. There have been various recent attempts by 
Iraqi historians to re-evaluate King Faisal and his 
policies through the mandate and the independence years. 
in general they seem to exonerate him of earlier harsh 
judgements, of being a British 'agent' or 'tool' and to 
show some aspects of his nationalist aspirations and his 
clever dealings with British High Commissioners as well 
as with the Iraqi Nationalists: See al-Adhami, M, Afaq 
'Arabiya, IV, No. 1, Jan. 1979, Baghdad, pp. 86-95, and 
earlier issues of the same magazine. 
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Faisal died on 7 September 1933 in Switzerland in 
5 
somewhat suspicious circumstances . The following day, his 
only son Prince Ghazi was installed on the throne, with 
some reservations on* the part of Nuri al-Sa'id and Jalfar 
al-'Askari who favoured the elevation of Faisal's brother 
zaid. On hearing of Faisal's death, Ja'far al-'Askari, 
who was then Minister in London, went to the Foreign Office 
and indicated that, 
There could possibly some difficulty about 
the succession of the Crown Prince, who might 
be considered by a section of opinion in Iraq 
as unfit by youth and inexperience to take the 
helm at this critical time. 6 
5- 'The British Ambassador in Berne cited Lady Paget's letter. 
She was a nurse who lived in the same hotel as King 
Faisal. She saw King Faisal the day he died "looking 
particularly well", accompanied by a "comely Indian woman" 
with whom he had "intimate relations". Lady Paget describes 
King Faisal suddenly feeling ill after having dinner, and 
vomiting, which she attributes to "poisoning". She accuses 
the doctors, stating that "no adequate poist-mortem. 
examination was made as his body was embalmed with 
suspicious celerity" and the Indian woman disappeared the 
day after his death. "All these features", the Ambassador 
wrote, "have convinced Lady Paget that King Faisal did 
not meet with a natural death". 
Sir H. Kennard, Berne, to G. W. Rendel, Foreign Affairp, 
F0371/16924/E 5519 of 14 September 1933. See also USNA 
890G. 00/277,11 September 1933: 'al-Ahrar published a 
statement to the effect that King Faisal's death was 
suicide'. 
6. Ambassador Francis Humphrys to SIS Foreign Af fairs, 
8.9.1933, FO 371/16924/E 5250. 
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Even before the death of Faisal Nuri had expressed the 
same opinion to the British Foreign Office 
7. 
In-fact, 
however, there seemed no other alternative to Ghazi and 
he was thus crowned with the approval of the British 
Ambassador, although not without reservations: 
It looks as though there may have been some 
hesitation in proclaiming the Crown Prince 
King, as Jalfar Pasha hinted that there might 
be. It is too early to say that the Crown 
Prince is firmly on the throne. 8 
Nuri and Ja'far's relations with Ghazi and their continuing 
intrigues (especially those Of Nuri), further undermined 
the position of the young King, as well as the precarious 
balance of the political system. However, the most serious 
problem was Ghazi's unstable character and inexperience 
which further undermined the position of the monarchy, 
contributed to destabilising an already enfeebled political 
structure and led to the Army's domination of political life 
between 1936 and 1941. Ghazils character generally attracted 
adverse criticism both from Iraqi politicians and the 
diplomatic corps. The British Embassy commented: 
7. The earliest sign of a rebellion against Faisal on the 
part of a supposedly loyal politician was the dispute 
between himself and Nuri al-Salid over the appointment 
of Rashid 'Ali as Prime minister in 1932. U. S. Legation 
to State Department (USN 890G. 00/201 and 221 of 7.6.1932 
and 27.10.1932) Hall minutes a report by Prancis 
Humphrys on the conflict between the two: "In private 
conversation with me at Geneva, Nuri went even further 
and said that he could not again accept the premiership 
so long as Faisal occupied the throne. Nuri talks of 
Zaid rather than Ghazi to succeed King Faisal". 
Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs, 19.12.1932, 
FO. 371/16903/ElO5. 
a- Minutes by G. W. Rendel, see Ambassador Humphrys (Baghdad) 
to SIS Foreign Affairs, 8.9.1933, F0371/16924/E5265. 
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The King's (Ghazi) absorption in his private 
hobbies made him heedless of the welfare and 
the susceptibilities of his subjects, and 
indifferent to affairs of State which had 
become notorious. 9 
The U. S. Legation Report was no more complimentary: 
He has shown little initiative in matters 
political and he is very irregular and lax 
in attending even the routine duties in 
connection with the government. Much of 10 
his time appears taken in trifling amusements. 
King Ghazi's character and practices affected the 
running of the Government and had inescapable repercussions 
on the political system, creating a dangerous power vacuum: 
King Ghazi was not playing, or capable of 
playing, the part of monarch effectively and 
vigorously disturbed the balance of the 
constitution. 
11 
His weak personality contrasted unfavourably with that of 
his father, and the delicate equilibrium which Faisal was 
able to maintain was destroyed almost immediately after 
Ghazils accession. The power vacuum was filled by contending 
political cliques, and the office of Prime Minister became 
9. Ambassador Archibald Clark Kerr (Baghdad) to SIS 
Foreign Affairs, 2.7.1936, F0371/20017/E4057. 
10. Knabenshue to State Department 23.8.1934, USNA 890G/296. 
For the King's personal scandals, see the story of 
the murder of a personal servant of the King within 
the confines of the Royal Palace, Peters6n to'SIS Foreign 
'1938, FO 371/21846/E4196 Affairs, 28.6. 
11. Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Office, 
Annual Report of 1937, FO 371/21856/E794. 
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a coveted prize, falling to the politician most able to 
combine British approval with support of either the tribes 
or the army. The atmosphere is captured in this report 
from the U. S. Legation in September 1933: 
It is said that Rashid Beg al-Gailani hopes 
to retain the premiership in the new Cabinet, 
and that Nuri Pasha seems to think that he 
may still be able to marshall enough 
influence to gain it. The general consensus 
df opinion is that Yasin will become the 
new Prime Minister. 12 
A similar report from the British Embassy explains further 
the qualities of the Ministers and their objectives in 
taking office: 
The King in effect has left more of the 
affairs to his ministers ... and his ministers, 
as long as they draw their substantial 
salaries, spend most of their time bickering 
amongst themselves and allowing the affairs 
of the State to run more or less under the 13 impetus imparted to them by the late King Faisal. 
To make matters worse, King Ghazils weaknesses led 
the politicians to turn against the monarchy and further 
to undermine its authority and legitimacy. Nuri al-Salid, 
for example, constantly attempted to depose Ghazi and to 
12. Xnabenshue to'State Department 21.9.1933. 
USNA 890G. 00/276. 
13. Review of Events in 1934, prepared by the 
Director of Operations and Intelligence, 
Air Ministry, 7.2.1935, 
F0371/18949/E898. 
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replace him by his uncle Zaid or his cousin 'Abd al-Ilah 
or by a Crown Council 
14 
. 
After a reign of less than six years King Ghazi died 
on 4 April 1939 in a car accident in what were, to say 
15 
the least, suspicious circumstances . According to Naji 
Shawkat, a former premier and Minister of Interior at the 
time of the King's death, "Ghazils death was a result of 
16 
foul play and Nuri al-Saild was behind it" . Ghazi's 
death, says Batatu, 'tqas one of the elements that damaged 
14. Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs. 1937 
Annual Report F0371/21856/E794. 
The suggestion of deposing the King and replacing him 
by Regent (Zaid or Abd al-Ilah) or by creating a 
Regency Council, was often mentioned in the British 
Embassy and the U. S. legation correspondence, mainly 
at the instigation of Nuri al Sa'id. The three 
British Ambassadors and C. J. Edmonds did not favour 
Nuri's schemes to get rid of King Ghazi. A change of 
heart and tune took place in 1939 as King Ghazi grew 
more popular with the Iraqis, to the dismay of the 
British Ambassador, as he maintained strong links 
with young Army officers, had his own broadcasting 
station which claimed Kuwait and incited nationalist 
feelings. For details, see: Ambassador (Baghdad) to 
SIS Foreign Affair. s, 28.6.1938, F0371/21846/E4196; 
10.1.1938, F0371/21856/E305; 25.1.1939, F0371/23200/ 
E938; 31.12.1938, F0371/23207/E281; and 1938 Annual 
Report, F0371/23214/E932. 
Also, Knabenshue to State Department 12.11.1937, 
USNA 890G. 00/433 and 8.3.1939, USNA 890G. 00/475. 
15. Batatu (1978), pp. 342-344. 
16. Interview with Naii Shawkat, Baghdad, October 1979.11 
Naji's theory is supported by his brother Dr Sa'iý Y) 
Shawkat, who was the coroner and a close friend of 
Nuri al-Sa'id. Naji adds that the fact that Nuri 
kept a picture of Ghazi's wrecked car in his office 
was a further indication of his involvement. 
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the moral authority of the crown beyond repair , 
17. 'Abd 
al-Ilah, Ghazils cousin and brother-in-law was installed 
as a Regent since his son Faisal II was only 4 years old. 
However, 'Abd al-Ilah was also young, inexperienced, and 
no great improvement on his cousin, but in many ways his 
lack of good qualities suited the British, and Nuri al- 
Salid, since he was completely in their hands. His close 
association with Britain and Nuri led to a struggle 
between the Crown and the nationalist elements which 
culminated in the uprising of May 1941, leading to the 
flight of the Regent and Nuri from the country, and their 
return to power as a result of British military intervention. 
This always remained particularly damaging to their moral 
authority and credibility; as Batatu explains, it 
made them so odious among the people that, 
regardless of what they did afterwards, they 
were never able to command public confidence. 
Their image as servants of foreign interests 
and the impression that the British were in 
the background of thely. actions and policies 
simply would not wash. 
Thus the Iraqis came to despise the Regent aný Muri 
al-Salid more than the young Faisal II and the other 
19 
politicians These were some of the reasons, coupled 
with the nature of the political system, which contributed 
to the alienation of the population from the political 
17. Batatu (1978), p. 343. 
18.1 - bid., p. 345. 
19- As was to be demonstrated in July 1958. 
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process, the use of coercive measures by the government 
and ultimately its dependence on local vested interests 
and foreign support for survival. Nevertheless the various 
developments which have been described were important 
factors in forcing Jama'at al-Ahali to compromise their 
ideology against their will, in order to survive at all. 
They attempted to gather as much strength as possible and 
to seize all available opportunities to maximise their 
chances of achieving their political objectives. 
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3. Middle Euphrates Tribal Risings, 1934-1937 
Throughout the period of the mandate and monarchy, 
it was a constant broad principle of British policy to 
support the power of the tribal shaikhs. On the one hand, 
this provided a counterpoise to the crown and the Baghdad 
politicians, since a major tribal rising would have been 
more than a match for the Army, and on the other, over- 
ambitious tribal leaders could be controlled through 
manipulation and tribal feuds. The shaikhs were given 
rights over vast tracts of land, and political and judicial 
powers over their tribesmen through the Tribal Civil and 
Criminal Disputes Regulation, first enacted by the British 
occupying forces in 1916 and later enshrined in the Iraqi 
constitution of 1925. Hence 'down to the July (1958) 
Revolution, Iraq would .... remain 
legally ubject to two 
norms - one for the cities and one for the tribal 
countryside' 
1. 
Although Faisal in particular was strongly tempted to 
curb the powers of the tribal shaikhs, he also realised 
their value as potential allies and took no direct steps 
to tamper with the shaikhly structure. However, on his 
death in 1933, the vacuum cre-ated led to a completely new 
configuration of political forces, and various Baghdad 
politicians turned to the shaikhs for supjýort against their 
" Batatu (1978), p. 24. 
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opponents, particularly after the appointment of 'Ali 
jawdat's government in August 1934. Following what had now 
become almost traditional practice, 'Ali Jawdat dissolved 
parliament, created a new political partY2 , and held 
elections in an attempt to fill the Chamber of Deputies 
with his own supporters. Thus the government set up: 
elaborate machinery, putting into production 
the periodic farce which goes under the title 
of general elections in Iraq. By 6th December, 
the elections had been completed in all liwas, 
and the nominees of the government, plus' a 
few gate-crashers, who paid considerable sums, 
duly elected. 3 
Nevertheless, various prominent personalities were 
not elected, and considerable unpopularity was incurred 
by 'forcing on provincial constituencies a number of 
unknown nonentities from Baghdad, whose election had 
deprived men of local standing of their seats' 
4. one of 
those so excluded was 'Abd al-Wahid al-Hajj Sikkar, the 
paramount chief of the Fatlah, based in Diwaniya, who 
had played a prominent role in the revolution of 1920, 
and who was now a member of Hizb al-Ikhaýal-Watani (The 
Party of National Brotherhood), controlled by Yasin al- 
5 
Hashimi, Rashid 'Ali al-Gailani, and Hikmat Sulaiman 
2.. Hizb al-wahdial-Wataniyya (Party of National Unity). 
3. Review of events in 1934 by Director of Operations and 
Intelligence, the Air Ministry, 7.2.1935, F0371/18949/ 
E898. 
4- Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affciirs, F0371/20010/ 
E851; 1935 Annual Report. 
5. See page 54 above. 
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All these leaders, besides being substantial landowners, 
had been associated with 'Abd al-Wahid and other tribal 
leaders for many years 
6. 
Yasin and Rashid 'Ali carried 
on a campaign against the exclusion of 'Abd al-Wahid and 
their other tribal supporters, organising a boycott of 
the Senate in January 1935: 
throughout the country they stimulated 
resentment among the tribal chiefs against 
the discourtesy with which they were 
habitually treated by government officials, 
and focused this discontent on 'Ali Jawdat's 
Cabinet. In the towns they found it easy to 
gather to their side a band of disappointed 
would-be Deputies, and the benevolent 
approbation of the Holy Cities was won by a 
subtle suggestion of sympathy with the 7 
sectarian aspirations of the Shi. 1ah community 
The sectarian aspect is important, since Shilis could 
rightly claim that their representation in the Chamber 
of Deputies, the government, and the civil service as 
a whole in no way reflected their numerical strength in 
the country. 
Rashid 'Ali and Hikmat Sulaiman held meetings with a 
nunber of disaffected shaikhs in their homes, known as the 
Sulaikh conferences, which also succeeded in involving 
Jama'at al-Ahalif particularly Jalfar Abu al-Timman, 
6. For details of the election and the subsequent tribal 
risings, see Macdonald, A. D., 'Political Developments 
in Iracl leading up to the Rising in the Spring of 1935', 
journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, XXIII, 1936, 
pp. 27-49. 
7. Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS, Foreign Affairs, FO 371/ 
20010/E851; 1935 Annual Report. 
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8 Kamil al-Chadirchi and 'Abd al-Qadir Isma'il . Tn the 
end 'Abd al-Wahid and his tribal supporters began a 
revolt in Diwaniya which forced the resignation of 'Ali 
Jawdat in late February 1935, and his replacement by 
Jamil al-Madfa'i. This was not the outcome which the Ikha 
politicians had sought, and thus they continued their 
intrigues with 'Abd al-Wahid's al-Fatla, together with 
al-Akral and al-'Azza tribes, which led to further revolts 
in March, which in their turn prompted al-Madfali's 
resignation. 
This time the Ikha did succeed in capturing the 
premiership: Yasin al-Hashimi took office on 17 March, 
8. GSO Baghdad, Political Journal (al-Jarida al-Siyasiyya. ), 
para 162,24.1.1935; para 290,4.2.1935; para 361, 
19.2.1935, and: "It may be interesting to report that 
a few months ago immediately after the last parliamentaty 
elections, I received a visit from a naturalized 
American citizen of Syrian origin who told me that he 
had met Shaikh Abdul Wahid al-Haj Sukkar (Sikkar), the 
Paramount Shaikh of the Diwaniyah District of the middle 
Euphrates, who told him that he was planning a revolt 
against the government because of its method of conducting 
parliamentary elections and because of other grievances 
against its system of administration. He said that the 
Shaikh would like to know what the reaction of the United 
States Government would be, should he prosecute such a 
revolt. " 
Knabenshue to State Department, 4.4.1935, 
USNA 890. G. 00/326. 
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with a cabinet which included Nuri al-Sa'id, Ja'far al- 
'Askari, and Rashid 'Ali, but, importantly, not Hikmat 
Sulaiman. Clearly, however, these tactics had created a 
. 
dangerous precedent. The United States Minister commented, 
with some justice, that 'If 'Ali Jawdat or Jamil al- 
Madfali had given orders to the Army to attack, the whole 
country would have been in uproar19. In fact, al-Madfali 
certainly seems to have considered using the Army but 
the King was against it, and more significantly, the Chief 
of General Staff, Taha al-Hashimi, Yasin's brother, was 
10 
in favour of a political solution . In addition, General 
Bakr Sidqi, the Commander of the First Division, which 
was based in Diwaniya, who was strongly influenced by 
Hikmat Sulaiman, discouraged the use of force 
11 
. In 
such circumstances, al-Madfa'i could only hand in his 
resignation. 
Yasin's rise to power naturally encouraged 'Abd al- 
Wahid to assert his authority both in Baghdad, which he 
entered more like a hero than a leader of a rebellion 
against the government', and against his local rivals in 
Diwaniya 
12. Hence, a few days after the cabinet was formed 
9. Knabenshue to State Department, 5.7.1935, USNA 890G. 00/339. 
10. Saleh, (1953), p. 101, and Longrigg (1953), p. 240. 
11. Ibid., also interview with Husain Jamil. 
12. "The tribal leaders having got their tails up would be 
difficult to handle in the future and would, either 
individually or collectively, defy the government in 
the form of armed rebellion in the event of their 
dissatisfaction with governmental action in their area 
for a failure on the part'of the government to fulfil 
its promises. " Knabenshue to State Department, 13.5.1935, 
USNA 890G. 00/329. 
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Rashid 'Ali, the Minister of Interior, and Nuri al-Salid, 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, went to Diwaniya 1. iwa 
-13 
They had two tasks: 
The first was to persuade 'Abd al-Wahid and 
his associates to disperse; and the second, 
to pacify 'Abd al-Wahid's tribal enemies, 
who were indignant and outraged at his success. 
He achieved his first object without great 
difficulty (though it is possible that the 
payment of a large sum to Abdul Wahid was 
necessary), but he was less successful with 
the sheikhs who had supported the previous 
Governments. They felt that, as Abdul Wahid 
had played so prominent a part in bringing 
Yassin Pasha and his colleagues into office, 
he would enjoy great influence with the 
Government and would naturally use his 
influence to get the better of his tribal 
rivals and enemies. They were deeply suspicious 
of the new cabinet and adopted an openly hostile 
and threatening attitude towards the Minister 
of the Interiorle. 14 
In a crowded meeting at the administrative headquarters 
of al-Shamiya qadha, three shaikhs, in a speech addressed 
to the two ministers, demanded no less. than their 
resignation and that of the whole Cabinet 
15. 
The prophesy 
that Yasin and Rashid 'Ali's intrigues in inciting the 
tribes to revolt would prove a double-edged sword, proved 
uncomfortably close to reality; 
For a time at least, Iraq is likely to be 
faced with recalcitrant Shaikhs who, now 
and then, feeling the urge of their newly 
found power, will prove to be thorns in the 
flesh of the central government much as 
were the feudal barons of old. lt 
13. INA, Ministry of interior Reports, File D/6/3, NOS. 85-107. 
14. Ambassador (Baghdad) to S/S, Foreign Affaizs, F0371/20010/ 
, E851; 1935 Annual Report. 
15- INA, Ministry of interior Reports, File D/6/3, No. 105. 
16. Knabenshue to State Department, 4,4,1935, USNA 890G. 00/326. 
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The anti 'Abd al-Wahid (and now anti-government) 
faction of the tribal leaders of Diwaniya and Nasiriya 
entered into agreements with the Shia 'ulama'of Najaf, 
in order to consolidate their power and protect themselves 
from probable government military operations. They 
nominated a muitah-i , Shaikh Muhammad Hasan Kashif al- 
Ghata', as their spokesman. In March 1935 he presented 
a "Shila Charter" which included twelve points, 
focuQsed on Shi'a demands for equality, 
vis-a-vis the Sunnis, in the matter of 
representation in Parliament and in the 
appointment of administrative officials. 
Secondary demands involve such questions 
as election reforms (direct instead of 
two stages), taxation, freedom of the 
press, land settlement, reduction of 
salaries of officials, enactment of laws 
against social and moral 'diseases', etc. 
and an amnesty for "those who have 17 
participated in the present national movement". 
The al-Hashim-i government and the country in general 
enjoyed a period of relative tranquility in spite of 
18 
this, between March 1935 and May 1936 . When the 
government had established its authority, it embarked on 
passing a series of major laws and reiorms through - 
parliament, on expenditure on capital works, amendments 
to the Customs Tariff Law, and loans for municipal improvements 
17. Ibid 
' ., 
see also Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign 
Affairs., F0371/18945/E2455 of 28.3.1935, and P0371/ 
2015/E3062 of 22.5.1935. For the full text see Appendix D. 
18. Although there were further outbreaks of local violence, 
mainly in response to the imposition of conscription, 
such as the Yazidi rising in Jabal Sinjar and Khalil 
Xhushawils revolt in Barzan. There were other riots in 
Kadhimain, Qurna and Rumaitha. 
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It also conducted a purge of the civil service, dismissing 
278 civil servants for incompetence. Besides enforcing 
consciption, the government attempted to strengthen the 
armed forces and founded the Air Force. Yasin's government 
increased the number of parliamentary seats from 88 to 
108 to enable him to reward his supporters without 
excluding others whose position in tribal or public life 
made their presence in the Chamber desirable. al-Hashimi 
went fur-ther than his predecessors in making Parliament 
more broadly representative, but no more democratic. 
The British Embassy, in a despatch in August 1935, welcomed 
Yasin's habit of seeking the approval of its staff in 
important matters. It reported: 
Mr. Edmonds was shown the list of candidates 
for the Northern liwas and was satisfied 
that, except in one 'ir-nstance, it could hardly 
have been improved upon. To this extent, 
therefore, the lessons of the recent upheaval 
appear to have been learned. 
19 
However, the seeds which Yasin and Hikmat Sulaiman 
had sown did not die, and both had to reap the bitter 
harvest. The middle Euphrates tribes remained restless 
and rebellions broke out again especially in May 1936, 
and in April 1937. The various governments responded 
by employing the armed forces to extinguish these 
rebellions ruthlessly, which met with widespread 
resentment and protests from prominent people; 
19. Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairsý22.5.1936, 
F0371/18946/E5008. 
Numerous villages have been destroyed and 
large areas of crops burned. Some stories of 
brutality on the part of the troops are now 
beginning to reach Baghdad. Few prisoners 
have, it seems, been taken, and there are 
the usual rumours of the shooting out of hand 
of parties of surrendering tribesmen with 
their womenfolk. 20 
The methods and the speed employed by both governments 
in dealing with tribal uprisings showed the politicians 
in their true colours. They always rushed to use force 
whenever they could, rather than attempting to understand 
and seek out the root causes of discontent or attempt to 
alleviate the miserable conditions of the fallahin. and 
to rid them from the exploitation of the shaikhs, landlords 
and government officials. Instead, the government not 
only co-operated with the exploiting class, but also 
enacted laws and regulations to benefit them and to 
enable them to exploit the peasants further. 
The use of the armed forces to subdue the tribes by 
Yasin al-Hashimi and later by Hikmat Sulaiman, instead of 
resigning as Jawdat and al-Madfa'i had done earlier, brought 
a new dimension to an already fragmented political system. 
In time this practice was to lead to a virtual invitation 
to the Army to take direct control of the government. 
Bakr Sidqi was the commander of the forces which dealt 
so swiftly and ruthlessly in putting down the rebellious 
tribesmen in 1935 and 1936 which further had the effect 
of putting the Army and Sidqi himself in the limelight 
20. Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs, 22.5.1936, 
F0371/20015/E3062. 
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as 'saviour' of the national honour. More importantly, it 
proved again that the Army was the real power in the land. 
The involvement of the Army in internal conflicts brought 
home the realisation of the need for a stronger and better 
government to lead the country, and demonstrated the 
weakness of the political system. Furthermore, the fact 
that the government had directed them against their own 
countrymen was a source of resentment for some Army 
commanders, officers, and the rank and file2l , and the 
public as a whole was deeply critical: 
many people have been shocked by the loss 
of life and the general devastation caused 
by the present Euphrates operations. 22 
One incident affecting Bakr Sidqi gives some indication 
of his though: ts during the period immediately before the 
coup of 1936. In May 1936, after Sidqi had put down a 
tribal insurrection in Rumaitha, Rashid 'Ali, who was 
Minister of Interior, came out to congratulate the troops, 
and gave a speech, ending with the words, "now I can be 
proud of the Iraq Army". To this Bakr Sidqi replied, in 
the presence of several officers, "On the contrary, one 
should not be proud of an Army which kills its own 
countrymen,... the real goal of the Army is a much 
nobler cause" 
23. 
21. Ambassador (Baghdad), to SIS Poreign Affairs, F0371/ 
20010/E851; 1935 Annual Report. 
22. Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs, 22.5.1936, 
F0371/20015/E3062. 
23. 
al-mallah (1975), pp-180-1; the story was told to the 
author by General Fu'ad 'Arif. 
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Chapter VI 
The Coupof 1936 
Th'e 'ir*eparation ; o-f the Coiip 
We shall now turn to the role played by Jama'at al- 
Ahali in co-operation with Bakr Sidqi and the Army in 
preparing and executing the coup of 29 October 1936 and 
analyse developments after the formation of the coup 
government 
1. During the last part of 1934, Hikmat Sulaiman 
became a member of the executive committee Of al-Shalbiya 
secret societY2 . This committee formulated a pledge similar 
to that of the Fabian Society which was to be taken by all 
full members, and members 
3 
of the Committee were assigned 
different sectors of society in which to recruit new members. 
Thus Ja'far Abu al-Timman was to contact members of his 
former party, while al-Chadirchi, Ibrahim, and Hadid were 
1. For details of the 1936. cOuP d'gtat, see al-Hasani, 'A., 
Asrar al 
--- 
Inqilab (The secrets of the coup), Saida, 1937; 
al-Mubarak, S., Inqilab 1936 fi al-'Iraq (1936 coup d19tat 
in Iraq), M. A. unpublished Thesis, University of Baghdad,. 1973; 
Tarbush, M., (1978); Kopietz, H., "The Use of German and 
British Archives in the Study of the Middle East: The 
Iraqi Coup d'Etat of 1936", in The Integration of Modern 
Iraq, edited by Kelidar, 'A., London 1979, pp. 46-62. 
2. The Executive Committee was composed of Jalfar Abu 
lal-Timman (President), Hikmat Sulaiman, Kamil al- 
Chadirchi, 'Abd al-Fattah Ibrahim (Secretary), Muhammad 
Hadid (Treasurer) and 'Abd al-Oadir Ismaill. 
3. 
al-chadirchi, (1970), p. 32. The SOcietY will be discussed 
in detail in the section on al-Ahali's role in Iraqi 
politics in ChapterIX.. 
160 
were to contact the young, the educated and the civil 
servants. Hikmat Sulaiman was given the task of contacting 
Army officers and of establishing the military wing of 
the society. Bakr Sidqi and Muhammad 'Ali Jawad were the 
first recruits and they became the connection between 
4 
Hikmat and the Army . In their turn Sidqi and Jawad 
contacted other Army and Air Force officers such as Shakir 
5 
al-Wadi, Baha' al-Din Nuri and later 'Abd al-Latif Nuri 
The military organisation was very secret; not only 
did the society's central committee not meet the military 
members, they did not know their names, not even Hikmat. 
But they were informed that all the Army officers had 
6 
dutifully taken the pledge . At this stage jama_'at__a'l-A'hal_i_ 
4. Inter. view with Hadid; see also al-Chadirchi (1970), p. 32. 
(Jamalat al Ahali. were aware of Hikmat Sulaiman's close 
fr-lendship with Bakr Sidqi) . 
5. 
al-Chadirchi (1970), p. 32. 
6. Ibid., An interesting and controversial circumstance 
took place when Bakr Sidqi was due to take the oath of 
loyalty to the Society. The following is an account by 
Ibrahim and Hadid, who were present: "On the evening when 
Bakr Sidqi was supposed to take the, Society's pledge in 
front of the Executive Committee, Bakr Sidqi and Hikmat 
Sulaiman entered the Chadirchi's guest room, where Abu 
lal-Timman, al-chadirchi, Hadid and Ibrahim had been 
waiting. When Sidqi saw Ibrahim and Hadid, he reacted 
nervously, sat a short while, then took Hikmat to a corner, 
whispered in Turkish, then excused himself and left the 
house. Hikmat afterwards declared that Bakr Sidqi had 
taken the pledge in front of him. Ibrahim protested this 
ploy, which confirmed his belief that Bakr Sidqi was not 
genuinely sincere in joining the society and in believing 
in its ideology, and that Jama'at al-Ahali had made a 
fatal mistake in working With tHe ArFy--. Hadid explains 
Sidqils reaction by alleging that he was suspicious of 
Ibrahim. " 
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adamantly supported the removal of Yasin's government by 
any possible means, "but the idea of a military coupdleta .t 
was never mentioned". For Hikmat Sulaiman and Bakr Sidqi, 
on the other hand, the idea of employing the Army to come 
to power was never very far from their minds; it had 
7 been discussed and considered earlier than October 1936 
According to the U. S. Minister, Hikmat was 'Well versed 
in revolutionary intrigue and thus well qualified to 
8 
organize the military coup dletat to overthrow Yasin" 
Bakr Sidqi shared many of Hikmat's political views 
and particularly his admiration for Kemalist Turkey. He 
may even have been influenced by other examples: 
His (Bakr Sidqi's) decision to act against the 
constitutional power must have been the result 
of rapid thinking - quite possibly he was 
influenced by General Franco's coup in Spain 
(the educated Iraqi follows closely the course 
of world events) ". 9 
7. 
The British Ambassador, in a despatch after the coup, 
wrote: "Yasin said he had made one big mistake. He had 
not trusted his own judgement. Two months before the 
event, the Mutasarrif of Diwaniyah had warned him that 
Bakr Sidqi was collecting ammunition as fast as he could 
and that he was obviously up to no good". Sir Archibald 
Clark-Kerr to SIS Foreign Affairs: 9.12.1936, F0371/ 
20015/E7919. 
8. 
Knabenshue to State Department: 24.12.1936, USNA 890G. 00/395. 
(Hikmat was a half-brother of Mahmud Shawkat Pasha, the 
leader of the Committee of Union and Progress which had 
deposed Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid in April 1909. ) 
9. Minute& by J. G. Ward: Ambassador 
(Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs: 29.10.1936, F0371/ 
2ool3/E6784. 
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The conditions for the coup were most favourable after 
Sidqils return from a two month trip to Europe early in 
October 
10, 
when he became acting Chief of General Staff. 
Taha al-Hashimi had left Iraq on an extended trip to 
England, Germany and Czechoslovakia, and then went to 
Turkey at the head of a delegation to the Turkish Army 
manoeuvres. Taha was accompanied by Muhammad 'Ali Jawad, 
the Air Force Commander and close friend of Bakr Sidqi, 
but he later returned to Iraq in the middle of October 
which may raise questions of earlier co-operation and 
11 
planning The Army was preparing for its own annual 
manoeuvres (from 3rd to 10th November) which Bakr used 
as a cover to deploy units of the Army to the vicinity 
of Baghdad. On 23rd October, Bakr approached General 
'Abd al-Latif Nuri, Commander of the First Division, and 
convinced him to join forces with him in the intended coup 
.1 12 dletat, and met with him again on 25 October 1936 to 
13 
complete the planning for the coup . Meanwhile, Hikmat 
10. Minutes by J. G. Ward: Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign 
Affairs: 2.11.1936, F0371/20013/E6940. "I have heard from 
the intelligence branch of the Air Ministry that General 
Baker Sidqi spent rather a mysterious holiday in Europe 
between July and Sept. of this year. It is known for certain 
that he was in Prague(like other Iraqi army leaders, he has 
doubtless been taking bribes from the Jewish agents of 
Czechslavakia's armament firms who abound in the Middle 
East, and was taking the opportunity of establishing even 
closer "relations" at the fountain-head". 
11. 
al-HashiMijTdhas Mudhakkarat (Memoirs), Beirut 1967, pp. 130-144 
12. 
al-Hasani (1974), Vol. IV, p. 211. Bakr Sidqi heard a rumour 
that General 'Abd al-Latif Nuri was going to commit suicide 
out of desperation. (mainly financial). Bakr contacted him 
telling him "instead of wasting yourself, you should support 
the coup and you will get what you want". Nuri agreed to this 
offer. al-Chadirchi (1970), p. 43; also Interview with Jamil. 
13. Yazbak, Y., -al-Muharrirun (The Liberat6rs)', ''Beirut, 1937, 
pp. 100-1. Af so al-Hasani (1974), vol. IV. 
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broke the news to Ja'far Abu al-Timman and Kamil al- 
Chadirchi. Hikmat told them "The army is going to stage 
a coup. Either you support it, or the army leaders will 
seek the support and cooperation of other political 
14 
groups" 
Jamalat al-Ahali held a meeting to discuss these 
critical developments, and to discuss their position on 
what Hikmat described as a virtual fait accompli. He 
pointed out that co-operation with the Army would give- 
the group a major opportunity to implement their goals 
and objectives. To diminish their fears of a possible 
military dictatorship he told them that the army would 
return to its barracks as soon as the coup had succeeded 
15 
that Bakr Sidqi was only interested in strengthening the 
14. Hadid was in Mosul at the time and was informed by Karail 
upon his return; Ismalil was not informed of the coup 
until the night of 28.10.1936. (Interview with Isma'il 
and Hadid). Ibrahim discontinued meeting Jama'at al-Ahali 
and did not know anything about the coup (Interview 
with Ibrahim). 
15. 
Hikmat Sulaiman could have been sincere in this promise, 
for he repeated this point on numerous occasions to the 
British Ambassador; although the latter remained doubtful, 
he relayed the messages to the Foreign Office. In one 
despatch he writes. - "Hikmat has told me that at all 
costs he will oblige the army to resume its normal and 
appropriate place in the policy of the Country, and 
that he himself will not submit to any form of domination 
by Bakir Sidqi". Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign 
Affairs, 4.11.1936, F0371/20014/E7147. 
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army and wished simply to become Chief of General Staff. 
To prove the good intentions of the Army, Jamalat al- 
Ahali would be given the responsibility of choosing the 
cabinet, as well as the composition of the letter to the 
King demanding the dismissal of Yasin's cabinet, and the 
b ay an (proclamation) announcing the coup, which Bakr 
Sidqi and 'Abd al-Latif Nuri would sign, as commanders 
of the Reform Forces' 
16 
. This news posed a dilemma for 
Jamalat al-Ahali for it required a binding and important 
decision, which was in fact to determine the future of 
the group, as well as that of Iraq. 
Hence they had two clear choices - either to support 
the Army or to decline to participate. They were certainly 
anxious to remove the Hashimi government, which had. 
resorted to severe measures to harass the opposition. 
f Moreover, 
it secrwd likely to last for a long time, and 
there seemed no hope of changing it by democratic means. 
Another important factor was that all the leading members, 
especially Kamil al-Chadirchi, whose dislike of Yasin was 
unrivalled 
17 
, had grown tired of staying in the background 
of the political system and were eager to prove their own 
16. Interview with Hadid and Isma'il; al-Chadirchi (1970), 
p. 43. Jamil, 'Bawakirli al-Thaqafa al-Jadida, vii"c, 
August 1978, Pp. 91-92. al-Hasani (1974), vol. IV, p. 216. 
17. For details of the animosity between the two, see 
the section on al-Chadirchils joining al-Ahali. 
Chapter VIII. 
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administrative ability. If Jamalat al-Ahali did not lend 
their support to the Army then they would not have a 
chance to share power, since the Army was determined to 
engineer the coup in any case, and would simply draw 
support from another group. On the other hand, if they 
supported the Army and took part in the government, they 
might risk being dominated by a military dictatorship. 
Rather optimistically, Jamalat al-Ahali tended to dismiss 
this, not only because of Bakr Sidqi's promises, but 
because they saw themselves as a well organised group, 
resembling a political party to a certain extent, with a 
platform and a solid ideology. They had an active 
membership and enjoyed wide popular support, and would 
certainly be strengthened if they could control the most 
important posts in the Cabinet. They felt confident and 
seem to have underestimated Bakr Sidqi; even if he were 
to develop dictatorial tendencies ifi the future, they 
argued, he was only a single army general, with no political 
ideology and no power base. The odds seemed likely to 
give them the chance to dominate the political situation 
and an opportunity to implement the ideology of 'Popularism'. 
For these reasons, Jamalat al-Ahali decided to support 
the coup and began preparing for it. The meetings were a 
mixture of excitement, apprehension and fear, for as Iraq 
was experiencing its first army coup, its possible consequences 
18 
were not readily comprehended by the participants 
18. Interviews with Hadid, Ismalil, Ibrahim and Jamil. 
See also al-Chadirchi, (1970), p. 44. 
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Hadid wrote the drafts of the letters and the 
proclamation which were to be signed by Sidqi and 'Abd 
19 
al-Latif Nuri . They were given to Colonel Shakir al- 
Wadi, who was acting as a liaison officer between Sidqi, 
Jama'at al-Ahali and the pro-coup Army and Air Force 
20 
officers in Baghdad . On the eve of the coup, 28th October, 
Jama'at al-Ahali held a final meeting, and decided to meet 
21 
again at 6 a. m. the next morning . The signal for the 
coup would be the dropping of the proclamation leaflets 
(Manshur) over Baghdad by Air Force aeroplanes, which 
would prompt Isma'il and some young army officers to 
distribute the same leaflets in various parts of the citY22 
as well as giving a signal to Hikmat to drive to the Palace 
to present the King with Bakr Sidqi and 'Abd al-Latif 
Nuri's letter demanding the resignation of the Hashimi 
Cabinet and the appointment of a government "from the 
people, headed by Hikmat Sulaiman,, 
23 
. At about 11 a. m. 
19. The bayan (Proclomation) addressed to the noble Iraqi 
people, and signed by General Bakr Sidqi, Commander of 
the National Reform Force, is in INA, File J l, doc. No. 170. 
The letter addressed to the King, and signed by General 
Bakr Sidqi, Commander of the Second division, and General 
'Abd al-Latif Nuri, Commander of the First division, is 
in INA, File J 1, doc. No. 171. 
20. Interview With Hadid; also al-Hasani (1974), Vol. IV, p. 216. 
21. Yazbak, (1936), p, 114. al-Haris. 30.11.1936. Quoted 
al-Daraji (1976), p. 427. 
22. Interview with Ismalil. 
23. Yasin, Rashid 'Ali, and especially Nuri al-Salid, accused 
King Ghazi of "being party to the coup". Ambassador (Baghdad) 
to SIS Foreign Affairs: 4.11.1936, F0371/20014/E7147. This 
seems unlikely, although it is "Just possible that Ghazi 
had shown an encouraging attitude to the plotters"., 
Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs: 5.11.1936, 
FO 371/20014/E7181. 
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a number of bombs were dropped on the serai. meanwhile, an 
assessment of the situation was taking place at the Royal 
palace by the King, Yasin, Nuri al-Sa'id, Ja'far al-Askari 
and the British Ambassador. The outcome was the resignation 
of the Cabinet and the appointment of Hikmat, and Ja'far 
al-Askari's courageous if foolhardy decision to go and 
meet the advancing army, which resulted in his murder. 
At 4 p. m. the victorious army entered Baghdad and 
at 6 p. m. a Cabinet headed by Hikmat Sulaiman officially 
took office. The composition of the Cabinet had been 
deliberated before the coup and an agreement had been 
reached between Jamalat al-Ahali and the Army, through 
Hikmat Sulaiman, who was to become the Prime Minister 
and Minister of the Interior, to include Ja'far Abu al- 
Timman (Fi. iance) and Kamil al-Chadirchi (Economics). 
The Ministry of Defence was left for Bakr Sidqi, who 
nominated General 'Abd al-Latif Nuri. al-Chadirchi's 
influence is evident in the formation of this Cabinet; 
he nominated Yusuf 'Izz al-Din, a member of the Society 
and one of his closest friends, to the Ministry of Education, 
Naji al-Asil, a supporter of the Ahali literary society 
and a friend of Kamil's to Foreign Affairs and supported Salih 
Jabr's appointment to the Ministry of Justic 
g4. Sulaiman wanted t, 
include Nuri al-Salid but the murder of Jalfar made this 
difficult. C. J. Edmonds wrote: 
24. Salih Jabr consulted. Yasin al-Hashimi before deciding 
to join the Cabinet and Yasin encouraged him to accept, 
10to protect their lives". al-Hasani (1974), Vol. IV, 
p. 237. 
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Among other things he said that he would 
have liked to include Nuri Pasha, but in 
the circumstances Nuri was bound to refuse. 
He could therefore not expose himself to 
a rebuff. 25 
Hikmat Sulaiman also wanted to include Nasrat al!.. Farisi, 
Jamil al-Madfali and Naji Shawkat, but they declined 
26. 
The coup went as planned except for Jalfar al-'Askari's 
murder, which sent the other Politicians and former 
ministers running for their lives 
27 
. 
25. Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs: 17.11.1936, 
FO 371/20015/E7625. Hikmat Sulaiman remained persistent 
in his attempts to include Nuri al-Salid in his 
Cabinet from the first day of the coup until he 
resigned; See Knabenshue to State Department, 24.12.1936, - 
USNA 890G. 00/395; 4.2.1937, USNA 890G. 00/39, - 10.6.19370, 
USNA 890G. 00/412. Also Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS 
Foreign Affairs: 15.11.1936, FO 371/20014/E7318. 
Hadid denied any consideration by Jama'at al-Ahali, 
before or after the coup, of includ'ln-gNuri al-Sa'17d 
in the cabinet, though Nasrat al-Farisi and Jamil 
al-Madfali had been considered. 
26. Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs: 17.11.1936, 
FO 371/20015/E7625. See also Shawkat, N., (1974), pp. 301-2. 
27. Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs: 30.10.1936, 
FO 371/20013/E6805; 31.10.1936, FO 371/20013/E6817; and 
Ambassador (Damascus) to SIS Foreign Affairs: 31.10.1936, 
FO 371/20013/E6819. Yasin, Rashid 'Ali and Jamil al- 
Madfa'i went to Syria. Nuri al-Sa'id was flown by a 
Royal Air Force plane to Egypt. 
The British Ambassador warned the new Prime Minister 
against the assassination of these politicians and 
arrangements were taken to protect their lives until 
they left Iraq. Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign 
Affairs, 17.11.1936, FO 371/20015/E7625. For details 
of Bakr Sidcli's attempts to murder these politicians# 
see al-Hasani (1974), Vol. IV, pp. 236-7. 
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Hikmat Sulaiman's government settled into power in 
the customary way. One of their first priorities was to 
establish the security they needed for survival, and 
they began by setting up a good working relationship 
with the British Embassy. Muhammad Hadid says that the 
group discussed possible British reactions to the coup 
beforehand and it wad decided that Hikmat Sulaiman, who 
was on good terms with C. J. Edmonds, should in some way 
prepare him for what was to come in order to soothe the 
British and to prevent any quick military reaction which 
might smother the coup in its infancy. Britain always 
feared any abrupt change, and had succeeded in building 
a working relationship with Yasin al-Hashimils government; 
furthermore, they had become wary of Bakr Sidqi ever since 
the Assyrian incident. This explains Hikmat Sulaiman's 
attempts to meet with Edmonds the day before the coup. 
The expectation of a swift reaction on Britain's part 
was well founded, as British troops in Egypt were put 
on alert the day of the coup, which further prompted the 
new government to make friendly gestures to the British 
28 
Embassy 
In three separate despatches to the Foreign Office 
the British Ambassador stressed Hikmat Sulaiman's desire 
to maintain good relations with Britain. 
28. See Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs: 
2.11.1936, FO 371/20013/E6825. 
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I went to him, I confess, full of prejudice, 
and I found myself, somewhat to my dismay, 
disarmed by his obvious desire to be friendly 
and by the earnestness and the apparent 
sincerity with which he begged for my 
support. ... So far the Prime Minister has 
shown every wish to be as friendly if not 
friendlier, than his predecessors. 
This was followed by a report on the new cabinet's policy 
and Hikmat Sulaiman's attitude towards the British 
government and the Treaty. The Ambassador wrote: 
So far as we are concerned, his (Hikmat's) 
attitude has been more than correct. He has 
gone out of his way to give satisfaction 
and to declare his friendship. He has accepted 
and acted upon every suggestion I have made 
to him. He has assured me that he will honour 
the Treaty of 1930, the railway convention 
and all other agreements concluded between 
His Majesty's Government and Iraq. 29 
The reason for Britain's anxiety and the need to soothe 
it seems to stem from the fact that the British Embassy's 
intelligence sources, as well as the Iraq Government, were 
taken completely by surprise. The U. S. Legation reported: 
The complete surprise which accompanied the 
final (sic) coup dI etat in October 1936, was 
convincing evidence that only a very limited 
number of persons were in the confidence of 
Hikmat Sulaiman and Bakir Sidqi. British 
political agents who have developed a fine 
network for gathering information were entirely 
unaware of what was taking place. The British 
military Mission in Iraq, most of whose personnel 
was with the Iraqi army on manoeuvres at the 
time of the coup letat, was likewise unaware 
of what was developing. The secrecy of its 
preparation, the cleverness of its organisation 
and the swiftness of its execution astounded 
everyone, even the Army itself. 30 
29. 
Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs: 2.11.1936, 
Fo 371/20614/E7145; 15.11.1936, E7378; 4.11.1936, E7147. 
30. Knabenshue to State Department: 24.12.1936, 
USNA 890G. 00/395. 
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The new government was welcomed by the progressives 
and leftists in Iraq, but the Arab nationalists werc 
31 
suspicious and in fact opposed it To deepen their 
32 
suspicions, the change was welcomed among the minorities 
31. 
The Arab Nationalists did not welcome the coup, not 
only because they had supported Yasin, but because it 
would "probably result in a setback to Pan Arabism. 
, The army leaders are Turkish trained, many are not 
Arabs at all and they undoubtedly look toward Turkey 
for inspiration". Minute by J. G. Ward, 30.10.1936, 
FO 371/20013/E6797. Another despatch described "Hikmat's 
indifference to Pan-Arab ideals". Ambassador (Baghdad) 
to sIS Foreign Affairs: 4.11.1936, FO 371/20014/E7147. 
In July 1937, Sir A. Clark Kerr, reported: "His (Hikmat's) 
desire to dispel the widespread (and quite true) 
impression that he did not care a hang for Pan-Arabs". 
Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs: 24.7.1937, 
FO 371/20795/E4455. 
Here the ethnic and sectarian origins of the members of 
the cabinet are of interest, since Hikmat's ministry 
was the first not to be dominated by Sunni Arabs from 
Baghdad and Mosul: 
Hikmat Sulaiman Turk 
Kamil al-Chadirchi Arabized Turk 
yusuf 'Izz al-Din 
Ja'far Abu al-Timman 
Salih Jabr 
Maji al-Asil 
'Abd al-Latif Nuri 
Bakr Sidqi 
Kurd 
Shi'i 
- Shi'i 
Sunni 
Sunni 
Kurd, 
Arab 
Arab 
Arab )the 
weakest members Arab ) 
of the cabinet 
GCS of the army and obviously 
the most powerful. 
32. Minutes by J. G. Ward, 29.10.1936, FO 371/20013/E6784, 
also Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs: 
15.11.1936, FO 371/20014/E7378. 
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The new governmentbsupporters organised a huge demonstration, 
"the largest demonstration Baghdad had ever seen , 
33, 
supporting the coup and demanding reforms. 
The government immediately turned its attention to 
the civil and military services, retiring and transferring 
Yasin's relatives and proteges, and replacing them with 
their own supporters; Hadid was promoted Director General 
of Revenues and Jamil appointed Director of Propaganda 
and Publication. Isma'il refused a high position in the 
government and went back to his favourite job as Editor 
of a'l-Ahali newspaper 
34 
. Ibrahim was offered jobs by 
33. The demonstrators held a meeting at the al-Haidarkhana 
Mosque where Muhammad Salih al-Qazzaz and Muhammad 
Mahdi al-jawahiri delivered inflammatory speeches and 
recited poems supporting the coup. al-Ahali 22.11.1936 
also Isma'il, Yusuf, Inqilab 1936 (1936 coup d'6tat), 
Baghdad 1936, pp. 77-78. Also Khairi, S. Min Tarikh 
Haraka al-Thawri3ýya al-Mu'asira fill-'Iraq Pt. I. 
1920-1958 (The History of the Mo ern Revot-titn-ary 
Movement in Iraq, Pt. I, 1920-1958), Baghdad 1974, p. 69. 
Khairi puts the size of the demonstration at 50,000 
persons and says that the Iraqi Communist Party 
organised and led the demonstrators, who were shouting 
anti-fascist slogans - which caused the German 
and Italian Legations to submit protests. 
34. Interview with Hadid, Jamil and Ismalil; see also 
al-Tariq, 5.11.1936 and al-Ahali newspaper which 
reappeared on 2.11.1936. 
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by Ja'far Abu al-Timman and Hikmat Sulaiman, but declined 
35 
and remained a secondary-school teacher 
Bakr Sidqi was appointed Chief of General Staff, and 
Muhammad 'Ali Jawad was made Director of the Iraqi Air 
Force.. A new Mutasarrif of Baghdad, a new Director 
General of Police, and a new Amin al-Asima (Mayor) of 
Baghdad were appointed. Rustum Haidar resigned as Chief 
of the Royal Diwan and was replaced by Ibrahim Kamal. ' 
The Government announced an extensive programme 
(see Appendix E broadcast by Jalfar Abu al-Timman, I 
which was summarised by the Prime Minister for the British 
Ambassador in a confidential conversation: it included: 
(a) The release of all prisoners sentenced by court 
martial under the late government. 
(b) The break-up of large estates now leased to tribal 
shaikhs and distribution of land to the peasantry. 
(c) Checking discrimination against racial and 
religious groups and minoriýies. 
(d) Restoring the freedom of the press. 
(e) Stamping out nepotism. 
35. was Ibrahim/visited by Hikmat and Ja'far after the 
success of the coup, and Ismalil was approached 
with the offer of a job which he delined. Ibrahim 
sent a letter addressed to Kamil al-chadirchi 
criticising the Ahali involvement in the Army coup, 
which destroyed the democratic principles of 
al-Sha'biya and would result in grievous consequences 
ain: ý-the group. Ibrahim held Kamil responsible and * predicted that he would pay dearly for his opportunism. 
(Interview with Ibrahim) . 
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The Prime Minister indicated to the British Ambassador 
that "he had little sympathy with grandiose Pan-Arab 
36 
schemes" 
36. J. G. Ward commented on the government's programme 
when it was announced: 
"This is a typical over-ambitious programme, such 
as is mainly designed to impress the Iraqi public 
at home. The vague generalities will probably 
amount to little in practice. " 
Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs: 11.12.1936, 
FO 371/20015/E7808. See also 31.10.1936, FO 371/ 
20013/E6906. 
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I 
2. Execution of the Coup 
To local observers, Yasin al-Hashimils government 
seemed "strongly entrenched and (will be) hard to 
shift ... unless something particularly serious should 
occur, he will remain as Prime Minister for some time" 
The government had taken all the measures rucessary to 
enable itself "to endure for a long spell of office" 
and Yasin himself had anticipated ten years2 . Until the 
very day of the coup which toppled it, Yasin's government 
seemed to have succeeded in consolidating itself on all 
fronts and in establishing its authority where previous 
governments had failed. The British Ambassador, in a 
despatch to his government, assessed the apparent strength 
of Yasin's government; he wrote: 
The partnership of Yasin and Nuri, so long as 
it held together, seemed to be unassailable 
from without, in that it kept in check the 
swing of influences which had discomforted 
governments in the past. The tribes were calmed 
and quiescent. The already diminished powers 
of the palace had been almost destroyed by the 
crisis of last Jund. The opposition seemed 
insignificant and inarticulate. 4 
1. Knabenshue to State Department: 5.3.1936, USNA 890G. 00/362. 
2. Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs: 17.5.1936, 
FO 371/20013/E6085. 
. 
3. In'which the King's sister (Princess 'Azza) eloped 
with an Italian waiter. See Ambassador (Baghdad) to 
SIS Foreign Affairs: 24.5.1936, FO 371/20016/E3089. 
4. Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs: 4.11.1936, 
FO 371/20014/E7147. 
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Yasin's strength was also drawn from the Army, mainly 
the strong Pan-Arab faction led by Colonel Salah al-Din al- 
Sabbagh. The British Ambassador continued his report: 
Yasin had seemed to draw a great part of his 
strength from the Army. His brother was at 
its head. It had always been ready to do his 
bidding, and it had done it well. Upon it he 
had spent almost a fourth part of the income 
from the State. He had pushed forward and 
pampered its senior generals. 5 
Yasin had succeeded in gaining the confidence and support 
of Arab nationalists inside Iraq and in the Arab world, 
and also had the general approval of the British 
6 
authorities . However, his strength and popularity was 
in fact somewhat illusory. He became ruthless in dealing 
with any opposition activity, and suppressed 'all 
newspapers which had the temerity to publish even the 
7 
slightest criticism of the government' 
Furthermore, the government rapidly became notorious 
for its maladministration, corruption, and bribery. The 
American Minister reported: 
5. Ibid. 
Knabenshue to State Department: 24.12.1936, 
USNA 890G. 00/395. 
Yasin also secured the admiration of the British 
Ambassador, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr. 
7. 
al-Ahali, Sawt al-Ahali, al-Mabdal, 41-Bayan, 
al-Tariq', al-'Alam al-'Arabi, and al-Haqq. 
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numerous government officials dismissed 
on one pretext or another were replaced 
by the friends of Yasin and his colleagues. 
Large tracts of public lands were 
apportioned among the members of the group 
in power and their friends. 
It is alleged that large sums of money from 
public funds were distributed as bribes 
to gain the friendship and support of 
various tribal shaikhs. The construction 
of Yasin, Nuri Sa'id and Tahsin Kadri, 
Master of Ceremonies at the Royal Palace, 
of what, to the local people, appear4d to 
be excessively palatial residences, which 
in their minds was an outstanding and 
visible sign of some form of financial 
dishonesty, very likely at the expense of 
the public. 
In addition to these disturbing factors 
which were fermenting discontent, Yasin 
seems to hav 9 commenced to suffer from 
megalomania. 
The Minister of Interior, Rashid 'Ali al-Gailani, 
increased the number of secret police as well as authorising 
widespread investigation and surveillance of members of 
the opposition, especially JamMat al-Ahali and the 
communists9, and the arrest and trial of persons accused 
of complicity in Communist activitieslo. The government 
also prepared an amendment to the Baghdad Penal Code with 
the aim of facilitating the arrest of political dissidents, 
thus creating a climate of virtual dictatorship which 
coincided with the violent suppression of the tribal risings 
by the armed forces. Finally, Yasin committed the fatal 
8. Knabenshue to State Department: 24.12.1936, USNA. 890G. 00/395. 
9. This secret police surveillance is clearly documented in 
the personal files of the leaders of Jama'at al-Ahali in 
the General Security office, q. v.; see also al=-JaridY' 
al-Siyasiyj2.... As a result of this activity Isma'il and 
11 others were arrested and brought to trial. 
10. Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs: 15.4.1936, 
FO 371/20013/E2507. 
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mistake of excluding Hikmat Sulaiman from his cabinet, 
which ultimately encouraged Sulaiman to lead Jama'at 
al-Ahali into a conspiracy with Bakr 8idqi to carry out 
a cou . p'd'9tat. 
Yasin's intention of staying in office for ten years, 
caused a 
mild sensation in Baghdad, where the spectie 
of Yasin as dictator again reared its head, 
and gave his opponents an excuse for 
contending that he was usurping the King's 
place. Hikmat Sulaiman was heard to make a 
caustic comment to the effect that from now 
on he presumed that the mot d'ordre would 
be changed, as far as the 'PrIme minister was 
concerned, from "Vive le Roi" to I'Vive le Mo 
Yasin's ambitions meant to Hikmat Sulaiman and other 
opposition politicians that they would be out of office 
for ten years, if not for ever, and thus Jama'at al-Ahali 
in general and Hikmat Sulaiman in particular, resorted 
in desperation to the Army and to the use of force, for 
Yasin's government left no hope that change might be 
12 
ai: hieved democratically 
In the same way, Bakr Sidqi, who had been Hikmat's 
intimate friend and confidant since 1933, felt that 
Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs: 15.4.1936, 
FO 371/20013/E6085. 
12. Interview with Hadid,, al-Daraji (1976), p. 419, and 
al-Chadirchi (1970), pp. 39-40. 
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his ambitions would not be realised as long as Yasin 
remained in power, since the latter's brother, Taha, 
was secure as Chief of Staff. Besides, Yasin's increasing 
dependence on the pan-Arab officers and their gradual 
promotion to key positions weakened Bakr's position within 
the Army. He also felt that he had not been adequately 
rewarded for his part in putting down the tribal risings, 
which had been instrumental in ensuring the continuation 
of Yasin's government. This, coupled with his disapproval 
of Taha al-Hashimi caused him such frustration that he 
13 submitted his resignation from the army in July 1936 
Rashid 'Ali counselled Yasin to reject the resignation, 
contrary to Nuri's advice, and Bakr was eventually 
14 
persuaded to remain at his post 
13. Apparently he was not satisfied with Taha al-Hashimils 
organisation and policies, which created a "skeleton 
or paper army, making it appear that there were four 
divisions while in fact there were only sufficient 
officers, men and administrative staff for two 
divisions". Knabenshue to State Department: 24.12.1936, 
USNA 890G. 00/395. 
14. Nuri sent a telegram from Teheran, where he was 
negotiating the Iraqi-Persian border agreement, urging 
Yasin to accept Sidqils resignation and informing him 
that Bakr was not to be trusted. He emphasized that 
Bakr Sidqi had been trained by British Intelligence in 
Iraq; (see al-Qa. isi (1976) quoting the unpublished memoirs 
of Rufalil Butti), which was confirmed by British 
Intelligence after the coup; Minutes by J. G. Ward, in 
15.12.1936, FO 371/20015/E7790, stated that: "The A. M. 
(S/Ldr. Jope Slade) states that Bakir Sidqi was employed by the British military as an agent on the Turkish 
'frontier' after the war. It might be worth telling 
this to the Ambassador". 
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The Opposition to al-Hashimils Government 
Although Hikmat Sulaiman was excluded from the al- 
Hashimi cabinet, he remained, at least for a while, on 
good terms with Yasin and Rashid 'Ali. He even held a 
dinner to celebrate Yasin's new government to which he 
invited many politicians and tribal shaikhs He was 
even prepared to go further, and tried to press Jamalat 
al-Ahali into abstaining from being too critical of 
yasin and his government in. Sawtal-Ahali newspaper, which 
was Permitted to appear on 18th April 1935. However, the 
paper was spppressed on 10th May because it criticised 
government's handling of a tribal rising in Rumaitha, 
and this date marks the beginning of the open breach 
between Jamalat al-Ahali and Yasin's government. 
Although he had been a member of the Executive 
Committee of the al-Sha'biya secret society since late 
1934,, Hikmat continued to be somewhat indecisive in his 
opposition to Yasin's government. He changed tactics 
when he returned from Turkey in the autumn of 1935, when 
he began to express his open admiration for Kemalist Turkey and 
to attack the government. He made constant comparisons 
between Iraq and Turkey and stressed that reforms should 
be carried out by a responsible government and a progressive 
administration. Only at this stage did he become active 
in co-ordinating and organising opposition within 
15. 
al-Chadirchi, (1970), p. 36. 
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Jama'at al-Ahali and with the rest of the disgruntled 
politicians 
16 
. 
in April 1936, Jama'at al-Ahali published another 
paper, al-Ba , under Hikmat's ownership. Its second 
issue contained severe criticisms of the government for 
accepting the railway transfer agreement, and the paper 
17 
was suppressed for a month . At the same time, Ja'far 
Abu al-Timman presented a petition to the King protesting 
against the government's policies, asking him to "put 
a limit to the government's aggravations and to appoint 
is 
compassionate officials who care for the people" 
He also published a letter addressed to the 'Iraqi 
people' criticising the practices of Yasin's administration 
and calling for a truly representative governmentl9. 
His protest letter was followed by another signed by 
many different Politicians, protesting against "government 
16 - al-Daraji, (1976), pp. 402-3. Hikmat Sulaiman published 
three articles on this subject in al-Bilad, 15,16, 
17 December 1935. 
17- 
al-Bayan, 7.4.1936. Also, Knabenshue to State Department, 
USNA 890G. C/76. See al-Daraji (1976), p. 406. 
al-Chadirchi managed to get this letter 
Syrian newspaper (INA, File D/14, NO. 32). 
arrested and would have stood trial but 
intervention of Bakr Sidqi, who managed 
dismissed. Interviews with Jamili Hadid 
al-Chadirchi. 
published in a 
For this he was 
for the personal 
to get the case 
and Nasir 
19- INA File D/14. Doc. Nos. 38 and 39. 
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policies and their severity (in dealing with the citizens) 
20 
which have caused many unwarranted deaths" The issue 
of al-Bayan prepared for 14 May contained a blistering 
attack on the government, but before Jama'at al-Ahali 
had the chance to distribute it, the police moved in and 
seized all issues, and not one copy was put into circulation. 
in consequence al-Bayan was suppressed again for a year2l. 
Jalfar Abu al-Timman and Hikmat Sulaiman presented a 
protest to the King on 16th May 1936, complaining that 
"these harsh measures taken by Yasin's government have 
,, 22 never been practised before 
20 'INA File D/14. Doc. No. 29. The petition was signed by 
the following politicians: 
Jamil al-Madfa'i, Maulud Mukhlis, Naji al-Suwaidi, 
Hikmat Sulaiman, Fakhri al-Jamil, Hamdi al-Pachachi, 
'Abd al-Aziz al-Qassab, Muhammad Ridha al-Shabibi, 
Dalud al-Sa'di, Jamal Baban, Rashid al-Khuja, 
'Abd al-Rahman al-Ni'ma, Ibrahim al-Urfali, 
Hussun Salim, and one other signature. 
21. Knabenshue to State Department: 28.5.1936, 
USNA 890G. 00/366. See also al-Daraji (1976), p. 416. 
22. INA, File D/14, Document No. 40. 
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Sawt al-Ahali reappeared on 12th August 1936, after 
a year's suspension, with another attack on the government's 
handling of the railway agreement. 
Early in the morning (the police) raided 
the paper's offices and confiscated all 
the remaining copies of the issue. Hikmat 
Sulaiman had, however, secreted a certain 
number and he himself sold them in the 
streets. However that may be, a few copies 
were smuggled out, and were to be had in 
the bazaar at ls. each. Sawt al-Ahali was 
promptly suspended for a further year. 23 
Once again Jamalat al-Ahali sent a letter of protest 
to the King, signed by Ja'far Abu al-Timman, Hikmat 
Sulaiman and Kamil al-Chadirchi 
24. A few days later Jalfar 
and Hikmat had an audience with the King where they 
25 
also protested against the action 
The ineffectiveness of Jamalat al-Ahali's attacks on 
Yasin's government, coupled with their impatience to put 
their own programme into effect, seem almost inevitably 
to have pushed them closer to Bakr Sidqi, then the strongest 
26 
general in the Army . This ultimately had the effect of 
compromising their ideology and principles and their belief 
23. Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs: 27.8.1936, 
FO 371/20013/E5650. 
24. INA, File D/14, Document No. 113. 
25. Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs: 
27.8.1936, FO 371/20013/E5650. 
26. Knabenshue to State Department: 
24.12ol936, USNA 890 G. 00/395. 
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in the democratic process, besides being against the 
wishes of Ibrahim and Hadid. For Bakr the association must 
have seemed highly advantageous, since his own chances of 
promotion were slim, and his position more precarious 
than ever. Yasin al-Hashimi was becoming increasingly 
dependent on the young Pan-Arab faction in the Army, which 
encouraged Bakr to seek an identifiable and reputable 
political group to provide him with both cover and support. 
Hence both Bakr and Hikmat succeeded in coming under the 
banner of Jamalat al-Ahali, and took advantage of its 
popularity to take power for themselves 
27 
. In Clark Kerr's 
words: 
At the same time I am advised that he 
(Bakr Sidqi) could not have ventured upon 
his march on Baghdad with any hope of sdccess 
unless he had been sure of the support of 
such men as Hikmat Sulaiman and Jalfar abu 
Timman, who could carry with them a large 
volume of public opinion. But I confess that 
I do not at present think that much comfort 
may be drawn from this. Bakr Sidqi may well 
have seen in co-operating with these two 
good men a passing means of advancing his 
own career, which, broadly speaking, began 
with the grizzly triumph of Simel [Summayl] 
moved on to still further bloody glories on 
the Euphrates and has now come to its 
present dazzling success. If he escapes the 
vengeance of the many powerful enemies he 
has made for himself and is given time to 
consolidate his position the way to supreme 
power lies open to him. 26 
27. Interview with Hadid and Ibrahim; the latter ultimately 
left the group because of its involvement in the coup. 
28- Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs: 4.11.1936, 
FO 371/20014/E7147. 
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3. The Unworkable Alliance between the Army and 
Jama'at al-Ahali 
Within a few days of the coup, Hikmat Sulaiman's 
cabinet had settled down in office and the Prime Minister 
began to make good some of his promises. The government 
released prisoners - Yazidis, tribesmen, and a few political 
prisoners, mainly Communists 
1, 
and in general there was 
an air of freedom for political activities. It permitted 
all the newspapers which had been suppressed by the 
2 
previous government to reappear .A royal irada was issued 
on 31 November 1936, dissolving Parliament, and elections 
3 
were announced for 20 February 1937 
Meanwhile, Sulaiman's government endeavoured to 
establish itself to the outside world as a legitimate 
constitutional government, especially in the Arab world, 
since it was accused of being hostile to Arabism by most 
4 
syrian, Lebanese and Egyption newspapers . The government 
waged a counter-campaign against these allegations, 
inviting Arab journalists to visit Iraq in order to 
persuade them to write favourable articles and books about 
Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS roreign Affairs, FO 371/ 
20014/E7137 and 31.10.1936 and E 71,45 of 2.11.1936; 
see also Khairi, S., (1974), p. 68. 
2. Ibid. # p. 69. 
3. Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs: F0371/ 
21856/E794, Annual Report for 1937; see also al-Hasani 
(1974), Vol. IV, pp. 242-245. 
4. Husain Jamil, who was appointed Director of Information, 
collected and kept a number of articles on the coup. 
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the new government 
5. The fact that it was the first 
government either in Iraq or the Arab world to gain power 
through a coup d'9tat, may have contributed to making it 
anxious to gain acceptance and to smooth apprehensions 
both inside and outside Iraq. Thus: 
It seems that the present government is doing 
everything it can to allay the fears of all 
factions and to appease them in every way 
possible and thus secure their support. 
This also explained the appeals for friendship conveyed 
personally to the British Ambassador and the numerous 
gestures of alliance and friendship for Britain 
transmitted through C. J. Edmonds, Advisor to the Ministry 
of the Interior by the Prime Minister. Hikmat's attempts 
seemed to bear fruit: 
He (Hikmat Sulaiman) is very popular 
everywhere, and the British Ambassador has 
been definitely won over to him, for he 
told me so himself. He intends to give 6 
Hikmat Sulaiman his full support ... 
These actions would have been routine for any Iraqi 
cabinet, and would have ensured it at least a normal 
period of survival 
7 but Hikmat's cabinet was mainly 
composed of Jama'at al-Ahali, who were determined to 
5. 
Interview with Jamil, who denies that the new government 
distributed money to Arab journalists to gain their 
favours. Howeveri 'Abd al-Razzaq al-Hasani has a copy of 
a cheque from the Iraq Goverrýment to the journalist Yusuf 
Yazbuk for ID 500. Furthermore, at least two books and a 
number of articles which were loud in their praise of the 
new government appeared shortly afterwards. See Yazbuk, 
al-Muharrirun (The Liberators), Beirut 1936 and Abu al- 
Rasr, 'Umar, al-'Iraq al-Jadid (The new Iraq), Beirut 1937. 
6. Knabenshue to state Department: 12-11.1936, USNA. 890G. 
00/387 and 4.2.1937, USNA 890G. 00/399. 
7. The average length of an Iraqi cabinet between 1921 and 1936 was 8.7 months. There were 22 cabinets in the period from October 1920 to October lq36. 
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carry out their ambitious programme of reforms, and not 
8 
merely interested in becoming ministers or deputies" 
At the same time, the fact that they did not come to 
power on their own, having arrived by means of guns, 
tanks and aeroplanes did of course complicate the situation. 
To make matters more difficult, the armed forces were 
under the command of Bakr Sidqi, who had already shown 
himself an ambitious and ruthless general. Hadid says 
of him: 
Personally, as a man, he was not trustworth 
he could do anything that came to his mind. 
ý 
This alliance, although a new one, might have had 
some slim chance of success, had Jamalat al-Ahali and 
other sympathetic political forces been more firmly 
entrenched and established. However, in the absence of 
a well-balanced system and because of its own inexperience 
and lack of organisation, Jamalat al-Ahali was too weak 
to stand firm in the face of a powerful and ambitious 
military leadership, or to challenge Bakr Sidqi's 
dictatorial advances, thus giving support to Beleri's 
notion of "the natural course" 
10 
, and also underlining 
the truth of the analogy of Sir Lancelot Oliphant at 
the Foreign Office: 
There is a great deal in the position and 
outlook of the new Iraqi Prime Minister which 
resembles the case of Sayid Zia ed-Din who 
8. Interview with Hadid. 
9. Ibid. 
10. Be'eri, Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society, 
London 1'970, p. 3-4. TIT37-t-Heory accepts that military 
coup and subsequent domination of power as the "natural course" in contemporary Arab history. 
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became Prime Minister of Persia when Reza 
Khan ousted the Shah of Persia. In the long 
run the Sayid had to disappear and leave 
Reza Khan as Dictator and subsequent Shah. 
Absit omen. 11 
From the beginning there were apprehensions and expectations 
on the future of the alliance, and thus on the future 
of the government. 
The U. S. Minister, Knabenshue, wrote a report to 
his government after a discussion with the British 
Ambassador, which assessed the future outlook. 
1. "The civil authorities (the prime minister and his 
cabinet) may prevail over the military authorities 
and eliminate the influence of the latter in the 
administration of the government. 
2. military authorities may possibly dominate the 
situation and exercise military control over the 
administration of the country through the civil 
authorities. 
3. The military authorities may possibly completely 
overthrow the civil government and administer the 
country by a direct military dictatorship. 
4. It is not entirely beyond the bounds of possibility 
that Bakir Sidqi conceived the idea of attempting 
to emulate Shah Pehlevi by dethroning King Ghazi 
and finally taking the throne himself . -12 
Hikmat himself accepted the anomalies of his position, 
but stood his ground at the British Embassy: 
There was no one who regretted these 
circumstances more than himself, or who 
appreciated more than he did the dangers 
inherent in the part played by the army, 
but he could promise me that his first 
preoccupation would be to put the army back 
into proper place. He would not remain a 
day in office if he failed to do this. 13 
Ambassador (Baghdad) To SIS Foreign Affairs: 25.11.1936, 
FO 371/20014/E7371. 
12. i Knabenshue to State Department: 12.11.1936, usNA 890G. oo/387. 
13. Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs: 2.11.1936, 
FO 371/20014/E7145. 
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In the early days of the coup, Bakr Sidqi seemed to 
shy away from politics and concentrated on strengthening 
the Army, which led Knabenshue to believe that his role 
might after all be purely military: 
It is my understanding that General Bakir 
Sidqi, now Chief of Staff, contrary to general 
expectations, is not trying to dominate the 
civil authorities and that he is devoting 
himself exclusively to army affairs. 
and a month later: 
The fear which was at first experienced by 
almost everyone, that General Bakir Sidqi 
would exercise a military dictatorship, has 
now been largely dispelled. He is devoting 
himself strictly and entirely to the 
reorganization and strengthening of the 14 
army, of which he is now Chief of Staff. 
On the other hand both the British Embassy and the 
Foreign Office remained rightly suspicious of Sidqi: 
Whatever General Bakir Sidqils ultimate aims - 
and his career since 1933 suggests that he 
will in the long run try to secure dictatorial 
powers - there is now likely to be an interim 
period, during which the General will 
endeavour to consolidate his hold on the Iraqi 
government, while Hikmat Sulaiman will 
endeavour to make good his assertion that 
he is in control of events and mot merely 
a puppet at the disposal of the Iraqi army. 
It seems probable that the "allies" of 
October 29th will shortly enter into acute 
competition, a state of affairs which will 
be complicated by the intrigues of Yasin 
Pasha and his friends and possibly 
. 
by 
5 
the 
independent ambitions of King Ghazi. 
As the year 1936 came to a close and the government 
began to initiate po. licies and to take important decisions 
14. Knabenshue to State Department: 12.11.1936, USNA 890. G- 
00/387 and 24.12.1936, USNA 890. G. 00/395. 
15- Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs: 4.11.1936, 
FO. 371/20014/E7147. 
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a rift appeared between Jamalat al-Ahali on the one hand, 
supported by various progressive elements, and Bakr Sidqi 
and his gang of officers'on the other, supported by 
conservative elements (including landowners, tribal 
shaikhs and merchants) as well as the Pan-Arab faction 
in the army and the Arab nationalists of al-Muthanna Club. 
The two camps virtually declared war, and used every 
available means to discredit each other. The conservative 
forces were generally stronger and more solidly based, 
and succeeded in winning Bakr Sidqi to their side. 
Meanwhile, the Pan-Arab army officers were plotting his 
assassination as his reliance on Kurds within the officer 
corps became increasingly evidentl6. At the beginning, 
Hikmat was the focus of the Reformists, hopes, but when 
they tried to pressure him to take their side, which 
was the weaker one, he fell under the complete influence 
of the domineering personality of Bakr Sidqi, virtually 
17 
, abandoning his colleagues in the process . The British 
16. Batatu'(1978), p. 305; After the assassination, the 
u. S. Legation reported: "As a Kurd he had, it seems, 
favoured Kurdish officers and this aroused the resentment 
of the Arab officers, many of whom were already very 
bitter about the assassination of General Jalfar who 
had been very popular in the Army. The most flagrant 
act of favouritism toward the Kurds on the part of 
General Bakir Sidqi was in the appointment of the 
latest class of cadets to the Military College, 70 per 
cent of which are said to have been given to Kurds. It 
seems that this was the final move of the General which 
aroused a group of Arab officers to form the plot 
resulting in his death. Knabenshue to State Department: 
19.8.1937, USNA 890G. 00/426. 
17. 
al-Chadirchi (1970), p. 43. 
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Embassy's Report for 1937 (written early in 1938) explains 
Hikmat's dilemma: 
At the beginning of the year Hikmat 
Sulaiman still retained much of the 
popularity which he had enjoyed when he 
became Prime Minister after the military 
revolt of theopreceding October. He was 
beginning to realise, however, that the 
task of governing the country was 
harder than he had imagined, and though 
he had shown skill in keeping his 
colleagues together, it was already 
clear that their differences were likely 
to widen as the time passed. He was, 
moreover, under the irksome necessity 
of placating the Chief of General Staff 
who became more'and more pressing in 
his demands and more impatient of 18 
civilian control as the months passed by. 
This conflict was further accentuated by a change of 
tactics on the part of Bakr Sidqi, who now began to 
interfere in the running of the government, both directly 
and indirectly, through the Prime Minister and the 
Minister of Defence, or often simply by executing his own 
decisions by means of acts of force and violence. This 
put the Prime Minister in the unenviable position of 
having to keep the two camps together. 
Before the coup and after joining the secret society, 
Hikmat could well have been accused of having deceived 
Jamalat al-Ahali not only because of his essentially 
superficial belief in their ideology, but also because 
he never finally severed relations with Yasin al-Hashim 
18. Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs: Annual 
Report for 1937,, Fo 371/21856/E794. 
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and Rashid 'Ali 
19 
. On the eve of the coup he attempted 
several times to meet C. J. Edmonds in order to prepare 
him for the coup and to square his position with tha 
20 British Embassy . After the coup he kept Jama'at al-Ahali 
in the dark about his close co-operation with the 
Embassy and his desire to include Nuri al-Sa'id in his 
cabinet. Such dealings were generally characteristics 
of Hikmat's behaviour as Prime Minister and confirmed 
'Abd al-Fattah Ibrahim's forebodings., They accord with 
General Rowan Robinson's description of Hikmat as being 
"despite favourable appearances, ... essentially shifty 
and weak in character"21 which may also explain Hikmat's 
abandoning Jama'at al-Ahali, and his gradually falling 
under the dominance of Bakr Sidqi and his faction, 
although his intention was clearly to remain in control 
of the situation himself. 
19. "Yasin then surprised me by saying that he was in touch 
with Hikmat and had warned him of the dangers of allowing 
people like Kamil Chadirchi to have a real say in affairs. 
Hikmat should proceed on more practicallines than those 
forshadowed in his programme to Abu Timman and Kamil 
Chadirchi or he would be making the greatest mistake 
of his life. " Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign 
Affairs: 9.12.1936, FO. 371/20015/E7917. 
20- Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs: 17.11.1936, 
FO. 371/20015/E7625. 
21. Minutes by J, G. ward, 4.11.1936, ro. 371/20014/E7147. 
193 
The Prime Minister's worst troubles with 
his own colleagues were due to Bakr Sidqi. 
Although not a member of the Cabinet, Bakr 
Sidqi was the man who had put Hikmat and 
the other Ministers into power, and his 
influence was therefore strong, while his 
views were determined and often at variance 
with those of the Ministers. Hikmat hoped 
at first that he would be able to keep 
Bakr quiet and amicable if he could only 
give him all the guns, tanks, aeroplanes 
and other materials which he was demanding 
for the army ... 
22 
For his part, sensing the weak position of the 
'Reformists' as Jama'at al-Ahali became known, Sidqi 
exerted more influence and attempted to dominate the 
situation: 
It is persistently alleged that he attends 
all cabinet meetings and is in fact the 
dictator. I have reason to believe that 
this at least is partially correct. I also 
believe that if a change of government 
should take place, Bakir Sidqi will continue 
to dominate the situation. 23 
This was clearly felt by members of Jamalat al-Ahali, 
who were frustrated in attempting to curtail Army 
interference as well as in their efforts to carry out 
their reforms. Sidqils interference in the work of the 
government culminated in the establishment of a "supreme 
Defence council, ", which was designed to "legalize his 
24 
own role in the running of the government". To this 
22. Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS roreign Affairs: Annual Report for 1937: FO-371/21856/E794. 
23. J<nabenshue to State ]Department: 4.2.1937, USNA 890G. 00/399. 
24. Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Poreign Affairs: 1938, PO. 371/20795/Z. 
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Kamil al-Chadirchi responded by tendering his resignation, 
which was not accepted25. This move brought the 'reformist 
ministers' opposition to Bakr Sidqi's dictatorial 
practices into the open. Thus, fairly early on, Jama'at 
al-Ahali came to the bitterl ydisappointing realisation that 
they were not thinking on the-same wave length as Sidqi, 
especially when they were confronted with Sidqi's plans 
to do away with Yasin, Rashid 'Ali and Nuri, after the 
shocking murder of Ja'far al-'Askari, which they opposed 
strongly. Later they were to face great difficulties in 
dealing with the General and the unruly Army officers 
whom he used both to eliminate his foes and his companions 
26 in debauchery 
Both Jamalat al-Ahali's constant demands for reform 
and their progressive and democratic ideas did not at 
all please Bakr Sidqi. Both in their official capacity 
and through the Popular Reform League the Reformist 
ministers and the deputies kept on voicing the need 
for the reform of the administration and the legal system. 
al-Ahali newspaper became a further source of irritation 
25., 
a oe a certain amount of friction was rumoured to have developed in cabinet meetings due to the presence 
of the Chief of General Staff". Knabenshue to State 
Department: 18.3.1937, USNA 890G. 00/402. 
26. Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs: 
Annual Report for 1937, FO. 371/21856/E794. 
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for Sidqi; he had no sympathy for its constant barrage 
of demands and criticism, and was particularly annoyed 
by the articles of Yusuf Matti and 'Abd al-Qadir Isma'il, 
who, incidentally, was voicing the same issues in the 
Chamber of Deputies along with Hadid, 'Aziz Sharif, and 
Sadiq Kammuna. Finally, al-Ahali refused to acquiesce 
in Sidqi's attempts to exercise complete control over 
the government, and their concerted efforts to curb the 
intrusion of himself and his clique into governmental 
and political affairs angered him and clouded his 
relationship with them, especially Kamil al-Chadirchi. As 
a result he denounced Communism and insinuated that 
al-Ahali were cast in a similar mould. He then turned 
against them directly by accepting overtures from the 
anti-Reformist factions, whose main objective was to 
foil al-Ahali's determination to carry out their programme. 
The political assassinations early in 1937 demonstrated 
Bakr Sidqi's single-mindedness not only in dealing with 
political adversaries but in taking politically dangerous 
decisions. They also pointed to the coming battle between 
a military dictatorship and a liberal party. The division 
became deeper and wider as time wore on, until the 
military dominated the political scene altogether, pushing 
the Reformists into the background. Eventually, the 
only way left for Jamalat al-Ahali to preserve their 
personal integrity and political prestige was to submit 
their resignation collectively and with as big a bang 
as possible. Thus the Reformist Ministers, along with 
Salih Jabr, submitted their resignation on 19 June 1937, 
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in protest at the government's use of force against a 
tribal rising in Rumaitha. This resignation, especially 
that of Jalfar Abu al-Timman, deprived Hikmat Sulaiman's 
government of popular support, leaving it weak and void 
of a strong base just like previous cabinets. This 
eventually encouraged the other political factions to 
make a move against it, a process hastened by the Pan- 
Arab officers' decision to close ranks and plot against 
Sidqi. His assassination in August deprived Hikmat of 
his only real source of power. 
Thus a significant period in the political life of 
, Tamalat al-Ahali and of the country came to an end. It 
is instructive, if somehow paradoxical, to compare the 
performance of Hikmat Sulaiman's own government, its 
shortcomings and its failure to carry out its ambitious 
programme with part of an article by Hikmat himself in 
S awt al-Ahali on 12 August 1936. This article, entitled: 
The Cabinet and its Principles, in which he criticised 
the government of Yasin al-Hashimi, also illustrates 
the predicament of the Iraqi political system in general: 
The foregoing discussion clearly indicates 
the failure of the al-Hashimi cabinet to rule 
the country in accordance with the interest 
of the majority of the people. Fifteen years 
have passed during which several cabinets 
have come and gone without any sensible difference 
ýeing felt by the people. That has occurred 
in an era when nations are making rapid progress, 
especially those which are still backward 
in their development. We feel that it is time 
to put an end to these antics and to start 
sincere and loyal work to strengthen the 
country and to improve the condition of 
the people. 
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Chapter VII 
Pdlitical and Economic Developments 
1941-1946 
1. The Political Situation 
As has already been described in Chapter III, 
Jamalat al-Ahali played only a minor part in politics 
between 1937 and 1941, a period which was characterised 
by a number of military coups and the domination of the 
Pan-Arab faction in the Army, headed by the officers of 
the Golden Square. The fall of Rashid 'Ali's government 
in 1941, and the reoccupation of the country by British 
forces, ushered in a new era in Iraqi politics, when 
Iraq became strongly affected by the new international 
constellation of power brought about by the Second world 
War. 
After only a month of fighting (2-30 May 1941) between 
the Iraq Army and the British forces from India and 
Palestine, the invaders won a decisive victory. The 
British closed in on the capital, and the Iraqi forces 
disintegrated in the face of the advancing troops 
1. 
News 
For more details on the , 
1941 
, 
May uprising, see Haddad, u., 
Harakat Rashid Ali al-Gailani, 1941 (Rashid 'Ali al- 
Gailani's. mo. v. ement) Sidon, 1950; al:: Durra, M., al-Harb 
al Iraqiya-al-Baritan_iyA (The Iraqi-British Wa-rTil-e-11'rut 
9.;. al-HasaHir,, _A., al-Asrar al-Khafiya Fi Harakat 1941 
al-TaharruElya H=ien Secrets of the L113eration (The H 
MO 
, 
vement 
,0, 
f 1941), Sidon 1964; Yaghi, I., Harakat Rashid 
'Ali al-Gailani (Rashid 'Ali al-Gailani's Movement)'., 
B. e. irut 1974; al-SabbaghS., Fursan al-'Uruba fi al- 
Iraq (The Arab Knights in I mascus 1956. 
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of this collapse caused chaos in the capital, and the 
government was forced to flee before the arrival of the 
British force: 
On the 29th May, Rashid 'Ali, his colleagues, 
the Golden Square and some few of their most 
prominent supporters, fled from Baghdad and 
crossed into Iran- The Germans and Italians 
had previously gone north to Mosul, whence 
they retired to Syria when the movement 
collapsed. Yunus Sab'awi, left behind in 
Baghdad as military governor to organize 
the final resistance, found it prudent, after 
a few hours of office, to follow the others 
to Tehran. On the 30th May a temporary 
"Committee of Internal Security" sued for 2 
an armistice. Fighting ceased on 31st May. 
On 1 June, the Regent returned to Baghdad; the opposition 
had been defeated, the Army humiliated and in disarray, 
while he was supported by an occupation army and an 
energetic British Ambassador, with well defined objectives. 
The Regent and most politicians who supported him clearly 
owed their position directly to Britain, and more 
immediately to the British Ambassador, Sir Kinahan 
Cornwallis. His tactics and persistence had been 
instrumental in calling for the troops to topple Rashid 'Ali. 
Hence the Regent and his circle were eager, if not 
obliged, to co-operate fully with the British authorities. 
The objectives of the British government in Iraq, 
as specified by the British Ambassador in his report, were: 
(a) To secure full facilities for our war 
requirements and unimpeded opportunities 
for training and defensive measures by 
our Navy, Army and Royal Air Force.. 
. 
2. Sir K. Cornwallis to SIS Foreign Affairs: 8.3.1942 (1941 
Review of Events), FO. 371/31371/E2596. 
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(b) To root out pro-Nazis and bring about 
a change in public feeling, both to 
facilitate (a) and, looking ahead, to 
consolidate our future position by 
making people realise the advantage 
of alliance with us. 
(c) Unofficially and in the hope of helping 
to create greater stability, to influence 
the administration as far as possible, 
but not to the extent of causing a crisis 
and so jeopardising (a) and (b). Owing 
to my personal knowledge of the working 
of the governmental machine and my old 
friendship with Ministers, shaikhs and 
others, I happened to be favourably 
placed for this. 3 
At least one lesson the British learned from the revolt 
of Rashid 'Ali al-Gailani was that there was a considerable 
degree of resentment over the fact of their presence and 
policy in Iraq and the Middle East. It was also imperative 
that they should impress on the Iraqi government the 
necessity of following more liberal policies and of 
attempting to create a more responsive and less corrupt 
administration. Thus: 
The Rashid 'Ali uprising in May 1941, 
during the course of which not only the 
Iraqi army but the majority of the 
population of Iraq demonstrated dislike 
for the British, cama as a great shock 
to Britishers in Iraq and stimulated the 
British Government into modernizing its 
control apparatus in this area. 4 
3. Sir K. Cornwallis to SIS Foreign Affairs: 30.3.1945, 
(Review of Events 1941-1943), FO. 371/45302/E2431. 
4. Henderson to State Department: 13.3.1944, USNA 
890G. 00/695. 
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Thus the Regent, in league with the British, set 
out to achieve a new set of objectives. The first step 
was to choose an acceptable Prime minister who would also 
be willing to carry out British war aims, both political 
and economic. Nuri al-Sa'id was ruled out, on the 
recommendation of the British government, and eventually 
Jamil al-Madfali was induced to form the new government 
5. 
al-Madfali's Cabinet was ready to co-operate with Britain's 
war efforts and demands without reservation, especially 
in external affairs. The British Ambassador wrote: 
The new administration fell in readily 
enough with the desiderata of His Majesty's 
Government, agreeing to the stationing of 
British troops anywhere in Iraq for the 
duration of the war, to the establishment 
of a censorship, to British military 
participation in the control of Basra and 
to the expulsion of the Italian Legation. 6 
Thus al-Madfali set a precedent which was followed by 
successive cabinets, which turned Iraq into a base for the 
British war effort, as well as a line of defence and a 
channel for supplies. Thus: - 
For the remainder of the war, under the 
premiership of Jamil al-Madfali (1941), 
Nuri al-Sa'id (1941-44) and the veteran 
nationalist Hamdi al-Pachaci (1944-46), 
Iraq co-operated fully with her British 
ally. She became. a base for the military 
5. Muhmud Subhi al-Daftari, 'Ali Jawdat and Jamil al- 
Madfa'i were approached by the Regent to form the 
government, but declined, the former two suggesting 
al-Madfali, upon whom the Regent insisted. al-Hasani 
(1974), Vol. VI, p. 6. 
6. Sir K. Cornwallis to SIS Foreign Affairs: 8.3.1942, 
Fo. 371/31371/E2596. 
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of the Levant and Persia, a channel of 
supply to Russia and until the Axis 
pincers were withdrawn, a defensive 
position against a possible attack 
through the Western Desert or the 
Caucasus. 7 
However, al-Madfali was reluctant to meet British 
demands in full. In his internal policies in particular 
he refused to take tough measures to suppress pro-Axis 
elements in government agencies, the Army and among 
the population at large, which led Cornwallis to have 
him replaced: I 
al-Madfa'i's cabinet acted as though 
the events of May had been comparable 
to any of the other coups dletat by 
which one government had succeeded another 
since the death of King Faisal I- one 
more lamentable episode over which it 
was charitable to draw a decent veil. 
officials flagged when Ministers themselves 
intercede on behalf of the worse 
offenders; inevitably, too, anti-British 
propaganda grew in volume and in force. 
Jamil al-Madfali's supineness had allowed 
(Nazi intrigue and propaganda) to gather 
volume in the summer (particularly in 
the towns). 8 
Furthermore al-Madfali resisted British efforts to 
interfere openly in Iraqi internal affairs, but realised 
that he would eventually have to bow to pressures from 
the Embassy and the Palace. Thus he tendered his resignation 
Longrigg, S. H., and StoakesF., 
_I-raq, 
London 1958, p. 102. 
Sir K. Cornwallis to SIS Foreign Affairs: 8.3.1942, 
Fo. 371/31371/E2596. 
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in September 1941. At first Ibrahim Kemal was seen as a 
possible replacement, but opposition from Nuri prevented 
Kemal from forming a government. Eventually Nuri was 
himself recalled from Cairo, where he had served as Iraqi 
representative, and appointed Prime Ministgr on 9th 
October. An Embassy despatch notes: 
The Prime Minister, before his appointment, 
promised me full co-operation and announced 
determination to pursue a vigorous policy. 9 
in fact, Nuri had submitted to the British Ambassador 
a memorandum of his promised policy, as the U. S. Minister 
in Baghdad reported to the Secretary of State: 
British Ambassador last night allowed me to 
read memorandum of Nuri's promised policy, 
the various points being replies to 
Ambassador's direct questions. 
one. Nuri promises fully implement Anglo- 
Iraq Treaty, particularly in respect of British 
defense measures and communications. 
Two. He will purge Iraq Army of pro-Axis 
elements and strengthen it for maintenance 
internal order with maximum 25,000 and 
minimum of 15,000 mostly recruited with 
minimum of conscripts, leaving out tribal 
elements (this will gain him popularity 
with tribes). 
Three. He would prosecute strong action 
against Rashid Ali Gailani and his more 
responsible followers (failure to take 
such action was cause of fall of Midfai 
Cabinet). 
Four. He will dismiss all pro-Axis Government 
officials and intern in concentration camp 
all potentially dangerous persons. 
Five. He will bring about reforms in Ministry of 
Education, dismissing pro-Axis teachers and 
replacing inflammatory text books (it was 
anti-British propaganda disseminated by 
students which was most effective and 
damaging). 
9 Ibid. 
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Six. He will bring about reforms in 
organisation and administration of other 
Ministries, particularly Interior, under 
guidance of British adviser of that Ministry. 
Seven. He will take steps to close Vichy- 
French and Japanese Legations (Nuri told me 
he intends to prepare public opinion for 
this by public statement thanking countries 
which had been friendly to Regent and legal 
Iraq Government such as Britain, America, 
Turkey, Egypt, etc., and condemned those 
which had been pro-Axis such as France and 
Japan). 
Eight. He promises not to raise Palestine 
or Pan-Arab questions during the war (this 
is very important for it is agitation in 
this respect which developed anti-British 
feeling and furnished best ammunition for 
German propaganda which culminated in 
May hostilities). 
with British troops in Iraq, Nuri has a 
unique opportunity to bring about. necessary 
reforms without fear of a coup d'etat. 
However, there are elements in his programme 
which might easily lead to. dissension in 
the Cabinet and which might draw attempt 
at his assassination of which he seems 
fully aware. 10 
Nuri proceeded to honour his commitments to the 
Embassy, and as a result remained in power for the rest 
of the War, much to the satisfaction of his masters: 
In the implementation of the Anglo-Iraqi 
Alliance it must be recorded that the 
present Administration have been exemplary. 
10. Knabenshue to State Department: 15.10.1941, 
USNA 890G. 00/601. This report reveals several important 
aspects of Nuri's political style. in connection with 
point eight, it is worth noting that Nuri was always 
at pains to declare his support for Pan-Arab nationalism* 
and consistently stressed his intention of working for 
the "liberation of Palestine". 
Sir K. Cornwallis to SIS Foreign Affairs: 8.3.1942, 
FO. 371/31371/E2596. 
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On the other front, internal affairs and the weeding 
out of anti-British elements, his government's performance 
was satisfactory too, as the British Embassy reported on 
12 different occasions . Nuri also turned to the Army, 
proceeding to dismantle it for all practical purposes. He 
dismissed and imprisoned a large number of officers and 
suspended the application of conscription in an attempt 
to gain popularity with the tribes 
13 
. The campaign to 
12. 
e. g. "Nuri Sa'id's government has continued to 
suppress activities prejudicial to the Anglo-Iraqi 
-Alliance and the effect of their action has, on the 
whole, been satisfactory. Thirty to forty more 
troublesome men have been interned in Fao, where 
there are now some 170 inmates". Sir K. Cornwallis 
to SIS Foreign Affairs: 14.12.1941, Fo. 371/31371/E258; 
also: "A considerable number of the more virulently 
anti-British officials and others were consigned to 
the concentration camp at Fao". Sir K. Cornwallis 
to SIS Foreign Affairs: 8.3.1942, PO. 371/31371/E2596. 
Nevertheless, constant vigilance was necessary: 
"Meanwhile, our security authorities had been 
engaged in preparing a list of the most dangerous 
characters still at liberty. On the 22nd May I 
presented this list, containing seventy-five names, 
to the Minister of the Interior and urged the 
internment of the men in question. Immediate results 
wete not forthcoming, but I maintained constant 
pressure". Sir K. Cornwallis to SIS Foreign Affairs: 
21.2.1943, Fo. 371/35010/El667. 
13. Sir K. Cornwallis to SIS Foreign Affairs: 14.12.1941, 
FO. 371/31371/E258. 
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purge the army of undesirable officers was taken personally 
by Nuri himself 
14 
, who also brought back British military 
advisers and reinserted them-intq command positions in 
15 
the army infra-structure . Furthermore, there were 
strong calls, supposedly initiated or at least backed by 
the British to dismantle the army altogether 
16. 
Such 
measures had the effect of seriously weakening the armed 
forces, and breaking their fighting spirit. This was 
clearly demonstrated in the campaign against Mulla 
Mustafa in Barzan in 1943: 
The army was sent to cope with the rebel 
tribesmen of Mulla Mustafa, a task which 
proved completely beyond their capacity. 
The truth is that the Iraqi army, the 
reorganization of which continues to hang 
fire, has never recovered from the sad 
events of 1941. Its morale is shot to pieces, 
all too many of its officers are lazy, 
arrogant and inefficient, and it is unpopular 
in the country. 17 
However, the government enlarged and strengthened 
the police force, raising numbers from 12,266 in 1941 
to 21,730 in 1947 
18 
, with the further recruitment of 
14. 
Sir K. Cornwallis to SIS Foreign Affairs: 8.3.1942, 
FO. 371/31371/E2596. 
15- 
al-Durra (1969), pp. 420-421; Interview with Nur al-Din 
Mahmud (former Chief of General Staff and premier of 
a military government, 19th November 1952). Quoted, 
Humaidi (1976), p. 107. 
16.., 
The Minister of Justice, for one, considers the army to be still completely unreliable and is reported to have advised the Regent that it should be disbanded 
and replaced by a gendarmerie force under the Ministry i 1i of the Inter or. Ambassador (Baghdad), to SIS Foreign Affairs: 21.12.1943, ro. 371/35010/El667. 
17. Ibid. 
18- A letter from Mahmud al-Durra to al-Hasani; see al-Hasani (1974), VO1. VI, P. 198. 
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5,000 secret policemen. In August 1944, during al-Pachachils 
government, General Renton, the Inspector-General of 
the Iraqi Army, was given the task of reorganising and 
reforming the Army. He submitted a report recommending the 
winding up of two full divisions which would have left the 
Army with only two divisions, one combat-ready division 
and the other for training purposes. This reduction would have 
automatically put 400 officers out of jobs and into 
retirement. The Defence Minister, Tahsin 'Ali, resigned 
in protest against the plan, which was supported strongly 
by Salih Jabr, Mustafa and Arshad al-'Umari, and backed 
19 
by the Regent . Cornwallis' report on the political 
situation during 1944 confirmed Tahsin Ali's fears, and 
20 in the event, three divisions were retained 
19. A letter from Tahsin 'Ali (the Minister of Defence 
at the time) to al-Hasani. See al-Hasani (1974) 
Vol. VI, pp. 224-227. 
20. Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs: 9.1.1945, 
PO. 371/45302/E608, and Humaidi (1976), p. 142. 
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2. British control during the war'ye . ars 
British political and economic interests in Iraq 
were sufficient to lead to a second British occupation 
in 1941. However, the hostilities of May 1941 served 
to underline the widespread opposition to Britain and 
the Iraqi politicians who supported British policy. 
The new British Ambassador, Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, 
who had first hand knowledge of Iraq, was determined to 
capitalise on the defeat of Rashid 'Ali's government and 
the presence of British forces inside the country to 
re-establish British authority and influence in Iraq 
and the Middle East, while at the same time securing 
the war-time objectives of the Allies in consolidating 
their defences against Axis advances. British objectives 
have already been specified 
1, but a further series of 
problems confronted Iraq during Nuri al-Salid's period 
in office as Prime Minister. These were the difficult 
economic situation, the unrest in Kurdistan 
2 
and various 
political activities which created popular opposition 
to government policies. Opposition generally centred 
around the presence of British troops and bases in Iraq 
3 
but more general resentment was directed at economic 
condit. ions and the problem of supplies. 
Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS roreign Affairs: 16.4.1945, 
Fo. 371/45302/E2431. 
2. Sir X. Cornwallis to SIS Foreign Affairs: 12.1.1944, 
FO. 371/40041/E345. See also Appendix F. 
3. Humaidi (1976) p. 165. It is reported that the government foiled an assassination attempts on the life of premier Nuri al-Sa'id. See Ibid., pp. 117-118. 
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In order for the British to achieve their objectives 
they had to operate on two different levels. In the first 
place, they had to control the Iraq government, the Regent 
and the politicians. Secondly, they attempted to influence 
the Iraqi population by means of propaganda, gestures of 
friendship, gifts of money and favours, while at the 
same time clamping down on and imprisoning anti-British 
and pro-Axis elements. Such efforts required a large and 
diversified organization: 
Since 1941 the British Embassy under the 
Ambassador, Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, has 
strengthened its staff and greatly enlarged 
the scope of its activities. The number of 
British advisers in the framework of the 
Iraqi Government has been increased, and 
within the organization of the British armed 
forces occupying the country have been 
established agencies charged with observing 
developments within the country and promoting 
feeling5of friendliness between the Iraqis 
and the occupying British forces. 
The British Embassy also has observers called 
Political Advisers in cities and towns of 
importance in the country. These observers 
not only keep the Embassy fully informed 
regarding political developments in the area 
but also assist in maintaining friendly 
relations with prominent Iraqis in their 
vicinity. 
Agencies of the British Government and 
British commercial concerns at times retain 
the support of Sheikhs and political or 
religious leaders by payments of money 
for services rendered. ... 
A British adviser or employee is to be found 
in practically every key position in Iraqi 
political, economic and cultural life, with 
the exception of posts of an ecclesiastical 
nature. It is practically impossible for 
this legation to have any dealings with the 
Iraqi Government which do not eventually 
come under the scrutiny of some British 
subject connected with that Government. 
British subjects are to be found in high 
positions in the Iraqi army, in Iraqi 
courts, in the Iraqi educational system, 
in Iraqi finance institutions, in Iraqi 
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agricultural organizations, etc. They 
also control Iraqi ports and transport 
systems, including water, rail, automotive 
and air. They assist in supervising the 
collection of taxes and the sale of land, 
and they influence the determination of 
import and export policies. 4 
In a report summarising his period of office, Cornwallis 
discussed the various agencies and their nature and 
purpose, notably rreya. Stark's Ikhwan al-Hurriyah 
and the British Council: 
tribute must be paid to the work of the 
British military mission, of British 
advisers and many other of the Iraqi 
Government officials and of the area 
liaison officers under the orders of 
Combined Intelligence Centre, Iraq. 
Nor must mention be omitted of the 
British army, which, by its traditional 
straight dealing and good behaviour, 
has done a great deal to heal old wounds. 
The task of controlling the administration proved 
too difficult and delicate, and at times frustrating. 
As has already been explained, Iraq had a weak and 
corrupt political system with warring political cliques. 
After the crushing of Rashid 'Ali and the Arab 
nationalists who were generally anti-British, one strong 
faction was eliminated, which was basically opposed to 
Nuri al-Salid and the British presence in Iraq, thus 
leaving no serious opposition. But the inherent weaknesses 
within the system remained and even gained strength from 
4.. Henderson to State Department: 13.3.1944, USNA 
890G. 00/695. 
5. Sir K. Cornwallis to SIS Foreign Affairs: 30.3.1945, 
Fo. 371/45302/E2431. 
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the disappearance of the opposition, especially that of 
the Pan-Arab Golden Square. Thus, the corruption inherent 
in the system, as well as the government's indifference 
and insensitivity to popular feelings, became more apparent 
than ever before: 
Many officials, among them three Cabinet 
Ministers, with whom this Centre (C. I. C. I. ) 
has personal contact, have expressed the 
opinion that were it not for the presence 
of-Allied Forces in the country acting as a 
deterrent, disturbances due to economic 
distress would by now have broken out. 
The person held largely to blame for this 
unsatisfactory state of affairs is the 
Prime Minister who is deemed to have 
neglected, with indifference, the interests 
of the masses and, in consequence, to have 
brought home, perhaps more forcibly than 
ever before, the realisation that the 
country is overned by an oligarchy of 
racketeers. 
9 
In his reports to London, Cornwallis severely criticised 
the Iraqi politicians with whom he worked. His purpose 
seems to have been to lay the responsibility for the 
maladministration and corruption on the ineptitude of 
the Iraqi politicians. In fact, he reported that although 
he was devoting time and energy to monitoring and 
manipulating the government, the problem lay with the 
quality of the politicians: 
The ... recurrent Cabinet crises illustrated the inability of Iraqi public 
men to put their country# even in the 
hour of danger, before personal animosities, 
private gain, family ties or sectarian interests. They showed up, too, the 
lamentable dearth of able, honest 
administrators considered eligible for 
Cabinet r. ank. 7 
6. Wilson, (Baghdad) to State Department, 14.1.1943, 
USNA 890G. 00/653. 
7. Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs: 21.2.1943, 
FO. 371/35010/El667. 
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In another report at the end of his stay in Iraq, 
the Ambassador explains Iraq's, and perhaps his own, 
dilemma: 
The real trouble lies not with us, but 
with the rulers themselves, who obstinately 
refuse to give up any of their privileges 
or prerogatives to others. There are now 
signs that they are becoming apprehensive 
for their future, and I and my staff 
continually do the best we can to stimulate 
their apprehensions, a violent clash 
between the "haves" and the "have-nots" 
is inevitable in time. 8 
This type of leadership was a burden both to Iraq 
and to the British Embassy although for very different 
reasons and with different effects. Britain's main 
preoccupation was the maintenance and control of a friendly 
government, but the quality of the existing politicians 
clearly made the task difficult if not impossible. The 
British Ambassador was put in the unenviable position 
of assembling politicians to form a Cabinet that 
would be sufficiently responsible to run the country 
without provoking incidents which might end in a return 
to direct British rule. Furthermore, Cornwallis had to 
preside over almost daily conflicts within influential 
groupings and warring factions: 
Yesterday the Counsellor of the British 
Embassy, who in the formation of the new 
Cabinet played a certain role behind the 
scenes under the direction of the British 
Ambassador, stated to a member of the 
Legation his view that although the new 
8- Sir K. Cornwallis to SIS Foreign Affairs: 30.3.1945, 
FO. 371/45302/E2431. 
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Cabinet is weak and makeshift, it is the 
best that can be done short of the British 
taking over complete control of the country. 
Certain signs of concern are perceptible in 
high Embassy circles over this situation. 
The British naturally wish to avoid assuming 
complete adminstration of Iraq, under the 
principles for which the Allied Nations are 
fighting, but are fully aware of the 
inherent weakness of Iraqi politicians, 
even in the best of Cabinets. It cannot 
be over-emphasized that Iraqi politicians 
are so loath to impose unpopular measures - 
and the measures to control hoarding of 
supplies, for which there now exists such a 
crying need, are bound to be extremely 
distasteful to the Iraqi public - that the typical politician would by far prefer to 
throw in his hand rather than risk his 
political career. The British are thus 
compelled to play a very delicate game, 
endeavouring on the one hand to induce the 
Government to impose those strict economic 
measures necessary to control hoarding and 
limit soaring prices, while not going so far 
as to upset the Iraqi applecart and having 
to assume administration of the country's 
affairs. 9 
In 1943, Iraq finally declared war on the Axis Powers, 
and signed the United Nations Pact at Washington, D. C. 
10 
where it had opened a Legation a few days later. In 
October the Parliament's term came to end, the first Iraqi 
chamber to do so, and elections were to be held in the 
same month. Nuri al-Sa'id and Salih Jabr co-operated in 
preparing a list acceptable to all concerned, but 
the Regent unexpectedly 
submitted his own list of candidates and insisted on having 
11 all of them elected to the Chamber of Deputies His 
9- Wilson (Baghdad) to State Department: 22.10.1942, 
USNA 890G. 00/635. 
10. Sir K. Cornwallis to SIS Foreign Affairs: 8.2.1944, 
FO. 371/40041/Ell43. 
11. Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs: 27.9.1943, FO. 371/35012/E5768. 
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list included at least five candidates'who were at odds 
with Salih Jabr 
12 
and others to whom Nuri al-Salid and 
Salih Jabr raised objections and threatened to resign. 
A compromise was reached through Nuri al-Salid's 
13 "patience and loyalty" , and the Cabinet accepted 99 
out of 105 candidates from the Regent's list14 Although 
Nuri remained in office, three ministers, including 
Salih Jabr resigned. 
One of the first acts of the new Parliament was the 
passing of the "Law amending the organic Law"15. The 
new law strengthened the power of the Monarch and 
consequently that of the Regent. However, according to 
the American Embassy, the British Government did not 
achieve the objective which it had sought from the 
amendment of the Organic Law, which would supposedly 
give more power to the Regent: 
'The Regent is proving to be something of 
a disappointment, however, in this respect. 
He is permitting personal likes or dislikes 
to influence himl9n the selection of 
cabinet members. 
12. Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs: 29.9.1934, 
FO. 371/35012/E5838. 
13. Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign, Affairs: 6.10.1943, 
FO. 371/35012/E5985. 
14. Sir K. Cornwallis to SIS Foreign Affairs: 8.2.1944, 
FO. 371/40041/EI143. 
15. Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs: 25.10.1943, 
FO. 371/35012/E6513. For more details on the preparations 
of the amendments to the Organic Law, see Khadduri (1960), pp. 206-222. 
16. Henderson to State Department: 3.11.1944, usNA 890G. OO/ 
11-344. 
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Nevertheless, the British forced the Regent and Nuri 
al-Sa'id into a working relationship, withdrawing Nuri 
from public life when the sensitivity of the Regent 
became too high. Hence the British Embassy played a major 
role'in. selecting, balancing, and reconciling the 
politicians, as well as shaping and implementing the 
policies of successive governments. The Ambassador kept 
a keen eye on the Regent, giving him instructions on the 
running of the government, the selection of ministers and 
high government officials, and on all major decisions. 
While the Ambassador encouraged the Regent to take an 
active part in politics and attempted to boost his 
moralel7, the Regent in his turn sought the Ambassador's 
advice on internal and external matters'8. The British 
Embassy worked best with Nuri al-Salid, whether he was 
inside or outside the Cabinet. Nuri always consulted and 
confided in the British Embassy, and more important,, 'he' 
submitted to their judgement and listened to their advice: 
On the 3rd October, Nuri al-Salid tendered 
his resignation, and was at once invited to 
form a new cabinet. He had decided (after 
considerable consultation with this embassy, 
in the course of which we had consistently 
emphasised the necessity"for a strong 
personality at the Ministry of Finance) 
that Salih Jabr musi be retained and that 
'Ali Mumtaz would in consequence have to go. 
17. Sir K. Cornwallis to sIS Foreign Affairs: 8.2.1944, 
Fo. 371/40041/Ell43. 
is. Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs: 18.12.1943l 
FO. 371/35013/E7953; 30.12.1943, PO. 371/35013/EB147; and 
22.1.1943, FO. 371/35010/E946. 
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Thus Taufiq Suwaidi declared that Nuri 
Pasha was retaining Salih Jabr only because 
the British had told him to do so. 9 
Although Nuri seemed the best man to serve the British 
in Iraq "since there was nobody equally good to take his 
place" 
20 
, his deviousness and corrupt style occasioned 
constant protests and calls for his removal. His 
autocratic rule was widely resented, as was his general 
indifference to pressing social problems: 
There is no doubt that successive Governments 
in Iraq have been corrupt; that many members 
of those Governments have been more interested 
in enriching themselves and their friends than 
in looking after the interests of the Iraqi 
population in general; that they have displayed 
a reprehensible lack of interest in improving 
sanitation, in enlarging educational facilities, 
and in protecting the workers and peasants 
from exploitation. 21 
Thus the British, although they appreciated Nuri's services 
to themselves, had reservations about his services to his 
own country: 
The British Ambassador's point iso broadly 
put, that although Ntiri may not have been 
an ideally efficient and intelligent leader 
of his country, he has certainly served the 
British well and deserves their continued 
support; this point is a good one, and is 
reported to have the support of the British 
military authorities, who have no desire to 
be forced to use valuable British troops to 
ma. intain order in Iraq. 22 
1 19. Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs: 14.10.1942* 
FO. 371/31371/E6356. 
20. Minutes by an employee at the Foreign office#17.5.1943* 
FO. 371/35010/E2884. 
21. Henderson toýState Department: 30.11.19440 USNA 
890G. 00/11-3044. 
22. Wilson to State Department: 14.1.1943, USNA 890G, 00/653. 
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The British Embassy's report on the formation of Nuri 
al-Salid's seventh Cabinet was minuted as follows: 
Total: 5 Sunni Arabs, 3 Shiahs, 2 Kurds, 
1 nondescript 
or: 1 Nuri, 3 crooks, 3 bumblers, 
4 (we hope) honest men. 23 
This prompted a most revealing remark by another official: 
It is a real pity they can't start 
training some young men, or this regime 
can't last indefinitely at this rate, 
and we are being identified to some 24 
extent with support of a reactionary regime. 
It seems that by mid-1943, the British Embassy in 
Baghdad and the Foreign Office in London had grown tired 
of Nuri's tactics, and were becoming impatient with the 
lack of change and reform. Through their network of 
intelligence agents the British had become aware of the 
general discontent, and the widespread criticism of Nuri's 
government, and had also become aware of the popularity 
of the most active political group, the Democratic Front 
which consisted of the regrouped Jamalat al-Ahali, other 
progressive and independent elements, and the reactivated 
Communist Party. A U. S. Legation despatch describes the 
popular reception of a Communist Party leaflet which 
put forward demands for the alleviation of economic distress: 
From such information as is available to the 
legation it would appear that the reception 
of the leaflet by the population is in general 
somewhat favourable. The failure of the 
23. Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs: 27.12.1943, 
Fo. 371/35013/E8069. 
24. Ibid., Minutes by an employee at the Foreign office. 
217 
Government to provide articles of consumption, 
particularly clothing, for the masses of the 
people has caused keen resentment and many 
persons are gratified that the distributors 
of the leaflet have dared to put into writing 
what many of them have been afraid to say 
themselves. 25 
These were the reasons behind the British Government's 
apprehensions for the future of Iraq in general and 
Nuri al-Salid and his "old gang" in particular. The 
Ambassador found it necessary to put more pressure on 
the Regent, the Prime Minister and other government 
26 
officials . He informed his government that he had 
had a meeting with the Regent in the course of which 
he recommended "that he (the Regent) should set his 
political house in order without more delay 
you will appreciate that proposed changes 
represent little more than the usual 
reshuffling of old political cards of 
which many people are becoming increasingly 
tired. I therefore felt justified in 
recommending the Prime Minister to 
introduce some new and younger blood if 
he could and instanced appointing a Kurd 
pending the withdrawal of the Minister 
of Justice as providing opportunity. 27 
The displeasure of the British Embassy with Nuri al-Sa'id's 
cabinet grew louder and the hopelessness of their position 
became more apparent: 
25. Henderson to State Department: 30.11.1944, USNA 890G. 00/ 
11-3044. 
26. Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs: 22.1.1943, 
FO. 371/35010/E946. 
27. Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs: 7.6.1943, 
FO. 371/35010/E3313. 
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Although the new Cabinet undoubtedly 
included men of ability, it contained no 
progressive elements and was representative 
of the old ruling class of established 
families. 
All observers of the Iraqi political scene are 
agr , eed 
that there is a crying need for new 
blood in the councils of State. The diffi-Fulty, 
however, is to find it. 
There is undoubtedly growing weariness of the 
"old gang" which one day is likely to find 2. 
violent expression in some form or another. 
This report may well have been advance warning of the 
decision to relieve Nuri al-Salid of his duties and to 
replace him with a new face. Conditions were arranged 
for Nuri's exit, his ill health, disagreement with the 
Regent and, finally, an insulting attack on his government 
in the C. -hamber of Deputies. He resigned on the 4th June 
194429. 
28. Sir K. Cornwallis to SIS Foreign Affairs: 8.2.1944, 
FO. 371/40041/EI143. 
29. Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs: 23.5.1944, 
FO. 371/40041/E3170; 17.5.1943, FO. 371/35010/E2884; 
8.6.1943, FO. 371/40042/E364o. 
219 
3. Economic Conditions durin. % the War Years 
The effects of the war were perhaps most acutely 
felt in the form of economic difficulties, with soaring 
prices and shortages of essential commodities. This 
resulted in general discontent and widespread suffering, 
and gave common cause for opposition political parties, 
which now demanded better and more responsive government. 
more significantly, it demonstrated the inability of the 
governmental machinery to solve a vital and basic issue 
which concerned the whole population. It also pointed out 
the corruption and degeneration of politicians and 
government officials. 
Economic difficulties began to be felt immediately 
after the arrival of British forces in Iraq in the 
summer of 1941, since they had to be supplied locally. 
This coincided with a year of bad harvests, dwindling 
imports, and increased shipping and supply difficultiesi. 
British forces were instrumental in increasing the 
amount of currency in circulation by SM. to over ten 
million dinars, which expanded even further because of 
growing military expenditure 
2 This was 
accompanied by wholesale profiteering, 
speculation and hoarding. Despite growing 
popular outcry, the Administration 
appeared incapable of coping with the 
U. S. Legation (Baghdad) to State Department; 5.1.1942o 
USNA 890G. 00/610. 
Ibid. 
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situation. Anti-hoarding legislation of 
a mild character was indeed promulgated, 
but little use appears to have been made 
of it. 3 
The strains were, naturally enough, felt most by the 
poor who constituted the overwhelming majority of the 
Iraqi population, for while their income remained constant, 
the prices of basic and essential commodities (bread, 
sugar, tea and rice) at least tripled and some increased 
4 
more than tenfold 
The British Embassy report for 1942 also emphasised 
the critical economic situation: 
During 1942 it (the economic situation) 
outweighed in importance all other problems, 
though this was only intermittently 
realised by the Iraqi Government themselves. 
our military disbursements grew from month 
to month and, in the absence of any 
measures for absorbing surplus purchasing 
power, the currency circulation increased 
from I. D. 11 million to almost I. D. 22 
million in the year. Simultaneously imports 
into Iraq were further curtailed, with the 
result that prices continued to mount at 
an accelerating rate - not only those of 
commodities in short supply, but even more 
markedly of land and local products. 
Hoarding and speculation proceeded unabated, 
thus forcing prices far higher than purely 
legitimate demand could have done, and 
causing a phenomenal increase in the cost 
of living. For the lower classes this was 
certainly doubled during the year. 5 
This report fails to emphasise the effect of the economic 
3. Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs: 8.3.1942, 
FO. 371/31371/E2596. 
Humaidi (1976), pp. 127-129. 
5. Sir K. Cornwallis to SIS Foreign Affairs: 21.12.1943# 
FO. 371/35010/El667. 
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situation on the population of Iraq or to show the very 
real hardships most people were experiencing. There 
were demonstrations in Baghdad led by women and children 
and railway workers went on strike, protesting against 
price inflation which made it impossible for them to 
6 feed their families . The government rationed sugar, 
established government bakeries and fixed prices for six 
7 
essential commodities . Sawt alý-Ahali and the Communist 
party led a campaign calli nq on the government to take 
realistic and energetic measures to relieve the 
wretched conditions-, of the poorer sections of the 
population. 
' 
They demanded government control of all 
essent, ial'commodities and just distribution at fair 
prices. They urged the government to impose severe 
punitive measures against profiteers, hoarders and 
speculators as well as against corrupt government 
officials who were in cahoots with them 
a. 
The British Ambassador encouraged the Iraqis to 
take some "interesting steps" to absorb surplus purchasing 
power: 
The government came also to realise that 
something must be done to deal with the 
fundamental problem of draining off the 
surplus purchasing power in the hands of 
the public ... Apart from official action - or rather 
t e% -ve %-ýýI llumd1ul. tIVID)f POIJI, 
7. U, S. Legation (Baghdad) 
USNA 890G. 00/610. 
8. sawt*al-Ahalip for the 
to State Department: 5.1.1942, 
period of the War 1942-1945. 
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inaction - some progress was made with 
encouraging the purchase by Iraqi 
investors of securities on the London 
Stock Exchange, while arrangements were 
also put in hand for the supply of 
diamonds to the local market through 
the U. K. C. C. 9 
in 1943 the same economic ills still prevailed and 
the problem of supplies continued. The government finally 
enacted a Law for the Regulation of Economic Life 
10 
and 
appointed Colonel Bayliss as director of imports with 
extraordinary powers, in the vain hope of controlling an 
increasingly critical situation. The economic situation, 
as reported in the British Embassy's 1943 Review, proved 
to be a source of continuous concern for the British 
goverrment: 
Iraq is caught between the devil of major 
British military and other war expenditure 
in the country and the deep sea of 
drastically curtailed imports. As a result, 
not only has the currency in circulation 
expanded from 6 million dinars in 1941 to 
34 million dinars at the end of 1943, but 
the general cost of living has risen most 
drastically. The consequence has been a 
form of inflation which, as it began to 
develop seriously in 1942, not unnaturally 
caused grave concern in Cairo and London, 
especially as it was accompanied by the 
evils of speculation, profiteering, 
corruption and hoardingell 
The British needed to buy wheat and barley from Iraq in 
orderto send it, to India, Persia and Turkey, which 
9. Sir K. Cornwallis to SIS Foreign Affairs; 21.2.1943# 
FO. 371/35010/El667. Furthermorej Salih Jabr complained 
in the Senate that the UKCC was charging ID 5 or 6 per 
ounce of gold, while the official price was 29/- or 
ID 1.45. Sawt al-Ahali (20.9.43,26.2.44) also criticised 
the way iW which --tE-egold was marketed in Iraq. 
10- Sir K. Cornwallis to SIS Foreign Affairs: 8.2.1944, 
Fo. 371/40041/Ell43. 
ibid. 
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further complicated the situation. Earlier, the British 
had sent wheat to ease the famine in India and in 1943 
the British Ambassador was pressing the Prime Minister 
and Finance Minister to provide barley desperately needed 
12 
in Persia and Turkey 
In 1944 and 1945, despite good harvests, the same 
difficult economic situation continued, basically because 
its root causes remained unchanged, in spite of the fact 
that Nuri al-Sa'id had created a Ministry of Supply in 
- 13 
March 1944 specifically to deal with the economic situation. 
The British Embassy Review of 1944 noted: 
The economic consequences of war have made 
themselves painfully felt. The country as a 
political unit has enjoyed continued prosperity, 
thanks to the maintenance, though on a reduced 
scale, of British war expenditure and to an 
adequate harvest. But the general population's 
condition of life has been further depressed 
by restricted imports and rising prices. The 
measures taken to combat these tendencies 
proved in the main ineffective, and the 
dismissal of Colonel Bayliss, the Director 
General of Imports I wa 14 followed by a period 
of economic decontrol. 
In 1945, the same difficulties prevailed: 
There is little change to report in the 
economic situation in general. The country 
continues to suffer from an inordinately 
. 
high price level and a striking shortage 
12. Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs: 28.3.1943, 
FO. 371/35010/E2239. 
13. 
al-Hasani (1974), Vol. Vj, pp. 194-195. 
14. Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs: 9.1.1945, 
FO. 371/45302/E608. 
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in consumer goods. Cotton textiles have, 
however, been arriving in reasonable 
quantities and distribution has now taken 
place in most areas. Good and abundant 
harvest. 15 
During the war years, Britain accumulated large debts 
to Iraq, as a result of goods and services provided by 
Iraq for the British war effort, which the British 
Embassy. considered the main benefit of the Anglo-Iraqi 
Alliance. The Iraqi politicians were counting on using 
the debt (ElOO million) to develop "some of their grandiose 
plans for the development of Iraq's natural resources and 
J6 
for the development of a modern local industry 
However, these plans were not to be realised as the 
British government subsequently claimed that it was 
unable to repay its debts. The U. S. Minister, Mr. L. W. 
Henderson, reported the problem and its possible 
repercussions to the Secretary of State: 
One of the most serious problems which face 
both Great Britain and Iraq is that arising 
from the fact that during the course of the 
war Great Britain has incurred a current 
indebtedness to Iraq in the value of 
approximately two hundred million dollars. 
British officials state in confidence that, 
in their opinion, it will be impossible 
for an extended period after the war for 
Great Britain to make any headway in 
liquidating this indebtedness by payment 
in currency, gold or goods. 
Iraqi officials have told me in confidence 
that they also are deeply worried at what 
the reaction will be in Iraq when the public 
learns that much of the wealth which it 
15 Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs: 19.3.1945, 
ro. 371/45302/E2177. 
16. Henderson to State Department: 20,9.1944, USNA 890G. 50/9- 
2044. 
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believes that Iraq has accrued during the 
war is in the form of frozen credits extended 
involuntarily to Great Britain. Only a 
handful of Iraqi officials realize that 
this purchasing power exists in an unusable 
form in Great Britain and that it may 
consequently be impossible for Iraq to 
realize during this generation. 
The situation has been guarded so carefully 17 that it has not been mentioned in the press. 
In fact this did not remain a secret for long. on 
2 February 1945, Sawt al-Ahali published an editorial on 
the Anglo-Egyptian War Debt Agreement and asked the 
government whether it had any plans to make use of the 
Iraqi sterling debt, which amounted to an estimated E60 
18 
million . The following day, the paper urged that a 
similar agreement should be made with Britain, and insisted 
that the agreement should specify the repayment bf the 
debt in hard currency, preferably dollars, because Iraq 
would need to import various essential items for its post- 
war reconstruction from the U. S. A. 
19. Soon afterwards, 
in June 1945, Britain and Iraq signed the "Hard Currency 
Agreement" which specified that Iraq would hand Britain 
all the hard currency it received, mainly from oil royalties 
and in return Britain would secure the amount of, 014 million 
for Iraq imports. This in essence further tied Iraq to 
the sterling area and ensured that Iraq's debts would be 
20 
paid. back in. small instalments over an unspecified period 
17. Ibid. 
is. Sawt al-Ahali, 2.4.45. 
19. Ibid., 3.4.1945. 
20. Ibid., 6.6.45; see also Agwani, M. s., The U. S. A. and F-h-eArab World 1945-1952, Aligarh, 19ý-8, p. go. 
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On 7.6.1945, Sawt al-Ahali wrote an editorial strongly 
criticising the agreement, showing its disadvantages 
for Iraq. The total amount of hard currency which Britain 
was to give to Iraq, in reality, did not exceed 0 millions, 
because Iraq would first hand back some/yll million 
which had been accumulated annually from oil revenues 
and other resources, and Britain would supply the $14 
millions in return. Also, the fact that Britain took the 
sole responsibility of supplying Iraq with imports 
would put the country even more under British economic 
control. A further disadvantage was that the bulk of the 
21 debt would be repaid in depreciated sterling 
The American and British governments concluded an 
agreement on these debts in March 1946, under which the 
U. S. government was to help Britain pay. Sawt al-Ahali 
demanded that the previous agreement should be changed 
because it was damaging to Iraqi interests. The paper 
also demanded that Iraq should not give up any part of 
what she was owed by Britain since she was in far greater 
22 
need than Britain However, as expected, the agreement 
23 
was renewed on the same terms as the previous year 
Muhammad Hadid wrote criticizing the 
21. sawt al-Ahalij 7.6.45. 
22. Ibid., 21-3.46. 
23. Ibid., 22.4.46. 
227 
renewal of the agreement and pointing out the damage done 
24 
to Iraqi interests for Britain's benefit However, Sawt 
al-Ahali now became more involved with the newly licensed 
National Democratic Party and the matter was lost in the 
bustle of local political activity. Hence Iraq probably 
lost a substantial part of Britain's borrowings, which 
might well have contributed to the improvement of the 
country's under-developed economy. An analysis some years 
later shed more light on the subject: 
the most important factor which has limited 
Iraq's freedom in directing her savings in 
accordance with her economic interest is her 
link with the sterling area. As a result of 
this link, Britain had a freLa hand during 
the last war to buy from Iraq without limitation 
or condition, while Iraq's freedom of purchase 
even from the countries of the sterling area 
were restricted. In consequence Iraq's sterling 
balances accumulated. These balances were in 
fact forced savings, the monetary value of 
which was a result of a fixed exchange rate 
between the dinar and sterling (had the 
exchange rate between the dinar and sterling 
not been fixed the latter would have 
depreciated in relation to the former) lower 
than their real value. Furthermore, when 
Britain failed in an attempt to abolish these 
balances, she set out to restrict expenditure 
from them in a manner that reduced their 
usefulness. Iraq was not allowed to buy from 
hard currency markets unless the goods were 
not available in the countries of the sterling 
area and were very essentiall the determination 
of which goods can be termed essential was 
subject to some extent to the control of British 
authorities, with the result that a large part 
of these sterling balances was spent in buying 
consumption goods, many of which were of the 
"luxury" class, from British markets. 25 
24. Ibid., 29.4.46. 
25. Oboosy, M. J. "A Study in the Theory of Economic Under- 
dev 
' 
elopment with Special Reference to Iraq", Ithe'Middle 
East Economic Papers, Economic Research Institute 
(_B_e_'1r_ru-t1954), pp. 143-44, Quoted Agwani (1958), p. 90. 
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4. The *P'O'St*-War Political Situation 
The Second world War produced new international, 
regional and local configurations which impinged 
simultaneously and collectively on the political climate 
in Iraq, forcing the regime and the British to change 
their policies and tactics and to concede a number of 
relatively liberal measures. Although Britain was still 
formidable in victory, she came out of the war battered 
and exhausted, while the United States, and, in spite of 
its te=Ible losses, the Soviet Union, emerged stronger 
and more ambitious. Even during the war years the Soviet 
Union could not be ignored and its progressive ideology 
and heroic resistance to the Germans made headlines in 
the Iraqi newspapers, especially Sawt al-Ahali, which 
impressed the Iraqis with their love of larger than life 
stories. The Communist party and other progresssive and 
democratic elements capitalized on the Soviet Army and 
people's performance in the war as proof of the soundness 
of their ideology 
American Involvement in the Middle East 
In the course of the Second World'War, the United 
States became directly involved in the Middle East for 
the first time, especially after joining Britain in the 
foundation of the Middle East Supply Centre in Cairo in 
See Sawt al-Ahali, for the war period, Chapter XI. 
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1941. The purpose of the Centre was to assist the army 
in eliminating bottlenecks, to meet wartime demands, and 
to 
rationalize all supplies for the Middle East 
and to ensure that with the utmost economy 
in shipping space the people of the, MidPe 
East should receive vital requirements. 
American participation in the agency after 1942 assured 
the success of its supply activities, because most imported 
commodities now came from the United States. A Combined 
Anglo-American Agency for Middle East Supplies was set up 
in Washington to process all MESC requisitions, but in 
spite of this collaboration, the MESC remained primarily 
3 
a British instrument . The MESC dealt with the Middle East 
countries as an integrated economic area in an attempt to 
feed the population and the Allied forces, in the hope of 
minimizing imports from outside the region. 
After the fall of Rashid 'Ali in 1941, the Arab 
countries became more subject than. ever before to British 
political and economic control: 
To say that the Arab Near East - so long in 
the British sphere of influence, and in 
political matters still tied to Britain more 
effectively than any other foreign power - is part of the United Kingdom's economic empire 
would not be as much of an overstatement as 
might seem at first. Both the export and import 
trade of the region are chiefly with Britain. 
As part of the sterling areal the Near East 
2. Speiser, E. A. The U. S. A. and the Near East, (Harvard 
1950), P. 115. - 
3. Hurewitz, J. C., The Middle East Dilemma (New York 
1973), pp. 221-2. ' 
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accumulated in L, 
some two billion 
securities. What 
stake, how is it 
be determined in 
or Baghdad. 4 
: )ndon the quivalent of 
dollars in sterling 
happens to this huge 
to be liquidated, will 
London and not in Cairc 
This particularly explains why Anglo-American relations 
in the Middle East and in the MESC were at best "not 
.5 marked by complete harmony" and often "led to friction . 
It became apparent that the United States had become 
deeply enmeshed in Middle Eastern affairs between 1942 
and 1945 
6, 
and generally resented Britain's virtual 
7 
monopoly of trade in the area . Hence American officials 
and businessmen demanded the removal of trade restrictions 
imposed by Great Britain on some Middle Eastern countries, 
and suggested making an increased amount of dollars 
available to the Arab countries so as to enable them to 
trade with the United States These demands were matched 
with an outburst of activity by major American corporations 
(particularly the oil companies in Sa'udi Arabia) in the 
lucrative Middle Eastern markets, since the War had eliminated 
German, Italian, and Japanese imports and left a vacuum 
that could now be filled by American goods and products, 
9 
oil c. ompaniest and financial institutions 
4. speiser (1950), p. 134. 
5. Campbellp J*C, The Defense of the Middle East (New York 
1960), pp. 31-32. 
6. ibld., p. 226. 
7. Agwani, M. S. (1958), pp. 30-31. 
Ibid., p. 88. Quoting the Baltimore Sun 16.2.1945. 
9.1 bid., pp. 89-90. 
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Nevertheless, the restrictions set up by Britain 
made it difficult if not impossible for non-British 
commercial interests to enter these markets, and British 
employees working for the Iraq government also proved 
unco-operative 
10, However, conditions began to change 
drastically at the end of the war as the United States 
emerged stronger than ever. Furthermore influential 
groups in the Middle East, particularly politicians and 
businessmen, began to look to the United States to play 
a bigger role in the area, encouraged by persistent American 
demands for the relaxation of British control. As an 
active partner during the last years of the war, the 
United States felt that it should have a share of the 
spoils, play a more active role, and gain a foothold in 
the middle East: 
I am also inclined to believe that 
although we do not desire the disappearance 
of British influence in the Middle East, we 
nevertheless feel that the time has come 
for us to play the role of a more active 
partner in the development of this part of 
the world. 
We would be able effectively once and for 
all to break through the British monopoly 
in this part of the world, which, although 
sugar-coated during the war period, has 
nevertheless been effective in assigning 
to the United States and its representatives 
the role of interested but rather passive 
spectators. 11 
10. Henderson to State Department: 13.3.1944, USNA 890G. 
00/695. 
ll. lHenderson to State Department: 20.9.1944, USNA 890G. 
50/9-2044. 
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On several occasions the British Ambassador 
had informed his government of the increasing interest 
in the area on the part of the United States and the 
Soviet Union, and although the two powers seem to be 
mentioned together, it is obvious that the British 
Embassy distinguished clearly between different spheres 
of influence, always guarding against the spread of 
communism in Iraq, while attempting at the same time to 
block U. S. economic and governmental intrusion 
12. However, 
Hamdi al-Pachachi's government encouraged American 
political and economic interests in Iraq, and sought to 
give the U. S. A. similar privileges to those enjoyed by 
the British. In 1944, Arshad al-'Umari told the American 
Ambassador that he hoped that, 
during the post-war era the relations 
between Iraq and the United States will 
be as close, or as nearly close as 
conditions render possible, as those 
between Iraq and Great Britain. ... 
It is evident from the remarks made by the 
Minister that the Government of Iraq is 
anxious that the United States will in 
the future display an active interest in 
this area and that it will not take the 
attitude that it is merely a territory 
in the sphere of influence of another 
Great Power. 13 
cornwallis was also aware of the changes: 
12. Henderson to State Department: 20.4.1944, USNA 
890G. 24/147, also 12.1.1943, USNA 890G. 6363/378. 
13. Henderson to State Department: 25.11.1944, USNA 
890G. 00/11-2544. 
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The Iraqis are, at the moment, in the 
pleasant position of being wooed by the 
Americans, and it is probable that in 
the near future they will be made much 
of by the Russians as soon as the Soviet 
Minister takes up his abode in Bagdad. 
They feel nowadays that they have a 
definite position in the international 
scheme and that they are no longer 
dependent on us as they were in the past. 
They keep careful watch on how we act 
towards their neighbours, and they are 
quick to notice and resent any more 
favourable treatment that we may give 
to others. 
In these circumstances, it obviously 
behoves us to take nothing for granted. 
We must be zealous in preserving the 
predominant political position which we 
have gained and in so acting we must 
realize that the Iraqis have grown up 
and must be treated as adults. We must 
take advantage of the undoubted opportunities 
which exist for British business enterprise, 
bearing always in mind that other nations 
are in keen competition. ... 
14 
If Iraq were not important to us, it might 
pay us to get out, but it is, in fact, 
extremely important. In addition to its 
strategic position, its oil and its 
communications, we have a third reason. 
We cannot afford to neglect Iraq in view 
of the interest which Russia and the 
United States are now taking in the Middle 
East. We no longer hold the field alone. 15 
with this outside competition and the advent of the 
Labour government to power in 1945, Britain now had to 
reconsider its position and to exert pressure on the 
rulers of Iraq to modernise their methods and establish 
more liberal and democratic policies. Furthermore, 
copditio. ns i. nside Iraq also created strong press. ures. for 
14. Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs: 9.1.1945, 
FO. 371/45302/E608. 
15. sir K. Cornwallis to SIS Foreign Affairs: 30.3.1945, 
FO. 371/44302/E2431. 
234 
change and reform. In particular, the more politicised 
and educated elements had grown more and more resentful 
of the power of the old oligarchs as well as becoming 
restless and impatient with the inability of the system 
to carry out much needed political and economic reforms. 
The economic hardships which the majority of the 
population had suffered, and the apparent inability of 
the government to relieve the situation, were undisputed 
proofs of the unrepresentative and corrupt political 
system and gave further momentum to opposition demands 
for reforms and change in the government. Even the 
British Embassy had to re-evaluate the situation: 
The high cost of living, irregularities 
in distribution of bread and flour, and 
the hardship which these things entail 
for the poor, have been taken up as themes 
for propaganda by the Iraqi Communists. 
it is clear that left wing elements in this 
country are gaining strength both in numbers 
and influence and that they are profiting 
from the immunities which they have so far 
enjoyed as anti-Nazis to develop propaganda 
to an extent which has not hitherto been 
permitted. There is now a well-established 
and popular left wing daily newspaper (Sawt 
al-Ahali) which makes a feature of news and 
articles favourable to Russia, a monthly 
magazine mostly filled with articles on the 
achievements of the Soviet Government, and 
an illicit and somewhat irregularly published 
periodical which is the organ of the extreme 
group. Cyclostyled handbills are distributed 
from time to time in the big cities, and 
Communist favours, ties and badges are 
sometimes worn by the more youthful and 
enthusiastic supporters of the movement. 
All this is very disagreeable to the rather 
reactionary politicians who govern Iraq, 
and I do not think it will be long before 16 
... 
: they. ?: es. ort. to some form of repressive action... 
.... 
16. Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs: 22.1.1943, 
FO. 371/35010/E946. 
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As a result, Britain felt it necessary to demand the 
infusion of new blood and a move away from old tactics and 
practices. Certain steps had to be taken in order to 
facilitate movement in that direction. First, and probably 
most obviously, Nuri al-Sa'id had to be sacrificed. The 
Regent was to be encouraged to take a more active role in 
internal politics, and a more neutral and acceptable 
individual would be asked to form a cabinet which would 
follow a more liberal line and give relative freedom of 
the press and political activity. According to plan, Nuri 
resigned, claiming lack of support from the Regent and 
Hamdi al-Pachachi headed what came to be called the "Regent's 
cabinet" 
17. The new government took measures to ease the 
tense situation, release built-up pressures and absorb 
widespread ill-feelings toward the ruling class. The 
government gave permission for applications to form trade 
unions, Aiih quickly showed "a fairly discreet activity"' 
8 
The first and largest union to be formed was the Railway 
Workers Union, which soon after its formation called for a 
19 
strike demanding wage increases There was also a 
resurgence of other political activities in the form of 
political partiýs, trade unions, and student demonstrations. 
Different groupings were formed from a number of sections 
17. Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs: 9.1.1945, 
FO. 371/45302/E608. 
18. Ambassador (Baghdad to SIS Foreign Affairs: 19.3.1945, 
Fo. 371/45302/E2177. 
19. Humaidi (1976), p. 153. 
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of society, notably peasants, women and students 
20. 
The government partially lifted censorship, and 
also allowed more newspapers to be printed, thus 
creating, 
a notable resurgence of political activity 
and discussion. This tendency was exemplified in 
the press. At the beginning of the year, 
five Arabic daily newspapers were published 
in Bagdad. There are now eleven. Part of the 
press is of course engaged in supporting the 
Government. The Opposition, whether in the 
press or out of it, is, thanks to a gradual 
lifting of the censorship, throwing off the 
restraint of the last three years. In many 
cases the old xenophobia and irresponsible 
nationalism are apparent just below the 
surface especially in attacks upon the 
"imperialism" of other powers. But the 
general tone of the opposition has not by 
any means unconstructive. In the sphere 
of internal politics it has demanded an 
effective tackling of the supply problem, 
the purging of public life, decentralisation 
and the formation of political parties. 
"communism" has undoubtedly increased 
during the year, and "Communist" leaflets 
have been distributed on a wide scale. But 
these terms in Iraq imply no more than an 
academic and impracticable sense of 21 frustration with things as they are. 
al-Pachachi's government succeeding in easing the tense 
political situation which prevailed during Nuri's time 
and moved towards establishing a more normal administration. 
The period was also marked by more vigorous and dynamic 
activitY on the part of the nationalist and democratic 
20- ibid., P. 160. 
21. Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs: 9.1.1945, 
Fo. 371/45302/E608. 
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groupings which had lost all faith in promises of democracy 
and reform. Instead, these turned to stronger and more 
direct opposition to the government and the British 
presence. Monitoring the political flurry, and sensing 
the inability of the government to face . up to it, the 
Regent became so discouraged that he confessed to the 
British Ambassador his determination to resign. The 
Ambassador in his turn conveyed this to his government, 
after'dissuading the Regent from the idea and asserting 
H. M. G's confidence in the Regent and the system, although 
the latter was not convinced: 
He (the Regent) remarked gloomily that 
he expected the King would be dethroned 
in due course "with all these Communists 
about". 22 
As the war came to an end, the situation became 
increasingly critical. The government could either go 
back to repression and coercive measures or move forwards 
by granting the right to form political parties. Political 
groupings had crystallized during and after the war into 
different factions. Three of them were led by well-known 
politicians who had been prominent members of Jamalat al-Aali, 
and,, for reasons largely connected with personality,, split 
and formed their own groups, Sawt al-Ahali led by Kamil 
al-Chadirchi, al-Rabita led by 'Abd al-Fattah Ibrahim, 
and al-watan, or al-Shalb, led by 'Aziz Sharif. All these 
22. Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs: 4.3.1945, 
FO. 371/45329/El531. 
238 
were at odds both with each other and with the Communist 
Party, which had itself survived a number of factional 
splits and emerged from the war stronger and more active 
under the leadership of Fahad. The former supporters of 
the May 1941 rising, members of the now defunct Nadi 
al-Muthanna who had been prominent in the Pan-Arab 
movement, were gradually released from internment. All 
these groups demanded independence, the removal of 
British troops from Iraq and the abrogation of the 1930 
Treaty23. Through their newspapers, whether legal or 
underground, these groups also demanded the implementation 
of democratic liberties and the abolition of wartime 
emergency measures and censorship, and the legalisation 
of political parties. 
on 27 January 1945, the Regent called for a joint 
session of both houses of parliament, and delivered a 
speech 
24 
which came as a surprise to the cabinet, as 
well as the politicians 
25 
, in which he declared that 
the government intended to implement a number of social 
reforms. He emphasised the need for the establishment 
of Political parties and the enactment of a new electoral 
law. After the Regent's speech, criticism was levelled 
at al-Pachachils government which it was clear he wanted 
23. Humaidi (1976), p. 165. 
24. al-Hasani (1974), Vol. VI, p. 244. 
25. interview with Muhammad Fakhri al; jamil who alleges that the British Embassy constructed the Regent's 
speech. See also flumaidi (1976), p. 167. ý 
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26 to replace . al-Hasani indicates that the Regent wanted 
Salih Jabr to form the Cabinet, which tends to confirm 
the suggestion that Britain had been grooming Jabr for 
27 the job since 1941 . Jabr, however, was indisposed 
and after a month Tawfiq al-Suwaidi formed the government, 
accepting the premiership on the condition that he would 
28 be given a free hand to select his ministers 
The cabinet was formed on 23 February 1946, and 
according to Kamil al-Chadirchi, "was a signal for a 
new era in Iraq" 
29. One of the reasons was that the 
cabinet included men of "high quality and good patriotic 
reputation", such as Sa'd Salih, 'Abd al-Hadi al-Dhahir 
3o 
and 'Abd al-Wahhab Mahmud . The new government promised 
to restore peace-time conditions by abolishing emergency 
26. For the full text of the speech, see al-Hasani (1974), 
Vol. VI, pp. 244-249. 
27. Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs: 14.10.1942, 
FO. 371/31371/E6356; 7.6.1943, FO. 371/35010/E3313, and 
Sir K. Cornwallis to SIS Foreign Affairs: 8.2.1944, 
FO. 371/40041/Ell43. 
28. 
al-Suwaidi, T., Mudhakkaratio_Nisf_Qarn min Tarikh 
al-'Iraq wa al-Qadhiya al-'Ara iya (My Memoirs 
-half a century of Iraq's his ry and the Arab 
Cause) (Beirut 1969), pp. 412-417, - also interview 
with Muhammad Fakhri al-Jamil, al-Suwaidi's son- in-law. 
29. al-Chadirchi (1970), p. 85. 
30. Ibid. Sald. Salih, an ex-muta'sarrif was known for his honesty and courage. 'Abd7a1__w--a=a Mahmud and 'Abd 
al-Hadi al-Dhahir were both left-inclined lawyers: 
Mahmud had worked closely with Jamalat al-Ahali in 
the early 1930s. 
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rule , closing internment camps, lifting censorship, 
permitting the formation of political parties, enacting 
a new electoral law, and alleviating the plight of the 
poor, especially the fellahin, by distributing miri land 
to them. In fact al-Suwaidi's Government fulfilled many 
of its promises. It ended martial law, closed the camp' 
at 'Amara, abolished censorship, allowed trade unions 
to be formed, changed the election law by abolishing 
secondary elections, and finally permitted political 
parties to function legally3l. 
On 2 April 1946, the Ministry of the Interior 
sanctioned the formation of five political parties. It 
refused to give permission to only one, which was called 
Hizb al-Taharrur al-Watani (The National Liberation Party), 
because the government accused the founders of Communist 
32 leanings . Although the Communist Party remained 
underground, many of its active members joined other 
established parties. 
The five parties were (from Left to Right): 
1. Hizb al-Sha'b (the people) headed by 'Aziz Sharif, 
, with 
its party organ al-Watan. 
2. 
lHizb 
al-Ittihad al-Watani (the National Union) headed 
by 'Abd al-rattah Ibrahim, with its organ al-Ra'i 
al-'AM, later al--Siyasa,, then Sawt al-siyasa. 
31. Humaidi (1976), p, 174. 
32. Khairi, S. (1974), p. 126. 
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ai-ýii'ziý 'a'l-W'atani al-Dimuqrati (the National Democratic) 
headed by Kamil al-Chadirchi, with its organ Sawt al-Ahali. 
4., Hizb al-istiqlal (Independence) headed by Muhammad 
Mahdi Kubba with its organ al-Istiqlal, later Liwal 
al-Istiqlal. 
5. Hizb al-Ahrar (the Liberals) headed by Kamil al-Khudairi 
then by Tawfiq al-Suwaidi, and later by Sa'Ad Salih, 
its organ Sawt al-Ahrar. 
The British Ambassador commented: 
The first three are parties of the Left and 
the word "Communist" is inaccurately but 
almost universally applied to their members. 
The fourth is made up largely of persons 
who were active in support of Rashid 'Ali 
Gailani and many of its members are ex- 
internees. The last is led by a tribal 
Sheikh from the Middle Euphrates who has 
been a Deputy for some years and always 
resides in Bagdad. With the exception of 
Kamil Chederchi, the leader of the National 
Democrat Party, who was Minister of Economics 
and communications in Hikmet Suliman's 1936 
ministry, none of the leaders of these parties 
have played more than minor roles in politics 
hitherto. 
It is an abuse of language to call these 
groups representative parties. Their 
programmes are vague and, in the case of 
the three Leftist parties, are almost 
indistinguishable, the lines of division 
being personal. Attempts have been made to 
unify the Left, but so far personalities 
have proved too strong. Every party has, 
as its main theme, the diminution of foreign 
influence in Iraq. 33 
A more perceptive evaluation of the three left parties was 
given by Mr. Busk in a despatch to the Foreign Office: 
33. Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs: 17.4.1946, 
FO. 371/52401/E. 3735. 
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With the attitude of the Government is 
contrasted the programme of the three 
political parties of the left. The 
programmes of the three left parties are 
all based on Democratic Principles and 
contain only moderate economic reforms. 
They acknowledge private property and 
initiative and call only for the 
distribution of state lands without 
Nationalisation of existing estates. 
They advocate planning by the State 
for economic developments and all agree 
on calling for the evacuation of foreign 
forces from Iraq and the solution of 
the Palestine Problem by establishing 
an independent Arab State. 34 
Iii-zb al-Ah'rar, the Liberal party, was supposed to act 
as a moderate pro-government political organisation and 
to balance the activities of the opposition parties. 
Soon afterwards the party disintegrated in the way of 
other parties with similar characteristics. Hizb al- 
istiqlalattracted a wide following from lawyers and 
students of Pan-Arab aspirations and maintained itself 
as an ally of the National Democratic party in their 
opposition to the regime. Serious attempts were made 
to unify the three leftist political parties but this did 
not materialise because of the leaders' (al-Chadirchi, 
Ibrahim and Sharif) failure to reconcile their basic 
personal differences, though Kamil al-Chadirchi was 
emerging as the popular leader of the left, along with 
muhammad Mahdi Kubba, the leader of the Independence Party. 
34. Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs: 19.9.1946, 
Po. 371/52402/E9584. 
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The period which followed the formation of political 
parties witnessed a wide upsurge in political activities 
which dominated the life of the capital. Political parties 
and their newspapers, the headquarters of trade unions, 
meeting halls and clubs became alive with articles, 
lectures, speeches and mass meetings. The left parties 
made their presence felt so much so that after they 
had only been in existence for three months, the Regent 
went to London to ask the British "for help in repressing 
left wing elements in Iraq" 
35 
, and in June 1946 he 
appointed the ruthless and hard-headed Arshad al-'Umari 
as Prime Minister36 , to deal with the widely growing 
influence of the left. The prime minister "went for his 
objective like a bull at a gate.. 
37, declaring the 
Hizb al-Shalb and the 11izb al-ittihad-al-Wat'ani illegal, 
35. Minutes by Mr. W. Baxter, Foreign office: 19.7.1946, 
Fo. 371/52402/E9584. 
36. Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs: 23.8.1946# 
Fo. 371/52402/E8328. The British Ambassador, Sir Hugh 
Stonehewer Bird, noted later: 
"It (the 'Umari regime) had deviated into a 
reactionary dictatorship"; see Sir H. Stonehewer- 
Bird to SIS Foreign Affairs: 5.12.1946, FO. 371/ 
52405/E11846. 
37. Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs: 
23.8.1946, FO. 371/52402/E8328. 
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suppressing the opposition newspapers38 and finally I 
sentencing Kamil al-Chadirchi to six months' hard 
39 labour 
Thus, the period in which the country enjoyed what 
could almost be described as normal political life, did 
not last more than three months. Nevertheless, it left a 
strong impact on Iraq, especially on the opposition and 
ruling hierarchy. The Regent and his politicians were struck 
by the magnitude of both the popularity and influence of 
the opposition parties which caused them to increase 
their suspicion of them. In fact, the period was crucial 
in making the ruling class more distant-and creating an 
unbridgeable gap between the government and the governed. 
This helped the opposition movement to involve a wide 
38. Ambassador 
3.9.1946, 
16.8.1946, 
6.9.1946, 
16.9.1946p 
(Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs: 
FO. 371/52402/E8794; 
FO. 371/52402/EB328; 
FO. 371/52402/E8921; 
FO. 371/52402/E9318. 
39- Ambassador (Baghdad) to s1s roreign Affairs: 
16.8.1946, FO. 371/52468/E8113; 
20.8.1946, FO. 371/52468/EB336; 
22.8.1946,, FO. 371/52468/EB345; 
28.8.1946,, Fo. 371/52468/EB531. 
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spectrum of alienated and disaffected sections of society, 
even including the Armed Forces. This latter group was 
ultimately to prove instrumental in providing the final 
blow which crushed the monarchy on the morning of 
14 July 1958. 
ARTIII 
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PART III 
The Role of Jama'at al-Ahali in iraqi 
Political Life, 1932-1946 
Introduction 
This section will discuss Jamalat al-Ahali's 
political activities, its involvement in political life, 
and the four stages of its development as a political 
movement. it is concerned with three different but 
inter-related aspects of the group's development. 
Chapter VIII describes the role and development of 
the group between 1932 and 1933 with special reference to 
al-Ahall newspaper; Chapter IX gives a chronological accountOP 
the group as a political movement between 1933 and 1935; 
Chapter X continues the story until 1942, concentrating 
particularly on the group's role in the coup of 1936 and 
in the government of Hikmat Sulaiman. Finally, Chapter XI 
studies the group's reappearance and the publication of 
Sawt al-Ahali between 1942 and 1946. 
During this period Jama'at al-Ahali passed through 
four distinct stages; the first of these was tho 
ideological stage, between 1932 and 1935. The second 
stage saw the group's active political involvement between 
1935 and 1937, while the third stage, of low-profile 
political activities# lasted between 1937 and 1942. The 
fourth stage saw the resumption of political activities 
between 1942 and 1946, and culminated in the formation 
of three separate political parties headed by three 
former prominent members of Jamalat al-Ahali. 
247 
Chapter VIII 
I. ': 6ae'ological Phase, 1932-1933 
The three years between 1932 and 1935, which saw 
the appearance of Jamalat al-Ahali on the political 
horizon, the spread of its ideology al-Shalbiya and the 
publication of its influential newspaper al-Ahali and 
literature Cia"s'ali'l 'a*l-Ahali ., were also one of the most 
intense periods of the group's activities. During the 
early part of this phase, the four founders of the group 
did not view themselves as professional politicians or 
aspirants to Political or government office. In fact, 
they did not wish to have anything to do with the system, 
nor with the traditional politicians whom they considered 
dishonest and opportunist. Jamalat al-Ahali initiated 
and supported a number of projects, such as the campaign 
to-eradicate illiteracy, the boycott of the Baghdad Light 
and Power Company and the boycott of foreign goods in 
general in an attempt to protect local industries. They 
also called for the establishment of a national bank and 
the formation of enterprises by voluntary individual 
donations of one fils, called mashrul al-fils. 
In their drive to gain acceptance and recognition and 
in their haste to achieve their goals, the founders of 
the group began to recruit prominent politicians, including 
Kamil al-Chadirchi, Jalfar Abu al-Timman, and Hikmat 
sulaiman. With their support they formed a secret political 
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society on the basis of al-Sha_lbiya, a step which was to 
alter the group's ideology because of its involvement in 
practical politics. During these years al-Ahali gained 
strong support through its own hard work and its 
influential newspapers, and it gradually became a focal 
point of opposition to the regime and the political system. 
This. emerges clearly from the regular and lengthy 
suppression of the various newspapers and the trials and 
imprisonment of members of the group. 
Týýe Beginning_ o'f-th'eý Group's Activities 
When Jamalat al-Ahali was founded, its first priority 
was to publish a good quality and essentially non- 
commercial daily newspaper, which would reflect and 
disseminate its ideas. The paper gained the group its 
popularity and was instrumental in establishing it as a 
well-known political group and later enabled its members 
to expand into other activities. For this reason the bulk 
of Jama'at al-Ahali's concern during its first two years 
was devoted to the production of the newspaper. The four 
founders were collectively responsible for the production 
of al-Ahali, but since 'Abd al-Fattah Ibrahim and Muhammad 
Hadid had become government employees, the task of the 
day to day running of the paper fell on Husain Jamil 
and 'Abd al-Qadir Ismalil. Although they continued to 
pursue their private law practices they devoted most of 
their time to the paper, with Isma'il even living on the 
paper's premises for a time. In the early days 'Ali 
Haidar Sulaiman assisted in running the paper as well 
as contributing various articles. The only paid editors 
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on the paper were Yusuf Ismalil, 'Abd al-Qadir's brother, 
and Yusuf Matti, both of whom had connections with the 
Iraqi Communist party. 
Three different groups of young men assisted in 
the production of the paper in different ways and also 
contributed material. The first consisted mainly of 
graduates or students of the Baghdad Law School who 
were friends and associates of Jamil and Ismalill. 
The second consisted of graduates of the American 
University of Beirut who were friends of Ibrahim and 
2 Hadid .A third group contributed political articles, 
short stories and poems, and translated stories and 
articles. They played an important secondary role, for 
they came from various progressive and Marxist groupings, 
finding al-Ahali more congenial to their way of 
thinking than any other existing paper or political 
3 
group at the time 
1. 
e. g. 'Aziz Sharif, Khalil Kanna, Jamil 'Abd al-Wahhab, 
Ismalil al-Ghanim, Qasim Hasan, Nadhim Hamid, &Sadiq Kammuna. 
2. The most important member of this group was 'Ali Haidar 
Sulaiman, who could be considered one of al-Ahali's inner 
circle, and remained there until he left the group after 
the death of King Faisal (see Conflicts). other AUB 
graduates were Ibrahim Baithun, Jamil Tuma, Nri Rufa'il, 
and Hashim Jawad. Fadhil al-Jamali also contributed some 
articles on education. 
3- This group consisted mainly of writers, like Mustafa 'Ali# 
'Abdullah Jaddu'j 'Abd al-Wahhab al-Amin, Lutfi Bakr 
Sidqi, Nalim Tuwwaiq, the poets Muhar=ad Mahdi al- 
Jawahiri, Ahmad al-Saft al-Najafil and Muhammad Salih 
Bahr al-IUlum. 
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2. Editorials, Articles and Interests of al-Ahali J 
Newspaper, 1932-1933 
As far as the outside world was concerned, Jamalat 
al-Ahali came into existence on 2 January 1932, when 
their paper first appeared. al-Ahali dealt with subjects 
of concern to the public in general and progressive 
members of the educated class in particular. its role 
as a committed opposition and progressive newspaper was 
clear from the very beginning, not only from its editorial 
columns, but also in the topics and subjects which it 
covered. These topics will be analysed under four headings: 
local, that is, Iraqi affairs; regional affairs (the 
easAarv% CkJ CCC'rS ; 
Arab countries), L(mainly Turkey, Iran and Indih), 
and international affairs (Europe, the United 
States and the Soviet Union). Almost every issue of al-Ahali 
attacked or questioned contemporary developments in 
Iraqi politics as well as in the regional, Eastern and 
international arenas, and most of the editorials contained 
criticisms of part or the whole of the system of government 
and of British policy. This was, of course, the main 
feature distinguishing al-Ahali from most other newspapers 
in Iraq such as al-Tariq, the IracL ' alý'i, Times, al-'Alam al-'Ar 
and al-'Ahd al-Jadid which tended to support the Iraqi 
and British governments, praising and complimenting 
their policies and generally supporting the system, or 
simply reporting the news without comment, occasionally 
raising objections to government policy. 
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Iracri Affairs 
al-Ahali newspaper dealt with every significant 
issue relating to conditions in iraq, analysing each 
point, pointing out various problems and suggesting 
solutions. The paper concentrated on topics of particular 
contemporary importance, such as the incompetence, 
inefficiency and venality of the government and the 
political system, the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, economic 
conditions and oil concessions, social conditions, and 
education. 
In the second issue of al-Ahali on 3 January 1932, 
an editorial appeared entitled A fi al-Bilad Nahdha? 
(is there a revival in the country? ). After a discussion 
of the real meaning of "progress", the paper answered 
sarcastically that those in power who had managed to 
build big houses, drive cars and take trips abroad had 
certainly achieved "progress". However, the majority of 
the population were still struggling at the barest level 
of subsistence and could not be said to have "progressed" 
at all. Before even attempting to prescribe the cure for 
the ills of society, the mass of the population should 
be involved in an ideology devoted to the "progress" 
Of every sector of society 
4 
4. a-l-A'ha*li, 3.1.1932. 
1 
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in another editorial entitled 'What is the meaning 
of dict. atorship in colonized countries? ", the article 
explained the system of people's dictatorship (D . iktat .0. r. ia 
al-Shalb) as in Italy and the Soviet Union, comparing 
the systems of government in those countries with those 
of the "Rulers and Monarchs" who are under foreign 
domination and simultaneously attempting to establish a 
form of dictatorship. While the former governments 
aspire to serve their people, the latter ultimately 
only serve foreign powers. In a direct reference to 
King Faisal the article continued 'What can we expect 
from a dictatorship established with the help of a 
foreign power against the will of the people? and what 
can we*expect from a dictator ... who has been appointed 
by that foreign power to be ruler? ". The article went on: 
"Peoples should rule themselves by themselves; they know 
their own aspirations best, and there is no one who can 
protect their rights better. No one should infringe on 
the rights of the people for their anger is great'15. 
Another strong editorial followed on 26 January, 
headed "Eleven years of the so called 'national government' 11, 
which described the frequency and arbitrariness with 
5. ' Ibid., 24.1.1932. This article was in response to 
rumours that Faisal was attempting to set up a 
dictatorship. 
0 
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which governments-had been formed. It compared the 
progress which had been achieved in Turkey, which used 
to have problems similar to those of Iraq before Kemal 
AtatUrk came to powor and transformed the Turkish Republic 
into a modern state. Iraq on the other hand had had no 
real progress, and nothing had been achieved except talk 
about 'great projects', while the population continued 
to live in primitive conditions. As the article pointed 
out this was a direct result of the government's 
incompetence and inefficiency, since it "did not pay 
attention to fundamental issues but only busied itself 
with superficialities". 
6 
al-Ahali paid attention to the 
government's policy and performance, regularly criticising 
faulty practices and policies or the lack of them, and 
especially the absence of planning. it stressed the 
desirability of the public accountability of government* 
pointing out that the people are the supreme power in 
the land. An article entitled 'What is our destination? 
Shall we keep going without direction and in the dark? 7" 
discussed the deterioration of each sector of the economy 
and the spread of vice and the general decline in morality 
in the country. it pointed out that the lack of planning 
and organization, which should have been the responsibility 
of the government, had resulted in bankruptcy in the 
agricultural sectori stagnation in industrialisationo 
and in an unproductive and defective educational system. 
6. Ibid., 26.1.1932. 
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The article concluded "It seems clear that the government 
does not possess well defined policies which could lead 
the country to prosperity ... so what is our destination? , 
7. 
The paper discissed historical and political issues 
in general, but in fact it was referring to the ruler 
of Iraq and the political system. This is clear from an 
editorial of 4.3.1932, entitled "Cheating the People", 
in which cheating is defined as taking place when "a few 
of the ruling class tries to keep the people misinformed". 
The article traces the history of kings and rulers who 
cheated their subjects by pretending that they were chosen 
by God as his shadow on earth, and thus had no responsibility 
towards their subjects. Such rulers, the paper asserted* 
are criminals, and their crime is so great that sooner 
or later the people will rebel against them, destroy 
their chains and make the people's will supreme 
8. 
al-Ahali did not confine its criticism to the 
executive branch of government, but also directed its 
attention towards the legislature and the judiciary. In 
an article on 20 May 1932, the editorial attacked the 
inefficiency and incompetence of the Chamber of Deputies 
and its inability to finish its work during its regular 
sessions. This necessitated an extension of the session 
and thus the waste of much needed public money on extra 
7. I'bid., 5.2.1932. 
a' Ibid., 4--3.1932- 
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expenses for the deputies 
9. In discussing the different 
committees and commissions of enquiry which had been 
set up in recent years on economic conditions (Hilton 
Young), land problems (Dowson), and education (the 
Monroe Commission), the paper urged the government in 
June 1932 to go ahead with the various recommendations 
for reform since so much money had been spent on these 
10 
studies 
Iraq's entry into the League of Nations, which 
supposedly signified the country's independence, was 
met with cynicism by al-Ahali, while the other newspapers 
hailed it as a major step in the history of Iraq (e. g. 
The Iraq_Times 23.10.1932). This and the Anglo-Iraqi 
Treaty of 1930 and relations between the two countries 
were the subject of constant discussion in al-Ahali. 
on 31.1.1932, an editorial headed "The case of Iraq's 
entry to the League of Nations ... the spirit of the 
Mandate still exists", denounced the hollowness of the 
country's much discussed 'independence'. The Iraqis 
had already been told that they were independent under 
the terms of the Treaties of 1924 and 1927 as well as 
the more recent 1930 Treaty. The article discussed the 
implications of the latest Treaty, showing that in fact 
the country remained under British control, with annexes 
9* ibld'., 20.5.1932; also Knabenshue to State Department, 
J. b. 1932, USNA 890G. 00/200. 
10- ib'id., lo. 6.1932. 
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to the Treaty which virtually handed the port of Basra 
and the railways to the British. rurthermore, the British 
had laid down stipulations to protect the minorities 
which could be-used as a pretext to inferfere in internal 
affairs. The article concluded that "the independence 
which they have been proclaiming is non-existent in any 
real sense and will have no effect on daily. life, but 
only in a legal and theoretical sense"ll. In other 
articles the paper attacked British influence and domination 
over Iraq, which it called "Slavery"12, saying that 
the British advisors"function is not to advise but to 
"watch over the Iraqis to make sure that they serve 
Britain's interests . 
13. Although this kind of comment 
may not appear particularly outrageous, it must be seen 
in the context of a period when no other newspaper 
carried on a campaign either against the particular 
iniquities of individual governments, or against the 
system as a whole. 
al- A hali was also greatly concerned with laws 
enacted at the time or those already in force. Many 
editorials accused the government of passing unconstitutional 
laws and of being biased in enforcing them, especially 
against its opponents. The paper challenged successive 
11- I'bi'd'., 31.1.1932. 
12. Ibid., 19.2.1932. 
13. Ibid., 14.2.1932. 
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cabinets to implement their programmes and to enact just 
and comprehensive laws, pointing out that mere statements 
of intent would not effect improvements 
14. On many 
occasions the paper attacked the Tribal Civil and 
criminal Disputes Regulation,, which was not only 
outmoded and unjust, and deepened the division between 
the urban and the rural populations, but was also 
applied to the cities whenever the government needed 
to suppress the opposition, a practice which the paper 
considered unconstitutiona, 
15 
. The paper 
protested against the suppression of al-Ikha' newspaper 
by a Cabinet decision, deeming the action unconstitutional, 
because the closing of newspapers fell more properly 
within the jurisdiction of the courts 
16. 
many articles 
followed dealing with the freedom of the press and other 
civil liberties 
17 
which the paper championed. 
The paper was also concerned with the economic sector 
in general and the oil companies and their dealings with 
the Iraq government in particular. Early in 1932 there 
were differences between the oil companies and the 
government, as the company refused to pay royalties in 
gold, cgntrary to the terms of the agreement, and insisted 
on making payment in depreciated sterling, In an attempt 
tp_ jej*pL; XAss the. government and to force it to take a 
14. ib'id., 15.3.1932. 
15- Ibid., 16.3.1932; 31.3.1932. 
16. Ibid., 18.3.1932. 
17. Ibld., 21.3.1932. 
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strong line in dealing with the oil company, the paper 
was determined to bring the issue into the open while 
the government wanted to hush it up. In an editorial 
headed: "I. P. C. does not want to pay Iraq's share in 
gold", the paper explained the position of the oil 
companies and the lack of action on the part of the 
18 
government This was preceded by an article on the 
19 
fall of sterling. on the world market . On 18.1.1932, 
another article appeared headed "The government's obscure 
position on the question of oil". It demanded that the 
government should not give any more concessions to the 
oil companies, since they had already received a great 
deal in return for very little, and that it should not 
accept any payment except in gold20. On 25 January, another 
article appeared: "The oil company refuses to pay in 
gold ... The ministry does not refer the conflict to an 
arbitration committee ... what does this mean? " 
21 TWO 
days later, it asked how the government had spent the 
proceeds from oil, as no worthwhile projects had been 
established 
22. The paper again insisted that the governme nt 
should answer questions affecting the public interest and 
shoul4 explain its position on a number of important issues, 
particularly its position in the negotiations with the 
oil company 
2.3 
18- Ibid., 13.1.1932; see Sluglett, 1976, pp. 194-199 for Te-tails of these negotiations. 
19 - iiýi*d'., 12 . 1.1932 . 
20. Ibid'., 18.1.1932. 
21. Ibid., 25.1.1932. 
22. Ibid., 27.1.1932. 
23. Ibid., 2.2.1932: 3.3.1932. 
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Meanwhile the government was. inviting bids for 
exploration rights in areas not covered by the earlier 
agreement. When it was announced that the British Oil 
Development Company had won the new agreement, al-Ahali 
wrote "Why has the government preferred the British oil 
Development Company to the others ... ? only because it 
is British and will only pay E20,000 a year? ". It criticised 
the agreement, saying that it was only signed under political 
pressure, and suggested that the government should at 
24 least be a partner in such a profitable project . Later 
the paper asked the government to confirm the truth of 
the rumour that the oil company was still refusing to 
25 26 
pay royalties in gold and pressed it to stand firm 
In these first months the paper threw down a number 
.I of major ideological challenges to the government in what 
amopnted to a demand for the nationalisation, of oil 
production. Thus on 9 March 1932, an editorial asked 
"The investment of oil revenue: should it be under 
government control or should it be left to individuals 
and companies? ". It compared the capitalist and the 
socialist systems, and showing the advantages of the latter 
27. 
It urged the government to take over the oil concessions 
in order to receive all the proceeds and profits which 
qou. 1d t. hen be distributed for the benefit of the population 
24. Ibýid*., 13 .2 . 1932. 
25 - I'bid., 18.2.1932. 
26. ibid., 3.3.1932. 
27. Ibid., 9.3.1932. 
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as a whole rather than to a few rich and influential 
28 individuals . in many editorials and articles, al-Ahali 
showed. its concern for the national budget and the 
various mistakes in planning, suggesting that allocations 
for industry, agriculture, health and education should 
take precedence over unproductive expenditure such as 
propaganda, the various new Iraqi legations and expensive 
29 
government buildings . This area of the paper's concern 
owed much to Hadid's interest in economic affairs. 
Other articles suggested reforms in taxation, and 
called for a progressive income tax. The paper reminded 
the government that the majority of Iraqis were poor and 
30 
should not be burdened with indirect taxes . it 
suggested instead that the government should tax the rich 
and the foreign companies, especially the oil company. 
It also called for the dismissal of most of the foreign 
(British) advisers and experts, only keeping those who 
were urgently needed, and insisting that the salaries 
of those who stayed should be reduced to the level of 
Iraqis holding the same job3l. The government was 
32 
urged to economise and to stop wasteful expenditure 
28. ibid. 
29. ibid., 13.1.1932; 28.2.1932; 17.3.1932; 23.3.1932; 
5-. 4.1932: 11.6.1932. 
30. I, b'i*d*., 17.1.1932. 
31. Ibid., 20.1.1932. 
32. Ibid., 2.1.1932; 15.1.1932; 1,28.2.1932. 
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In general the paper drew the attention of the government 
and the public to the hardship and poor living conditions 
of the mass of the population. In one article it 
suggested that readers should either send in their 
complaints or come in person with their problems, 
particularly about the high cost of food, water, 
electricity and other essentials33. 
aY-Ahali showed its concern for social conditions 
in different ways. As well as discussing the obstacles 
to progress, it suggested solutions. The paper also had 
a special section for arts and literature which included 
"the story of the day" which usually depicted real life 
situations. These stories were often adaptations of 
European works altered to relate to conditions in Iraq. 
The subject of peasants suffering at the hands of shaikhs, 
landowners and sirkals was always a focus of the paper's 
attention. It also described the exodus of peasants from 
the countryside to appalling living conditions in the 
cities, especially Baghdad, and the effect of the decline 
in agricultural production on the economy as a whole 
34 
Again, the paper criticised outmoded customs and 
habitsl and the way in which they blocked social progress. 
It also called for the adoption of modern attitudes to 
marriage and the abolition of expensive wedding ceremonies 
33. Ibid., 14.1.1932; 24.1.1932; 31.3.1932. 
34. Ibid., 30.3.1932. 
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which young people could not afford 
35. 
Jamalat al*-Ah'a'li' 
naturally laid great emphasis on both formal and informal 
education, and the paper carried articles on the extension 
of school education, the illiteracy campaign, and the 
reform and diversification of the educational system. 
Beginning from the very first issue of al-Ahali, a series 
of 67 articles were published on education in the Soviet 
union, translated by 'Abd al-Fattah Ibrahim 
36 
. In his 
introduction Ibrahim stated that since readers were 
familiar with the French, British and American educational 
systems, the paper had decided to introduce them to a 
new system which attempted to spread vocational education 
(al-tallim al-intaýýi) among the peoples of the Soviet 
union 
37. In January 1932, the paper announced that it was 
preparing an opinion poll, asking for suggestions for the 
reform of the educational system and the Department of 
38 
Education itself . There was an immediate response, and 
several letters and short articles were published on the 
subject, as well as criticisms of the government for not 
35. Ibid., 12.1.1932; 18.1.1932. 
36. This was a book by Albert Bencovitch, Chancellor of the 
Second Soviet University, translated into English at 
Columbia University, and then into Arabic by Ibrahim. 
The Arabic. title is al-Tarbiya al-Haditha fi Russia 
al-Soviatjya (Modern Education in tEe Soviet-Union)-. 
inter viFw-71'th Ibrahim. 
37- a'l--A'h*a'li, 4.1.1932. 
38. Ibi'd'. ', 21.1.1932. 
I 
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39 
allocating enough money to education generally . al-Ahali 
published and discussed the findings of the Monroe 
Commission and articles by radhil al-., Tamali and other 
educationalists on education in Iraq 
40 
. It also announced 
on 5 May 1932 a five-year plan for eradicating illiteracy 
which gained wide public support. The paper published news 
of the formation of committees all over the country to 
41 
establish night schools and centres for illiterates 
Although this project was interruptecl for several months 
when the newspaper was closed down, it started up again 
later with more drive and better organisation. 
Ideological Articles 
The discussion and analysis of different political 
ideologies and theories, particularly those of the 
Fabians, was a central concern of the paper. This activity 
was vital to its role as a means of political education, 
and was also designed to give wider publicity to the 
ideals of, al-Sha'biya, which were explained through 
the writings of such figures as Fenner Brockway, Harold 
Laski and H. G. Wells. It also translated articles by 
well-known progressive writers. In addition, the paper 
had a weekly section on political and constitutional 
theories and their practical application 
42 
. In the second 
39. Ibid. * 4.4.1932. 
40o Ib . ido, 15.2.1932; 10.3.1932; 13.3.1932. 
41. Ibiý., 5.5.1932; 8.4.1932, - 11.5.1932; 17.5.1932; 
22.5.1932. 
42. ibid., 12.1.1932. 
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issue there was an article by H. G. Wells entitled "The 
World in 50 years time", in which the writer asserted 
that the cure for the deteriorating world conditions 
was the implementation of the principles of social 
43 democracy . The next issue carried an article which 
explained the ideological roots of the French Revolution 
44 
An article on socialism, the first of its kind to appear 
in Iraq, was published on 22 January 1932. Entitled 
"Socialism in the year 1932" it was written by a leader 
45 
of the Independent Labour Party, Fenner Brockway . In 
a series of articles 'Ali Haidar Sulaiman discussed the 
history of the co-operative movement urging the Iraqis 
to establish co-operatives 
46 
. The paper also translated 
an article "Rebellious Youth" which had won the first 
prize in a competition organised by the ILýls New Leader, 
containing a fierce attack on the capitalist system and 
calling for a socialist revolution 
47 
. Another article by 
H. G. Wells on the"present crisis in human affairs" was 
published on 4 March 1932. An article entitled "The 
difference between Socialism and Communism" explained 
43. Ibid., 3.1.1932. 
44. Ibid. 0 4.1.1932. 
45. jý Ibid. # 22.1.1932. 
46. ibid., 27,28j, 29.1.1932. 
47. Ibid., 28.2.1932. 
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the fact that although both ideologies are opposed to 
capitalism, there are many differences between them 
in prin ciple and methodology 
48 
. Hadid wrote an article 
summarizing the life of G. B. Shaw, in which he emphasised 
his role in the Fabian Society and this was followed by 
another article discussing Shaw's contribution to 
49 
literature . An article by Harold Laski, "Thoughts 
on Reform", translated from the American periodical 
Nation, was published on 28 February 1932. The translator's 
introduction stated that "Professor Laski'is considered 
one of the free thinkers of this age. He,; Is a socialist 
and teaches political science at London-Uhiversity ... 
the best world. in the professor s v4e,. ý*'is the democratic 
world which can only be achieved through equality of 
economic opportunity". 
Arab affairs . 
Although the paper devoted some space to news from 
the Arab countries, it was far more concerned about 
local and international developments. This somewhat 
lukewarm attitude toward Arab unity stems from the 
group's opposition to King Faisal and his "Arab policies", 
since they suspected him of pursuing this policy not for 
the benefit of the Syrians and Iraqis* but for his own 
personal grandeur. Furthermore, with the possible exception 
48. Ibid., 8.4.1932. 
49. Ibid., 2,3.5.1932. 
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of Jamil, most members of Jama'at al-Ahali equated 
nationalism with Fascism 
50 
. Hence the coverage of the 
news of developments in the Arab world was not comparable 
to that given to the struggle in the Indian sub-continent, 
or the progress of Turkey, or, rather later, the Spanish 
civil war. What news there was, concentrated mainly on 
the struggle for independence in Syria and Palestine and 
political developments in Egypt. However, the paper -* 
-adopted: a. -realistic and practical approach'to 
. the quesition 
of Palestine, Arab unity and independence which marked 
a complete departure from the empty political nostrums 
of the day which were repeated by politicians and the 
Iraqi and Arab newspapers and surrounded with a halo of 
sanctity. The traditional Arab nationalists looked to 
the Arab kings, especially Faisal and even 'Abd al-'Aziz 
ibn Sa'ud, to unite the Arabs, while al-Ahali called 
for liberation from foreign control, true independence 
and democratic governments for the Arab countries. 
closer co-operation in political, economic and other 
fields would then be possible. al-Ahali continually 
emphasised that only the Arab population as a whole 
could gain independence, curb Zionist expansion and only 
then move towards unity. It called on the Arab countries 
to adopt a policy of nonco-operation with the colonial 
51 
powers 
50- See the section on Ideology, Ch. IV. 
51- al-Ahali 29.1.1932; 21,22,26.2.1932. 
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The paper was particularly interested in developments 
in Egypt, most likely because of Jamil and Ismalil's 
s ympathies with the Wafd party. al-Ahali viewed Egyptian 
political activities with respect and admiration as the 
Egyptians were better organised and more politically 
mature than the Iraqis52. This attitude is also noticeable 
in al-Ahali's coverage of developments in Syria, and 
the Syrian struggle for independence from the French. Most 
of the Arab news was concerned with Syria, again due to 
Jamil's influence. After Jamil left the paper, al-Ahali 
began to adopt an antagonistic attitude towards Arabs 
working in Iraq in general and the Syrians in particular, 
basically because most of them supported King Faisal 
and his Arab policies. This position cannot be said to 
have been a reflection of popular sentiment but it was 
a view held by certain patriotic (watani and progressive 
elements who opposed Faisal and believed that the King 
was attempting to build himself up as an Arab leader 
rather than an Iraqi ruler. al-Ahali labelled those Arabs 
who supported him as mercenaries (murtazaqa) 
53. Another 
article showing al-Ahali's attitude towards non-Iraqi 
Arabs who supported King Faisal was aimed at Arab 
journalists visiting Iraq as guests of the government 
to attend the first industrial and agricultural exhibition 
52. Ibid., 22.1.1932; 13.2.1932. 
53. Interviews with Ibrahim and Hadid. 
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in Baghdad. The paper asked them not to limit their 
observations to the items in the exhibition or to a 
few new buildings in the capital, but to focus their 
attention on the majority of the population and to 
investigate their social and economic conditions in 
order to determine whether real progress had been 
54 
achieved in Iraq . This was followed by an editorial 
on 24 April 1932, entitled "Why did the Syrian journalists 
come to Iraq? ", accusing the journalists from Greater 
Syria and Egypt of giving a false impression of the 
progress Iraq had achieved under King Faisal. The paper 
claimed that those who came to Iraq to study the 
conditions of the country in the name of Arab Unity 
only did so because the government had paid them. 
Eastern affairs 
India and the Indian struggle for independence was 
one of the chief concerns of the paper, especially in 
the early days. A serialization of Mahatma Gandhi's 
memoirs in 97 parts began in the very first issue. In 
the section called "The Latest Telegrams" Indian 
resistance to British rule figured prominently. This 
wide coverage was a result of the group's admiration of 
Gandhi and Nehru and in their belief in popular resistance 
and defiance of the colonial power. in this wayg al-Ahali 
was trying both directly and indirectly to influence Iraqi 
54. al-'Ahal . i, 6.4.1932. 
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as well as other Arab readers 
55 
, and persuade them to 
adopt the Indian style of popular resistance to foreign 
rule, to awaken political consciousness and to prove 
that the imperialists were using the same methods everywhere. 
At the same time the paper drew a clear distinction between 
leaders like Nehru and Gandhi and rulers like King Faisal 
and 'Abd al'Aziz Ibn Sa'ud who co-operated with colonial 
powers. The first photograph to appear in the paper was 
of Nehru, in the centre of the front page, above a caption, 
"on the occasion of his being sentenced to prison for 
56 
two and a half years - the maximum sentence" . The 
second photograph was that of Gandhi, leading the civil 
disobedience campaign, which was also on the centre of 
the front page 
57 
. 
Turkey also received wide and very favourable 
coverage. It was depicted as an example of a reforming 
administration, and al-Ahali specifically praised the 
Turkish system and leadership for their efforts to 
improve the quality of life of their people. The paper 
reported on and urged the adoption of projects successfully 
implemented in Turkey such as "People's Houses" and the 
"People's Schools" 
58. 
55. 
According to Jamili some copies of the paper were 
posted to his friends in Syria. 
56. 
al-Ahali 15.1.1932. 
57.1 ,b- id., 20.1.1932. 
58. 
ibid., 10.3.1932. 
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International Affairs 
Unlike most of its competitors, al-Ahali reported 
widely on world affairs. The paper took a strictly anti- 
imperialist line, and always took the side of the 
oppressed and the underdog. In its early days it was 
briefly sympathetic to Mussolini, regarding his dictatorship 
59 
as collective rather than personal . The paper's 
attitude to Britain was in some ways contradictory; it 
attacked the British presence in Iraq and British 
colonial policy, but at the same time looked with envy 
at British democratic and parliamentary institutions, due 
to the strong influence of the Fabians on the group. This 
was also true of the paper's position towards the United 
States and France. In general al-Ahali supported democratic 
institutions and opposed capitalism and imperialism. The 
paper also devoted considerable space to articles on 
the Soviet Union. Ibrahim and Ismalil in particular 
clearly approved of the Soviet system of government# 
and as we have seen, the early issues of the paper 
contained a long series on Soviet education. At this 
stage reporting was largely confined to factual issues, 
but ideological matters were also discussed. This again 
distinguished al-Ahali from its contemporaries, which 
seldom referred to the Soviet Union or mentioned Communism 
or even socialism, since their main interests lay in Iraqi# 
59- See the section on Ideology, Ch. IV. 
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Arab and British affairs. 
Political and economic developments in the Soviet 
Union appeared regularly in the section called "The 
Latest Telegrams" which was edited by Yusuf Isma'il, the 
brother of 'Abd al-Qadir and one of the early members of 
the Iraqi Communist Party. He used this section to 
popularise his beliefs, and this eventually resulted in 
Jamills departure from the group. Yusuf Ismalil always 
praised the Soviet Union and attacked the capitalist 
countries which were intriguing against it6o. During the 
Sino-Japanese conflict, in which the capitalist countries 
tried to drag the Soviet Union into the war, a headline 
appeared: "The capitalist countries are working to invade 
Russia because it is sincere in maintaining peace ... 
the 
Russia is ready to deal with/situation ... and expresses 
61 
its caution" 
On the economic side the paper published an article 
translated from thefconomist on the progress of the five 
year plan in the Soviet Union 
62 
, followed by another one 
entitled 'Why does the Soviet Union need workers?... ". 
describing the boom in the Russian economy and the need 
for man-power to fulfill the five year plan. Komsomol 
members volunteered to work in these projects, and women 
had entered the labour market and were working on the 
same footing with men 
63. "Lenin, the man from the Volga" 
60- al-Ahali, 18.1.1932. 
61. ibid., 13.2.1932. 
62. Ibid., 24.1.1932. 
63. ibid., 25.1.1932. 
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was a translation published in two parts describing 
Lenin's activities before the October Revolution and 
his accomplishments after the establishment of the 
64 
Soviet Union . This was followed by an article about 
Stalin, under the title "Stalin; Russia! s man of steel", 
showing how popular Stalin was despite his ruthlessness 
and stated that his popularity could not be compared 
65 
with that of the old Russian Czars 
You*t: h 
As it announced on its front page, al-Ahali was 
published by a group of young men, and thus addressed 
itself primarily to its own age group, which was the 
most fertile ground for the ideology of al-Shalbiya. 
In fact, the paper was called Jaridat al-Shabab (the 
young people's paper) by many of its readers and 
66 67 
supporters . As well as a section on Youth Affairs 
there were numerous editorials and articles specifically 
addressed to young people, urging them to organize in 
societies 
68 
, and to direct their energies to improving 
69 
the life of the poor . It urged them to boycott foreign 
64. Ibid., 15,21.4.1932. 
65. Ibid., 22.4.1932. 
66. 
it is interesting that the tracts (Rasa'il mentioned 
earlier were specifically directed to young people. 
67- 
al-Ahali, 11.1.1932. 
68. Ibid., 26.2.1932; 6.4.1932. 
69. Ibid., 15.4.1932. 
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imports and films70 and criticised idleness and 
aimlessness 
71 
, calling'on young people to go to 
the countryside to educate and influence villagers by 
teaching them. to read and write and demonstrating basic 
health techniques. They were also encouraged to teach 
them their rights and make them demand better living 
72 
conditions . This method recalls that of the narodniks' 
or Russian Populists who also sent young people and 
students to the countryside 
73 
. 
9ýii'e* Campaigns 
One of the most important features of al-Ahali was 
its establishment of a number of campaigns which were 
met with an enthusiastic response all over the country. 
These campaigns were meant to create a means of 
communication between Jamalat al-Ahali and the population 
at large to galvanise them and organise them in 
associations, and to solidify opposition to the government 
and British policies. Another important point of the 
campaigns was to demonstrate the government's incompetence 
1ý I 
and its neglect of much needed social welfare policies. 
One problem al-Ahali faced, which was partly of its own 
creation, was fighting too many opponents on too many 
fronts at the same time. The sheer number of campaigns 
meant that it spread itself too thin to be able to achieve 
70. ! bid., 2.5.1932. 
71. Ibid., 11.6.1932. 
72. Ibid., 8.3.1932. 
73. Interview with Jamil. See also Batatu (1978), p. 302. 
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any real success in most of them. In fact, it is remarkable 
that a fair degree of success was attained in at least 
some of them. The first popular campaign conducted by 
al-Ahali was against the high rates charged by the 
Baghdad Electric and Power Company in January 1932. 
A complaint about this was published in the first issue 
of al-Ahali 
74 
, and 
it was followed by publication of 
the Company's balance sheets with the comment, "This is 
75 
how much the Electric Company takes of our money... " 
These articles were followed with many complaints about 
the high rates the Company was charging the residents 
of Baghdad, in an attempt to create a suitable climate 
76 for a boycott . As a result, the paper was closed for 
over ten months in July 1932, which delayed the action 
until later. Another major campaign which met with 
popular support was the boycott of the Bata shoe company, 
which was accused of competing unfairly with Iraqi shoe 
77 
makers and thus squeezing them out of business . Pupils 
and teachers from boys' and girls' schools responded to 
the boycott and organised committees to spread the 
campaign 
78. In an article, 'Will Bata win or the Iraqis? " 
79 
the paper showed the strength of popular feeling 
74. 
al-Ahali, 2.1.1932. 
75. Ibid., 15.1.1932. 
76. Ibid., 24.1.1932; 29.3-1932; 29.4.1932. 
77. ibid., 25.3.1932. 
78. Ibid., 26.4.1932. 
79. Ib .id., 22.4.1932. The manager of Bata approached al-Aha'li 
for a full page advertisement in the paper, 
'but 
Isma'il refused. 
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A similar campaign against the high admission charges 
to the Baghdad cinemas was widely supported by students8o. 
The paper made a strong appeal for a boycott of foreign 
imports whose competition with local products had 
resulted in the disappearance of local handicrafts and 
81 
artisans and workers losing their livelihood . The 
paper reported that a group of workers were about to 
form "A society for the prevention of unemployment" 
(. al'-Batalah)(idleness), 
82 
to which the government responded, 
at least on paper, by forming a "Committee for the support 
,, 83 of local manufacturers . Many articles and studies were 
published by the paper, calling for the establishment of 
a national bank - on the same lines as the Egyptian 
al-Bank al-Abli- The paper urged the participation of 
Iraqi nationals with the government in the creation of 
a central bank which would be a first step in replacing 
the foreign banks which dominated the finances of the 
84 
country 
A number of other calls to form societies for 
charitable and public purposes were made by al-Ahalio but 
these did not come to fruition. Many attempts were also 
made to start Mashrul al-Fils (the penny campaign), similar 
So' ibid., 
ý28,30.3.1932. 
81- Ibid., 25.3.1932; 14.4.1932. 
82. Ibid., 7.4.1932. 
83. Ibid., 2.5.1932. 
84. Ibid., 8.2.1932; 5,16,21.6.1932; 2.7.1932. 
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to the al-qirsh campaign which had been operating 
successfully in Egypt. This campaign tried to collect at 
least one fils (one penny) from as many citizens as possible 
to form a corporation to set up much needed industrial 
85 
projects . The paper also campaigned for the creation and 
development of summer resorts in the north 
86 
, and called 
for the establishment of people's houses and people's 
schools on Turkish lines, to be given to the peasants 
and workers, and built and administered by the people 
themselves 
87 
Perhaps the most potentially successful of al-Ahali's 
projects was the campaign to eradicate illiteracy. 
detailed article on 5 May 1932 explained the various 
organizational committees, the financing and administration 
and the teaching staff. This was followed by an editorial 
inviting the government to state its views on the project, 
which immediately attracted widespread support among the 
educated classes, and students in institutions all over 
the country pledged their participation, informing the 
paper that they had formed preparatory committees and 
88 
were ready to leave for the countryside . An article 
declared that "the young people have pledged their 
85 - Ibid., 6.5 . 1932. 
86. Ibid., 6.4.1932; 1.5.1932. 
87. Ibid'., 8,10,11,24.3.1932. 
88.1 bid., 11,13,19,22.5.1932. 
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support for the five year plan to eradicate illiteracy 
89 but the government remains silentIl" . The suppression 
of al-iihali, newspaper for almost a year meant that the 
campaign was temporarily abandoned until the paper 
reappeared in 1933. 
89 - Ibid., 17.5.1932. 
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3. Personal Conflicts 
(a) The departure of Husain Jamil and its effect on the group 
On 14 April 1932, the paper appeared with a new 
owner, 'Abd al-Qadir Ismalil. Husain Jamil remained managing 
director, but on 17 June, his name disappeared altogether. 
A month later he accepted a government job as Assistant 
Prosecutor at Hilla. Jamil's departure was the result 
of personal and ideological differences between himself 
and 'Abd al-Qadir Isma'il, which surfaced in the early 
months of publication and centred around the style and 
contents of the paper. Since such disagreements continued 
to be important in the organisation of al-Ahali, it is 
worth examining the episode in some detail. 
At the beginning, Jamil and Ismalil worked almost 
full-time on the paper, assisted by Yusuf Isma'il and 
Yusuf Matti, both of whom had Communist connections. The 
first and earliest contention between Jamil and 'Abd al- 
Qadir Isma'il was over the paper's basic orientation. Jamil 
claims that he wanted the paper to include different 
features and sections to attract the average reader such 
as sport, general information, women, youth and literature, 
while at the same time introducing the ideas and ideology 
of al-Ahali (al-Shalbiya) 
1- 
Ismalil, on the other hand, 
wanted al-Ahaii to be a wholly ideological newspaper in 
which every article should be a reflection of al-Ahali 
ideology; anything else he considered pandering to commercial 
" Interview with Jamil. 
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considerations. He wanted to adopt the style and format 
of the Egyptian paper al-Shura 
2 
and thought that the 
al-Ahali movement and its paper should, 
follow a clear and well-defined ideology, 
and take a clear line on opposing the 
Iraq Government and the British presence 
and influence in the country. 
Isma'il now attributes the conflict with Jamil to their 
social backgrounds; Jamil, in his view, "has taught 
himself to survive under all circumstances, as he wanted 
3 
to appease everyone" . Whether the conflict derives from 
their different backgrounds is a matter of opinion, but 
the two men have very distinct personalities and 
subsequent events have proved that they do not share a 
common political ideology. 
Another source of conflict between Jamil and Isma'il 
was the foreign news section called Latest Telegrams, which 
was the responsibility of Ismalil's brother Yusuf. Yusuf 
Ismalil and Yusuf Matti would translate the foreign 
telegrams, but before sending them to the press, they 
would alter them slightly and add a provocative headline 
to each telegram. Thus they would add a cynical twist to 
items about capitalists, fascists, or reactionaries, and 
words of praise for national liberation movements, socialists 
and progressives. Thus the news always attacked the 
British government in India and supported the Republic 
2. 
published 
al-Shura was a strictly ideological newspaper/by the 
Wafd party in the 1920s. 
3. Interview with Isma'il. 
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0 
in Spain. One item reported pro-Chinese demonstrations. 
by Communists in Athens, and another suggested that Turkey 
was turning Communist on the Russian model, because civil 
servants were only taking a quarter of their salaries and 
turning the remainder over to the government in savings 
bonds4. Jamil objected to this kind of presentation, 
which he considered would arouse unnecessary resentment 
against a newly established newspaper, and eventually 
alienate it from many sections of society. If this trend 
was allowed to continue, the paper would only appeal to 
a small minority of progressive elements, and would thus 
5 not be able to survive financially or otherwise 
'Abd al-Qadir Isma'il fully supported his brother 
and considered that the telegrams were both a source of 
attraction and completely in line with the paper's 
ideology. However, the final blow came when Yusuf published 
a telegram reporting on a speech of the Pope under the 
heading 'Hypocrisy ... one good deed is better than years 
of prayer. ' After reporting the speech, the article 
continued 'Then the Pope knelt down to pray surrounded 
by aristocrats. ' On the occasion of the Sino-Japanese 
war Yusuf wrote of the Pope's prayers for the Chinese: 
'Prayers and hymns will protect the Chinese people, j6 
These items infuriated local Catholics who complained to 
4. 
al-Ahali 24,28.1.1932; 5.2.1932; 5.5.1932. 
S. Ibid., 14.2.1932. 
6. Ibid., 17.2.1932. 
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Jamil about these insults to the head of their church. 
Seizing on this complaint, which he felt he must uphold, 
Jamil demanded that Yusuf be dismissed: otherwise he would 
leave the paper himself. 'Abd al-Oadir sent his brother 
away for a while, but gradually relations between Ismalil 
and Jamil became intolerable. Jamil recalls that he would 
suggest that items should be published, and Ismalil would 
7 
object or ignore them, and he himself would do the same 
This was reflected in the format of the newspaper, for 
on one day news from the Arab world would appear in 
capital letters on the front page, with telegrams and 
world news relegated to the third or fifth pages, while 
a few days later this would all be reversed. Sometimes 
8 
news from the Arab countries would disappear altogether 
Eventually, Jamil decided to let Ismalil have his 
way in the running of the paper, and transferred ownership 
to him in April 1932, while remaining managing director. 
However, the paper's increasingly leftward stance and 
its more aggressive attacks on the government and the 
political system became less and less congenial to Jamil, 
or, as Ismalil alleges, to 'Jamil's future ambitions19. 
Hence on 17 June Jamil resigned and was replaced by another 
7. Interview with Jamil. 
a. 
e. g. al-Ahali between February and June 1932. 
9- interview with Isma'il. However, at this stage Jamil 
cannot be accused of having high ambitions, since the 
post at Hilla was relatively modest. In fact he was 
transferred to 'Ana a few months later because of his 
political activities. 
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lawyer, Isma'il al-Ghanim, thus ending his official 
connection with the project he had helped to create. 
However, he remained on good terms with Jamalat al-Ahali 
and later contributed articles to the paper under a 
pseydonymlo. 
'Abd al-Qadir Isma'il was unable to run the paper 
on his own, and sent an urgent request to his cousin 'Abd 
al-Fattah Ibrahim who was working as a translator at the 
port authority in Basra, asking him to come to Baghdad to 
assist him. Ibrahim arranged a transfer to Baghdad with 
the help of Nasrat al-Farisi, then director general of 
the Ministry of Justice who was a sympathiser of Jamalat 
al-Ahali 
11 
Meanwhile, al-Ahali carried on its blistering attacks 
on the government, and exhorted young people to utilise 
their energies to work hard to reform the deteriorating 
condition of the country 
12. After Jamil left the paper 
its style became less subtle and more emotional, and its 
articles played on the emotions of young people, using 
the exaggerated rhetoric typical of the Arab journalism 
of the day. Furthermore, its tone became more strongly 
parochial (_iqlim . criticising the Syrians and other 
Arabs working in Iraq and accusing them of simply seeking 
material gain. it attacked Nuri and Faisal's scheme for 
lo. Interview with Jamil. 
11. Interview with Ibrahim. 
12. 
al-Ahali, 18,19.6.1932. 
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the unity of the fertile crescent under Faisal's leadership, 
and criticised supporters of the project for their self- 
interest. In general it showed more concern for Iraqi 
and international affairs, and took less note of events 
13 in the Arab world 
The government only took any serious notice of 
al-Ahýaii when it directed its attacks against individual 
members of the ruling class. In late June 1932, a 
headline appeared: 'Oppression will not last ... because 
nations do not die. ' It attacked the corruption of the 
system, in which an official's main concern was to amass 
as much wealth as possible. Finally, it pointed out that 
the ruling class knew well that it could not stay in 
power for ever, that their maladministration would hasten 
the people's awakening and thus push forward the day of 
liberation 14. A few days later another editorial appeared 
under the heading 'What benefits has the national government 
brought to the people? ', showing again that nothing 
substantial had been achieved for ordinary individuals. 
Instead, autocratic rule simply served vested interests, 
as had traditionally been the case 
15. 
On 28 June there 
was another attack on Nurils government, particularly for 
its unity scheme: 'Will the fascist comedy be repeated? 
13. 
Ibid., 19.6.1932,19.6.1932,24.4.1932,22.6.1932# 
20.6'. 1932,1.7.1932,2.7.1932,3.7.1932,26.4.1932, 
27.4.1932,9.5.1932,5.5.1932. 
14. 
Ibid., 14.6.1932. 
15. 
Ibid., 21.6.1932. 
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16 What is behind these claims?? ' On this occasion the 
paper was given a warning by the Ministry of Interior, 
which it published in its own columns the next day. 
However, al-Ahali was not deterred, and published even 
more forceful attacks on the government and the political 
system. 'The content is the same although the outward form 
may change ' introduced an attack on the ruling class, who 
had served first the Ottomans, then the British, and 
were now serving the so-called 'national government'. The 
ruling class has always shown its insensitivity to the 
people's welfare, while taking all the advantages for 
itself. They do not want to lose their positions, whatever 
the cost to the population at large17 . This particular 
article seems to have been the last straw, and the paper 
18 was suspended for three months in July 1932 
The paper reappeared for a few days in October, with 
al-Ghanim as managing director and a new owner, 'Aziz 
19 
Sharif The first editorial contained a sharp attack 
on the government for having closed the paper for what 
it described as a 'summer holiday'. It declared that 
the paper would continue to oppose the government as long 
as it acted in an undemocratic and unrepresentative fashion. 
16. 
Ibid., 28.6.1932. 
17. Ibid., 6.7.1932. 
18. 
Knabenshue to State Department: 16.7.1932, USNA 890G. 00/209. 
19. 
Isma'il's name disappeared because Rashid 'Ali disliked 
him, but in fact he and Ibrahim continued to be responsible 
for the day to day running of the paper. 
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It made sarcastic reference to Iraq's entry to the League 
of Nations three days earlier, and ended: 
The government exists to serve the people, 
not to suppress them. If it goes astray, the 
people have the right to criticise it, and 
call it to account for its misdeeds. We, the 
sons of the people, from their flesh and 
blood, demand that their interests be rightly 
served. This is what we stood for, this is 
what we wrote, and this is why we were 
suppressed. Here we stand again, sincere in 20 our beliefs and passionate in our commitment. 
The same issue contained an article on a theme later taken 
up as a slogan by the Iraqi Communist Party: 'What is 
the object of our struggle? A free country and a happy 
people. ' It explained that the working out of the 
dialectical processes would eventually secure the 
fulfilment of this aim. The next day's issue contained 
an article headed 'We are popularists', which explained 
the ideology of al-Sha'biya, and expressed their demands 
for 'government by the people for the people: the present 
government does not meet these conditions in any way. ' 
21 
This time the government wasted no time in closing the 
paper down after only two days, and it remained suspended 
for six months, although the original order had been for 
a year 
22. 
During this period two volumes of Rasalil a'_l'-Ah*a*li 
ila al-Shabab were published, both by 'Abd al-Fattah Ibrahim. 
20. 
al-Ahall. 7.10.1932. 
21. 
ibid., 8.10.1932. 
22. Knabenshue to State Department: 20.10.1932, 
USNA 890G. 91/2, which mentions the suspension for a year. 
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The first, 
_'Ala 
Tariq al-Hind, appeared at the end of 
IV()J. JL 
1932, while al-ShalbiyA Lappeared early in 1933. 
The paper began publication once more on 21 April 
1933, with 'Aziz Sharif as its owner and manager. The 
first editorial was headed lal-Ahali, returns' criticising 
the paper's suppression as an irresponsible act. The 
article clearly projected self-confidence as it declared 
the futility of any government's attempt to choke a 
genuine ideology, which it claimed had spread like wildfire; 
al-Shalbiya, as had been expected, had become the "destiny 
of youth" 
23. Another editorial followed the next day on 
Rashid' 'Ali's Government and its position on the Treaty 
of 1930, raising many questions about the formation of 
the 'coalition Cabinet', which included 'the man who 
signed the Treaty' (Nuri al-Sa'id) as well as the 'leaders 
of the opposition' Rashid 'Ali and al-Hashimi. The paper 
asked the new Cabinet to deal with the Treaty, or rather 
to abolish it, as a matter of urgency. The members of 
the Cabinet were described as 
The men responsible for the difficulties of 
the last 13 years, who have played on the 
opposition as well as on the government sides. 
The only new personality is the minister of 
Justice (Muhammad Zaki, who was sympathetic 
to al-Ahali) modern in his education, modern 
in his thinking, with youthful energy and 
enthusiasm. 24 
23- 
al-Ahali, 21.4.1933. 
1 
24. Ibid., 22.4.1933. 
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This article was an attempt to sound out the new 
cabinet's policies and also to pressure Rashid 'Ali and 
Yasin (the al-Ikha leaders) to put their previous promises 
into effect by continuing their opposition to the 1930 
Treaty in line with the al-Ta lakhi Charter 25. al-Ahali's 
position of greater restraint towards the government was 
obviously influenced by Ja'far Ab, u al-Timman, who had 
taken up a wait-and-see attitude towards the government. 
To put more pressure to bear on Rashid and Yasin, 
another editorial appeared on 23 April discussing the 
Cabinet's programme and expressing its apprehension at 
the surprise declaration by the cabinet that it would 
'respect international commitments'; the paper wondered 
whether this meant the acceptance of the 1930 Treaty. 
It also wondered about the government's position in 
circumstances when international commitments might 
26 
clash with national aspirations al-Ahali continued 
to show concern for the general condition of the population 
and the policies of the government, and continued to deal 
with the same issues, although in a somewhat more 
emotional fashion. It began to focus more attention on 
the plight of the agricultural sector and the wretched 
27 
condition of the peasants 
25. 
See page 55. 
26. 
al-Ahali, 23.4.1933. 
1 
27. ibid., e. g. various issues in May and June 1933. 
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(b) The Departure of Jamil 'Abd al-Wahhab and Khalil Kanna 
When 'Abd al-Wahhab and Kanna were students at Baghdad 
School of Law, they were imprisoned with Isma'il and 
others for their active opposition to the 1930 Treaty. As 
a result they became friends and associates of Ismalil 
and Jamil, and helped the group in the early days of 
the publication of the newspaper. After 'Abd al-Wahhab 
and Kanna's graduation in 1932 they set up a law office 
which became a meeting place for Jamalat al-Ahali and 
supporters. Soon after Husain Jamil's departure, Jamil 
'Abd al-Wahhab found the course of Jamalat al-Ahali too 
difficult and dangerous for his liking so he accepted 
a government position as a judge in October 1932, and 
subsequently severed all ties with the group and the 
paper. 
Khalil Kanna remained with the group rather longer, 
contributing articles and translations, though he also 
veered gradually to the right. However, when Jamil left 
the paper and 'Abd al-Fattah Ibrahim returned from 
Basra, al-Ahali, began to turn towards the left. In 
consequence Kanna broke away from the movement, as he 
found himself out of tune with the progressive ideas 
al-Ahali had embraced. Ile described the members of Jamalat 
al-Ahali in his memoirs as a 
mixture of leftists, communists, opportunists 
and other ill-intentioned individuals who 
concealed themselves behind the banners of 
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democracy and popularism. 
28 
The departure of 'Abd al-Wahhab and Kanna, and 
more significantly, that of Husain Jamil, meant the 
loss of the moderate influence and the dominance of 
the more radical wing, comprising 'Abd al-Fattah Ibrahim, 
'Abd al-Qadir Isma'il and 'Aziz Sharif. The change became 
particularly noticeable in the pages of the newspaper. 
However, the group was now to be joined by a political 
personality of considerable influence, Kamil al-Chadirchi, 
whose arrival brought about important changes in 
its 
style and practice. This was because al-Chadirchi was 
the first practical politician to be recruited to al- 
Ahali, and the first person to have access to the 
traditional channels of political influence. 
4. Kamil al-Chadirchi joins al-Ahali 
Kamil al-chadirchi, who had been on the Executive 
Committee of al-Ikha'Party and was the editor of its 
paper, began to drift away from the party due to 
disagreements with the party leadership, particularly 
over Rashid 'Ali's acceptance of the post of Chief of 
the Royal Diwan in November 1932. The rift became 
complete when al-Ik: Nal agreed to form a government in 
28. 
Kanna K. # al-Iraq Amsuhu wa Ghaduhu 
(Iraq, its past 
and future)-#TB-eirut 1966), p. b2-. In 1935 Kanna joined 
Nadi al-Muthanna and was subsequently imprisoned for 
his involvement-in the May 1941 uprising. In 1946 he 
joined Hizb al-Istiqlal, from which he resigned to settle 
down with Nuri 51-Salid's Hizb al-Ittihad al-Dasturi 
(Constitutional Union Part-yF-T-see Longrigg l953-, p7ff5)- 
He mjrýied Nuri's niece and remained his right arm and 
protOgO, holding several ministerial positions until 
the collapse of the monarchy. 
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March 1933 without insisting on any revision to the 1930 
Treaty, which was against Wathiqa al-Talakhi (The 
Talakhi Charter) which they had signed with Hi*zb' ai-ýiatani 
in March 1931 
29 
. Over the two years, and particularly in 
the course of the meetings of-the leadership of the two 
parties, al-Chadirchi had developed great admiration and 
respect for Ja'far Abu al-Timman and a close friendship 
with Hikmat Sulaiman. On the other hand he had grown 
disenchanted with Yasin al-Hashimi and Rashid 'Ali's 
tactics and ambitions. 
At the beginning of 1932, while al-Chadirchi was 
still editor of al-1khal paper, al-Ahali newspaper 
appeared. al-Chadirchi wrote: 'When the paper (al-Ahali) 
was published, I followed it with interest. I found it 
a liberal paper in harmony with my own ideas in many 
ways. . 
30 Obviously moved by the quality of the now 
paper, al-Chadirchi wrote an article welcoming it and 
31 
wishing it well in its endeavours . He went on to 
support the demands made by al-Ahali, sometimes even 
echoing al-Ahali editorials in his own newspaper 
32 
. 
al-Chadirchi began his contacts with Jamalat al-Ahali 
29. Longrigg (1953), p. 184; also al-Chadirchi (1970), 
p. 25. al-Chadirchi states that Yasin al-Hashimi 
was behind a conflict between Hikmat Sulaiman and 
himself for insinuating to him that Hikmat Sulaiman 
was behind Rashid 'Ali's acceptance of the position. 
30. 
al-Chadirchi (1970), p. 27. 
31. 
al-Ikhalal-Watani No. 134,13.1.32. Quoted al-'UmariK. j (19682. p*. 43. 
32 
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during the latter part of 1932. He suggested to Jamil 
'Abd al-Wahhab and Khalil Kanna that they should share 
their law office with him and he began to attend their 
meetings regularly. Eventually he offered them a house 
for their meetings and discussions. in his memoirs al- 
Chadirchi explains these early contacts: 
I believe that the desire to work together 
came from both sides ... For my part, I 
contacted 'Abd al-Fattah Ibrahim, then 'Abd 
al-Qadir Isma'il, and the more we met, the 
stronger our relationship grew. We met in 
my house jIbrahim, Hadid and 'Ali Haidar 
Sulaiman)33 and we discussed the need to 
establish a socio-political programme as 
the foundation for a political movement 
and a scheme for al-Ahali to follow. In 
early 1933 al-Ahali newspaper began to 
propagate this ideology under the name of 
al-Sha'biya. 34 
However, al-Chadirchils motives for leaving Hizb al-lkhal 
fal-watani and joining Jamalat al-Ahali are still disputed 
35 by his former colleagues Ibrahim believes that Kamil 
al-Chadirchi was pressured into leaving al-Ikhal by Yasin 
who 
al-Hashimi, /ignored him, refused to take him seriously, 
humiliated him and injured his pride. Ibrahim considers 
al-Chadirchils joining al-Ahali to have been an act of 
33. 
al-Chadirchi does not include Ismalil. 
34. 
al-Chadirchils recollections are definitely inaccurate. 
The principles. of al-Shalbiya had been agreed upon 
by Jama_'at al-Ahal'! in 193 d the summary of al- 
Sha'biva, (called t progran=e) was published i-n a 
pamphlet in 1932. Besides al-Ahali newspaper had been 
propagating the ideology since thi; paper first appeared in January 1932. 
35. 
Ibrahim, Hadid and Ismalil are still (March 1980) alive; 
al-Chadirchi died in 1968. 
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36 
desperation and a way of getting back at Yasin 
Ismalil attests to al-Chadirchils belief in socialism and 
democracy and describes him as a progressive person who 
might well have been too much to the left for the al-Ikh*al 
leadership. Hadid asserts that al-Chadirchi had similar 
political views to those of al-Ahali, and feels that it 
was natural that he should leave the traditional party 
and join a more progressive and radical movement. 
Exactly how al-Chadirchi came to join al-Ahali is 
also not entirely clear; Isma'il and Ibrahim say that he 
was accepted first as an associate and then gradually 
worked his way up within the group. al-Chadirchi's memoirs 
are borne out by Hadid's version, which is quoted below. 
It should be remembered that prior to al-Chadirchils 
arrival the group did not contain a singlelpracticall 
37 
politician, or member of a prominent family 
36. Yasin was friendly with Kamil's brother Raluf and 
had secured employment for Kamil since 1925. Kamil 
was also well connected with other politicians 
(see below). Kamil's ambition and some of his 
objections to Ikha' policy seem to*have been the 
causes of the friction between Yasin, Rashid 'Ali 
and himself. Kamil was not nominated as one of the 
party's deputies in 1932, which may well have 
prompted his formal break with the leadership. 
37. 
Furthermore, al-Chadirchi, who was born in 1897, 
was several years older than the founders of 
al-Ahali. 
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When al-Chadirchi made these contacts, we 
the founders of al-Ahali met and evaluated 
his overtures. We came to the following 
conclusions, - "al-chadirchi has similar 
olitical viewl- to our own, and is also a 
weTl'--known and distinguished political 
personalit . It is to our advantage Mat 
we should establish a wor)king basis with 
him. He is experienced in Iraqi politics 
and to an unseasoned political movement 
like ours he, could be a great asset. He 
would_get_us_out of our shell and he could 
transform us from a doFmFa'tlc into a rea- =1stic 
(practical) political movement". 
This principle was later to applied in t 
cases of'Abu al-Timman and Hikmat Sulaiman. 
Two significant points emerge which show al-Chadirchils 
character in a more favourable light, and contrast with 
the assessment of Ibrahim and others. In the first place 
it is clear that al-Chadirchi severed his ties with 
al-Ikha' on his own initiative, at a time when they had 
actually achieved power, showing that he was not after 
spoils and personal gain, and that he possessed a much 
higher standard of principles and ethics than most 
Iraqi politicians of that era. Secondly, it is clear that 
in joining al-Ahali movement he tied himself to the most 
ideologically extreme opposition group existing at the 
time. If he did not possess strong and well defined 
beliefs, al-Chadirchi would have found more comfort and 
glory as well as spoils, in joining Nuri al-Salid's 
camp (like Muzahim al-Pachachi) or by aligning himself with 
al-madfali and 'Ali Jawdat. Better still, he could have 
38. interview with Hadid. According to Siddiq Shanshal, 
Yunis al-Sab'awi was convinced that al-Chadirchi 
left al-Ikha' and joined al-Ahali for ideological 
reasons. 
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moved closer to King Faisal through the good offices of 
Mahmud Subhi al-Daftari, his brother-in-law and first 
cousin, or through Naji Shawkat, another brother-in-law. 
However, it must be admitted that once settled in al-Ahali, 
al-Chadirchi soon proved too ambitious for the style of 
collective leadership which had characterised the group 
until his arrival. His tactics, which were aimed at 
securing the leadership for himself, harmed the principles 
and ideology of the movement and weakened the position of 
the founders, especially Ibrahim 
39 
39. 
In Independent Iraq Khadduri 
wrongly asserts that al-Chadirchi joined al-Ahali in 
1934 (p. 72) and Laqueur, W. 2., Communism and Nationalism 
in the Middle East (London 1956'T repeats the error on 
p-177. it is cl from conversations with the founders 
that al-chadirchils early contacts began in 19321 and 
that he became a full member in mid-1933. 
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Chapter IX 
The Development and Role of Jamalat al-Ahali 
between 1933 and 1935 
With the arrival of Kamil al-Chadirchi, and the 
consolidation of the group in the course of 1932 and 1933 
through the activities of its newspaper, Jamalat al-Ahali 
attained the status of a popular and well-established 
political movement. It emerged clearly as a progressive 
group, in active opposition not only to particular 
governments but to the political system as a whole and 
to the overriding influence of Britain. Thus successive 
governments dealt with Jamalat al-Ahali sever6ly and 
subjected the paper to lengthy and frequent suppression 
and its members to persecution and imprisonment. 
In this chapter, Jamalat al-Ahali's position will 
be discussed with respect to the Assyrian incident, the 
and 
death of King Faisal in 1933, /the boycott of the Baghdad 
Electric and Power company in 1934. Other activities will 
also be mentioned, including the formation of the society 
for the eradication of illiteracy, the establishment of 
the Baghdad club, the formation of the al-Shalbiya secret 
societyl the recruitment of Ja'far Abu al-Timman and 
Hikmat Sulaiman to the group, the departure of some of 
the early members and the publication of various newspapers. 
The chapter ends with an account of Jamalat al-Ahali's 
early involvement in practical politics. 
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The Assyrian Incident 
al-Ahali devoted its full attention to the Assyrian 
conflict and took a clear and strong position on it from 
the beginning to the end. It reported the background of 
the Assyrian problem, laying the main responsibility on a 
combination of British interference and the weakness of 
the Iraq government. The first article appeared on 25 June 
1933 as the news of the trouble began to filter through to 
Baghdad. In an editorial entitled "The Assyrian and the 
Ally". the paper traced back the promises made by the 
British to the Assyrians during World War 1, particularly 
the settlements in northern Iraq and the formation of 
the Levies. It went on to demand that the impasse should 
be resolved quickly and decisively by the government 
threatening to act against British interests in Iraq, 
perhaps by a boycott of British goods. 
After a lull, which coincided with the negotiations 
with the Mar Shim'un, the paper returned to the attack 
at the end of July. An article headed "The Assyrian 
Question and the Present Political Situation" blamed 
the British once more and ended by saying "Britain should 
be made to understand that the policy of divide and rule 
1 is a policy of the past" . The Acting British Ambassador, 
Mr. Ogilvie-Forbes submitted a formal complaint to the 
al-'Ah'ali, 30.7.1933. 
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Iraqi Foreign Ministry, 
conveying the sense of concern with which 
H, M. Government view the campaign of slander 
and defamation which the Iraqi press is 
conducting against Great Britain and 
inquiring what action the Iraqi Government 
propose to take. 2 
In due course the Iraq Government issued a warning to 
al-Aha. li newspaper 
3 
which the paper published, accompanied 
by another strong attack on British policy. The Acting 
British Ambassador was infuriated and made an urgent 
official request to the Prime Minister for a public 
4 dementi . He had an audience with King Faisal 
in which 
the latter put on one of his finest dramatic performances: 
King Feisal with a gesture of shame seized 
offending paper from my hand and threw it under 
his chair. He asked me to convey his sincere 
apologies to His Majesty's Government. I said 
I hoped that something would be done to the 
editor and His Majesty promised to take up 
matter personally with the Prime Minister. 
al-Ahali was not deterred from continuing its attacks 
2. Mr. Ogilvie Forbes to SIS Foreign Affairs: 20.7.1933# 
FO. 371/16916/E4082. 
Foreign Office to Acting Ambassador, Mr. Ogilvie 
Forbes: 28.7.1933, FO. 371/16916/E4082; 
2.8.1933,, FO. 371/16916/E44339; -and 
9.8.1933, FO. 371/16916/E4478. 
3. 
al-Ahali, 6.8.1933. 
4. Foreign Office to Acting Ambassador: 
28.7.1933, FO. 371/16910/E4082. 
5. Mr. Ogilvie Forbes to SIS Foreign Affairs: 
3.8.1933, FO. 371/16910/E4358. 
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on British policy, and in fact urged an even more 
vigorous campaign against Britain and France for having 
co-ordinated their efforts to create such a dangerous 
6 
situation. As a result the government was virtually forced 
to ban the paper for ten days 
7. 
After the storm had subsided somewhat, the paper 
reappeared on 19 August, but continued its original line 
on the Assyrians. It praised the Army for the way it 
had dealt with the "renegades", and hailed those who 
had supported it in eliminating the threat to Iraqi 
sovereignty, particularly Prince Ghazi, Hikmat Sulaiman 
and Bakr Sidqi, while criticising the King and Nuri for 
their concern for the interests of Britain rather than 
those of Iraq. The paper criticised Sir Francis Humphry9k, 
early return to Iraq, and the likelihood that he would 
8 interfere in what were essentially internal affairs 
After the fighting had ended, the paper described 
the return of Hikmat Sulaiman to Baghdad in glowing terms, 
but much greater adulation accompanied the reporting of 
the popular reception for the victorious Army in Mosul# 
6. 
al-Ahali, 7.8.1933; also Ambassador (Baghdad) to 
S7S Fore'ign Affairs: 18.8.1933# FO. 371/16910/E4782. 
7. Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs: 
8,8,19331 FO. 371/16910/E4433; 
18.8.1933, FO. 371/16910/E4782. 
The Report also included the Iraqi Foreign Ministry's 
apology for the press campaign against the British 
government and informed the British Embassy of the 
Council of Ministers' decision on suspending al-Ahali 
newspaper. 
al-Ahali, 19,20,21.8.1933. 
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Kirkuk and Baghdad. It also published letters of support 
for the Army, and other letters from individuals in all 
walks of life volunteering to enlist to save the country 
from the Assyrian aggression 
9. The paper encouraged the 
formation of committees to raise funds for the families 
10 
of those who had been "martyred" on active service 
it also published a letter from Bakr Sidqi, the Commander 
in Chief of 'Imad Force and the Northern Region, addressed 
to the people of Mosul, thanking them for their generous 
welcome, which ended on an interesting note: 
Our thanks are coupled with admiration and 
appreciation. I present our thanks as a 
pledge for the deeds which the army will 
perform in the future as part of its great 
duty, which it is preparing to carry out. 
Let both the Army and the people await 
that day. 11 
The paper continued to follow the develop; nent of 
the Assyrian problem with great interest# particularly 
the discussions of the case at Geneva, and the various 
schemes to settle the Assyrians in other parts of the world. 
9. Ibid., 25.8.1933,2.9.1933. 
The paper reported, for instance, that the barbers 
will shave the Iraqi officers and soldiers free for 
three days, as well as the cafe owners, who would 
have the soldiers free. Of the two main restaurants 
in the capital one gave a free lunch and the other 
free dinner. 
10. 
al-Ahali, 19,20,21,23,24.8.1933. 
11. Ibid., 25.8.1933. 
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It also published over a hundred official documents 
relating to the Assyrian conflictl2 as well as the 
.. 13 government's Blue Book on the Recent Assyrian Mutiny 
The Death of King Faisal 
on hearing of Faisal's death on 8 September, Jamalat 
al-Ahali met and decided to publish the news in a casual 
and almost indifferent manner, which contrasted sharply 
with the grief-stricken reaction of the rest of the 
press. Most of the issue, in which Faisal's death was 
reported in a few paragraphs, was addressed to the young 
Ghazi, praising his position during the Assyrian conflict, 
which had 'gained him the love of the people', and 
urging him to 'protect the constitution' and to 'stand 
14 
on the side of the people' . As a result there were 
angry reactions, and even attempts to burn down the press 
building 15 , and this, combined with the departure of 
'Ali Haidar Sulaiman, led to the publication of a special 
'disaster issue' (laddad al-fajila) on 15 Septembor. It 
contained one photograph of Faisal and two of Ghazi, and 
described the funeral procession and the accompanying 
scenes of grief. 
12. 
Ibid,., from 2.10.1933 to 2.11.1933. 
13. 
Ibid.,, 1.10.1933. 
14. 
Ibid., 9.9.1933. 
15- interview with ismalil, also al-Chadirchi (1970) 
p. 28. 
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The Departure of 'Ali Haidar Sulaiman 
al-Ahali's attitude to the death of King Faisal was 
the apparent reason for 'Ali Haidar Sulaiman's departure 
from Jama'at al-Ahali, which lost the group the services 
of one of its most brilliant members. Sulaiman reacted 
strongly and unexpectedly to the death of the King, and 
wrote an article eulogising him, pointing out that Faisal's 
death was a great loss not only to Iraq but to the whole 
Arab nation, which he demanded that 'Abd al-Oadir Ismalil 
should publish. Isma'il informed him of the group's 
decision and refused to print itl6. As a result, Sulaiman's 
relations with Jamalat al-Ahali became somewhat distant 
and he began to absent himself from the group's meetings. 
When the Minister of Interior Naji Shawkat discovered 
that Sulaiman had fallen out with the group* he asked him 
to become his private secretary which he accepted. He 
told 'Abd al-Fattah Ibrahim that he was tired of being a 
secondary school teacher, which would take him nowhere 
and did not suit his ambitions. This may explain Sulaiman's 
behaviour at the death of the King. He later became the 
Director-General of the Ministry of Interior and also 
17 
served as Ambassador in Washington 
16. -- Ibid. 
17. Interview with Ibrahim, Isma'il and Hadid. Politicians 
like Nuri al-Salid, Yasin al-Hashimi, Jamil al-Madfa'i 
and 'Ali Jawdat frequently lured the educated to their 
side by offering thom Uood positions, thus wcakening tho 
opposition. Nuri offered Ibrahim and Hadid posts as 
diplomats which they refused, and ismalil refused to 
work for the government altogether. 
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Jamliyyat al-Sali li Mukafaha 
,t 
al-'Ummi)4ya 
(The Society for the Eradication of Illiteracy) 
When al-Ahali newspaper reappeared on 21 April 1933, 
after being suppressed for six months, it resumed its 
interest in one of its earlier campaigns, the eradication 
of illiteracy. It announced that it would publish a 
special supplement on illiteracy which eventually appeared 
on 30 June. The editorial was headed "The enlightenment 
of the people comes before everything else", and was 
addressed to the young and the students, both men and 
women, workers, self-employed and civil servants, urging 
them to establish 'people's houses' in every part of the 
country in order to teach as many people as possible. 
The article ended with the encouraging news that in 
Baghdad there is "a group of young men who are determined 
to start this task"18. 
This group of young men were members of Jamalat al- 
Ahali headed by Ibrahim and Hadid whose application for 
the formation of the Society for the Eradication of 
Illiteracy had been granted by the Minister of the 
Interior on 25 September 1933. Meanwhile, the paper was 
publishing letters of support'for the project from 
people of all walks of life who were pledging to establish 
centres for the eradication of illiteracy. Although the 
campaign coincided with the Assyrian conflict, the paper 
continued its coverage of both with almost equal enthusiasm. 
19 
18. 
al-Ahali, 30.6.1933. 
19. Ibid., 18.9.1933; 5.8.1933; 31.7.1933. 
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On 7 October, al-Ahali published what it called "The 
first step towards eradicating illiteracy" and the new 
Society's constitution (al-Nidham al-Asasi). The 
constitution was more appropriate to a political party 
or organisation than a society for the eradication of 
illiteracy, which supports Jamalat al-Ahali's claim 
that they used the society as a front for their political 
activities. 
In order to ensure the society's success, Jamalat 
al-Ahali decided, under the influence of Kamil al- 
Chadirchi, to include prominent personalities on -the 
executive committee. The first name which was suggested 
and was met with instant approval was that of Jalfar Abu 
al-Timman. al-Chadirchi and Ibrahim both give themselves 
the credit for having approached him first 
20. Abu al-Timman, 
being the man he was, was pleased to participate in a 
project which was clearly widely beneficial, although 
at that time he was deeply disillusioned by Iraqi politics# 
and only a week after his election to the presidency of 
the society on 26 October, he announced that he was 
retiring from politics. After further consultation 
Jamalat al-Ahali succeeded in forming the executive 
committee which consisted of Abu al-Timman, Nasrat al-Farisi, 
Kamil al-Chadirchi, Dr radhil al-Jamali, Muhammad Hadid, 
'Abd al-Fattah Ibrahim, and 'Ali Haidar Sulaiman. The 
20. Interview with Ibrahim, also al-Chadirchi(1970), p. 29. 
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Committee elected Abu al-Timman president, al-Farisi 
21 
. 
vice-president, Ibrahim secretary, and Hadid treasurer 
The society published a 24-page pamphlet which was 
distributed all over the country, describing similar 
attempts to eradicate illiteracy in Turkey, Russia, Italy, 
Mexico and China. It called for a combined effort of the 
people and the government in order for the campaign to 
be completely successful. The society ended the pamphlet 
with this call: 
The society sends this appeal to every 
Iraqi, government employee, merchant or 
worker, to join its ranks and to perform 
his duty, whether as an active or an 
associate member. It calls on all those who 
want to join to do so as soon as possible 22 in order to open branches and commence the work. 
News of activities appeared quickly from various 
areas; the Teachers' Training College in Baghdad opened 
four different night schools with an enrolement of over 
700 pupils, and the secondary school in Mosul opened 
classes for 400 pupils. Similar news came from Basra, 
Balquba, Samawa''Amara,, Samarral,, Nasiriya, 'Ana, Kirkuk, 
Hilla and many other smaller towns and villages23. However,, 
the activities of the societywre somewhat reduced as a 
result of al-Ahali's involvement in the boycott of the 
Baghdad Light and Power company, Abu al-Timman's 
retirement from politics, and the suppression of the paper 
for lengthy periods after 27 Deýember 1933 
24 
.. But 
21. 
al-Ahali', 27.10.1933. 
22. Ibid., 15.11.1933. 
23. Ibid.,, 17.11.1933. 
24. 
al-Ahali was suppressed for 3 months on 27.12.33. It 
reappeared on U. 2.1934, was suppressed again for 4 months 
on 12.3.1934 and reappeared on 4.7.1934. Finally it was 
suppressed for one Xear on 7.9.1934. It did not reappear 
until after the 193 coulp dletat on 3.11.1q1A- 
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whenever the paper reappeared it resumed its campaign and 
began to publish the news of the society's numerous 
branches which had been set up all over the country. In 
an editorial on 4 March 1934, al-Ahali demanded that the 
government of Jamil al-Madfali should allocate at least 
ID 10,000 for the campaign to eradicate illiteracy and 
to subsidise the society's operations. The article 
reminded the Minister of Finance (Nasrat al-Farisi) that 
he was one of the founders of the society and that he 
25 
was also its vice-president 
After the suppression of al-Ahali, Sawt al-Ahali 
continued the same interest and coverage of the campaign. 
On 6 July 1934 the first conference of the Society for 
the Eradication of Illiteracy was attended by the executive 
committee and representatives of branches of the society 
from Basra, Nasiriya, Kufa, 11illa and Balquba. Abu al- 
Timman suggested that Nasrat al-Farisi should preside 
over the conference, which the society agreed. Ibrahim 
was elected secretary, and the meeting proceeded to evaluate 
the results of the society's activities. The session continued 
for two days and ended with resolutions to expand the work 
of the society 
26. The Baghdad branch reached about 150 
members including Yunis al-Sab'awi, Muhammad Salih al-Qazzazo 
25. 
al-Ahali, 4.3.1934. 
1 
26. Ibid,., 7,8.7.1934. 
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Yusuf al-Gailani, Mahmud Ahmad, and Sadiq al-Bassam, as 
well as Husain Jamil and 'Ali Haidar Sulaiman 
27. 
But the 
activities of the society and the Baghdad branch in 
particular were overshadowed by other political activities 
coupled with the various suppressions of the group's 
newspapers, which prevented the reporting of the society's 
news. 
27. Interview with Hadid and Ibrahim. 
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The Boycott of the Baghdad Light and Power Company 
The first issue of al-Ahali on 2 January 1932 hinted 
that the rate of 28 fils per kilowatt for electricity 
which the Company was charging was very expensive. The 
article indicated that most Baghdadis were complaining 
that the rates they were paying were higher than those 
in other Iraqi and foreign cities. Thus the paper paved 
the way for a boycott of electricity which was organised 
by Muhammad Salih al-Qazzaz and his newly formed Majlis 
Naqabat Ittihad al-'Ummal al-'Ala (The Supreme Council 
of the workers' Union), but whose actual organisation 
and execution was carried on by Jama'at al-Ahali through 
their papers and the active participation of its members. 
The paper campaigned against the electric company for 
three reasons: first, the company was British owned; 
second, it was indeed charging an exorbitant rate and 
third, the earlier campaign had met a very strong and 
positive public response. 
Thus on the 3rd November 1933, the Supreme Council 
of the Workers' Union 
(al-Bayan al-Tamhidi) 
and urging the people 
which was to start on 
refused to lower the 
issued a preparatory declaration 
calling for a boycott of the company 
to be prepared for the boycott 
the night of the Sth if the company 
rates 
1. 
al-Ahal'i followed this 
1. 
al-Ahali, 4.11.1933. 
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announcement with news of individuals switching off their 
electric power and replacing it with their own generators 
2 
or with gas or oil lamps . It also published an article 
by 'a worker from Baghdad' entitled "The electricity 
boycott" which was in fact a manual on howthe boycott 
should be conducted, after attacking the foreign company 
which 
came to Iraq not for the love of the Iraqis 
but to make money out of them helped and 
encouraged by the lack of concern on the part 
of the government. It is therefore the 
responsibility of the people to teach the 
company a lesson by applying the methods used 
successfully by 'our brothers the Syrians'. 
The writer considered it 
the duty of every citizen to support the 
campaign. The first step is to withdraw 
the deposit from the Electric Co., then 
to cut off the electric current and use 
lamps or candles instead, and finally to 3 
support the Workers' Union and its decisions. 
Before and during the actual boycott, al-Ahali 
turned to the government's attitude toward the Electric 
Company, criticising its insistence that the rates of 
electricity were reasonable, since they were the same 
as those chargedin Berlin., al-Ahali wrote that this 
statement was received by the population with "shock 
and aston"2. shment"; in any such conflict the government 
should at least be neutral, or should be Outy bound to 
support local demands rather than the claims of a foreign 
Ibid., 5,8,17.11.1933. 
Ibid., 3 . 11.1933 . 
I ft 
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company. It ridiculed the government's reference to Berlin 
and asked whether wages there were similar to those in 
Baghdad. Furthermore, the paper reminded the government 
that Iraq was the land of oil and that Germany had hardly 
any, and warned the government not to allow ministers or 
deputies to hold positions in the Electric company since 
they would only use their influence for its benefit. It 
specifically demanded that the Minister of Economic Affairs 
Rustum Haidar should stand up to the company. 
On 3 December, a banner headline in the paper announced 
that the boycott of the electric company would begin on 
the night of 5 December. It also published the declaration 
of the Supreme Council of the Workers, Union, describing 
the history of the company and the unsuccessful demands 
over the previous months for a reduction in the rates. 
The declaration also pointed out that the company was 
charging different prices within Baghdad itself, and that 
4 
prices were lower in areas where British nationals resided. 
Thus the al-Hinaidi air base was paying 14 fils per kilowatt, 
al-Shaljiyya 10 fils and the railway area 8 fils, while 
the other residents of Baghdad were being charged 28 fils 
An editorial followed the next day entitled "The population 
should unite in the boycott of the Mectricity Company", 
urging every citizen to do his part in forcing the company 
4. On 30th November, the paper published the rates of 
electricity in various cities, Istanbul, Cairo, Beirut, 
Bombay, Mosul and Ifilla, which were all less than 20 fils- 
al-Ahali 23,25.11.1933. 
5. Ibid., 3.12.1933. 
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I 
to comply with popular demands and to prove to the world 
that 
We are a nation that resists exploitation 
despite the government's leniency towards 
the company. We are determined to make this 
boycott a lesson for other foreign companies. 
wbile supporting the boycott of a "capitalist company" 
the article asserted that the only real solution would be 
the cancellation of the concession and the takeover of 
the electric supply by the Municipal Authority (Amanat 
al-'Asima) which would then itself reap the profits, 
estimated as ID 40,000 in 1933 and ID 50,000 in 1934. 
The boycott quickly gathered momentum, spreading to 
every district including houses, shops, coffee houses, 
hotels, cinemas, even to the Baghdad Chamber of Commerce 
and Hizb al-Ikha' al-Watani and some ministers and 
deputies. They all declared that they had switched off 
their electricity as they were inspired by the "Venerable 
Leader of the country Ja'far Abu al-Timman" who was the 
first to respond to the call, ordering the electric 
company to switch off the electric current at his house 
6 
and business and demanding the return of his deposit 
The U. S. Legation commented: 
6. ibid., 9.12.1933. On 3.11.1933 al-Ahali published an 
'Wrý-TiEcle by Muhammad Salih al-ga-z-z-az- in the labour 
section entitled "The Labour Movement in Iraq and 
its Objectives", which was a survey of various efforts 
to establish trade unions since 1924. The General 
union of Iraqi workers was formed out of a merger 
of the Artisans' and Mechanics' Associations in 1933. 
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The bbycott has been extended to hotels, 
restaurants, religious institutions and 
local clubs. The leaders are inviting the 
public to boycott electrical energy in the 
local press ... and by special letters and 
are threatening the shops which do not 
respond to their appeal. The Baghdad Power 
and Light Co. has announced in the local 
papers that at the present time it is not 
prepared to reduce its rate. 7 
Some companies and businesses which had their own generators 
even resorted to putting up notices to the effect that 
they were generating their own electricity and were not 
dependent on the company. al-Ahali began to display daily 
headlines on the progress of the boycott - the boycott 
enters its twenty-fifth, forty-fifth day, etc., - and 
when it was banned, Sawt al-Ahali continued the process 
a 
until the hundred and eleventh day when it too was banned 
In spite of this widespread protest, the company 
refused to accept requests to terminate electricity supply, 
and would not allow subscribers to withdraw their 
deposits 9. After a few days, the government announced that 
it had reached an agreement with the company under which 
the rate would be lowered from 28 to 26 filslo, and warned 
newspaper editors that any paper discussing the boycott 
would be banned. al-Ahali immediately protested, challenging 
the legality of this step and demanding that a written 
7. U, S. Legation to State Department: Review of Events 
for 1-15 November 1933. 
S. Sawt al-Aha'li, 26.3.1934. 
9. 
al-Ahali, 10.12.1933. 
10. ibid., 7.12.1933. 
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warning was the only form of caution which the paper would 
accept. It considered that the announcement was merely 
a move to frighten journalists, and bitterly attacked 
the government for having chosen to support the company 
against its own people 
In the face of these threats, the boycott movement 
grew in strength, and letters of support appeared regularly 
in the pages of the newspaper. The Workers' Union also 
gained more confidence, and became more trenchant in 
its dealings with the company and the government. After 
the announcement of the two fils reduction, the Union 
issued another declaration entitled "The Continuation of 
the Strike", in which it scornfully rejected such a 
12 
paltry offer 
Although the opposition was directed at the company, 
it was also, by extension, directed against the government. 
The British Embassy took the company's part, although the 
Ambassador himself seems to have had some doubts about 
both the sense and the equity of the company's position: 
I am assured by those who ought to know that 
the boycott started as a result of a genuine 
grievance against the high prices charged by 
the Company. I can well believe that there 
is resentment against the Co. and that many 
of those who are still refusing to use electric 
light really consider that the reduction in 
rates that was supposed to come into force 
from Jan lst. is not enough. So far as I 
11. 
Ibid., 8.12.1933. 
12. lbid,. # 10.12.1933. 
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personally am concerned, my light bill has 
jumped up from E31 in November to no less 
than C59 for 25 days of December and the 
members of my staff complain of rises in 
their bills also. 
Bateman recently wrote to the manager 
pointing out, more in sorrow than in anger, 
that there was a chorus of criticism of the 
Co. which was steadily rising amongst the 
very people who were the Company's staunchest 
supporters. Perhaps it would not be amiss to 
put this side of the question to Max Muller 
(the Co. manager). He can not be expected to 
get our goodwill or our support (for what 
really is a lot of Belgian shareholders) if 
his Co. are going to rook us at this rate. 
It is daylight robbery and if I were of a 
suspicious nature, I might be moved to think 
that I was being made to make up for the 
financial losses (they are not a bit heavy 
in fact) caused by the boycott which I have 
done my best to break. 13 
Jamil Madfali and his government were faced with two 
alternatives during the boycott. Either they could take 
on the company and force it to lower its prices, or they 
could take action against the boycott itself. The first 
course would have given it widespread popular support# but 
it would also have played into the hands of the nationalists, 
particularly the Workers' Union and al-Ahali, and encouraged 
them to put forward similar demands in the future. It 
would also have lost them the support of the British 
Embassy, which might well have resulted in the fall. of 
the government. It was much easier to oppose the boycott 
and its organisers and teach them a lesson, and at the 
same time win the Embassy's approval. This failure to 
side with genuine local interests resulted in the 
government's complete alienation from the population. 
13. Sir Francis Humphrys to SIS Foreign Affairs: 24.1.1934, 
FO. 371/17860/E1068. 
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The government began by questioning the legality of 
the Workers' Union on technical and legal grounds, saying 
that al-Qazzaz had simply formed it out of the old 
Artisans' Association without the consent of the Ministry 
of Interior. The newspaper also received a warning from 
the government at the same time. On 25 December al-Qazzaz 
and his associates were tried on charges of disturbing 
the peace, and exiled to Sulaimaniya for six months. On 
27 December the police went to the offices of al-Ahali, 
arrested the editor 'Abd al-Qadir Isma'il, and banned 
14 the paper for a month 
Even these measures had no substantial effect on the 
boycott, which continued unabated until the end of March 
1934. The paper reappeared, was banned, reappeared under 
15 a different name, and was promptly banned once more 
Eventually the government negotiated a further two fils 
reduction in mid-March, and set up a committee to supervise 
16 the company's accounts . Although the boycott could not 
be said to have achieved its original aims, it had the 
effect of creating even more support for Jamalat al-Ahali, 
and conversely, of discrediting the al-Madfali government. 
The episode seems to have been significant in galvanising 
14. 
al'-Ahali 17,27.12.1933, -, B. 2.1934. Also Ambassador 
(Baghdad) to SIS Poreign Affairs: 10.1.1934, FO. 371/ 
17860/E248. 
15. 
Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs: 10.1.1934, 
FO. 371/17860/E249. 
16. 
al-Ahali, 6.2.1934 and Sawt al-Ahali 16.3.1934. 
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widespread active opposition, and was obviously an 
important factor in the recruitment of Hikmat Sulaiman 
to the al-Shýa'biyz secret society. 
Nadi Baghda (Baghdad Club) 
After the initial success of the Society for the 
Eradication of illiteracy, Jamalat al-Ahali decided to 
found a club and cultural centre at the end of 1933 
which it hoped would become a focal point of opposition. 
It would also become a source of recruitment for the 
group, similar to Nadi al-Nashal, which Ibrahim and 
friends had established in Beirut during their student 
years. Ibrahim was particularly enthusiastic about this 
hoping to be able to spread al-Shalbiya through meetings, 
lecturers and discussions and to gain new recruits for 
the. al-Sha'biya secret socie t§7. Jamalat al-Ahali rented 
and furnished a house for the club in the outskirts of 
Baghdad and a general meeting was held on 9 March 1934 
to elect an executive committee which included 'Abd 
al-Fattah Ibrahim, Muhammad 11adid, Yusuf , al-Gailani, 
'Auni al-Khalidio Hashim Jawad, Dr Sabih al-Waýbi and 
Dr Ahmad 'Izzat al-Qaisi. These officers elected Ibrahim 
18 
president, al-Gailani secretary and al-Khalidi treasurer 
Others soon became members of the club, notably Jalfar Abu 
al-Timman, Naji al-Asil, Yusuf 'Izz al-Din and a number 
of lawyers, teachers and university graduates19. 
17. Interview with Ibrahim. 
18. 
al-Ahali 10.3.1934. 
19. Interview with Ibrahim. 
315 
The club soon became the centre of modern and 
progressive ideas; lectures, seminars and debates were 
held on a variety of topics, and classes for foreign 
languages (English, French, German and Turkish) were 
20 
also planned . However al-Madfali's government was 
getting impatient with the activities of Jama'A al-Ahali 
and infiltrated the club with some of its own supporters, 
who insisted on introducing liquor and gambling, thereby 
transforming it into a leisure centre and diverting its 
attention from politics. Ibrahim and the Executive 
committee resisted these attempts and the undesirable 
members were expelled. The latter protested to the 
Ministry of the Interior which responded by closing the 
club and confiscating its property2l. 
20. Th 
,e 
club advertised for foreign language instructors. 
Sawt al-Ahali 2.5.1934. - 
21. According to Ibrahim, they were almost the same elements 
which disrupted the Iraqi Society in Beirut. However# 
al-Chadirchi declares (1970, p. 32), that Ibrahim was 
himself largely responsible for the failure of Nadi 
Baghdad. 
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al-Sha'biya Secret Society (Jam'iyyat al-Shalbiya al-Sirriya) 
From the very beginning Jamalat al-Ahali, had toyed 
with the idea of forming a political party or society 
1. 
The return of Ibrahim from Basra in the middle of 1932 
and the arrival of Kamil al-Chadirchi in early 1933, 
resulting in the group affirming its identity as an 
opposition political group with far greater popular 
support and appeal. This, together with the establishment 
of al-Ahali, newspaper as the leading political daily 
paper encouraged Jamalat al-Ahali to pursue the various 
forms of political activity which have just been 
described. In this way they gained the confidence of well- 
respected figures such as Ja'far Abu al-Timman, as well 
as attracting many educated young people who became 
attached to the group in one way or another. These 
developments must be seen against the background of the 
prevailing political situation and the absence of any 
political party in a real sense. 
Thus Jama'at al-Ahali decided to form a society on 
the principles of al-Shalbiya, as a first and initial 
step towards forming a political party. 
First of all, the group had to decide whether the 
party should be legal, that is licenced by the government 
Interview with the four founders of Jamalat al-Ahalit 
Ibrahim, Jamil, Isma'il and Hadid. 
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or secret. It was decided that it should be secret, 
partly to avoid persecution and partly because many 
potential members and supporters were civil servants 
and thus prohibited from taking part in political activities. 
It was also necessary to decide what kind of people the 
group should try to recruit. Here al-Chadirchi was 
instrumental in persuading Jamalat al-Ahali to include 
'outstanding personalities' in the secret society 
rather than only concentrating on the educated young. 
He suggested ia'far'Abu al-Timman, who was already 
working with Jama'at al-Ahali and who was always admired 
and revered by all of them 
2. This decision was to be of 
immense significance in the history of Jamalat al-Ahali 
since it strengthened the position of Kamil al-Chadirchi 
within the group and weakened Ibrahim's. Ibrahim also 
voiced his reservation to recruiting prominent political 
personalities, especially Hikmat Sulaimant who was to 
be instrumental in involving the group in the tribal 
risings and the 1936 coup_dletat. 
On 1 November 1933 Abu al-Timman announced his 
intention to leave politics because of his disillusionment 
with the Hizb al-Ikhal whose leaders Yasin and Rashid 'Ali 
had broken the Ta'akhi charter, and with the Hizb al-Watani, 
who had refused to answer his call for a boycott of the 
2. "In the twenties and thirties few ranked higher in 
popular esteem than Jalfar Abp -t-Timman. Indeed# to a 
broad spectrum of Iraqis of varying persuasions, even 
the communists, he stood, until his death in 1945, as 
the symbol of irreconcilable opposition to British 
influence, a man of courage and genuine warmth whom 
not even politics could corrupt. " Batatu (1978), p. 294. 
elections 
3. 
al-Ahali published an editorial entitled 
"An ominous Event; Abu al-Timman is leaving politics", 
which praised Abu al-Timman and his long history of 
service to his country. It attributed his resignation to 
the deterioration of the political parties and of the 
political situation in general. The paper considered this 
an encouraging sign for the start of a new era of real 
struggle 
4. For a period of two months until its closure on 
27 December 1933, al-Ahali published letters from all over 
the country supporting Abu al-Timman, urging him to 
return to his patriotic activities. 
in two separate articles addressed to the "Great 
leader of the country, Ja'far Abu al-Timman" in March 
1934, Sawt al-Ahali urged him to return to the Political 
arena to work with "sincere and patriotic young men who 
know how best to benefit the country and to combat the 
5 
vested interests of politicians" . These calls were 
probably meant to test Abu al-Timman's reactions to the 
possibility of working with Jamalat al-Ahali, as well as 
bringing the attention of his supporters and other 
disappointed nationalists to the fact that a group with 
a new approach to iraqi politics was now in existence. 
The climate in Baghdad was also encouraging for Jalfar Abu 
3. 
al-Ahali, 2.11.1933; also Kubba M. (muthakkarati Ii 
Sam-G-a-T-Ahdath) (my memoirs at the Heart of Events), 
Beirut IVO-, p. 52. 
4. 
al-Ahall, 3.11.1933. 
Sawt al-Ahali, 14,15,23,26.3.1934. 
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al-Timman to return to his usual political activity, for 
since the death of King Faisal the political system had 
become less stable. al-Madfa'i had not proved a brilliant 
or strong administrator and the other political factions 
were clamouring for power, undermining his position still 
further. 
Thus Jama'at al-Ahali which was now composed of 
Ibrahim, Hadid, Isma'il and al-Chadirchi approached Abu 
al-Timman and revealed to him the evidence of the secret 
society and the principles of al-Shalbiya. According to 
al-Chadirchi,, Abu al-Timman 
studied each point carefully ... and declared that he accepted these principles 
initially. However, he emphasised that he 
was a true Muslim and that his religion 
did not contradict with the principles of 
democracy and socialism. .. Abu al-Timman accepted al-Shalbiva firmly and with 
understanding, which we had hoped. 6 
This did not surprise Ismalil, who knew Abu al-Timman 
,, 7 well, "a man with an open mind and heart . This 
development caused further changes in the direction and 
style of the group. Abu al-Timman had no equal within 
the group, and was more like a father figure than a member 
of a secret society and although they continued to discuss 
and debate all important issues ccltectivelyo the last word 
was left for Abu al-Timman, and if he did not agree, 
Jamalat al-Ahali would not vote for it. Ibrahim now feels 
6. 
al-Chadirchi (1970), pp. 29-30. 
7. interview with Isma'il. 
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that the ideological basis of the group was being 
compromised in order to gain wider popularity and 
acceptance. He realised that this was a two-edged 
sword but the euphoria of Abu al-Timman's arrival 
temporarily dispelled all his doubts. 
it was an important turning point in the life 
of al-Ahali.. Abu al-Timman was the most admired 
natTU-nalleader, and a figure with great 
popular influence. When people knew he had 
joined us, they contacted us and wanted to 
join as well. We became very popular. 8 
As a result, Jama'at al-Ahali increased their activities, 
as a political group through their auxiliary organisations, 
the Illiteracy Society and Nadi Baqhdad, although al-Ahali 
and Sawt al-Ahali were suppressed five times during 1933 
and 1934 and only published for six months out of a 
possible two years. As well as attacking the government 
and its policies and practices, the papers began to call 
on the people, particularly the young, to organise 
themselves in popular movpments with well-defined 
programmes which would deal with the ills of society and 
improve the conditions of all the population9. They also 
f elt sufficiently confident to begin explaining the 
ideology of al-Shalbiya in the newspapers in late 1934 and 
1935 10 , calling for wide support for the new ideology, 
which was appazently finding acceptance all over the country. 
8. Interview with Ibrahim. 
9. 
al-Ahali 2,, 9,10,11.3.1934. Sawt al-Ahali 17.5.1934. 
10. 
al-Ahali 8.7.1934: 25.8.1934; Sawt al-Ahali 18,19.4.1935. 
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Significantly another of its papers al-Mabda' 
11 
published 
an article on 10 March 1935 which-criticised the government 
for using force against the rebellious Mid-Euphrates 
tribes. It called on the army to support the popular and 
patriotic movements, since it had gained the respect and 
admiration of the people for its dealing with the 
Assyrians. The paper urged the Army to preserve this 
12 respect and trust by supporting the popular movements 
The recruitment of Hikmat Sulaiman 
Abu al-Timman soon became the focal point of the 
society, and the committee began to meet regularly at 
his house to discuss the political situation, the 
society's activities and its future projects. The question 
of the quality of members and leaders of the society was 
brought up again. al-Chadirchi, who was always anxious to 
recruit prominent political personalities, was now 
supported by Abu al-Timman, who was sensitive to the 
fact that he was surrounded by men much younger and less 
experienced than himself. The decision to recruit practising 
politicians rather than dedicated young people from the 
Illiteracy Society and Nadi Baghdad was another compromise 
at the expense of the ideology of al-Shalbiya and another 
means through which al-Chadirchi could assert his claims 
to the leadership of the group. In this he was opposed by 
al-Mabda' was owned by Jalfar Abu al-Timman and 
managed by Hasan al-Talibani; nevertheless 'Abd al- 
Qadir Isma'il remained effective in running the 
paper. 
12. 
al-Mabda' 10.3.1935. 
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Ibrahim, whose influence had begun to diminish and whose 
position within the group had begun to be seriously. 
contested ever since al-Chadirchils arrival. This 
development represented another step away from the original 
leftist path and towards the more conventional practices 
of Iraqi politics. 
After the decision to include prominent personalities 
had been taken, the second step was to suggest possible 
candidates. Two names were brought up, Nasrat al-Farisi 
and Hikmat Sulaiman. The former had worked with al-Ahali 
as Vice-President of the Society for the Eradication of 
Illiteracy and continued to be on good terms with the 
group. However, they had found him generally lukewarm 
and ineffectual. Hence al-Chadirchi suggested approaching 
Hikmat Sulaiman, with whom he had served on the Executive 
Committee of Hizb al-Ikha'. Hikmat too had fallen out 
with the Ikhal leadership and was then out of politics. 
Hikmat Sulaiman of course had been Minister of Interior 
at the time of the Assyrian incident, which had gained 
him popularity for his supposedly uncompromising position 
towards the Assyrians and the British. During the 
conflict al-Ahali newspaper praised his position towards 
the Assyrians and his support of the Army. Abu al-Timman 
knew Hikmat well and was prepared to work with him. But# 
for Ibrahim, Hadid and Isma'il, although the prospect of 
working with someone of Hikmat Sulaiman's stature naturally 
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seemed extremely attractive 
13 they realised that it would 
inevitably involve a certain degree of compromise. It was 
agreed that al-Chadirchi should approach him to see whether 
he would join the society, and after a few meetings Hikmat 
agreed to do so, expressing his eagerness to work with 
Jalfar Abu al-Timman. The group insisted that he should 
not inform Yasin and Rashid 'Ali about its activities. 
On the face of it, it seemed unlikely that Hikmat would 
be able to sever relations with his political past and 
embrace the new ideology, but he pledged to do so. 
Hence by mid-1934, Hikmat had become a member of the 
central committee. Ta'far was president, 'Abd al-Fattah 
Ibrahim secretary and Muhammad Hadid treasurer. The committee 
established an oath or pledge14 which had to be taken by 
every initiated member. The pledge was in two different 
forms, one for Central Committee members, and the second 
for regular members. The Central Committee assigned 
different members to different areas of recruitment; 
these areas were first, educated young people, especially 
members of the Illiteracy Society and the Baghdad club, 
students at various institutions of higher education and 
younger government employees. This area was assigned to 
al-Chadirchi Ibrahim and Hadid. Ja'far Abu al-Timman was 
responsible for contacting former members of al-Nizb al-Watani 
13. Hikmat Sulaiman was born in 1885, and was thus four 
years younger than Ja'far Abu al-Timman. 
14- This is similar to the Fabian Society's practice - 
see above p. 114. 
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and other nationalists, while military officers were the 
responsibility of Hikmat, who was to form an organisation 
within the armed forces. Hikmat was in close contact with 
General Bakr Sidqi, with whom he had established a strong 
friendship ever since the Assyrian conflict 
15. 
Although 
the names of the army officers were to remain secret even 
to the other Central Committee members, Sulaiman later 
informed them that Sidqi had established contacts with 
some Army and Air Force officers including Bahal al-Din 
Nuri, Shakir al-Wadi and Muhammad 'Ali Jawad. in a short 
time, the Society succeeded in recruiting many of the 
ablest young including Muhammad Salih al-Oazzaz, Sadiq 
Kammuna, Hasan al-Talibani, 'Abdullah Salim (former head 
of the Balquba branch of al-Hizb al-Watani , Yusuf 'Izz 
al-Dinn Ibrahim (a friend of al-Chadirchi who became 
Minister of Education in the Coup Government), Nadhim 
al-Zahawi and Hashim, Jawad. According to Hadid, the 
Society had between forty and fifty members in 1934-35 
who met regularly and paid monthly dues as well as taking 
part in the other activities of the group. 
The Activities of Jamalat al-Ahali 1934-1935 
During the al-Madfa'i and 'Ali Jawdat governments 
between November 1933 and March 1935, Jamalat al-Ahali 
and their secret society published four separate newspapers. 
15. 
al-Chadirchi, (1970) p. 32; also interview with Isma'il, 
Hadid and Ibrahim. 
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The first was al-Ahali with 'Abd al-Qadir Isma'il and 
'Aziz Sharif alternating as its owners, which was followed 
by Sawt al-Ahali under Kamil al-Chadirchi, which appeared 
between 14 March and 21 May 1934, and from 18 April 1935 
until 10 May 1935. one further issue appeared on 12 August 
1936, and the paper then disappeared until 23 September 
1942. The third paper, al-Mabda', was published under the 
ownership of Ja'far Abu al-Timman and Hasan al-Talibani, 
from 26 January 1935 until 11 March 1935. Finally there 
was al-Bayan owned by Hikmat Sulaiman which appeared on 
12 March 1935 for a single issue. Another issue published 
on 7 April 1936 was confiscated and suppressed by al-Hashimils 
government. 
From this brief survey of the group's newspapers it 
is possible to gauge the extent of the sanctions applied 
against them by. the two governments. At the same time it 
is clear that the group were determined to follow an 
approach of total opposition to successive cabinets and 
to the political system as a whole. Thus the governments' 
retaliation was not limited to suppression of one or two 
issues or for a short period, but of continuous suppression. 
This was very costly to Jama'at al-Ahali in terms of 
political support as well as financially, since the press 
was left idle. On 12 March 1934, al-Ahali was suspended 
for an article entitled "Jalfar and Lawrence" which 
criticised Ja'far al-'Askari for praising Lawrence of Arabia 
and accused Lawrence of having worked for British Intelligence 
16 
16. 
al-Ahali 12.3.1934. 
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It was suppressed again on 8 September 1934 when 'Abd al- 
Qadir Isma'il and Kamil al-Chadirchi were arrested on a 
charge of circulating letters (manshurs) attacking King 
Ghazi 
17. 
al-Chadirchi was released after four days, but 
ismalil had to stand trial and was sentenced to a year's 
imprisonment although he appealed and was acquitted 
18 
. 
The real motive for the lengthy suppression of al-Ahali 
and Sawt al-Ahali was their total opposition to the Iraqi 
political system and British influence in the country, as 
is illustrated in the following report from the British 
Embassy: 
On the whole the attitude of the Arabic press 
towards British policy in Iraq has been restrained. 
The one serious offender was the Ahali. In 
March His Majesty's Ambassador had to protest 
strongly against the publication of articles 
concerning the appointment of a British vic6- 
consul at Diana and the administration of the 
Port of Basra, which were couched in abusive 
terms with pointed references to His Majesty's 
Government. As a result the Ahali was suspended 
for ten days. It reappeared, however, immediately 
as Saut-al-Ahali, under the same editorship, and 
conFl"nuedits policy of scurrilous articles on 
the work of the British officials in Iraq. In 
April His Majesty's Ambassador again protested 
to the minister for Foreign Affairs, and for a 
while there was an improvement in the tone of 
this newspaper. The improvement did not, however, 
continue for long, and on the 23rd May, following 
further representations, it was suspended for one 
year. A short while later it was again revived as 
the Ahali and, in September, His Majesty's Charge 
dlAffalir-es had again to draw the attention of the 
17. Knabenshue to State Department: 19-9.1934, USNA 890G. 9/a/loo 
18. Knabenshue to State Department: 19.9.1934, USNA Ghazi/180 
also 22.11.1934, USNA Ghazi/19. Isma'il admitted that he 
had written the manshur against King Ghazi which, with 
the help of his friends, was distributed all over Baghdad. 
(Interview with Isma'il). 
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Iraqi Government to offensive criticism of 
British policy. The Government this time took 
energetic action and the Ahali was suspended 
for a year. 19 
Isma'il believes that the series of articles he wrote 
after his visit to the marshes was the reason for the 
annoyance of the government and the British Embassy and 
his subsequent arrest and trial. Apparently the Embassy 
sent an Indian employee to offer him a large sum of 
money for the articles in an effort to prevent him from 
publishing them, but he continued to publish them until 
the last issue of al-Ahali on 8 September 1934 when he 
was arrested. The series, which started on 4 July, ran to 
49 articles entitled "The tragedy of 'Amara Liwa; 15 days 
,, 20 amoiýg the Ma'dan of the marshes axid the rice fields 
ismalil described in detail and in his usual emotional 
style, life in the marshes for various classes and 
individuals, such as the shaikhs, the sarkals, the men of 
religion, the fallahin, the women, the government officials 
and the British officials. He explained the injustices and 
the suffering inflicted on the fallahin and their families, 
their customs and traditions, and the primitive health 
and education centres. Ismalil ended his description of 
the suffering of the rice planters by saying "Every 
Iraqi when he eats his rice should know that it is mixed 
with the blood of these wretched slaves". 
Besides attacking the Iraq and British governments 
d. u. r. ing : this period, al-Ahali and Sawt al-Ahali continued 
19- Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs: 1.2.1935, 
FO. 371/18951/E940. 
20- 
al*-Ahali, 4.7.1934 to 8.9.1934. 
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to discuss general economic and social issues. They 
called on the government to establish industrial and 
agricultural projects, to activate the economy, to reduce 
dependence on foreign trade and foreign companies and to 
abolish monopolies. It called for the expansion and 
improvement of health and educational centres and the 
creation of more employment 
21 
. Sawt al-Ahali followed 
the same line, calling for the creation of much needed 
public projects, such as irrigation works and oil 
refineries and for the improvement of the conditions of 
workers and peasants. News of progress in Turkey was given 
a great deal of coverage and compared with the lack of 
progress in Iraq. This may have been to please Hikmat 
Sulaiman who was greatly impressed with developments in 
22 
Turkey 
In 1935, Jalfar Abu al-Timman published al-Mabdal, 
which had some changes in the format but was in the same 
stype of al-Ahali's previous papers. al-Mabda' continued 
to attack the government of 'Ali Jawdat, accusing it of 
23 
openly serving Britain instead of Iraq . When al-Mabda' 
was banned, Hikmat Sulaiman published al-Bayan, whose 
editorial was written by Ja'far Abu al-Timman, entitled 
,, who is the danger to the safety of the state? ". Abu 
al-Timman criticised the government's policies and 
practice in general and for closing his newspaper in 
21. e. g. al-Ahali, Feb. March, July, Aug. and Sep. 1934. 
22. Sawt al-Ahali, 14.3.1934 to 21.5-1934 and 18.4.1935 
To 10.5.1935. 'Kamil al-Chadirchi himself looked to 
Turkey with favour but the increased and generally 
favourable coverage of Turkey was probably aimed at 
satisfying Hikmat Sulaiman. 
23.1., -3 a-lq 
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particular, and called on the Iraqi people to stand 
24 together against the government . During this period, 
Jamalat al-Ahali was involved with Rashid 'Ali and other 
politicians in instigating the Mid-Euphrates tribal 
leaders to revolt against 'Ali Jawdat's government. 
They finally succeeded in forcing it to resign and it 
was replaced by a government headed by Yasin and Rashid 
'Ali. 
The Attemptto Form a Political Party 
When Hikmat Sulaiman returned from his holiday in 
Istanbul in the autumn of 1935, he appeared more determined 
than ever to oppose al-Hashimi's government. Jama'at 
al-Ahali's political activities had declined and their 
spirit was broken and the al-Sha'biya secret society, 
the Baghdad club and the Illiteracy Society activities 
had come to a virtual standstill, because of Yasin's 
more vigorous attacks and Hikmat's original reluctance 
to oppose his former colleagues 
25 
. In general, the new 
government seemed more confident and in firm control of 
the political situation. Even thb- Nuri-Yasin alliance 
which had not been expected to last seemed to be working 
well. In contrast, Jama'at a-Ahali or more precisely the 
24. 
al-nayan 12.3.1935. 
25. Hikmat Sulaiman was offered the post of Minister of 
Finance by Yasin al-Hashimi in March 1935, which he 
declined 
, 
at the instigation of the Executive Committee 
of the 
, 
al-Sha'biya secret society. He and the society 
were prepareýt accept the Post of Minister of 
Interior, bu was given to Rashid 'Ali al-Gailani. 
Yas 
, 
in wa 
,s 
well aware of Hikmat's connection with 
Jama'at al-Ahali. 
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members of the al-Sha'biya society began to break away, 
even members of the Central Committee. Hikmat was 
hesitant, unstable and still maintaining contacts with 
Rashid and Yasin. As a result of criticisms of his third 
Tract (al-Sha'biya Vol. II), Ibrahim began to complain and 
to express his dissatisfaction with the situation in the 
society. More significantly he was feeling the pressure 
of Kamil al-Chadirchi and his manoeuvres to diminish his 
own position within the group. Ismalil was being drawn 
further to the left and away from the society altogether 
while Hadid remained passive. 
The only immediately obvious way out of this impasse 
was to form a legal political party, a suggestion which 
gained the approval Of most of the members of the Central 
committee. In the discussions which followed three 
distinct and conflicting ideas emerged. One tendency 
was represented by al-chadirchi, Ibrahim, Hadid and 
Isma'il, who believed that the Central Committee should 
only include educated persons who firmly believed in 
the principles and ideology of al-Sha'biya. Hikmat 
Sulaiman however wanted to include some tribal leaders, 
whom he considered would strengthen the party and widen 
its base, although in fact this would serve only to 
strengthen his own position. Finallyj Abu al-Timman's 
position had become somewhat awkward. On the one hand 
he supported the first group while not wishing to be in 
a party oi mainly young people with radical leanings, 
and on the other he was always careful not to offend 
Hikmat Sulaiman, whose defection to Yasin's camp never 
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seemed too remote a possibility. Thus a special meeting 
was held to discuss the issue further. Here Ja'far for 
the first time in his political life, seemed to be setting 
cbntradictory and unrealistic rules for his colleagues, 
although Hikmat's influence seems to have been crucial. 
He demanded that members of the future party's central 
committee should have the following qualifications: they 
should believe in the principles of al-Sha'biya; they 
should not be drawn from the ranks of the traditional 
politicians; they should not be from the working class 
like Muhammad Salih al-Qazzaz; they should not hold 
extreme socialist beliefs like 'Abd al-Qadir Isma'il and 
finally they should not be too young. Here Abu al-Timman 
agreed to include Hadid and exclude Ibrahim, although 
Hadid was younger, presumably because Hadid came from 
a better known family. The idea of excluding Ibrahim 
and Isma'il from a party to be based on the ideology 
which they had helped to formulate must have come as 
a shattering blow for both of them, particularly as it 
came from Abu al-Timman, a man they admired and reveredý 
who knew them well and appreciated their sincerity and 
26 
ability . On such conditions no agreement was possible 
26. Ibrahim alleges that al-chadirchi was behind the 
idea of excluding him from the Committee, but Isma'il 
thinks that he was in any case drifting away from 
the group which was now obviously dominated by Abu 
al-Timman, Sulaiman and al-Chadirchi. 
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and the idea of forming a political party was postponed. 
Meanwhile Jamalat al-Ahali devoted most of its energies 
to the developments in the Iraqi political arena, 
eppecially in intrigues with tribal leaders and subsequently 
with the army in what was to culminate in the October 1936 
coup d'etat. 
333 
Chapter X 
al-Ahali's Involvement in Iraqi Politics 
(1935 - 1942) -L 
The period between 1935 and 1942 witnessed a 
drastic change in the practices and structure of Jamalat 
al-Ahali. During these years the group moved away from 
its former generally ideological orientation and towards 
closer involvement in practical politics, which 
necessitated a series of intrigues and temporary alliances. 
This change of direction can be traced to the recruitment 
of the three prominent political personalities, namely 
Kamil al-Chadirchi, Ja'far Abu al-Timman and Hikmat 
Sulaiman which has just been described. The latter in 
particular was instrumental in involving the group with 
other politicians in the instigation of tribal uprisings 
in 1934 and 1935 and in the 1936 cotpd'9tat. These changes 
resulted in the departure of 'Abd al-Fattah Ibrahim and in 
the weakening of the group's radical wing. 
After the success of the coup, Jamalat al-Ahali were 
given the majority of the ministerial seats in the new 
cabinet, and thus attempted to implement their programme 
based on al-Shalbiya, forming a political party to achieve 
their aims. The Reformists, as they became known, began to 
meet stiff resistance from Bakr Sidqi and his clique of 
army officers after the cou , as well as from other 
entrenched political groups which opposed them for a 
variety of reasons but mainly because of their reform 
programme. The combination of these forces proved a serious 
This Chapter is substantially based on interviews 
with the founders and on the memoirs of Kamil al- Chadirchi . 
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impediment to Jama'at al-Ahali. The group's uneasy 
alliance with Hikmat Sulaiman and Bakr Sidqi. soon 
faltered, for as soon as the Prime Minister and the army 
chief felt secure in power, they turned against Jamalat 
al-Ahali and its programme of reform, which made the 
movement and its ideology look like an empty shell. -They 
were unable to achieve even a small part of their programme 
and in sheer frustration and acknowledgement of their 
failure, the reformist ministers eventually tendered 
their resignation. 
During 1935 and 1936, with Yasin al-Hashimi's 
accession to power, the various activities of Jamalat 
al-Ahali fell victim to the government's heavy hand. 
The group was watched closely by the secret police which 
severely limited the activities of the al-Shalbiya secret 
society. Furthermore, the newspapers were regularly 
suppressed for long periods. 
Sawt al-Ahali was reopened for a brief period, from 
18 April to 10 May 1935. In its last issue it criticised 
the al-Hashimi government's handling Of the Rumaitha 
uprising and the use of force instead of making attempts 
to solve the acute problems of the region. In 1936 only 
one issue of Sawt al-Ahali and al-Bayan appeared as they 
were suppressed immediately and not a single issue of 
al-Ahali or al-Mabdal was allowed to be published. Thus 
in the period immediately before the coup, Jamalat al-Ahali 
was left with no means of opposition except to present the 
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King with protests against the government and were almost 
forced into co-operating with the army in preparing the 
coup detat. 
The Departure of 'Abd al-Fattah Ibrahim 
Abd al-Fattah Ibrahim's role and contribution to 
Jama'at al-Ahali can not be minimised. His position among 
the founders was paramount, as they themselves have 
testified. Ibrahim was responsible for the elaboration 
of the principles of al-Sha'biya and its literature and 
also nurtured the movement from early days. He was 
instrumental in widening the horizons of the founders 
themselves and was particularly influential in maintaining 
the high standard of al-Ahali and the other newspapers. 
Thus Ibrahim had the commanding respect of the other 
founders and the undisputed leadership of the group. The 
challenge to his position was in part of his own making, 
in that he allowed Kamil al-Chadirchi to join the-group, 
which brought him much distress, eventually forcing him 
to abandon the movement he had created. The conflict 
between Ibrahim and al-Chadirchi was almost inevitable, 
given the differences in background, personality, experiences 
and aspirations. Because of Ibrahim's special position and 
the significant contribution he had made to Jamalat al-Ahali 
it was hardly possible for al-Chadirchi to force him to 
leave the moment he himself joined the group. In fact, 
the process was t9 take three years, although the basic 
conflict became clear relatively early on. When al- 
Chadirchi joined in mid-1933 the vital question was whether 
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it should remain ideologically pure, or whether it should 
attract powerful supporters from the ranks of the more 
high-minded conventional politicians. al-Chadirchi 
successfully encouraged the group to recruit Jalfar Abu 
al-Timman against Ibrahim's better judgement, thus 
strengthening his own position. 
Ibrahim attribLxýeS the conflict to the threat that 
he posed to al-Chadirchi's ambitions, while al-Chadirchi 
blamed Ibrahim for the failure of Nadi Baghdad in 1934, 
al-Ahali's 
and more significantly for third tract, which managed 
to offend both the Arab nationalists and the Communists, 
who wrote a rebuttal entitled al-Sha'biya fi'l-Mizan 
(al-Shalbiya in the Balance). al-Chadirchi claims thathe- 
intervened successfully to prevent the Communists from 
publishing the book, while Ibrahim alleges that al-Chadirchi 
had instigated the authors to write it in the first place. 
This incident brought Ibrahim onto the defensive, 
and he pushed the conflict into the open. Thus he began 
to be much more uncompromising on the principles of 
al-Sha'biya in what seems to have been an attempt to 
demonstrate that his differences with al-Chadirchi were 
a result of his firm attachment to the group's principles, 
and to show that his opponent had neither ideology nor 
principles. in the process, Ibrahim criticised Isma'il 
for his Communist leanings and embarrassed him by demanding 
that he should choose between the Communist party or 
jama'at al-Ahali. This annoyed Ismalil, particularly as 
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the confrontation took place in the presence of Ja'far 
Abu al-Timman, whom he greatly admired. al-Chadirchi 
took advantage of this incident to win Ismalil to his side 
and thus Ibrahim was left with no support on the Central 
committee. Although Ibrahim and Hadid never had any 
major disagreements and Hadid was always passive and 
never took sides, he was in fact closer to al-Chadirchi 
than to Ibrahim. 
During January and February 1935, according to the 
police files 
2 there were a number of meetings between the 
leaders of Jamalat a1 -Ahali (Abu al-Timman, Sulaiman, 
al-Chadirchi and Isma'il) and Rashid 'Ali al-Gailani, 
Nasrat al-Farisi, Sadiq al-Bassam, Yunis al-Sablawi, 
'Ali Mahmud, and 'Abd al-Razzaq Sh4bib, who also met with 
some shaikhs from Diwaniya in order to co-ordinate their 
efforts against the government. This shows the extent of 
the group's early involvement in intrigues with traditional 
politicians such as Rashid 'Ali and Mid-Euphrates tribal 
leaders such as Muhsin Abu Tabikh and 'Alwan al-Yasiri. 
'Abd al-Fattah Ibrahim objected strongly to these tactics 
as he felt that they were against the principles and the 
spirit of al-Shalbiya. He was uneasy at the movement being 
involved in such activities in partnership with reactionary 
tribal shaikhs and corrupt politicians, the more so as 
2- 
al-i'arida al-Siyasiya (The political journal)* paragraph 
162 of 24.1.1935 and paragraph 290 of 9.2.1935 GSO. 
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ol 
Hikmat Sulaiman had even suggested that the group should 
3 invite some tribal leaders to join the society 
Some time in the middle of 1936, Hadid relayed a 
I 
message from Abu al-Timman urging Ibrahim to attend an 
important meeting of the society's Central Committee. 
He. duly went to al-Chadirchi's house and was told that 
the Central Committee meeting was to witness Bakr sidqi 
taking al-Sha'biya societyb pledge or oath. Sidqi did 
not take the pledge and left the meeting without saying 
4 
a word to which Ibrahim reacted very strongly, criticising 
the group's involvement with the army in a potentially 
dangerous adventure, which would be damaging to the 
society and its principles even if the coup succeeded. 
Ibrahim warned them that they would pay for their mistake. 
This was the last time that Ibrahim attended a society 
meeting, which al-Chadirchi also misunderstood, claiming 
that he feared that Ibrahim might reveal their conspiracy 
to Yasin, which was of course untrue and unfounded*' 
5 
After the coup Abu al-Timman, Hikmat Sulaiman, and 
'Abd al-Qadir Ismalil visited Ibrahim at home and offered 
him a good position in the new government, which he 
refused, preferring to remain a secondary school teacherý 
al-'Umari, K., (1970), p. 62. ' 
4. 
al-Chadirchi (1970), pp. 38-9. 
5- it was alleged that Ibrahim had established a secret 
contact with Yasin through his wife and Yasin's daughter who were teachers at the same school. 
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al-chadirchi did not attempt a reconciliation with 
Ibrahim, and even though al-Chadirchi became a Minister, 
Ibrahim did not hesitate to write a letter to Abu al-Timman 
in which he explained al-Chadirchils motives in forcing 
him out Of the movement, accusing him of betraying the 
principles of al-Ahali, and of falsely spreading rumours 
against him and his family 
6. 
Thefoup of 1936 
The role of Jamalat al-Ahali in the preparation and 
execution of the 1936 coup has already been described 
in Chapter VI. In this section we shall concentrate on 
the group's role in the new government, and particularly 
on thp developments which led up to the resignation of 
the reformist ministers froqthe Cabinet in Tune 1937. 
on 3 November, a few days after the coup, al-Ahali 
newspaper reappeared. This issue was entirely devoted to 
news of the coup and of the mass demonstrations which 
had been organised by al-Ahali and other progressive 
elements. In these first numbers the paper insisted on 
calling the men of the previous regime to account, and 
praised the coup and the new government. Jamalat al-Ahali's 
secret society, al-Shalbiya, was legalised under the name 
of Jamliyyat al-Islah al-Shalbit (Popular Reform League)# 
6. See Appendix H. 
(letter of Ibrahim to Ja'far) 
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4 
and al-Ahali newspaper became the League's official organ. 
Editorials were given over to the League's programme, and 
discussed topics such as foreign policy, raising living 
standards, the redistribution of wealth, the establishment 
of banks, increasing the salaries of junior civil servants, 
strengthening the armed forces and a host of other such 
topics 7. 
It was natural that the paper and its staff should 
regard the coup as a triumph for the group's principles, 
although their illusions were soon to be shattered. In 
the first place, the unequal nature of their alliance 
with the army, coupled with Hikmat's early 'defection' 
to Bakr Sidqi gravely weakened the position of the group 
within the government as a whole. Secondly, the former 
regime soon recovered from the shock of the coup 
8, 
and 
the traditional politicians set about rearranging their 
alliances with other groups opposed to Jamalat al-Ahali. 
Finally, the group lacked experience of the day to day 
administration of government, and senior civil servants 
and the British advisers were not overly co-operative 
9 
or sympathetic 
7. See al-Ahali 3.11.1936 - 26.1.1937. 
The coup itself only occasioned one fatal casualty, the 
shooting of Ja'far al-'Askario which was entirely un- 
premeditated. Yasin al-Hashimil Nuri al-Salid and Rashid 
'Ali fled the country: Yasin died in Beirut in January 
1937, and the others returned after Sidqi's assassination 
and the fall of Hikmat's government in August 1937. Their 
supporters remained in their positions within the armed 
forces and the civil service, which gave rise to constant 
intrigues. 
Although c. i. Edmonds and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr seem to 
have had a cordial relationship with Hikmat Sulaiman. 
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On 16 November, the Popular Reform League was 
officially licenced by the government. al-Chadirchi, who 
was Minister of Economics and Communications, was elected 
secretary, Sadiq Kammuna deputy secretary, and Muhammad 
Salih al-Qazzaz treasurer. The League published its 
programme, with application forms for membership attached. 
Progressive and leftist elements soon attached themselves 
to the League 
10 
, thus earning it a good deal of adverse 
publicity which was eagerly exploited by its opponents. 
In November the British Embassy reported that al-Chadirchi 
was 'called a Communist by his Arab friends' and described 
'Abd al-Qadir Ismalil as 'a man who, in the past, has 
shown leanings towards Communism'. Discussing the League's 
programme, Clark Kerr reported: 
you will see that there is a noticeably 
Red tinge about many of its items, and 
that it adds considerably to the discord 
of incompatible ideals which seem to inspire 
the members of the new Government. 
Speculation about the future becomes, - 
therefore, all the more difficult. 11 
This particular brand of criticisin was not without 
effect even among the leaders and supporters of the League. 
Jalfar Abu al-Timman and 'Abd al-Latif Nuri (who was 
Minister of Defence) did not join until 25 December. 
Furthermore, Hikmat also remained aloof, and in fact never 
joined, which clearly made for considerable difficulties: 
10- For the-. programme, see Appendix. q, 
11- Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs: 
2.11.1936, FO. 371/20014/E7181; 25.11.1936, FO. 371/20014/ 
E7351; and 13.1-1937, FO. 371/20795/E660. 
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Although the Popular Reform League has 
been created to support the Government, 
the Government have not pledged themselves 
to adopt the full programme of the League 
Until they do so the programme may only be 
regarded as a list of visionary hopes 12 designed presumably to win popular support. 
As well as causing obvious problems for the leadership, 
such rebuffs also resulted in the public being discouraged 
from joining the League. Hikmat's attitude was clearly 
due to pressure from Bakr Sidqi, although it seems likely 
that he had never had a particularly sincere commitment 
to the ideology of al-Ahali in any case. When pressed, to 
join formally in January 1937, he suggested that the 
League 'should be absorbed into a political party with 
a less radical creed.. It could then become the official 
party of the present government'13. This suggestion was 
in fact accepted by the League on 9 January, but it 
emerged during the discussions that senior members refused 
to be associated with any party that would be dominated by 
14 
Ba%r Sidqi or his agents . The failure of the League 
signified the end of attempts to create a mass base for 
the ideology of Jama'at al-Ahali, and the victory of more 
conservative 
iorces'within the government. Eventually, 
12. Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Fore'ign Affairs: 25.11.1936, 
Fo. 371/20014/E7351. 
13. Amba'ssador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs: 13.1.1937,, 
- Fo. 371/20795/E660. 
14. Ibid - 
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Bakr Sidqi began a campaign of violence. against members 
of the League, and in July 1937 it was formally suppressed 
by the government for 'disseminating destructive ideas, 
evil intentions', and Communism' 
is. 
By early 1937, therefore, events had combined to 
make the inner circle Of Jamalat al-Ahali both critical 
and apprehensive of the activities of Hikmat and Bakr 
Sidqi, and of the government's failure to take more 
drastic measures against the enemies*of reform Or to' 
stick to the democratic principles which it had proclaimed. 
Bakr Sidqi gave further demonstrations of his ruthlessness 
and dictatorial tendencies in the assassination of Dhia 
Yunis on 20 January and the attempt on the life of 
Maulud Mukhlis on 9 Februaryl6. More directly rI elevant 
to the fortunes of Jama'at al-Ahali however was his 
conduct during the campaign leading up to the election 
to the Chamber of Deputies on 20 February. 
On 21 January, al-Ahali newspaper called on the 
gover. nment to ensure that the forthcoming elections should 
be democratic, genuinely representative, and free from 
interference. It also suggested that candidates should 
prepare election manifestoes. However, even these 
seemingly moderate demands caused Bakr Sidqi to threaten 
to prevent the election of any 'reformist' to the 
15. Knabenshue to State Department: 22.7.1937, 
USNA 890G. 00/424. 
16. Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs: 
Annual Report of 1937; FO. 371/21856/E794 also 
14.2.1937, FO. 371/20795, /El235. 
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17 
Chamber . in fact, he and Hikmat resorted to the 
traditional methods of election, and distributed the 
seats among the various political factions. After 
negotiations with Jalfar Abu al-Timman, Bakr was 
eventually persuaded to allocate 12 of the 114 seats 
to the reformists. Bakr himself put up 30 nominees, 
while the rest were given to Hikmat to distribute mainly 
to tribal shal s. 
In such circumstances it was hardly surprising that 
the Chamber became the scene of a number of battles 
between the reformists and their opponents. Since they 
were in a minority it rapidly became apparent that the 
reformists would be unable to pass any of their legislation. 
All attempts to enact measures of social and economic 
19 20 
reform were greeted with accusations of Communism 
iiikmat Sulaiman, who always sided with the majority 
faction, fervently denied that his government had any 
such tendencies: 
17. a Interviews with Hadid and Isma'il, who were both' 
elected Deputies. other reformist deputies included 
'Aziz Sharif, Sadiq Kammuna, - Ja I far Abu al-Timman who 
was a Senator. In addition Husain Jamil was appointed 
Director of Government Propaganda. 
18. Interview with Jamil, Ismalil and Hadid. See also 
Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs: Annual 
Report of 1937, PO. 371/21856/E794. 
19. 
al-Chadirchi submitted a 30-page report to the Cabinet# 
advocating closer control over the oil company by the 
government, and that the government should acquire rights 
to those areas not included in the company's concessions. 
, 
T., se. points were to be included in Law 80 of 1959- Many of th 
20 See Appen ix T. Attempts to introduce more equitable labour and agrarian 
legislation were countered by proposals to erect a statue 
of Bakr Sidqi. See the Proceedings of . the Chamber of Deputies., 1937. 
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on March 25, the Prime Minister stated in the 
Chamber of Deputies that Iraq is, and will 
remain, a democratic state and that there is 
no place in an Islamic country for any other 
form of government. 21 
Bakr sidqi himself was moved to make a 'similar declaration 
in an interview with al-Bilad newspaper: he 
alleged that the rumours of communism in 
the Government of Iraq are circulated by 
the government-'s enemies abroad and that 
they are without foundation. He stated 
that Iraq had not reached a point of 
capitalistic development sufficient to 
make a suitable place for communism; that, 
furthermore, communism is not compatible 
with the monarchial principle and that so 
long as he remains Chief of Staff, his 
army will defend the throne of King Ghazi. 
22 
In this atmosphere it is not surprising that 
al-Chadirchi was seriously considering resignation from 
the government 
23 
, and over the next months he and his 
reformist colleagues became more and more isolated. In 
April 1937 Mahdi al-jawahiri, a supporter of Jama'at 
al-Ahali and one of Iraq's leading poets, was arrested 
for publishing a critical article by Muhammad Salih al-Qazzaz 
in his newspaper al-Inqilab. Both men were sentenced to 
terms of imprisonment amid protests from the reformist 
21. In a newspaper interview, Ja'far declared that he was 
"entirely opposed to communism. He indicated that his 
inclination to assist oppressed people people and the 
labouring classes had given rise to the charge that 
he favoured communism, but he pointed out that as a 
businessman, financier, and large land owner, communism 
would not be in his own interests. " Knabenshue to State 
Department: 30.3.1937, USNA 890G. 00/404. 
22. ibid. 
23. 
al-Chadirchi (1970), p. 46. 
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groups in the Chamber and from al-Ahali newspaper 
24 
. 
in may, al-Chadirchi and some of the reformist 
deputies who were considering resignation, consulted with 
Abu al-Timman, who counselled patience, saying that the 
group would be more effective if it remained inside the 
government. In spite of this, al-Chadirchi did in fact 
submit his resdgnation, but the Cabinet did not accept 
it, although Hikmat told Clark Kerr that he was considering 
replacin g him with Muhammad Hadid 
25 
. By June, even Jalfar 
had come to the conclusion that he could no longer remain 
at his post, and was looking for an excuse to make a 
dramatic exit. This presented itself in the middle of the 
month, when the government sanctioned an attack on bome 
recalcitrant tribes in the Samawa area, in the course of 
which a number of villages were destroyed by bombing. 
Subsequently the police inflicted heavy casualties on 
the tribal forces and ugly stories of the shooting of 
26 
tribal hostages soon reached the capital 
As a result, Jalfar and Kamil al-Chadirchi persuaded 
their colleagues Yusuf 'Izz al-Din, the Minister of 
Education and Salih Jabr, the Minister of Justice, a former 
supporter of Yasin al-Hashimi, to join them in submitting 
their collective resignation on 19 June, stating that they 
24. 
al-Ahali 30.4. to 7.5.1937. 
25. Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs: 12.6.1937, 
FO. 371/20795/E3699. 
26. Ambassador (Baghdad) to SIS Foreign Affairs: Annual 
Report of 1937, FO. 371/21856/E794. 
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wished to disassociate themselves from the Samawa 
operation27. The timing of the resignations was particularly 
embarrassing for the government, since it coincided with 
the arrival of a delegation from Turkey. Hikmat was 
apparently particularly sorry to lose Jalfar, whom he had 
always admired, and made several attempts to change his 
mind. Bakr also pleaded with Ja'far, but the latter 
refused to respond, saying: "I refuse to carry the drum 
while you are the drummer 
28 
. The resignations were 
accepted, and the vacant ministries were filled by anti- 
reformists on 24 June. On 24 July, al-Ahali newspaper 
was banned for an indefinite period, and in August Hikmat's 
government issued a decree depriving both 'Abd al-Oadir 
and Yusuf Ismalil of their Iraqi nationality for their 
communist beliefs 
29. The destruction of Jamalat al-Ahali 
as an effective political force was complete, at least 
for the time being. 
clearly Jama'at al-Ahali took a major gamble when 
its members attached themselves to Bakr Sidqi and Hikmat 
Sulaiman. They had not managed to create a well-organised 
party machine, and had no safeguards against abuses of 
power by the military. They were also no match for their 
, civilian' opponents, who represented deeply entrenched 
forces within the political system and were easily able 
27. 
Knabenshue to State Department: 26.6.1937, usNA Sgoa. oo/410 
However, 'Abd al-Razzaq al-Hasani claims that both JaT ar 
Abu al-Timman and Kamil al-chadirchi had previously 
advocated the use of force against the Samawa tribes. 
For their letter of resignation, see Appendix J. 
28. Husain Jamil, Bawakir (1979), p. 96. 
29. Knabenshue to State Department: 19.8.1937, 
USNA 890G. 00/B/9. 
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to crush them. The fact of their defeat had wide 
repercussions for the future of the national movement 
as a whole, which was weakened and driven underground, while 
various factions of the army came to dominate all 
governments until the fall of Rashid 'Ali in 1941. On 
the other hand, the experience certainly proved a valuable 
lesson for the group, particularly for al-Chadirchi, who 
became a leading figure in opposition politics in the 
1940s and 1950s without ever holding a Cabinet post30. 
in a sense, the-destruction of the movement can be 
seen as a fulfilment of Ibrahim's predictions. The 
group seems to have been prepared to abandon its 
ideology too easily and thus lost credibility among 
those who might otherwise have been prepared to support 
it. its narrow dependence on the military was unlikely 
to result in the creation of a genuinely democratic system, 
and the group's decision to associate itself with Bakr 
and Hikmat can only be explained in terms of an act of 
desperation, perhaps underlining their lack of political 
experience. However, these criticisms should not obscure 
the fact that far stronger forces were at work within the 
political system, which would almost inevitably have 
combined to defeat the movement in other ways if it had 
ever shown signs of approaching the successful implementation 
of its ideals. 
30. According to al-Chadirchils son Nasir, 'Abd al-Karim 
Qasim approached Kamil before the Revolution of 1958, 
asking him to accept the premiership if the revolution 
succeeded. al-Chadirchi categorically refused this offer. 
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Low P*r"ofile* 'Politicai Activities, 1937-1942' 
During this period, al-Ahali's activities virtually 
came to a halt. The assassination of Bakr. Sidqi and the 
overthrow of Hikmat's government was followed by the rise 
to power of the Pan-Arab army and civilian faction, which 
distrusted, jama'at al-Ahali for what they regarded as 
their indifference to Arab nationalism. Furthermore, 
international developments greatly affected the politics 
of the region, and pro-British and pro-German factions 
appeared on the political stage in every Arab state. 
The group's activities in the late 1930s and early 
1940s were confined to informal meetings and discussions, 
since all political associations were banned. Immediately 
after the'ministerial resignations, al-Chadirchi and 
Ismalil left the country, while Abu al-Timman and the 
rest of the group stayed in Baghdad but did not take 
any part in public life. The former ministers were 
attacked in the government-sponsored newspapers, particularly 
al-Difal,. al-Istiqlaland al-'Uqab. When Abu al-Timman 
tried to reply to these attacks, he was'not permitted to 
31 
publish his defence The campaign continued after the 
counter-coup which brought Jamil al-Madfa'i's government 
to power in August 1937. al-Chadirchi stayed out of Iraq 
31. Letter from Hadid to al-Chadirchi 8.8.1937; two letters 
from Abu al-Timman to al-Chadirchi, 18,24.7.1937. 
al-Chadirchi private papers, Baghdad. 
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until he heard of Sidqi's death 
32 but Isma'il was not 
allowed to re-enter the country until 1958, and spent 
the intervening years in Paris and Damascus, in spite 
33 
of appeals on his behalf by al-Chadirchi and Abu al-Timman 
politics in the period after 1937 were dominated by 
a series of military coups, in which the Pan-Arab Golden 
square emerged as the most powerful faction in 1939. 
The army group was led by Salah al-Din al-Sabbagh, and 
the civilian wing by Yunis al-Sab'awi, Sa'ib Shawkat 
and their supporters in Nadi al-Muthanna. Since Jama'at 
al-Ahali could have no influence whatever on the course 
of events, members of the group resumed their own careers. 
Abu al-Timman went back to business and became president 
of the Baghdad Chamber of Commerce; Hadid set up the 
first vegetable oil factory in Iraq; Husain Jamil went 
back to his legal work and become a judge; al-Chadirchi 
ran his estates, and Ibrahim, while remaining a secondary 
schoolteacher, also started al-Rabita press, which became 
the main source of progressive literature in the 1940s 
and 1950s. They all maintained an interest in politics and 
met every week at Abu al-Timman's house. 
32- 
al-Chadirchi stated his intention of remaining outside 
Iraq until he 'was assured of his safety from "the 
Dictator" ', Letter from al-Chadirchi (in London) to 
Hadid, 20.8.1937. 
33. Isma'il first went to Paris, but left France at the 
outbreak of war in 1939. He then went to Damascus, 
where he joined the Syrian Communist Party. Sawt al-Ahali 
carried numerous petitions for permission for him t5 
return to Iraq between 1942 and 1946. 
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In 1941, when the breach between the Pan-Arab and 
pro-British factions was evidently coming to a head, the 
group began by giving its support to Rashid 'Ali's 
government. On 5 April, when the Regent had left Baghdad, 
Abu al-Timman called a meeting at his house for members' 
of Jamalat al-Ahali and other leftist elements. He stressed 
the need for all progressives to stand behind the government, 
although he expressed his own and the group's 
'reservations 
about Rashid 'Ali personally 
34. 
al-Majalla, which was owned 
by Ibrahim, came out in open support of the government on 
16 April. Yunis al-Sab'awi, who was Minister of Economics, 
managed to recruit Ibrahim and Hadid to the ministry to 
organise the rationing of essential supplies 
35 
, and Jamil 
was appointed as a civilian member of the Baghdad military 
36 
court 
The fall of Rashid 'Ali was followed a few weeks later 
by the German invasion of the Soviet Union, which led the 
Soviet Union to join the Allies. As a result, the political 
situation in Iraq changed completely, and Jamalat al-Ahali 
and the left as a whole moved to support the Allies against 
the Axis. For its part, the government was obliged to allow 
more freedom to democratic and left-wing elements) hence 
Sawt al-Ahali was allowed to resume publication in September 
1942, and continued to function uninterrupted throughout 
the rest of the war. 
34. Interview with Ibrahim: al-Chadirchi, 1970, p. 54. 
35. Interviews with Hadid and Ibrahim. 
36. Interview with Jamil. 
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Chapter XI 
The Resumptionof Political Activities 
1942 - 1946 
The war and the British occupation brought severe 
hardships to most of the population of Iraq, though a small 
group of merchants and entrepreneurs were able to make 
substantial profits out of the acute shortages of essential 
supplies. However, the new political situation which permitted 
groups like al-Ahali to function more or less unrestricted 
coincided with the emergence of a greater degree of 
political consciousness, an expansion in the student population 
and the greater inýiolvement of the labour movement in politics. 
Rumours of a visit to Iraq by Stafford Cripps in 
1 
February 1942 encouraged al-Chadirchi to re-establish 
contact with his old rival 'Abd al-Fattah Ibrahim. Together 
with Hadid, they prepared a memorandum on contemporary 
political, economic and social conditions in Iraq, together 
with suggestions for reforms in all fields. In the event, 
the visit was cancelled, but contacts had been resumed, and 
some of the old wounds healed. In the more relaxed political 
climate, the three were encouraged to consider the possibility 
of reconstituting Jamalat al-Ahali as an active political 
association and if possible to recommence publication of a 
newspaper. 
Monroe, E., Britain's Moment in the Middle East, 1914-1956, 
(London 1965), F. 148. 
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In the course of his negotiations with al-Chadirchi, 
Ibrahim laid down two conditions on which he would insist 
before consenting to work with him again. In the first place, 
'Aziz Sharif had to be inclpded in the group, and secondly 
his brother 'Abd al-Rahim Sharif would have to take over 
the editorship of the newspaper 
2. The inclusion of the Sharif 
brothers would give Ibrahim some leverage in dealing with 
al-Chadirchi and Muhammad Hadid. al-Chadirchi gave his 
consent, and Sawtal-Ahali reappeared on 23 September 1942. 
It soon became the focus of progressive ideas, and was the 
only publication to put forward anything approaching left 
wing views. 
The group's long term aim was to try once more to form 
a political party when the time was ripe, based on the 
principles of al-Sha'biya. Once again, however, personal 
differences surfaced and prevented the group from achieving 
this. Only three months after the paper reappeared, the old 
divisions emerged, between al-Chadirchi and Hadid on one 
side, and Ibrahim and the Sharif brothers on the other. 
Both Ibrahim and the Sharifs had moved closer to Marxism; 
the Sharifs had established contact with the Syrian and 
Iraqi Communist Parties, and Ibrahim had formed a Marxist 
group in Baghdad, Jamalat al-Rabita which was eventually to 
become the nucleus of a political party, Hizb al-ittihad 
al-Watani. In contrast, Hadid and al-Chadirchi had become 
more moderate and restrained in their opposition to the 
2- 
al-Chadirchi, 1970. p. 54: interview with Ibrahim; 
al-Mallah, 'A., (1972), p. 27. 
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government and the political system in general. 
Early in 1943, Hadid and al-Chadirchi were pressed 
by leading members of the Marxist and Communist left to 
be given space in Sawt al-Ahali to publish their own 
articles. The Communists argued that since they could not 
publish their own newspaper, they should be given access 
to the columns of Sawt al-Ahali where they would publish 
articles under their own names. al-Chadirchi and Hadid 
would not hear of such an arrangement, though naturally 
Ibrahim and the Sharifs were in favour. al-Chadirchi 
threatened to leave the paper if the arrangement was accepted, 
since he believed that the others were planning a major 
leftwing infiltration of the paper and the group, which 
3 
would eventually deprive him of all control . Similarly, 
he and Hadid were anxious that the paper should not appear 
too radical or aggressive, and that it should not alienate 
potential sympathisers or provoke suspension by the government. 
Thus they were fairly restrained in their criticisms of 
government policy, putting a democratic centralist position 
which they thought offered the best prospect for the paper 
and the projected political party. 
In contrastj Ibrahim and the Sharifs advocated a return 
to the politics of confrontation, pressing al-Chadirchi to 
accept their demands for collective leadership and to set 
about forming a secret political party. This al-Chadirchi 
Interview with Hadid. 
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categorically refused to do and also rejected any interference 
on the part of other political groups in the running of the 
paper. Ibrahim and 'Aziz Sharif then suggested an editorial 
committee to run the paper, and a two-tier executive. The 
first tier would consist of the founders of Jamalat al-Ahali 
while the second would include representatives from all 
progressive groups, who would contribute articles and 
4 
finance to the paper . Once more, al-Chadirchi refused to 
budge and in March the Sharif brothers left the paper, 
followed in June by Ibrahim, who was unable to stand up to 
al-Chadirchi on his own and was in any case under considerable 
pressure from the left to leave Sawt al-Ahali5. The 
departure of Ibrahim and the Sharifs'enabled al-Chadirchi 
and Hadid to start establishing a moderate progressive 
political movement. 
al-Ahali kept up its demands for the establishment of 
more democratic and constitutional conditions and for the 
creation of a better climate for Pol'itical activities, such 
as the formation of parties, trade unions, and social and 
cultural societies. The Regent's speech from the throne 
in December 1943 promised that the government would encourage 
6 
the formation of political parties . In May 1944, a group of 
4- 
al-Chadirchi, 1970, pp. 57-66. 
'Aziz Sharif left to head Jamalat al-Watan, which later 
applied for permission to f6rm Hizb al-Sha'b (The People's 
Party). He edited a series of bookk-S-cai-lle-dRasalil 
al-Balth, on aspects of the national quest contemporary 
Arab politics and similar topics. 
6. sawt al-Ahali 29.12.1943. 
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communist and Marxist lawyers, who were mainly supporters 
of 'Aziz Sharif 
7 
petitioned the government to form a 
political party, Hizb al-Shalb (People's Party) but the 
8 
government refused . The group then issued a bayan holding 
al-Chadirchi responsible for the rejection of the 
application, and he was also attacked by the secret 
9 
communist paper al-Qa'ida . The founders of the illegal 
Hizb al-Shalb, published another attack on him in al-Hawadith 
in February, 1944 for his failure to form a political party, 
10 
accusing him of defeatism . These attacks were clearly 
designed both to demoralise al-Chadirchi personally and to 
reduce the influence and credibility of Sawt al-Ahali. 
In reply, al-Chadirchi wrote an article in March 
affirming his beliefs in democracy, but also stressing that 
the time was not yet ripe for the formation of a political 
party and that the left element-t did not represent a 
suf. fic, iently coherent or homogeneous body of opinion 
7. After leaving Jamalat al-Ahali, the Sharifs parted 
company with Ibrahim in the latter part of 1943. 
8. Henderson to State Department: 4.5-1944, USNA 890G. 
00/697. 
9- 
al-Chadirchi, 1970, p. 70. 
'o' I'bid., p. 76. 
il. Sawt al-Ahali, 3.3.1944. 
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Nuri al-Sa'id had also tried to take advantage of these 
evident splits in the opposition to recruit al-Chadirchi 
to his Cabinet 
12 but of course the latter refused. Instead, 
he concentrated on building up support for himself. and his 
ideas among moderate middle and upper class. groups to form 
a centre party. The left continued to press him to join 
them throughout 1945 and 1946, and in fact suggested that 
he should head a national democratic coalition of right, 
left, and centre wings. Again, 'al-Chadirchi was not to be 
drawn: 
It is reported that endeavours made by 
communists to bring together Kamil al- 
Chadirchi and 'Aziz Sharif have failed, 
and that Kamil al-Chadirchi is working 
with a group which includes H. E. Majid 
Mustafa, Hussein Jamil, Mohammad Hadid, 
and 'Abdul Kerim al-Uzri to form a party 
to be known as El Hizb el-Watani and that 
preparations have already reached an 
advanced stage. It is stated that the 
party will be very wide in its membership 
which will include many "Kurdish young 
men" and some notables. 
13 
Finally, in August 1945 al-Chadirchi told a meeting of all 
progressive groupings and personalities that he was determined 
to have no further formal ties with them, and that he and 
his associates were in the process of forming the National 
Democratic Party14. 
12. sir K. Cornwallis to SIS Foreign Affairs: 19.2.1944, 
FO. 371/40041/Fell36 - 
13. Sir Hugh Stonehewer Bird to SIS Foreign Affairs: 30.5.1945', 
FG. 371/45302/E4268. 
14- al-Chadirchi, 1970, pp. 72-73. 
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By the beginning of 1946, therefore, when Tawfiq 
al-suwaidils government came to power, Jamalat al-Ahali 
had split into three distinct groups, al-Hizb al-Watani 
al-Dimuqrati, headed by al-Chadirchi, Hadid and Jamil, 
Hi'zb al-Sba'b, headed by 'Aziz Sharif, and Hizb al-Ittihad 
al-watani, headed by Ibrahim. in April 1946, the three 
parties were formally licenced by the government, together 
with Hizb al-Istiqlal (Independence Party) led by Mahdi 
Kubba, -and Hizb al-Ahrar (Liberal Party) led by Yasin 
al-Khudhairi. 
The National Democratic Party included several old 
members of Jamalat al-Ahali, such as Yusuf Ilyas, Sadiq 
Kammuna, and newcomers like 'Abd al-Karim al-'Uzri and 
Zaki 'Abd al-Wahhab. The first party meeting on 26 April 
was attended by some 760 members, mainly from Baghdad. 
The People's Party was composed mainly of Marxist lawyers, 
who later became either close associates or actual members 
of the Communist Party 
15. They included Tawfiq Munir, 'Abd 
al-Amir Turab, Hamid Hindi, Ibrahim al-Dargazalli, Nalim 
Shahrabani, Jirjis Fathallah and Salim 'Isa. The group 
adopted - al-Watan as its official newspaper. It 
called for major social and economic reforms and was also 
interested in the national struggle in other Arab countries, 
particularly Syria, Lebanon and Palestinel6. No official 
figures for membership are available, but the group claimed 
15. The Sharif brothers both became members of the Central 
Committee of the Iraqi Communist Party in the 1950s. 
16. al-Watan, 25.2.1946, and passim, July-August-September 1946. 
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17* 
some 2000 members . The National Unity Party was. a-smaller 
organisation, comprising about 500 members, mostly academics 
and intellectuals such as 'Abd al-Jabbar 'Abdullah, Nadhim, 
al-Zahawi, Nasir al-Gailani, Kamil Qazanji,, Muhammad 
Tawfiq Husain, Jamil. Kubba, and the poet Mabdi al-Jawahiri, 
whose paper, al-Ra'i. al-'Am became the group's official 
organ 
18 
. The party elected a Central Committee but no 
president, since it believed in the principle Ofcollective 
leadership. However, Ibrahim was elected as leader of. the. 
politbureau. 
Sawt al-Ahali between 1942 and 1946 
in July 1942, while deliberations were taking place 
between members of Jama'at al-Ahali over the publication 
of their newspaper, Kamil al-Chadirchi submitted a 
memorandum outlining his suggestions for the contents of 
the paper and its future coursel entitled Xhittat al-Jarida 
(Plan for. the newspaper). He suggested that the paper 
should be named Sawt al-Ahali and gave various guidelines. 
It should, 
call for the implementation of the democratic 
rights granted in the constitution such as 
free elections# the formation of associations, 
political parties and trade unions, and 
freedom of the press and of assembly. 
The., paper would also. concern itself with suggesting suitable 
17. See correspondence between The People's Party and the 
National Unity Party in the Secret Police files for 
1946. The GSO Library. 
18. Later'al-jawahiri fell out with the leadership, and 
al-Siyasa became the group's newspaper. 
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and practical remedies for the country's problems, 
particularly in the spheres of land tenure, education, 
public health, labour, supply, and the general standard 
of living. Another area of concern would be to highlight 
the fight against Fascism by bringing home the damage 
which would have been done to the country and population 
had Germany occupied the Arab Middle East. At the same 
time the paper would explain why it supported the Allies 
19 
and the democratic front 
As has already been described, the Sharif brothers and 
Ibrahim left the paper in the course of 1943, after a 
series of bitter disagreements with Hadid and al-Chadirchi. 
This development signalled the beginning of a more generally 
moderate line for the paper and less trenchant criticism 
of the government. al-Chadirchi felt that wartime conditions 
ruled out any policy of out and Out opposition, especially 
as the government had sided with the Allies against Fascism. 
Furthermore, he felt that the group was in a position to 
benefit more (in the sense of gaining concessions and 
rights) from working within rather than outside existing 
structures. Such a policy would be most likely to create 
a stable base for the group's future. 
The paper itself reappeared on 23 September 1942, 
numbered 76 of year 9, emphasising itS continuity from the 
earlier Sawt al-Ahali. It had format similar to the older 
aI 1-Ahali papers except that the caption "published by a 
19- Yattatal-Jarida (plan for the newspaper), al-Chadirchi 
private papers, Baghdad. A more leftist version of this 
appeared in the first issue of Sawt al-Ahali on 23.9.1942. 
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group of young men" had been omitted; by 1942 Kamil 
al-Chadirchi was 46. It quickly regained its former 
prestige because of the high quality of its journalism 
and its lively treatment of its subject matter. Circulation 
averaged 8000 issues, compared with 2500 - 3000 in 1932, 
and issues'of the paper were almost always completely sold 
out. 
Although Sawt al-Ahali remained critical of the political 
system and did not hesitate to point out the shortcomings 
and malpractices of the regime, it did so from inside 
rather than outside the system at least until the establishment 
of the National Democratic Party in 1946. It also refrained 
from outright criticism of Britain and the British occupation 
of Iraq, which it regarded as part of the sacrifices 
necessary to assist in the achievement of an Allied victory. 
Instead of initiating projects, as Jamalat al-Ahali had 
done in the 1930s, it suggested policies for the 
government to adopt, although thev,. proposals generally fell 
on deaf ears. 
- The paper devoted a great deal of space to the progress 
of the war on the Russian front, emphasising the heroic 
sacrifices of the Soviet people and the Red Army. Although 
Britain and the United States were also given favourable 
coverage, the accent was very definitely on the Soviet Union. 
In this way al-Chadirchi could justifiably claim that he 
was adopting a leftist and progressive position in the face 
of accusations to the contrary. However, it is also noticeable 11 
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that. Sawt al-Ahali was not suspended at all during this 
period, a reflection of its cautious policy towards the 
government and also of the government's generally more 
conciliatory attitude towards the left. 
Another important change which came over the paper 
after the departure of Ibrahim and the Sharifs was a far 
greater concern for developments in the Arab world. Apart 
from giving far greater coverage of events in the area, 
Sawt al-Ahali advocated a kind of federal unity of 
independent states. When Husain Jamil rejoined the editorial 
staff at the time of the formation of the National Democratic 
Party in 1946, his articles showed the unmistakeable 
influence of Arab nationalist ideas. The paper began to 
publish the names of writers of articles at the same time, 
in order to give publicity to prominent members of the Party. 
. 20 Iraqi Affairs 
Early issues of the paper in the autumn of 1942 
concentrated on the necessity for national unity in the fight 
against Fascism. The paper advocated solidarity with the 
government in the face of the tense international situation, 
but it also called for the provision of genuine democratic 
institutions and civil liberties, together with the 
legalisation of trade unions and political parties, as well 
20. This survey of the principal interests of Sawt al-Ahali 
is more general in nature than that of the paper's 
predecessors in the 1930s. In the earlier period, the paper's 
reactions to specific political developments were crucial 
in shaping its tone and style. in the 1940s, in contrast, 
the general ideological guidelines remained more or less 
constant, showing greater restraint towards the government 
but a more systematic approach to political and socio- 
economic problems and issues. 
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as for reforms within the system as a whole. Furthermore, 
it continued the political-educational tradition that had 
been an important feature of the paper in the 1930s, 
explaining political systems and ideologies to its readers 
in almost every issue. 
When al-Chadirchi became president of the Journalists' 
Union in December 1944, the Union campaigned for the 
abolition of censorship, since newspapers frequently 
appeared with blank spaces. Sawt al-Ahali stressed the 
need to create better relations between Britain and Iraq, 
since both countries were fighting the same enemy. It 
called on educated young people and progressive elements 
within the country to work together, and also attacked 
right wing nationalism, particularly that of the pro-Nazi 
Sami Shawkat, whom al-Chadirchi described as 'the Moseley 
of Iraq'. After the Regent's conciliatory speech from the 
throne in 1945, Sawt al-Ahali pressed more vigorously for 
democratic freedoms and the ending of the state of emergency. 
From this time onwards the paper developed an increasingly 
critical tone, which it maintained for the rest of the 
21 
period of its existence . On 4 April, the day after permission 
had been given for the formation of the National Democratic 
21. sawt al-Ahali continued publication more or less 
continuýius_ly until 1957, when it was suspended and 
al-Chadirchi imprisoned for a year. After the Revolution 
of 1958 it continued publication until 1962: al- 
Chadirchi remained editor throughout the period. 
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Party, the paper published an article on the leading role 
of Jamalat al-Ahali in pressing for political liberties, 
emphasising that the new party would continue the struggle 
until a truly representative government was formed. 
The paper took a strongly critical line on the shortages 
and economic difficulties faced by the majority of the 
population in wartime and the profiteering which went on 
at their expense. It took the government to task for its 
mismanagement and incompetence, and called for the 
establishment of a central supply agency to monitor and 
control the prices and distribution of essential commodities. 
Five articles in September 1942 were devoted to the economic 
effects of the war on society in general, and the 
difficulties faced by ordinary people in all walks of 
life in obtaining daily necessities, urging the government 
to take greater advantage of Lend-Lease supplies. The paper 
continued to publish features of this kind throughout the 
remaining years of the war. It advocated the virtual 
nationalisation of the economy, supported the 
introduction 
of rationing in 1943, and called for measures to protect 
local industry and manufacture. It encouraged plans to 
create a central bank and the establishment of consumer 
co-operatives, and supported increases in the wages of the 
lower paid. The paper always concerned itself with the 
plight of the poorest members of society who were suffering 
most acutely from the current economic dislocation. 
Altogether it stressed the need for positive government 
intervention in the reconstruction of the economy after 
the war, and for a determined effort to reduce the immense 
polarity between rich and poor. 
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In the same way, Sawt al-Ahali was passionately 
concerned about health, education and welfare, suggesting 
free medical care, social security payments and compulsory 
free education for all. Only in this way, the paper claimed,. 
could a truly democratic society be created. The Ministry 
of Education should be radically overhauled with the 
provision of modern text books and teaching methods. A 
university should be created in Iraq, and a number of 
vocational and technical colleges. Free meals should be 
made available at all educational institutions. Educated 
youngsters should help out in adult literacy centres. 
international standards on wages, conditions and working 
hours should be rigorously implemented. Sawt al-Ahali 
welcomed the government's decision to permit the formation 
of labour unions in 1945, although when it discovered that 
the communist Party was in control of most of them it 
cautioned the workers against political interference. 
Nevertheless, when the communist-dominated Railway Workers, 
Union called for a strike and was subsequently dissolved 
by the government, the paper supported the strike and 
protested at the closure of the union. 
The paper was no less concerned about conditions in 
the countryside, criticising the exploitation of the 
peasants by shaikhs and landlords. It called for the 
introduction of modern machinery and the establishment 
of peasant co-operatives. Land should be given to the 
landless and seeds and fertilisers supplied. Priority 
should be given to the supply of water and electricity 
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and the establishment of minimum health and educational 
and housing standards in the rural areas. 
Arab Affairs 
As has already been mentioned, the new Sawt a'l-A'ha*l*i' 
displayed a far keener interest in developments in the Arab 
countries than its predecessors. It took a moderate but 
positive line on Arab unity, stressing the paper's support 
for a form of nationalism which would accord high priority 
22 
to political and socio-economic reform . The paper believed 
that there was no necessary contradiction between democracy 
and nationalism, and that Arab nationalism would strengthen 
ties of all kinds between Arab states23. Particularly in 
1942 and 1943, the paper called on the Arab countries to 
stand firmly on the side of the Allies against the Axis. 
As well as being justifiable on moral grounds, this action 
would also give the Arab states more leverage to press 
for 
genuine independence after the war. However, the paper also 
warned its readers not to be tricked again 
by the false 
promises which they had been given between 1914 and 
1918, 
and urged the strict application of the Atlantic Charter 
to the Arab states. 
Sawt al-Ahali thus gave warm encouragement to the 
various conferences of Arab lawyers, students, women and 
24 
so forth which were held in 1944 and 1945 . However, when 
22. Min Ahdafuna al-Qawrniya in Sawt al-Ahali 7,11.12.1942. 
23. Sawt a. 1-Ahali always used the term Arab peoples rather 
than Arab people. More recent Arab nationalist doctrine 
stresses that the Arabs are a single people, and thus 
prefers the latter term. 
24. 
e. g. Sawt al-Ahali 7.4.1944,28.8.1944,8.1.1945. 
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the representatives of the Arab states met at Alexandria 
in 1944 for the negotiations which were to lead up to the 
formation of the Arab League, the paper was extremely 
cautious, and advised the politicians to engage in realistic 
I consultations with the people of their own countries, since 
they were afraid that this form of unification might simply 
25 
serve the interests of the Imperial powers . In the 
event, although the paper hailed the League as the "first 
stone in the structure of Arab unity" the very tentative 
nature of the arrangements seem to have come as a considerable 
relief. Sawt al-Ahali urged the League to take up a clear 
position on Palestine, Syria and Lebanon and the Maghrib 
26 
both at its own meetings and at the United Nations 
Palestine was always one of the newspaper's major 
concerns: Zionism was always opposed as the creation of 
capitalism and imperialism 
27 
, and the paper stressed that 
Palestine was an Arab country first and foremost. Illegal 
immigration should be stopped, and practical action and 
pressure should be employed. Popular movements would be 
more effective than press releases and speeches. In 
particulare the Supreme council for Palestine should be 
elected by the people of Palestine, in order to function 
25. I'bid., 4.10.1944,10.10.1944. 
26. Ibid'., 17,19.2.1946. 
27- e. g. Ibid., 22.3.1943,30.4.1943. 
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as a properly representative body in the fight against 
28 
Zionism . Again, the paper always supported the independence 
struggle in Syria and Lebanon, and praised the progressive 
political parties in Syria. It attacked the French for 
suspending the Lebanese parliament and arresting the Cabinet 
in November 194329. It condemned the bombing of Damascus 
in May 1945, and called for the Arab League to take united 
30 
action against France . In a new departure, the paper took 
a special interest in Maghrib affairs, and followed the 
course of the war in North Africa. In this context too it 
declared that the states of the Maghrib should be covered 
by the terms of the Atlantic Charter# calling on France, 
the other Allied powers and the Arab League in turn to 
grant them independence. 
international Affairs 
The progress of the war received greater coverage in 
the paper than any other item. Sawt al-Ahali maintained 
its hope and belief that democratic and progressive forces 
would join to create a better world and defeat imperialism, 
fascism and reaction. It hailed the establishment of the 
United Nations, and the peace conferences at Yalta, Potsdam 
and Teheran. It also supported the establishment of world 
economic, social and cultural agencies. The Soviet Union 
attracted the paper's highest praise, and the birthdays of 
28. Ibid., 2.3.1944,1.4.1946. 
29. Ibid. various issues in November 1943. 
30. Ibid., 21.5.1945,29.5.1945,1.6.1945. 
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Lenin and Stalin and the anniversary of the foundation of 
the Red Army were regularly and enthusiastically celebrated. 
The achievement of the Soviet Union in building what the 
paper saw as a more just society was also constantly 
discussed. Britain was no longer attacked as an enemy or 
occupying power, but praised for its stand against Fascism, 
and, as before, for its political and social institutions. 
The Labour victory in 1945 was celebrated by the paper, and 
Hadid and al-Chadirchi, in common with many of their 
contemporaries, believed that the new government would 
31 drastically change its relations with Iraq . France was 
supported as an ally, but attacked for its policies in 
Syria, Lebanon and the Maghrib. Sawt al-Ahali criticised 
the United States for its general support of Zionism, but 
hoped that it would use its increased influence in world 
politics and particularly on France and Britain, to secure 
the independence of the Arab countries. It also hoped that 
Iraq would benefit from American aid to assist in the 
zigricultural and industrial reconstruction of the country 
after the war. 
By the end of the war, therefore, Jamalat al-Ahali 
now under the undisputed leadership of Kamil al-Chadirchi, 
had established itself. as the Principal fOCUS of legal 
31. Ibid., 27,31.5.1945. 
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opposition. Its constant demands for political and socio- 
economic reform, put forward since 1942, had both echoed 
and served to crystallise popular sentiments for change. 
Its wide popularity made it a force to be reckoned with 
which, together with other local and international factors, 
had the effect of undermining the moral authority of the 
regime as a whole and forced the government of Tawfiq 
al-suwaidi to concede a number of liberal measures for a 
brief but important period in 1946. 
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Chapter XII 
conclusion 
In 1932, when Jamalat al-Ahali published its first 
newspaper, the bulk of the Iraqi population lived in 
conditions of abject poverty. Illiteracy was widespread, 
and ethnic and sectarian strife commonplace. Political 
consciousness was minimal and notions of civil rights or 
liberties confined to the educated few. The political 
system as a whole took little account of the most pressing 
concerns of the population at large, and political life 
was generally the preserve of a privileged minority. 
Even the opposition in the late 1920s and early 1930s 
generally concentrated on the issue of securing independence 
from Britain, and showed little interest in social or 
economic problems. 
In this context, Jama'at al-Ahali was an entirely 
new phenomenon, since it was the first political grouping 
with an articulate and developed ideology linked to a 
strong social conscience. Furthermore, the founders of 
the group showed a remarkable degree of maturity and 
unselfishness by concentrating on raising levels of 
political and social consciousness rather than in advancing 
their own careers in the fashion of many of their 
contemporaries. Although from relatively well-to-do and 
educated backgrounds, they preferred to devote themselves 
to improving the position of the deprived majority, in 
the face of fierce opposition from entrenched vested interests. 
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In the beginning, Jama'at al-Ahali consisted of four 
young college graduates who were fired with ideas of political 
and social reform, and a profound desire to cure the ills 
of their society. Their experience abroad had led them to 
a keen realisation of Iraq's backwardness, and the belief 
that formal and political education could play a vital role 
in transforming the country. Thus they decided to establish 
" newspaper to disseminate their ideas, hoping to create 
" movement which might eventually be transformed into a 
mass political party. The general basis of their ideas 
was al-Shalbiya, a set of principles derived mainly from 
Fabian socialism, which was propounded in the pages of the 
various newspapers (al-Ahali, Sawt al-Ahali, al-Mabdal and 
al-Ba, Lzýn) and in a number of books. The group remained aloof 
from participation in practical politics until it attracted 
the attention of prominent personalities like Kamil al- 
Chadirchi, Ja'far Abu al-Timnan and Hikmat Sulaiman, who 
encouraged the original founders to broaden the scope of 
their activities. Hence in late 1933 the group inaugurated 
the campaign to eradicate illiteracyp Nadi Baghdad, the 
boycott Of the Electricity Company and al-Sha'biya secret 
society. 
The success of thdse activitiest combined with the 
wide, ranging political connections and ambitions of al- 
Chadirchi, Abu al-Timman and Sulaiman led the group to 
embark on a far greater degree of participation in day 
to day political affairs. Beginning in 1935, they co-operated 
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with other politicians in intrigues with a number of tribal 
leaders which ultimately brought down the governments of 
'Ali Jawdat and Jamil al-Madfali. However, when Yasin al- 
Hashimi came to power in March 1935, his government became 
particularly vigorous in its opposition to Jama"at al-Ahali 
and this was to drive the group into an uneasy but vital 
alliance with Bakr Sidqi and the Army, through the mediation 
of Hikmat Sulaiman. 
I In spite of the fact that the group played a key role 
in the preparation of the coup, and had a majority in the 
Cabinet, members of Jamalat al-Ahali were soon relegated to 
the role of spectators. Sulaiman sided with Sidqi, and this 
enabled the. Army to arrogate more and more power to itself 
which eventually forced the Reformist ministers to leave 
the government in the process. Their programme was virtually 
ignored and their ability to influence the course of events 
became almost non-existent. Furthermore their association 
with Sidqi condemned them to the political wilderness until 
long after the latter's fall, since they were not acceptable 
to the Pan-Arab faction which dominated the political stage 
until 1941. 
By 1942 however, changes in the local and international 
political situation which were generally more favourable 
to their ideas encouraged members to regroup and to resume 
publication of their newspaper. Thus Sawt al-Ahali 
reappeared in September 1942, and the group began its 
political activities once again. However, ideological and 
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personal differences soon reappeared, and eventually divided 
the group into three factions, which were to become the 
nuclei of three political parties. Of these, Kamil al- 
Chadirchils National Democratic Party most closely 
resembled the original gradualist and social-democratic 
Jamalat al-ýkhali before the coup of October 1936. 
Jamalat al-Ahali was certainly not the first group to 
introduce what Batatu has described as 'ideas of a levelling 
nature" into Ikaq, and al-Shalbiya, its, 
I ideology, was 
derived from other political theories. However the group's 
main contribution was to make ideas of democracy, social 
justice and the accountability of the government to the 
governed gradually accepted as necessary and generally 
desirable components of political life, which before the 
appearance of Jama'at al-Ahali, was dominated almost entirely 
by factions centred around powerful personalities rather 
than definite programmes. In spite of all its deficiencies, 
Lya provided an attractive and novel approache with al-S]1j1pi 
the promise of a just and democratic society which proved 
particularly inviting both to the growing numbers of educated 
young people and to some of the less well-off strata of 
urban society. Hence the group's major function was that 
of political education; in introducing different political 
ideologies, and in particular in stripping the facade of 
Batatu (1978), p. 367. 
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respectability away from the system of government and 
revealing its deficiencies and inadequacies. It has been 
described as a school (madrasa) which introduced a whole 
generation to politics, but it also acted as an intermediary 
stage through which many passed on the way to more profound 
radicalisation. 
Although Jamalat, al-Ahali never exercised real political 
power the influence of their ideas and their popular 
newspaper over the past fifty years is undeniable. Under 
the monarchy they acted as a principal fccus Of Opposition, 
constantly attacking the motives and policies of the 
politicians of the day whom they accused of serving the 
interests of Britain rather than Iraq. They tried to show 
that independence was not simply a matter of self-rule 
but of political and economic sovereignty. Furthermore, 
the notion of opposition was given a new meaning, since 
Jama 'at al-Ahali did not seek office but a complete change 
in the political system and consistently opposed all 
governments until 1958 on the basis of principles rather 
than personalities. The strength of their effectiveness 
in fighting the various regimes can be gauged from the 
frequency with which the various newspapers were suppressed. 
Thus they created the notion of two distinct and essentially 
conflicting camps, the government and its supporters in 
the 
one and/opposition, supported by the mass of the population, 
in the other. This Polarisation led to the increasing 
alienation of the government and the ruling class and 
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contributed significantly to the ease with which the ancien 
.I. 
regime was overthrown in 1958. 
Given the particular composition of Iraqi society the 
fact that Jamalat al-Ahali was always essentially non- 
sectarian and had no ethnic bias whatever proved of major 
assistance to the national movement, which was particularly 
I vulnerable 
to such pressures. The leadership worked 
harmoniously together, and the wide representation of all 
the major races and sects in the country was also reflected 
in the rank and file. Furthermore, over the period between 
1932 and 1958 the movement attracted some of the most 
distinguished political activists of the day 
2, 
and Abu al- 
Timman in the 1930s and 1940s, and al-Chadirchi in the 
1940s and 1950s were the acknowledged leaders of the 
opposition, commanding the respect and admiration of all 
political factions. 
However, in spite of the leading role played by 
Jamalat al-Ahali in the pre-Republican period, the fact 
remains that apart from a brief and heavily compromised 
period in 1936-37 the group never succeeded in achieving 
political power. This was partly because of factors inherent 
in the socio-economic and political structure of the 
country, and partly the result of failings within the group 
itself. In the first place, the activities and ideology 
of Jamalat al-Ahali represented a major threat to powerful 
and entrenched vested interests, which vigorously resisted 
2. See p-.. 380 below. 
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attempts to undermine their privileged positions. Secondly, 
the generally low level of Political consciousness, and 
the desperate poverty and illiteracy of most of the 
population meant that the group had little in the way of 
solid foundations on which to build. Purthermore, their 
essentially moderate and gradualist approach eventually 
proved ineffective in circumstances which encouraged the 
growth of more radical ideologies. 
As far as the group itself was concerned, there were 
a number of important disagreements between the founders 
on'both ideological and practical matters, which resulted 
in conflicts and resignations. Personal differences were 
allowed to interfere with the smooth running of the 
newspapers and the Organisation in general, particularly 
the clashes between Jamil and Isma'il and later between 
Ibrahim and al-Chadirchi. Although the core of the group 
agreed on the broad lines of al-Shab'. iya, each member 
favoured a different approach which reflected his particular 
background and experience. 
The decision to incorporate more senior and prominent 
political personalities also had a serious effect on the 
direction and future of the movement and diverted it from 
its original purposes. with the benefit of hindsight, it 
seems naive on the part of Ibrahim#Ismalil and Hadid to 
have underestimated the extent to which men like al-Chadirchi, 
Abu al-Timman and Sulaiman would attempt to utilise the 
movement for their own ends, rather than allow themselves 
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to be led by young men who lacked their own years of 
political experience. The recruitment of the three politicians 
had the general effect of transforming a potentially radical 
movement into an essentially centrist organisation. Jamalat 
al-Ahali failed to establish a solidly based political 
party and depended heavily on its newspapers, which were 
regularly suppressed. Furthermore, its activities were 
concentrated almost entirely on Baghdad in spite of the 
fact that the movement was widely supported in other parts 
of the country. Again, its members allowed themselves to 
become involved in intrigues which conflicted with their 
earlier ideology. In their eagerness to seize power, the 
group became a party to the tribal risings of 1934-37, 
and more significantly to the coup of 1936, which proved 
highly damaging to its image as an essentially principled 
organisation. Finally, Jama'at al-Ahali failed to take 
advantage of its position as a movement of the centre to 
play a mediating role 
between the left ýrepresdnted by 
the Iraqi Communist party) and 
the righ (represented by 
Eadi al-Muthanna): instead, they managed to alienate 
themselves from working relationships with both groups. 
These rifts gravely weakened the national movement and 
delayed the formation of a broadly based National Front 
until 1954. 
This study has attempted to place Jamalat al-Ahali within 
the framework of the politics of the period# as One of the 
most significant components of the Opposition under the 
monarchy. The various failings of the movement should not 
obscure the fact that it played a vital and pioneering role 
in spreading social democratic and liberal political ideas 
and made a major contribution to the national movement as 
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a whole. Moreover, the ideas of the founders of Jamalat 
al-Ahali have exerted, and continue to exert, an important 
influence on the political thinking of wide sections of 
Iraqi society. 
Note 2: (p. 3 76) 
Some well-known political personalities who 
had joined, or associated with Jamalat al-Ahali 
between '1932 and 1946 and their'future careers 
0% 
J, oine. d. the Monarchical 
Regime 
_ __ 
'Ali Haidar Sulaiman 
Khalil Kanna 
jamil, 'Abd al-Wahhab 
'Abdullah Bakr 
Fakhri al-Jamil 
Darwish al-Haidari 
'Abd al-Wahhab Marjan 
(Premier) 
Nasrat al-Farisi 
Naji al-Asil 
Academics 
Dr Ahmad 'Izzat al-Adhami 
Dr 'Awni al-Khalidi 
Dr Sabih al-Wahbi 
Dr Fadhil Husain 
Yusuf 'Izz al-Din 
Left-Wingers & Marxists 
'Abd al-Fattah Ibrahim 
Nadhim al-Zahawl 
Nasir al-Gailani 
Zaki 'Abd al-Wahhab 
Tal'at al-Shaibani 
Kamil Qazanchi 
'Ali al-Wardi 
writers 
'Abd al-Wahhab al-Amin 
'Abdullah Jaddu' 
Lutfi Bakr Sidqi 
Muhammad Mahdi al-Jawahiri 
'Abd al-Ghani al-Mallah 
Mahmud Ahmad al-Sayyid 
P> 
Joined I. C. P. 
'Abd al-Qadir Isma'il 
Nuri Rufa'il 
Nuri Tuma 
Yusuf Ismalil 
'Asim Flayyih 
Yusuf Matti 
'Aziz Sharif 
'Abd al-Rahim Sharif 
Yusuf Salman (Fahad) 
Qasim Hasan 
Nadhim Hamid 
Na'im Tuwaiq 
Zaki Khairi 
Arab Nationalists 
Yunis al-Sablawi 
'Abd al-Razzaq Shibib 
Isma'il al-Ghanim 
Fa'iq al-Samarrali 
Trade Unionists 
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Muhammad Salih al-Qazzaz 
Makki al-Ashtari 
Became Ministers under 
the Republic 
Muhammad Hadid 
Husain Jamil 
Mustafa 'Ali 
Hasan al-Talibani 
Tal'at al-Shaibani 
Hudaib al-Hajj Humud 
Hashim Jawad 
IAziz Sharif 
381 
Appendix A 
Secret Treaty signed in Baghdad on 25th 
Uril 1941 between Rashid Ali al-GgMinl 
in the name of fFie Regent of the King; iom 
of IýýaZj aMl ZlulV authorised by the-l-a-tter 
and 
-th. 
e. Minister of His aiesty -t-Fe- King 
and pnper-or of Italy and Ab a (sic) 
in Iraq_,, -d--u 1 authorised by overnment 
and in the capacity or representative ad 
referendum of the government of the Reich 
The Treaty comprises 11 articles. 
Article 1. 
Italy and Germany recognise the government of 
Rashid Ali al-Gailani as the only national government of 
Iraq. The two above-mentioned countries undertake to give 
to the above-mentioned government whole-hearted support 
in its efforts to annul the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance 
as being contrary to the principle of Iraq's national 
sovereignty, if the royal Iraqi government should be forced 
to begin military hostilities against the British Empire in 
order to attain this object. 
Article 2. 
Italy and Germany recognise the necessity of the 
union Of Iraq and Syria into one single kingdom under the 
sovereignty of His Majesty the King of Iraq. 
Article 3. 
Italy and Germany undertake to furnish to the 
royal government financial aid up to 10 milliard lire in 
the form of direct payments and also of long term credits 
for the supply of armaments, aircraft, tanks and all kinds 
of military requirements necessary for the conduct of a 
war against the British Empire. 
As a guarantee for the repayment of this sum, 
the royal Iraqi government undertakes to provide a mortgage 
on the oil wells which are on its territory and also to 
allow Italian and German financial advisers for the 
organisation and control of the Iraqi. Ministry of Finance. 
Article 4. 
Of the sum mentioned the equivalent of one milliard 
lire is paid directly to His Excellency Rashid Ali al- 
Gailani on the signature of the present treaty. 
Article 5. 
The Royal Iraqi government undertakes to nation- 
alize all exploitations of oil on its territory and to 
create a "Special Exploitation Board" for these enterprises. 
italy and Germany shall have a 75% participation in the 
management of this organisation, on the basis of a convention 
which shall be signed as soon as nationalisation has taken 
place. 
382 
Article 6. 
The royal Iraqi government undertakes to furnish 
Italy and Germany concessions for the construction of pipe- 
lines to the Syrian coast ports which shall be leased to 
these two countries in accordance with article 7 of the 
present treaty. 
Al 
,1 
pipe-lines already in operation on Iraqi territory 
shall be placed under the "SpecialBoard for Oil Exploitation". 
Article 7. 
The royal Iraqi government undertakes to lease to 
Italy and Germany, after the realisation of the union of 
Iraq and Syria in one single kingdom, at least three ports 
on the Syrian coast for a period of 40 years with the 
adjacent zone of 25 kilometres radius. The payment of the 
lease shall be settled by a special agreement. 
Article 8. 
Ita. Ly and Germany shall have the right to organise 
on the territories leased to them, military, naval and 
air bases and to construct all kinds of fortifications. 
Territory leased in this manner shall be excluded from 
the competence of Iraqi Customs organisations. 
Article 9. 
The royal Iraqi government recognises Italy's special 
right to control and protect the Christian population 
throughout the territory of the future United Kingdom of 
Iraq and Syria. This right shall be exercised by a Commission 
specially appointed by the Italian government which shall be 
directly accredited to H. M. the King of Iraq and Syria as 
the representative of the Christian population of the Iraq- 
syrian Kingdom. 
Article 10. 
Ir the Iraqi government finds it necessary to ask-ka1y. 
and Germany for direct military assistance for the prosecution 
of the war against the British Empire, this will take the 
form of an officially announced declaration. The royal Iraqi 
government undertakes in these circumstances to require the 
powers, with which it is bound by Treaties of Alliance, to 
give to the Italian government complete collaboration in 
its intention of giving assistance to Iraq. 
Artirle 11. ý-; ý -The Present treaty, with the exception Of Article 4, 
shall only become valid after completion by the signature of 
a duly authorised representative of the Reich. 
The present treaty is secret, but shall be replaced after 
the realisation of the union of Iraq and Syria, by a new 
ty to be public and based on the present treaty. trea 
Enclosure to despatch no. 1885 of April 14,1942, from 
American Legation, Baghdad, USNA 890G. 6363/689. 
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Appendix B 
Biographical details of the founders of 
Jamalat al-Ahali 
'Abd al-Fattah Ibrahim 
Ibrahim was born in Baghdad in 1905 to a middle class 
family. His father was a judge (qadi) who worked for the 
ottoman administration and remai-ned with the Ottomans until 
he was captured in 1917 and exiled to Henjam until 1922. 
'Abd al-Fattah and the rest of his family had to move to 
his uncle in Basra, where he started his education. In 1919 
he finished his baccalaureate and returned to Baghdad in 
order to continue his secondary education, staying with 
another uncle. During this time he began to become involved 
in political organisations and developed an interest in 
public affairs. 
He graduated from secondary school in 1923 and in 1924 
went to Lebanon to study history and political science at 
the American University of Beirut. In 1927 he graduated and 
returned to Iraq, and taught at a secondary school in Mosul 1. 
for a year and a half2. However, he disagreed with the 
education authorities on various matters of policy and was 
transferred to Basra. He resigned his job and left t study 
for an M. A. in Modern History at Columbia University3. 
upon his return to Baghdad in 1931, he was approached by 
his relative, 'Abd al-Qadir Isma'il, and his friend Husain 
Jamil to form Jamalat al-Ahali and to establish the newspaper. 
Although Ibrahim participated - in the project, he accepted 
a post as a translator with the Basra Port Authority, 
eventually returning to Baghdad in 1933 to replace Husain 
Jamil, who had left al-Ahali newspaper as a result of a 
conflict with 'Abd al-Qadir Isma'il. Ibrahim was the 
ideologist Of the group, and besides writing much 
of its ideology and guiding the paper along with Ismail, 
'he became the secretary of the Society for the Eradication 
of illiteracy in 1933 and the President of the Baghdad 
Club in 1934. 
Differences between him and Kamil al-Chadirchi. became 
acute in 1936, and he left the group in protest against its 
1- 
He would have preferred to work in Baghdad and in fact 
graduates were usually assigned to their home towns. 
He was sent to Mosul as a punishment for his anti- 
government and patriotic activities at the AUB. 
2. One of his outstanding students was Yunis al-Sal, 'awi. 
3. While a student at the AUB, Ibrahim read Professor 
Parker Thomas Moon's book Imperialism and World Politics. 
He was fascinated with the book and he -corresponded with 
Moon and was accepted for the M. A. degree. He wanted to 
write his thesis on Anglo-Iraqi relations. He spent a year 
at Columbia collecting material for the thesis, but for 
family and financial reasons returned early. Later he 
wrote his excellent book On the route to India based on 
material he had collected at Columbia. 
4. See Chapter X. 
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, inv. o, lv. em'e'nt with Bakr Sidqi. After the success of the 
coup dletat, he was approached and offered many positions 
by the members of Jama'at al-Ahali - except by Kamil 
al-Chadirchi - but he refused and remained in the Ministry 
of Education until 19465, when he resigned to form the 
National Unity Party, Hizb al-Ittihad al-Watani. In 1939 
he formed a cultural and political club iam'13ýyat al-Rabl'ta, 
and establishing a printing house, al-Rabita press, 
which published books by progressive authors6. He also 
published a newspaper for a short time as the party organ 
after he split from Sawt al-Ahali over a disagreement with 
Kamil al-Chadirchi. He remains the major shareholder and 
the Chairman of the Board of the Rabita Press and held a 
government post for one year only after the 1958 revolt, 
as the Director of Oil Refineries. 
5. During the May 1941 conflict between the Rashid Ali 
government and Britain, he was assigned by Yunis al- 
Sabawi, Minister of Economics at that time, to 
supervise the rationing of the supplies of necessary 
commodities. After the fall of the government he returned 
to teaching and in 1942 he became the Director of 
Education in Basra. 
6. Some of the books published were by 'Abd al-Fattah 
Ibrahim, Hashim Jawad, Nadhim al-zahawi and Zaki 
Salih. 
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Husain Jamil 
Jamil was born I 
in Baghdad in 1908 to an upper- 
middle class family . His grandfather, father and uncle. 
were all judges in the civil and religious courts. He 
studied at elementary schools at al-Haidariya in Baghdad 
and in 'Amara. At an early age he developed an interest 
in politics and history, reading Iraqi and Egyptian 
new , sp , 
apers and magazines at hqTae and at al-Ma'had al- 
lilmi (Scientific Institute)6-f. In secondary school he 
began his involvement in patriotic activities and secret 
societies. With his classmate and friend 'Abd al-Qadir 
isma'il he organised and led students in strikes and 
demonstrations. He participated in the first pupils, 
strike, Shaikh Dhari's funeral, and in the al-Nasuli 
demonstration, after which he was expelled and later 
reinstated. in 1927 he entered Law School and was 
expelled for leading the huge demonstration against the 
visit of Sir Alfred Mond to Baghdad. He then studied at 
Law School in Damascus at his family's expense. He 
graduated in 1930 and returned to Baghdad to practice 
law and to resume his political activities. Later that 
year he was arrested, tried and acquitted, in the 
distribution of leaflets attacking the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. 
In 193,1 he team , ed up with 
Isma'il, Ibrahim And Hadid, to 
form Jama'at al-Ahali and to publish al-Ahali newspaper, 
'ts managing director and owner. In the summer and became i 
of 1933, after a sharp conflict with Isma'il, he accepted 
a government post as an assistant public prosecutor in 
Hilla. He continued his contacts with al-Ahali group and 
paper, so to weaken the link the government transferred 
him to 'Ana, a town near thq Syrian border3. After the 
successful military cou. ý? d'etat in 1936 he was appointed 
director of the publ ing and propaganda department, but - 
in 1937 he returned to the judicial branch. In May 1941, 
during the Anglo-Iraqi conflict, he was chosen by Rashid 4 
'Ali's government to be a member of the Military Tribunal 
jamil considers his family, in the 1900s, as being 
petit bourgeois. 
2. The Scientific Institute, al-Ma'had al-II'Jmi, was 
founded by Thabit Abd al-Nur to promote science and 
education in Baghdad. 
3. Jamil was under police surveillance and his travels 
were recorded in his personal file at the General 
Security Office. 
4. An order was issued by the emergency government to 
form the military tribunal but it never had the 
opportunity to convene. Interview with Jamil. 
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In 1942 he rejo4ned al-Chadirchi, Hadid and Ibrahim to 
publish Sawt al-Ahali and in 1946 he resigned his government 
post to become the Secretary of thd National Democratic 
Party' (al-Hizb al-Watani al-Dimugrati). He was appointed 
twice to minMirial office, in 1952 and 1959. He also 
served as Iraq's ambassador to India and the United Nations. 
In the 1950s and 1960s he was elected president of the 
Iraqi Lawyers' Union and of the Arab Lawyers' Union. 
He still practises law in Baghdad. 
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'Abd al-Qadir Isma'il__(al Bustani) 
Ijma'il was born in Baghdad in 1907 to a middle class family . He studied in a Kuttab school then left to work 
with his uncle in a weavi7n-gfactory for a period of time 
before returning to a government school. In his fifth 
year, he was expelled because he protested against the 
school administration, and had to continue his elementary 
education in a private school. In secondary school he 
became more active in political activities; Jamil was his 
classmate and Ibrahim, his cousin, came to Baghdad from 
Basra and lived near him. 
Ismalil took part in the al-Nusuli dem6nstration and 
together with Jamil was expelled and later reinstated. He 
participated in the demonstration at the funeral of Shaikh 
Dhari and in 1928, as a freshman in Law School, was one of 
the organisers and leaders of the demonstration against 
the visit of the Zionist leader, Sir Alfred Mond, to 
Baghdad. He was expelled from Law School but was reinstated 
the following year, after pressure was exerted on the 
government. In 1930, along with many young students, he 
was arrested, tried and sent to prison for six months for 
activities against the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. The sentence 
was suspended and he returned to college to graduate in 1931. 
During these years he was active in elections, 
demonstrations, protests and in the student and labour 
movements. He also wrote social and political articles in 
the Iraqi newspapers and magazines. In 1928, he was the 
managing editor of a monthly magazine al-Shabab (Youth). 
Later he worked with the famous writer, IbraFTEm- Salih 
Shukur, whom he assisted in managing and editing his paper 
The Future, (al-Mustagbal), which was considered an Opposition 
paper. With this background, coupled with Ismalil's dislike 
for government employment, it was logical that he should 
practise law, to form al-Ahali movement and to publish 
al-Ahali newspaper with Hadid, Ibrahim and Jamil. He became 
the newspaper's manager and, in fact lived in the 
building in which the paper was housed. He remained in charge 
of running the paper until he left Iraq in July 1937. 
He was greatly influenced by Marxist ideology, and 
was in contact with the Iraqi Communists. He earned the 
nickname 'Abd Oadir Ismailov', but did not in fact become 
a Communist party member until he left Iraq. In 1935 he 
was put on trial accused of being a Communist party member 
and for publishing Communist leaflets, but was acquitted 
His father came originally from India, but married an 
Iraqi and took Iraqi nationality in June 1930. He 
worked as a clerk in the Qadiriya Awqaf. 
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for lack of evidence 
. .. 
Is 
'm'a'''i*1 supported al-Ahali's 
involvement in the military 
coup d'etat in'1936, and after the. success of the coup 
he led the biggest demonstration-Baghdad had ever seen 
in support of the cou in 1937 he was elected a deputy 
for his home district?, 
* 
and was one of the founder members 
of the 'Popular Reform League'. 
As a result of the rift between al-Ahali and Bakr 
sidqi, ismalil had to leave Iraq for gyria, after an 
attempt on his life and warnings from his friends in the 
Army. He left for France, and the Iraqi Ministry of 
interior issued an order in 1937 stripping Isma'il and 
his brother Yusuf who was studying law in France, of 
their Iraqi citizenship, and prohibited them from entering 
Iraq, because of their 'Communistic activities and 
agitating the people and disturbing the peace'. 
In 1939 he was expelled from France and came to 
Syria and Lebanon to spend the war years in great hardship. 
He was imprisoned by the French authorities, went into 
hiding, became a cadre of the Syrian communist party, and 
in 1948 became a member of the Central Committee. After 
the 1958 Revolution in Iraq, Ismalil's citizenship was 
reinstated and he returned to Baghdad to become the 
editor of Ittihad al-Shalb, the Iraqi Communist party 
organ until 1960, when it was suppressed by the Qasirrýs 
government. 
He lives in retirement in Baghdad. 
2. He was under police surveillance. In his file, the 
police recorded all his movements, contacts, travels. 
The General Security Office. 
3. Isma'il was offered various high positions in the coup 
government, but hd refused and told Jalfar that he was 
only interested in representing the people, which is 
why Abd al-Timman insisted on nominating and securing 
Ismalil in the elections against Bakr Sidqi's objections. 
sidqi made it obvious that he disliked him. Interview 
with Ismalil. 
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Kamil al-Chadirchl 
al-Chadirchi was born in Baghdad on 4th April 1897, 
to an aristocratic family of Turkish stock. His father 
Rifa't was a high Ottoman official and was Mayor of Baghdad 
several times. Kamil finished his secondary school 
education in 1913, and served a short period in the 
ottoman Army, from which he was discharged on "health 
grounds". After the war his father took part in the 1920 
Revolt and was ordered to leave Baghdad. He chose to go 
to Istanbul, where ho took the whole family except Raluf, 
the eldest son. Xamil entered Istanbul Medical School in 
in2l, but left and returned to Iraq in 1922 to enter the 
Baghdad Law School. Whilst a student, he was employed as 
8ecretary to the Governor of Baghdad (Naji Shawkat, who 
later married the sister of Kamills wife). In 1926 
Yasin al-Hashimi appointed him Assistant to the Minister 
of Finance, in charge of the parliamentary division. In 
1927 Yasin chose him to run for election; he eventually 
won a seat in the Parliament as a member of Yasin's 
Hizb al-Shalb (The People's Party). 
In 1930 he joined the newly formed Hizb al-Ikha 
al-Watani under Yasin's leadership, and was elevat to 
the Party's Central Commission. At election time, however, 
he lost his seat, mainly due to lack of support from 
Yasin and Rashid 'Ali, as differences began to emerge. 
Between 23 August 1931 and 30 June 1932, he was editor 
of the Ikhals party organ and was tried and sent to 
prison for his severe criticism of Nuri al-Said's 
government. When Rashid 'Ali and the Ikhal party defied 
the Ta'akhi Charter with Hizb al-Wata-n-ir-and accepted the 
posi: EiFo-nof Chief of the Royal Di; 
ýian, al-Chadirchi 
1. Th--einformation is taken mainly from the following 
sources: (1) al-Chadirchi, (1970), pp. 11-13; 
(2) Khadduri, (1973), pp. 128-142; 
(3) al-'Umari, K., (1970), pp. 52-68; 
(4) al-'Umari, K., (1968), pp. 36-49; 
(5) Khadduri, 'Political ideology in the Arab 
World', Hawar, 5th year, Vol. 213, Beirut (1967) 
(6) al-Chad7r-ch-l"Private Papers, kept at his son 
Nasir's Library; 
(7) Interview with Nasir al-Chadirchi; 
(8) GSO - al-Chadirchi private file. 
For more detailed and descriptive information about 
al-Chadirchi's private life, his growth and his family, 
pleasd refer to al-Chadirchi, (Beirut, 1971)opp. 16-60. 
(In Khadduri's three books, the author points out that 
al-Chadirchi joined al-Ahali in 1934, but the right 
date is in the middl7e- of 1933). 
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resigned from the executive c* ommittee, and later from 
the Ikha' party, to join Tamafat al-Ahali. 
In general, al-Chadirchi was highly educated, and 
widely read in Arabic, Turkish and English, His son 
Nasir says that during the early years of his interest 
in politics his "'chief preoccupation was with such 
questions as British control of domestic affairs and the 
ways and means of achieving independence. Intellectual 
curiosity led him to read various works of political 
thought and he became fascinated with the idea of 
democracy, which h5 adopted as a political creed and a 
principle of life' . In one of his articles on sovereignty 
and democracy, he advocated the need for public participation 
in a truly parliamentary democracy in order to achieve 
progress3. 
al-Chadirchi always wished to attract attention; 
he felt he was different, due to his upbringing by his 
tough, uncompromising father4. It therefore seemed 
natural that he should join the opposition camp against 
the 
-go *v, 
e, rnmen , 
t. Two parties existed then - Abu al-Timman's 
a. 1--"Hizb al-Watani, which was. predominantly comprised of 
merchants, and Yasin's Hizb al-Ikha' al-Watani, which 
consisted mainly of lan7d-owners and a few young Effendis. 
Kamilt who had large estates in Hilla, was chosen to serve 
on the Ikha' party's central committee, which occasioned 
consid(Sý; ýrý`aVe jealousy. Thus he was determined to prove 
himself, and although, according to Rufalil Butti, the 
editor of the party organ, al-Ikhal al-Watani, he did not 
have a strong base in the party, he never missed an 
opportunity to show his abilities. 
Ile led a campaign criticising the POlicies'of Nuri al-Sý'idls 
first cabinet and extended his attack to the King himsolf, 
for siding with 14urils camp against the opposition5. 
2. Interview with Nasir al-Chadirchi. - 
3. Kamil al-Chadirchi, 'al-Siyasa wa al-Dimuqratiya 
(Sovereignty and Democracy) I al-Bilad,, August 28,1931. 
4. interview with al-Chadirchi's cousin and brother-in- 
law mahmud Subhi al-Daftari. 
5. al-'UmariK1970), p. 54. 
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al-Chadirchi stood three trials in court cases 
brought against the paper. During the trials and in 
defence he demonstrated his eloquence and his strong 
beliefs in freedom and democracy6. He was sent to prison 
and ordered to pay fines. As a result of this stand, 
al-Chadirchi felt confident that he deserved a prominent 
position in Ikhals. party, but this was not to be the case, 
and he joined Jamalat al-Ahali in the middle part of 1933. 
Chadirchils subsequent career until 1946 has been 
discussed in detail in Part III above. He remained the 
leader of the National Democratic Party until 1961, and 
had led the party into a national front in 1954 and 1957. 
al-Chadirchi remained a powerful figure in opposition 
politics, but never took political office after his 
brief period as a minister between 1936 and 1937. He 
died in Baghdad in 1968. 
6- 
al-Chadirchi private papers: the court cases were 
brought because of the following articles: 
(1) The poem Jaras al-Nahdha (The Bell of Resurgence), 11.9.31, 
(2) An editorial attacking the government paper al-Iraq, 
14.9.31. 
(3) The paper support of the Municipal strike of July 
1931, and for publishing the "Artisan Society" in 
July, and for defending the strike. 
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Muhammad Had id 
Hadid was born in Mosul in 1906 to a wealthy merchant 
and landowning family with interests in local and national 
affairs. His father was active in the campaign to keep 
Mosul within Iraq. Muhammad Hadid finished his elementary 
education in Mosul in 1924 and was sent by his father to 
continue his education at a school attached to the American 
University of Beirut. He spent three years in Beirut and 
returned to Mosul for one year before leaving for England 
to study at the London School of Economics, reading Economics 
and Politics, with Professor Harold Laski. Hadid graduated 
in 1931 and returned to Baghdad. He was persuaded by 
Ibrahim xamal to work at the Mirlistry of Finance, and 
shared an office with. Yusuf 1IZz al-Din Ibrahim,. 
his closest friend and the future minister of 
Education in the 1936 coup government. 
Soon after his return, Hadid was approached by 'Abd 
al-Fattah Ibrahim, his friend from AUB, and together with 
jamil and Isma'il they formed Jama'at al-Ahali and 
established al-Ahali newspaper. Muhammad Hadi was the 
only founding member who remained within the movement from 
the beginning and until the end, although under rather 
different circumstances. In the period between 1932 to 1936, 
he took a prominent role in the group's activities, but 
never a leading role. After the success of the 1936 coup, 
he was elected a deputy in the Chamber of Deputies, but 
after the fall of Hikmat's government he decided not to 
return to government service but to establish an industrial 
enterprise. Thus he established the Vegetable Oil Company, 
which began production in 1943 and became extremely 
successful. In 1946 he was elected vice-president of the 
National Democratic Party, remaining al-Chadirchils 
right-hand man until 1961. He was also briefly Minister 
of supply in Nuri al-Sa'id's government in 1946. 
In 1958, he was invited by Qasim to be Minister of 
Finance, holding the post until 1962. After 1963, he 
took no further part in politics, although he maintained 
a strong interest. 
He is still active, running his various business and 
industrial enterprises. 
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Appendix C 
Translation of Minhai al-Shalbiya 
Khulasat al-Sha-lbiya 
al-Sha 'biya 
1. There is no comprehensive definition of al-Sha'blya, - it 
is a specific point of view on all the different problems 
which society encounters. 
2. These probl ' ems 
are divided into political, economic, 
and social. al-Shalblya alms to solve them in such a way 
as to ensure securi y, prosperity and progress for society. 
3. Security means that every individual is assured of 
personal safety and rights. Individual rights mean freedom, 
equality and the right to employment in such a way as to 
secure the fullest utilization of an individual's capabilities. 
4. Prosperity means the provision of a minimum standard of 
living at which an individual can secure his material and 
spiritual needs and the provision of such luxuries as 
the public budget will allow. 
5. Progress means the continuous improvement in the quality 
of life of the society. This is achieved either by 
conserving human resources or increasing the quality of 
life in the society. 
B. al -Mabadi' al-Shalbiya al-Siyasiya (The Political 
principl of al-Sha'biya). 
1. The existence of the state is necessary to ensure 
security, prosperity, and progress for the people. 
2. The state must have total internal and external sovereignty; 
true sovereignty belongs to the people. 
3. The system of the government must be constitutional 
and democratic. 
4. in the state's relations with individuals, it must have 
the right to intervene in order to organize society. 
C. al-mabadi' al-Sha'biya al-I_qtisadiya (The Economic 
principles of al-Sha'biya). 
1. Planning: The State should establish a central planning 
body to secure the organisation of economic life in ft" 
accordance with the economic conditions of the country 
and in response to the requirements of the people. 
2. 
_Industry: 
The State should control key industries, either 
by est ýblishing them directly or by participating in capital 
investment to an extent which secures government control. 
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The state should allow individuals to establish small 
industries and private workshops, and it should sell the 
products of government industries directly to consumers. 
3. Public Services: The State should own all public 
servi-Ees -such as tramways, railways, ships, electricity 
and water supplies. 
4. Agriculture: The government should distribute miri 
lands to peasants, so that they can utilize them TIC ectly. 
It should establish government farms and collect taxes 
on small holdings at a lower rate than on larger holdings. 
5. Di'st'ribution: The government should encourage the 
establishment of cooperatives for distribution and will 
grant them financial and other assistancees. 
6. Di'sparities of Wealth: The government will attempt to 
deci-ease disparities of wealth as much as possible by: 
a- Progressive Income Tax 
b- Progressive Death Duties. 
7. E. M-P.. 0. YM ent: it is the duty of the government to provide 
employment opportunities for every citizen to ensure 
acceptable standards of living and the mental and physical 
health of workers. 
S. Banks: The government will establish different kinds of 
ban7ks and all financial transactions should be transferred 
to these banks. 
D. al-Mbadil al-Shalbiya al-ijtimaliya (The Social 
Principl of a. 1-Sha Ibiya) . 
Education: 
a Free general elementary education. 
bA campaign to eradicate illiteracy. 
C The Establishment of cultural and educational 
institutions. 
d The establishment of public libraries for the 
whole population. 
The establishment of cinemas, theatres, and music 
halls. 
f The creation and development of enthusiasm for 
physical education and sports and the provision 
of the necessary equipment. 
Health: 
a- The establishment of general and maternity hospitals, 
and mother and child care centres. 
b- The expansion of public health facilities to ensure 
a minimum level of prevention and protection from 
disease for every individual. 
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c- Securing sanitary housing conditions through: 
1. Town planning on a healthy basis, 
2. The construction of simple, cheap and sanitary 
houses for rent or for sale for small payments 
or low mortgages, 
3. Personal Relations and Family: 
a- The enactment of laws in conformity with the needs 
of modern living to ensure the welfare of the 
population. 
b- Working for the emancipation of women while 
protecting the sanctity of the family. 
al-Ahali press gla; ýgghdad 1932 
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Appendix D 
The Pact of the People 
Demands of the Euphrates Leaders Submitted 
to His Beatitude Shaikh Mohammed al-Hussein 
al-Kashef al-Ghata for Transmission to the 
Appropriate Authorities 
We, the undersigned, leaders of the Middle Euphrates, 
hereby submit our legal demands, the purpose of which is to 
improve the -condition of the Kingdom of Iraq in order that 
the country may advance in the ranks of civilized nations; 
that it may advance, exercising justice and equality among 
its various classes and elements; and may demonstrate it 
is worthy of independence under the aegis of His Hashimite 
Majesty. We submit our demands to His Beatitude Shaikh 
Mohammed al-Kashef al-Ghata, our religious leader, the great 
reformer and authority on Islam and Moslems, to have them 
transmitted to our August King, His Majesty King Ghazi I 
and to his respected government; and we ask that they be 
put into effect. His Beatitude is our representative and 
our envoy plenipotentiary, whose orders, which are to our 
interest, are duly carried out by us. In witness of our 
goodwill we give him this undertaking as our pledge to 
safeguard foreign interests 
in the country, to respect 
international treaties, to insist on the execution of 
necessary reforms and on the realization of our lawful 
demands at whatever cost. 
Article I. Ever since the inception of the Iraq 
Government a stupid policy has been pursued which has been 
-contrary to the people's 
interest. A policy of 
discrimination among the different communities has been 
used as the basis of rule. The majority of the people have 
been represented in the Cabinet by one or two Ministers 
ýwho keep pace with the policy 
(of the majority)*. The 
Government has acted upon this basis in engaging employees. 
Partiality in appointments of officials and members of the 
Chamber of Deputies has been manifest, whereas Article 6 
of the Constitution makes no 
discrimination among the 
people of the country. In order to restore confidence 
in 
the people and to eliminate discriminationj all groups 
should participate in the Council of Ministers, 
in 
Parliament, and in other Government appointments as they 
do in military conscription and taxation. 
Art i cle I I. Present laws for parliamentary elections 
have been Tb-used to an extent that Parliament does not truly 
*Note. it is probably meant that the one or two repreaent 
Shiah Ministers generally follow the '. 
opinion of the Sunni ministers, who have 
a majority in the Cabinet. 
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represent the country. In order that the Government may not 
tamper with the elections we think it advisable that the 
electoral laws be modified. They should ensure complete 
freedom and should include restrictions which would prevent 
the Cabinet from interfering in them directly or indirectly. 
Elections should be direct, each liwa to be considered as 
an independent electoral college. 
Article III. Article 77 of the Constitution provides 
the appointment of Qadhis of the sect to which the majority 
of the inhabitants of the place to which he is appointed 
belong, whereas actually religious legislative authority 
is granted to Qadhis belonging to a minority of the 
inhabitants. We demand that the provisions of this article 
of the Constitution be enforced and that the Jalfari 
(Shiah) religious law be taught in the Iraq Law College. 
Article IV. Whereas, the Iraq Court Of Cassation is 
the only recZTu-rse for safeguarding the life and property of 
the people; and whereas, Christians, Jews and other elements 
are represented on this court; we demand that a Shiah be 
appointed in each and every branch of this court in order 
to be confident of the judgment of the courts. 
Article V. As the Press is the medium through which 
the piýo-p-leexpýess their opinion, it is necessary to allow 
freedom of the press, to remove administrative restrictions, 
and to confine responsibilities to the courts in accordance 
with the spirit of Article 12 of the Constitution. 
Article VI. The Awqaf are Moslem endowments made for 
the purpose 6-fserving the Shara' and of maintaining the 
people in charge of 
it or enlisted in its service. The 
Government's policy has, however, been directed towards 
another aim. The Awqaf revenues are spent on administrative 
organizations, and houses of 
learning and pious establishments, 
are neglected. The policy which 
has been followed thus far 
should be discarded and Awqaf revenues should in future be 
spent on Islamic 
institutions in general. 
Article VII. Land settlement committees though which 
agriciMit;: U-ralsettlement may be realized should be increased 
and altered. We demand that the law for the formation of an 
agricultural and industrial 
bank be put into effect as soon 
as possible, and that land be given to its cultivator free 
of charge. 
Article VIII. Abolition of land and water taXes. Use 
of the IsETIT-akk-Tconsumption) system in the collection of 
J<oda tax. No tax should be collected on water lifts. 
Ar t icle IX. The number of Government appointments is 
contiFU-ý'OusýlYincreasing owing to the absence Of a cadre. The 
salaries paid by the Government are high in view of the 
economic situation and the standard of living. Officials have 
been careless in serving the interests Of the People, and 
have neglected local laws. Immediate measures should be taken 
to remove all officials of 
bad reputation, to reduce the 
a%-. 
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salaries of officials to a reasonable extent in order to 
reduce the expenditures of the state,, and also to reduce 
civil and military pensions. 
Article X. Justice has not been'done in allocating 
health, constructional and educational institutions in the 
country according to the distribution Of population, 
especially in the southern part. Laws and regulations should 
be enacted against social and moral diseases. Educational 
programs. should be improved. Religious instruction, like 
other sciences, should have a place in the examinations. 
_public 
morality should be protected. Public prostitution 
-should be suppressed. Public sale of alcoholic drinks, 
gambling and anything leading to the ruin of morality 
should be prohibited. 
Art 
- 
icle XI. Those who have participated in the present 
national move; 
-ent, whether the people,, officials, the army 
or police, should not be touched. 
Article XII. Suppression of the laws contrary to these 
demands and their replacement by other legislation which 
will ensure their execution. 
--Al-Rali Press, Nejef. 
Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 
466 of April 14,1935 
'from the American Legation at 
Baghdad 
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Appendix 
Translation of "Programme of Policy" issued by 
CaLinet of Saiyid Hikmat Sulaiman. 
The new Cabinet undertook responsibilities at a time 
when the people had been reduced to despair. It came to 
power to do away with the previous state of affairs, and 
to start a new era of general reform in every sphere of 
the life of the nation. 
This programme, therefore, includes only such 
undertakings as are to be carried out forthwith or in the 
near future, in accordance with the principles laid down, 
as follows! - 
Foreign Policy. 
The Cabinet proposes: - 
1. To strengthen the co-operation between Iraq and 
Great Britain, and to continue efforts to ensure that all 
possible financial, economic and military benefits are 
derived from the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance. 
2. To strengthen the ties of friendship and Co-operation 
between Iraq and the Turkish Republic, and to use every 
endeavour to hasten the conclusion of a non-aggression pact 
between Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan. 
3. To continue the friendly relations between Iraq 
and Iran, and employ every means to strengthen them, and 
to settle all outstanding questions between the two 
countries. 
4. To strengthen brotherly relations with the Kingdom 
of Ibn Saud and with the other Arab States; and to maintain 
and cement the friendly relations between Iraq and all 
other States. 
Internal Administration. 
The amendment of the Civil Servants Law, the 
Disciplinary Law, and all regulations relating to the 
engagement and promotion Of officials, with a view to 
ensuring the creation of a civil service on the principles 
observed by all other civilised nations, taking into 
consideration the following points: - 
1. That special care should be taken to select for 
Government appointments only educated Youths Of good character. 
2. To ensure that they carry out their duties efficiently. 
3. That the promotion of officials appointed on these 
'lines 
should be carried out in a regular and impartial manner. 
4. The settlement of all disputes among the tribes, 
whether such disputes arise through 
land or other questions, 
with complete impartiality. 
5. The settlement of the nomadic tribes who have no 
lands, by giving each family sufficient land to ensure their 
livelihood, and to introduce the legislation necessary for 
this purpose. 
Iiealth - 
To increase the number of hospitals and medical 
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institutions; to engage sufficient doctors to meet the 
country's needs; to raise the scientific standard of the 
Medical College, the Midwifery School, the Health Officials 
School, and the Pharmacy School; and to enlarge these 
institutions in order to increase the number of graduates. 
To establish new medical units and special institutions 
in order to combat diseases which threaten the existence 
of the nation, such as venereal disease, malariau, and 
others; to promote child welfare institutions, and to raise 
their standard by placing them in charge of trained women 
capable of teaching mothers correct methods of caring for 
their children. 
prisons. 
To introduce the latest reforms in the prison system; 
to educate and train the prisoners so that, when, released, 
they may become useful citizens; and to improve conditions 
in the reformatory schools. 
municipalities. 
To improve conditions in the municipalities; to 
increase the number of public parks, gardens, and sports 
grounds; to supply municipalities with all the technical 
assistance required in order to ensure proper town-planning, 
and an adequate supply of drinkingwater and electric light 
in every town and Village; to improve labour conditions 
by encouraging labour unions and by constructing houses 
for the labouring classes. 
police. 
To raise the standard and capacity of the police force 
so that it will be able to perform 
its duties in the most 
eff ic ient manner. 
Finance. 
To prepare a permanent cadre for officials in conformity 
with the country's requirements. 
To improve the financial administration so that all 
the revenues of the State are collected without undue loss 
of time or giving rise to complaint. 
To consolidate the system of financial inspection to 
ensure effective supervision. 
To prepare a general programme of capital works, each 
of which shall be completed 
in its allotted time. 
To amend all out-of-date financial laws, especially 
those relating to taxation and, more particularly, income- 
tax, in order to make it more equitable and logical; to 
take steps to replace, in time, the present land system by 
a cadastral system; to take measures 
to improve the internal 
and external trade of Iraq 
in order to balance them as far 
as possible. 
To open spinning and weaving factories to supply the 
army, the police, and students with their clothing requirements. 
To expand the Agricultural and Industrial Bank so that 
it may be capable of fostering 
industrial schemes, and 
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improving the quality of Iraqi products. 
To supervise the activities of banks, companies, and 
other economic institutions, and to introduce legislation 
to ensure the development of Iraq's resources through the 
employment of insurance money in Iraq. 
To settle the land question on principles of equity 
and public interest, and to divide State lands which are 
still uncultivated among the people in such a way as to 
preserve the rights of individuals. 
justice - 
To ensure equality before the law and to administer 
justice impartially; to strengthen the spirit of independence 
and impsrtiality in administering the law; to reconsider 
the system of appointing and promoting judges, as well as 
all questions connected with their transfer and discipline; 
to raise their standard and broaden their legal knowledge. 
To reconsider the laws connected with the constitution 
of the courts; to reform the present laws of procedure, 
and the civil# commercial and criminal laws, in a manner 
consistent with the sound development of the country. 
Defence. 
To lay down fixed rules for the expansion Of the army 
and, more particularly, the air force, and to increase 
its strength on the most modern lines in order to make it 
capable of defending the integrity of the country. 
To rely as far as possible upon the country's own 
resources in providing for the needs of the army, and, 
when important economic schemes are undertaken (such as 
the construction of roads, bridges and factories, and the 
establishment of air and other transport companies), to 
reconcile civil and military needs. 
To strengthen the co-operation between the different 
sections of the community and the army and to popularise 
military training. 
Economic Sphere. 
To pay special attention to productive schemes which 
increase the country's wealth, such as the undertaking of 
large irrigation schemes; the improvement of the country's 
principal roads; the construction Of important bridges; 
the improvement of means of transport and communication: 
the introduction of reforms in the agricultural administration; 
the improvement of the quality of Iraq's products; the 
expansion of afforestation; the improvement Of the quality 
of livestock and measures to combat their diseases; to 
carry out all schemes which are necessary for the expansion 
of industry; the construction of an oil refinery; and to 
develop generally the country's resources. 
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Education. 
To popularise education among the younger generation; 
to raise the standard of educational missions abroad, and 
limit their training to branches of knowledge which are 
essential for the rapid development of the country. 
To expand education in the villages; to improve 
industrial education; to abolish secondary school fees; 
to improve the general knowledge and capacity of teachers 
of both sexes; to build the required number of Government 
schools on modern lines; to ensure a proper system of 
examinations; and to lay down a permanent programme for 
all branches of education. 
To hasten the construction of the new Iraqi Museum. 
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Appendix F 
Tr anslation of Letter 
ý,, From: Mulla Mustafa Barzani 
To: H. M. Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, His Majesty's 
Ambassador in Iraq 
-Dated: 24th December, 1943. 
A. C., 
I congratulate you on the occasion of the happyId, 
praying God to let. us enjoy a genuine 'Id through distinct 
., victory for the armies of Great Britain, which is sought 
by all right-thinking people. 
I- Availing myself of the 'Id, which is a special Occasion 
_for 
jubiliation and rejoicing, I earnestly pray the 
I 
just British Government and your esteemed person to answer 
-my plea for pardon for all of us and for the return Of our 
, 
imprisoned and interned followers and our "brigands" (sic) 
The wrong we have been suffering has become too acute for 
description. We pray Your Excellency not to refer us to 
other than your doorstep, for we have no friend besides you. 
if any body should make any accusations or allegations against 
us, we pray you not to listen to him. The only thing we can 
take pride in is compliance with Your Excellency's orders at 
no matter what cost. We have laid our grievance before the 
just Government of Great Britain and before your Compassionate 
''person. 
Nothing is too much to hope for from your justice. 
I pray God to grant you distinct victory. 
Please accept my highest respect. 
Yours sincerely, 
ýi 
, 
Enclosure to 
Sir K. Cornwallis to SIS Foreign Affairs: 26.1-1944, 
FO. 371/40038/E234. 
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Translation of Letter 
From: Mulla Mustafa Barzani. 
To: H. E. Sir Kinsham Cornwallis, His Majesty's Ambassador. 
Dated: 25th December, 1943. 
I beg to acknowledge the eceipt of your order in the 
letter dated 21st December, 1943. Whatever your orders I 
shall obey them as child would the orders of a compassionate 
father. I have the fullest confidence in "Your Majesty"(sic); 
while our friendship for the merciful British Government knows 
no bounds. As regards the fair counsel of British officials, 
this we have received and listened to; but officials of the 
Iraqi Government had so acted towards us that we got estranged 
and found ourselves compelled to act in self defence. As regardE 
The Iraqi Government's (promise of) pardon for us, this promise 
is only a spoken word which we would not see translated into 
action. They intend betraying us. We have evidence of this 
in their saying "W e have pardoned you" while on the other hand 
they arouse the tribes and distribute arms to them. In view 
of this, a section of the people like us speak of a 
(contemplated) betrayal. In any case, we take pride in bowing 
down to Your Majesty's orders (Literally: Your Majesty's 
orders we proudly place over our eyes and head - Translator) 
Nevertheless, according to what we hear with our own ears and 
see with our own eyes, the British Government are just and 
merciful. They defend the oppressed against their oppressors, 
listen to the complaints of those who are suffering wrong, 
and offer succour to those who can find no means Of succour 
elsewhere. Accordingly to them I address myself for redress 
against the most violent wrong I suffer at the hands of a 
section of Iraqi Government officials, Your Majesty's door 
is never closed in the face of those seeking succour at your 
doorstep. Hence I seek succour at Your Majesty's doorstep, 
Most earnestly proving you to accept my plea and have 
compassion with me in my poor condition, and issue your 
orders to have despatched to me Major Stepping, on your 
behalf, and someone also representing the, Iraqi Government, 
to honour me, I your loyal servant: Major Stepping to act as 
umpire in my case, proceeding according to the law of the 
Great British Government. If under that law I stand condemned, 
I shall accept his (Major Stepping's) award, even though it may 
mean death sentence for me. If, on the other hand, Major 
stepping finds out that I have a grievance and that the Iraqi 
Government have oppressed me, I would pray Your Majesty to 
instruct the Iraqi Government to pardon me, set free our 
"Prisoners" (? imprisoned followers) and repatriate our 
internees, when we shall live in our homes and most faithfully 
serve them (the Iraq Government) in accordance with Your Majesty 
orders. As against that, I shall pledge myself to undertake 
that there shall be no rebellion or brigandage in this region 
for as long as I may live. Your Majesty, with the might of 
the Great British Government behind you, will guarantee my 
faithfulness to such pledge and undertaking on my part. I 
await Your Majesty's orders to comply with them at no matter 
what cost. I pray God to give support and victory to Britain's 
armies against her enemies. 
Yours sincerely, 
'A 
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Appendix G 
The Programme of the Popular Reform League 
Its Aims 
To endeavour, by means of political, social and economic 
reforms, to safeguard the public interests and to ensure the 
progress of the individual members of the community and to 
put down exploitation. 
How these Aims will be Achieved 
1. Foreign Policy. 
The cultivation of closer relations between all Arab 
countries and the development ofintercourse between people's 
organisations in those countries. The strengthening of 
friendly relations with the neighbours of Iraq and other 
foreign countries on the basis of mutual equality. 
2. Internal Policy. 
(a) The strengthening of the internal organisation of 
the State through the further development of the army and 
the air force, through the military training of members of 
popular organisations and the reform of the police in order 
that these forces may be fit and ready to defend the country 
against any external aggression. 
(b) The grant of full opportunity for the free 
expression of thought and the exercise of all progressive 
democratic liberties. 
(c) The spread of culture among all classes of the 
people in a just manner. 
3. Economic Policy. 
To andeavour to raise the standard of living of the 
people and to ensure to every person the means to obtain 
the moral and material necessities of life. To ensure to 
all, in addition, such luxuries as the wealth of the nation 
may make possible. 
(a) The nationalisation of the means of transport, 
correspondence and communication, of water-supply and 
electric power, and the organisation by Government enterprise 
of such technical undertakings as the country may require to 
safeguard the peace and happiness of the people. 
(b) The creation of a national bank for the practical 
control of the finances of the country. 
(c) The grant of a monopoly of all land# agricultural 
and other loans to the national bank in order that the people 
may be saved from the oppression of the money-lenders. The 
enactment of laws to punish those who extort exorbitant 
rates of interest. 
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(d) The imposition of a sliding-scale of taxation on 
all incomes and inheritances, so that the State may have 
the means necessary to enable it to carry out essential 
reforms. 
(e) The reclamation of waste land and its distribution 
to the peasantry in order that they may directly enjoy its 
fruits, and the organisation of co-operative enterprise 
among these people. 
(f) The building of model villages, the filling in 
of swamps, and the protection of the peasantry from the 
ill effects of marshes. 
(g) The annulment of oppressive agricultural laws 
and customs and the enactment of laws to ensure the progress 
of agriculture, the welfare of the peasants and their 
protection from exploitation. 
(h) The reduction of the salaries of highly paid 
officials and the just treatment of junior officials and 
employees. 
4. Education. 
To make elementary education 
illiteracy by the creation of ins- 
enlightenment - public libraries, 
concert halls. The development of 
special'clubs, and assistance for 
education through night schools. 
compulso 
titutions 
cinemas, 
physical 
the poor 
ry; to stamp out 
for culture and 
theatres, 
culture through 
to continue their 
5. Health. 
(a) To ensure that first consideration is given to 
preventive medicine and that curative medicine receives 
second consideration. The general increase of health 
institutions in all parts of the country, and the increase 
of public gardens and of children's playgrounds. 
(b) To build up healthy dwellings by the following 
means: - (i) The planning of towns according to the 
principles of public health, the building of 
healthy dwellings and their lease at low rents 
to offers and soldiers, workmen and minor 
officials and those in need. 
(ii)TO combat intoxication, which harms the health 
of the public, and the encouragement of marriage. 
6. The Workers. 
The enactment of laws to protect the workers, to 
guarantee their rights, to ensure their progress and to 
restrict working hours to a maximum of eight hours a day. 
To encourage trade unions and workmen's organisations and 
to fix a minimum wage for workers of all kinds. 
7. The Lives of the People. 
(a) To enact laws in conformity with modern civilisation 
to regulate personal status. 
(b) To endeavour to bring about the liberation of the 
women while at the same time preserving the principles of 
family life. 
407 
Appendix H 
'Abd al-rattah Ibrahim's letter to Ja'far Abu al-Timman, 
16 January 1937 
His Excellency Muhammad Jalfar Chalabi Abu al-Timman, 
In spite of my knowledge of your preoccupation with 
your duties which are certainly more important than this 
letter, I find myself obliged to write to you not to 
defend myself, but to point out the truth. 
I still believe that nothing requires me to defend 
my reputation which had been attacked by some persons, 
whom I was mistaken in thinking possessed manhood and 
(nurage. They have proved that they have no hesitation 
in using lies and falsehoods in order to conceal their 
poisonous selfishness which they dress up as sacrifices 
for the public good. They have excelled in pretending 
their good nature and honourable intentions, until they 
have succeeded in deceiving the most intelligent and 
experienced of men. Although I do not blame you for 
believing what they have attributed to me, your experience 
will have alas proved to you that the political arena is 
crowded with exploiters who make national struggle a 
market for speculating with the public interest and for 
gambling with the future of this wretched people. I could 
have answered their accusation without resorting to lies 
and fabrications. However my dignity and honour did not 
permit me to wage such an offensive, especially since I 
sensed that you seemed to have believed their lies. Thus 
I decided to conduct myself honourably, trusting that the 
mischief will only hurt its creator. But their wickedness 
has reached the point of having accused me and my wife of 
spying. I am certainly surprised that such an accusation 
could originate from individuals who have forgotten my 
services to them and who have allowed themselves to exploit 
the efforts of others for their own benefit. They have not 
defended a comradeuho stood on their side for many years 
and who sacrificed a lot more than they did in intellectual 
and material term's and was largely responsible for creating 
the ideology which they have announced to the public as 
their own. But what hurts me most was that Your Excellency 
has tended to be'lieve these lies which should disgust any 
man of integrity, for even if I disagreed with you, I do 
not have the slightest doubt of your sincerity in your 
beliefs and in your struggle to achieve what you believe 
to be just. 
I do not wish to come back to work with these people or 
to prove my sincerity to Your Excellency* for these matters 
are of little importance. However I want to be free to 
expose these liars, because they are using your name in 
cheating the public. I will be guided by my conscience and 
I am sure that I will be doing my duty in serving the 
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public interest, in particular towards you personally, for 
there is no doubt that they are hiding behind Your Excellency 
and your well known patriotism to achieve their own personal 
ends. The excuse they gave for my leaving the Society was 
that I wanted promotion in the civil service, although they 
knew well that I have spent eight years as a secondary school 
teacher without being promoted. In fact other teachers who 
were appointed with me or after, even some of my own students, 
have been given positions of responsibility and have been 
promoted two or three grades. The only reason for my being 
passed over is my association with the group, and if I 
were seeking promotion I should not need to resort to 
unethical methods. I am ready to resign my job, for staying 
on in such a manner brings nothing to me but disgrace, and 
I am still waiting for an opportunity to get out of this 
painful situation. 
Finally I wish to bring to Your Excellency's attention 
that the owner of al-Ahali newspaper refuses to pay what 
he owes me despite many requests. I insist that I shall not 
forego any amount, however little, to people who do not 
deserve either help or encouragement, that is why I wanted 
to bring the matter to your attention because I feared that 
I might otherwise be forced to gain my right by methods 
that you would disapprove and which might damage the 
reputation of the group. 
I wish Your Excellency success in your efforts and I 
hope that you will not suffer personally from the behaviour 
of persons who do not deserve your confidence. 
With respect, 
'Abd al-Fattah 
Iraqi National Archives 
Jalfar Abu al-Timman's private papers 
document No. 51 
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Appendix I 
al-Ch , ad , 
ir 
, chi , 
IS, Proposals. for the future 
utilisation of Oil Resources, Ma I rch . 1937 
As Minister of Economics and Communications, Kamil al-Chadirch 
submitted a secret report to the Council of Ministers 
containing a well researched study entitled "the oil Concessio 
it dwelt on the previous agreements between the Iraqi 
Government and the oil companies and pointed out their 
unfairness and the oil companies"infringements on Iraq's 
rights. al-Chadirchi concluded his report with a 
recommendation to review all the previous agreements with 
the oil companies which "were unjust and to the disadvantage 
of Iraq's interests". He recommended the following 
alterations to the previous agreements: 
lot (a) A review of the long-term concessions. 
(b) The participation of the Iraq Government in profit 
sharing with the IPC and Khaniqin oil Co. 
(c) Increasing the Iraq Government's share in the Ipc to 
a minimum of E750,000. 
(d) Putting a minimum limit on the Iraq Government's share in theKhaniqin oil Company's capital and regulating 
the Company's extraction and importation of oil. 
(e) A just distribution of the oil resource areas on the 
basis of geological surveys. 
(f) The reduction of local oil prices, on the same basis 
as in Iran. 
(g) The training of Iraqis in technical jobs by the oil 
companies, on the same lines., as in Iran. 
(h) The improvement of the position of the Iraqi director 
in London. He should be treated as a government 
representative and be allocated an office in the 
company's headquarters to keep in daily contact with 
the company. At the moment he only meets briefly 
once or twice a month with the company's other 
directors and cannot exert any pressure or influence 
on their decisions. 
There are many other secondary points for review if the 
Council of ministers approves these hasic recommendations 
and gives this Ministry the authority to negotiate with 
the oil companies. " 
Kamil al-Chadirchi, Minister of Economics and communications 
Baghdad, 9 March 1937 No. S/221 To]2 Secret 
oil affairs Division. Ministry Of Economics and Communications 
(Kamil al-Chadirchi private papers) 
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Appendix J 
The Resignation of the Reformist Ministers 
To His Excellency the President of the Council of Ministers: 
Whereas, it has been impossible to realize the 
aspirations of the nation on account of which we have 
sacrificed ourselves, hoping to give happiness, well-being 
and tranquility to the children of the country and to render 
justice to all; 
Whereas, it has been likewise impossible to apply the 
wise and pacific measures which we had decided to take for 
the welfare and the stabilization of the country, measures 
which public opinion had welcomed unanimously and with 
satisfaction and whose good results were awaited by alll 
Whereas, chance has willed that the contrary result 
should come to pass and that the blood of the children of 
the country should be spilled by processes which would have 
been hidden from us had they not been revealed as a result 
of the irritation of certain circles; 
Whereas, finally the obstina, cy in following, not 
without ostentation, the actual policy which 
is irreconcilable 
with that wise one which it 
is the duty of devoted men to 
follow has been observed; 
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, we no longer have 
any reason for sharing the responsibility and we present our 
resignations with our respect. 
Jalfar Abul Timman, Salch Jabar, 
Minister of Finance. Minister of Justice. 
xamil al-Chadirchi, Yusuf Ibrahim, 
Minister of Economics and Minister of Education. 
Communications. 
Despatch No. 815 - Diplomaticsdated June 20, 
1937, from American Legationo Baghdad, Iraq. 
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sources 
Notes on Sources: 
This work has been based on three main primary 
sources; archives, contemporary newspapers and other 
publications, and interviews with the founders of 
Jama'at al-Ahali and some of their contemporaries. 
The archives consist of British Foreign Office and 
Air Pý. nistry papers on Iraq in the Public Record Office, 
London, the correspondence between the American Legation 
in Baghdad and the State Department in the United States 
National Archives in Washington, DC, and various archive 
deposits in Baghdad. Here the British archives are 
probably the most informative, but the American material 
has often given additional insights or alternative 
interpretations of the political situation which have 
been of considerable value. The most important Iraqi 
archive material is the collection of files on individuals, 
particularly the founders of Jama'at al-Ahali, in the 
General Security Office, Baghdad. These dossiFrs make 
it possible to construct a chronological history of the 
activities of the various individuals and the group as a 
whole, and has proved particularly useful in checking 
accounts given in interviews in the course of the research. 
In general, the material in the Iraqi National Archives 
still awaits indexing, which makes research into 
particular areas somewhat laborious. 
In 
, order 
to study the progress and development of 
Jamalat al-Ahali, it was felt to be essential to construct 
a complete run of the group's various newspapers for the 
period 1932-1946. Hitherto no complete series existed, 
but it has been possible to collect this material on 
microfilm, and a copy will be deposited in the British 
Library. 
other major publications of the group from the 
1930s have been made available through the generosity of 
the founders, especially Mr Husain Jamil. The private 
papers and library of the late Kamil al-Chadirchi were 
made available through the kindness of his son, Mr Nasir 
al-Chadirchi. Mr 'Abd al-Fattah Ibrahim and Mr Husain 
Jamil also kindly gave access to their private libraries. 
since all the leading members of the groupo with 
the exception of Kamil al-Chadirchi, are still alive it 
has been possible to interview them all at length at 
various times between 1975 and 1979. These interviews 
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have been of central importance to the study as a whole, 
and it is impossible for me to express adequate gratitude 
to Messrs Hadid, Ibrahim, Ismalil and Jamil for their 
assistance and their constant and friendly encouragement. 
A number of other individuals also gave valuable 
assistance and interviews. 
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